

ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN · BAND 1

Sabine Schmidtke

**The Theology
of al-'Allāma al-Hillī
(d. 726/1325)**

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KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG · BERLIN

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To my parents

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INTRODUCTION

During the last decades, scholars have made extensive progress in investigating the nature of the relationship between Mu'tazilism and Imamism.¹

W. Madelung began this advance when he offered a general outline of the development of Shi'ite theology in relation to the corresponding Mu'tazilite theological developments.² M. McDermott investigated the views of the three important theologians Ibn Babūya (d. 381/991), Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) and 'Alam al-Hudā al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) in a very detailed study.³ Further significant contributions to the study of imamite theology were made by D. Sourdel in his two articles on al-Mufīd.⁴

It can therefore be safely stated that the relationship between Mu'tazilism and Imamism has been surveyed up to 'Alam al-Hudā al-Murtaḍā with whom the fusion of Imamism and Mu'tazilism reached its final shape.⁵

¹ Prior to this, 'Abbās Iqbāl's *Khanadan-i Nawbakhtī* (Iranian Culture and Literature, no. 43, Tehran: Tanārī, 1966) had already been published. The first edition was in 1932.

² W. Madelung, "Imamism and Mu'tazilite Theology," in *Le Shi'isme imamite* (edited by T. Fahd, Colloque du Centre d'études supérieures spécialisé d'histoire des religions de Strasbourg, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), 13-40. See also idem., "Religieuse Literatur in arabischer Sprache: Die Shi'a," in *Grundriß der arabischen Philologie* (edited by Helmut Gätje, Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1987), 2:366-7.

³ M. J. McDermott, *The Theology of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd* (d. 413/1022) (Recherches, Nouvelle Série A. Lanque arabe et pensée islamique, vol. 10, Persian Studies Series, no. 9, Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1978).

⁴ D. Sourdel, "L'Imamisme vu par le Cheikh al-Mufīd," *Revue des études islamiques* 40 (1972) 217-296. This article includes a translation of al-Mufīd's *Awā'il al-maḡalāt*. Idem., "Les conceptions imamites au début du XI^e siècle d'après le Shaykh al-Mufīd," in *Islamic Civilization 950-1150* (edited by D. S. Richards, Oxford: Cassirer, 1971), 187-200.

⁵ Madelung, "Imāmism," 27.

Some time after Shaykh al-Tūsī (d. 460/1067), who was a student of al-Murtadā and who followed his master in theological questions,⁶ the last Imamite Mu'tazilite school started to develop, about which until now not much has been known. W. Madelung has remarked that this development was largely under the influence of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers.⁷

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), who was a student of the Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), had developed independent theological views which set him apart from the school of Abū Hashim al-Jubbā'ī (d. 321/933).⁸ Despite much criticism by the Bahshamiyya and later heresiographers that he introduced philosophy under the cover of kalām,⁹ Abū l-Ḥusayn's views were successful to the extent that his school established itself side by side with the Bahshamiyya.¹⁰ His views were later adopted by some of the

⁶His theological views can be learnt from his Iqtisād al-hadī ilā tariq al-rashād (edited by Rasan al-Sa'īd al-Tihriani, Qur' al-Khayyām, 1490/1980) and his Kitāb tashhīd al-usūl fī 'ilm al-kalām (edited by 'Abd al-Muhsin Mishkāt al-Qinī, Intishārāt-i Danishgah-i Tehran, no. 1835, Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1362/1983) which is a commentary on the section on the theology of al-Murtadā's Jumal al-'ilm wa-l-'amal.

⁷Madelung, "Imāmism," 27-8; idem, "Sīca," 365ff.

⁸See W. Madelung, "Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī," Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd edition, Edited by H. Gibb et al. Leiden Br. 11, 1960-), Supplement Fasc. 1-2 25-6; idem, "Religionsliteratur in arabischer Sprache: Der kalām," in Grundriß der arabischen Philologie (edited by Helmut Gatz, Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1987), 329. D. Gimaret, "Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī," Encyclopaedia Iranica (edited by F. Yarshater, London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 1132ff. Ahmad b. Yahya b. al-Murtadā, Kitāb taḥqīq al-matā'ala (edited by Š. Diwald-Wilzer, Bibliotheca Islamica, vol. 21, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1961), 119.

⁹Ibn al-Murtadā, 119.

¹⁰Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, for example, states that in his time the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and the Bahshamiyya are the last active of the Mu'tazilite schools, see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, I'tiqādāt fīraq al-muslimīn wa-l-mushrikīn (edited by Taha 'Abd al-Ra'uf Sa'd and Mustafa al-Hawārī, Min turāth al-Rāzī, no. 2, Cairo, 1398/1978), 42.

Zaydī Mu^ctazilites¹¹ and to a much greater extent by the Imamite Mu^ctazilites;¹² as a result they survived longer than the teachings of the Bahshamiyya.

The sources for the reconstruction of the theological views of Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī, all of whose works on theology are lost,¹³ are the writings of a later follower of his school, Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), viz. the shorter Kitāb al-fā'iḳ fī uṣūl al-dīn¹⁴ and the more extensive Kitāb al-muṭamad fī uṣūl al-dīn¹⁵ which is only partly extant. A further valuable source is the Kitāb al-kāmil fī l-istiḡṣā' fīmā balaghānā min kalām al-quḍamā' by Taqī al-Dīn al-Najrānī (or al-Baḥrānī) al-^cAṣālī (vocalization uncertain) about whom no further biographical details are known.¹⁶ This work, which highlights the differences between the Bahshamiyya and the school of Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī, was written between 536/1141 and 675/1276-7.¹⁷

¹¹ Ibn al-Murtadā, 119; W. Madelung, Der Imām al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen (Studien zur Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients, neue Folge, vol. 1, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1965), 222.

¹² Ibn al-Murtadā, 119.

¹³ For his lost theological works, see W. Madelung, "Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Supplement Fasc. 1-2:25.

¹⁴ Rukn al-Dīn b. al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-fā'iḳ fī uṣūl al-dīn (MS San'ā', al-Jāmi' al-kabīr, c. 18m al-kalām 53).

¹⁵ Rukn al-Dīn b. al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-muṭamad fī uṣūl al-dīn (edited by M. J. McDermott and W. Madelung, London: Al Hoda, 1991).

¹⁶ Taqī al-Dīn al-Baḥrānī (or al-Najrānī) al-^cAṣālī (vocalization uncertain), al-Kāmil fī l-istīḡṣā' fīmā balaghānā min kalām al-quḍamā' (MS Leiden OR 487).

Excerpts of this work have been edited and published by E. Mayed Elshahed, Das Problem der transzendentalen sinnlichen Wahrnehmung in der spätmutazilitischen Erkenntnistheorie nach der Darstellung des Taqīaddīn al-Najrānī (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 86, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1983). For this edition, see also W. Madelung, "Review of Das Problem der transzendentalen sinnlichen Wahrnehmung by E. Elshahed," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 48 (1985): 128-9.

¹⁷ Ibid., 128.

2

There are safe indications that the Imamite Mu^Ctazilites had already adopted the doctrine of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī towards the end of the 6th/12th century. Sadīd al-Dīn Mahmūd b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥimmaṣī al-Rāzī (d. after 600/1204) is the first known Imamite follower of this school.¹⁸ The development of this last Imamite Mu^Ctazilite school reached its peak with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), Kamāl al-Dīn Mītham b. Mīnām al-Baḥrānī (d. 699/1300), and Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) who is usually known as al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī.

From among these scholars, al-Ḥillī has been the most outstanding and fruitful writer on theological questions; indeed, his fame as a theologian lasts until today. One of his more concise works, for example, the Bab al-ḥādī ʿashar, together with al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's (d. 826/1423) commentary on it, not only serves today among Shi^Cites as a basic textbook on theology, but is also well known in the western world from W.M. Miller's English translation.¹⁹ In addition to numerous concise books, al-Ḥillī also composed a considerable number of extensive theological works. We have, therefore, a large number of his writings which allow us to investigate his theological views in great detail. This does not apply to the same extent to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who seems to have been more of a philosopher than a theologian, and whose few theological writings are too concise to be suitable for a thorough

18. Ibn al-Maḥāḥimī, Mu^Ctamad, introduction, viii.

19. Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, al-Bābu 'l-ḥādī ʿashar. A Treatise on the Principles of Shi^Cite Theology (translated by W.M. Miller. London. The Royal Asiatic Society, 1928).

study.²⁰ Mītham al-Baḥrānī whose theological views are laid down only in a single work, the Qawā'id al-marām fī 'ilm al-kalām, also offers too limited a field.²¹

During the centuries between the time of Abū l-Husayn al-Baḥrī and al-Ḥillī, a number of significant developments had occurred in Islamic thought which must also be taken into consideration in an investigation of al-Ḥillī's doctrine.

Most significant among these was the growing interest among the different theologians in the philosophical thought of Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), who was a contemporary of Abū l-Husayn al-Baḥrī. Although the theologians traditionally opposed all those philosophical principles which disagreed with their theological views, they tended nevertheless to adopt more and more philosophical terminology, and even elements of philosophical teachings, as long as they could possibly be brought into agreement with their theological doctrine.

Abū l-Husayn al-Baḥrī, who seems to have studied philosophy and the sciences with the Christian Abu 'Alī b. al-Samḥ,²² was considered by later writers such as al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) and Ibn al-Qiftī (d. 646/1248)

²⁰ His most important theological writings are his "Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id" (together with Ḥasan b. Yūsuf al-Ḥillī's ḥashf al-murād fī sharḥ tajrīd al-i'tiqād. Qum: Maktabat al-mustafawī, n.d.), his Fuṣūḥ fī l-usūl (edited by Shākir al-'Arif and Ḥamid Khālīsī, Al-'Aqā'id al-Islāmiyya, vol.1. Baghdad, 1960), and his "Qawā'id al-'Aqā'id" (together with Ḥasan b. Yūsuf al-Ḥillī's ḥashf al-fawā'id fī sharḥ qawā'id al-'Aqā'id, in Majmū'at al-rasa'il, 2-97. Qum: Maktabat Ayat Allāh al-'Azma al-Mar'ashī al-Najafī, 1404H.)

²¹ Kamāl al-Dīn Mītham al-Baḥrānī Qawā'id al-marām fī 'ilm al-kalām (edited by Ahmad al-Husaynī, Min makhtūṭat maktabat Ayat Allāh al-Mar'ashī al-'Āmma, no.3. Qum, 1406H.)

²² See S.M.Stern, "Ibn al-Samḥ," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1956):31-44.

to have been deeply influenced by the concepts of the philosophers.²³ Yet this opinion is disputed among modern scholars and certainly requires further investigation.²⁴

The profound impact of the philosophical tradition can easily be found in the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209). He is famous for having fully developed what had been initiated by his predecessor al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), and what Ibn Khaldūn called the "method of the moderns" (ṭarīqat al-muta'akkhkhirīn)²⁵ in Ash'arite theology, through freely mixing philosophical and theological concepts and terminology.

However, despite this adoption of elements of the philosophical tradition, al-Rāzī usually displayed a highly critical attitude towards basic philosophical doctrines when he held on to the traditional Ash'arite views. An exception is his Mabāhith al-mashriqiyya which he wrote in his youth and in which he usually follows the philosophical views of his teacher Abu l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. after 560/1164-5).²⁶

²³ Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, al-Milāl wa l-nihāl (edited by 'Abd al-'Azīz Muhammad al-Wakīl. Cairo, 1387/1968), 1:85; idem, Nihāyat al-aqdām fī 'ilm al-kalām (edited by A. Guillaume. Oxford, 1934), 221; Jamāl al-Dīn Abū l-Hasan 'Alī b. al-Qiftī, Ta'rīkh al-hukamā (edited by J. Lippert. Leipzig, 1903), 293-94.

²⁴ D. Gimaret ("Abū 'l-Husayn al-Baṣrī," Encyclopaedia Iranica, 1/1:324) doubts whether S. Stern's identification of Abū l-Husayn with a homonymous student of Ibn al-Samh is correct without offering any arguments for his assumptions. He further considers the allegations of al-Shahrastānī and Ibn al-Qiftī about the impact of philosophy on Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī as exaggerated.

²⁵ Abū 'Zayd 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Muḥammad b. Khaldūn, Muqaddima (edited by 'Alī 'Abd al-Wāhid Wāfī. Cairo, 1376-1382/1457-62), 3:1048. Although Ibn Khaldūn maintained that al-Ghazālī founded this new method of theological thinking, his contribution should not be overestimated. Despite his study of philosophy which resulted in the composition of his Maqāsid al-falāsifah (a neutral exposition of philosophical views) and his Tahāfut al-falāsifah (a refutation of the philosophical positions), al-Ghazālī's main interest did not lie in theology. Moreover, in his theological exposition, the Iqtisād fī l-'itiqād, he maintains somewhat conservative views. It was rather Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who fully developed this modern method.

²⁶ S. Pines, "Abū 'l-Barakāt," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1:113.

A further significant peculiarity of al-Rāzī's theology is that he often adopted the theological concepts of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī although modifying and interpreting them in such a way that they support the Ash'arite rather than the Mu'tazilite point of view.²⁷ Owing to the impact of the philosophical tradition, al-Rāzī often employed philosophical terminology to express his views, which are otherwise directly based on the positions of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. There are safe indications that al-Rāzī was thoroughly acquainted with the positions of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī; during his visit to Khwārazm al-Rāzī was involved in debates with Mu'tazilites who were most likely followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, possibly even direct students of Ibn al-Malahimī.²⁸ He moreover frequently mentioned the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ibn al-Malahimī and even quoted at times from Abū l-Ḥusayn's Kitāb al-taṣaffuh.²⁹

Al-Rāzī's theological doctrine can be learnt from his extensive theological works which have been published, such as his Kitāb al-arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn,³⁰ his Muḥaṣṣal,³¹ his Maʿālīm uṣūl al-dīn³² and his Matālib al-ʿalīyya min al-ʿulūm al-ilāhiyya. His Tafsīr is a further valuable source of his thought.³³ His Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl fī dirāyat al-uṣūl is extant in manuscript.

²⁷ Ibn al-Murtadā (119), for example, points out that al-Rāzī followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ibn al-Malahimī in the 'subtle (latīf)' points of theology not touching, however, basic doctrine.

²⁸ Ibn al-Malahimī, Muʿtamad, introduction, vff.

²⁹ E.g. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Matālib al-ʿalīyya min al-ʿulūm al-ilāhiyya (edited by Ahmad Hijāzī al-Sagga', Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1407/1987), 3:326-7.

³⁰ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Kitāb al-arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn (Hyderabad: Dā'irat al-maʿārif al-ʿathmaniyya, 1353/1934).

³¹ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-muta'akhkhirīn (edited by Taḥa 'Abd al-Ra'uf Sa'd. Min turāth al-Rāzī. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1404/1984).

³² Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Maʿālīm uṣūl al-dīn (edited by Taḥa 'Abd al-Ra'uf Sa'd. Min turāth al-Rāzī, no.3. Ca ro, 1979).

³³ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kebi (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1405/1985). For the chronology of his works, see D. Gimaret, Théories de l'acte humain en théologie musulmane (Etudes musulmanes, vol.24. Paris: Vrin, 1980), 136-7.

2

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what degree al-Ḥillī's doctrine is directly based on the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers, and to what extent the thought of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and the Avicennan tradition had an impact upon his theology. In regard to the influence of the philosophical tradition, it will be of interest to compare al-Ḥillī's reception of it with the position of his master Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, who must be considered as a philosopher rather than as a theologian.

CHAPTER I THE BIOGRAPHY OF AL-^CALLĀMA AL-ḤILLĪ

1. Dates of Life and Family

Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, called al-^CAllāma al-Ḥillī, was born in 648/1250 in al-Ḥilla. This is confirmed by al-Ḥillī himself although a minor disagreement occurs concerning the exact date. In his Khulāṣa, he reports the date as 29 Ramaḍān/25 December¹ but in his Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muḥanna'iyya, he says that according to a statement by his father he was born on 27 Ramaḍān/23 December.² Al-^CAmīlī suggests that this difference may be the result of a writing error since the numerals 7 and 9 look very similar.³

Al-Ḥillī died either on 20 or 21 Muḥarram 726/27 or 28 December 1325 in his home town al-Ḥilla.⁴ All biographers agree on this year except al-Afandī who erroneously reports that al-Ḥillī died in the same year as Uljaytū, i.e. in 716/1316.⁵

¹ Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Riḥāl al-^CAllāma (edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-^CŪlūm. Najaf: al-Ḥaydariyya, 1961), 48.

² Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muḥanna'iyya (Qum: al-Khayyām, 1401H.), 139.

³ Muḥsin al-Amin al-^CAmīlī, A'yān al-shi'a (Damascus, 1946-1982), 24:222.

⁴ Al-^CAmīlī, 24:223; see also ^CAbd al-Nabī b. ^CAlī al-Kāzimī, Takmilat al-riḥāl (edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-^CŪlūm. Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1971), 1:315, who reports the 29 Muḥarram/5 January 1326. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Khwānsārī, (Raudāt al-jannāt. Qum, 1987, 2:282) and Nūr Allāh al-Shushtārī (Majālis al-mu'minin. Tehran, 1365sh, 1:574) report the 21 Muḥarram/29 December. Muḥammad b. ^CAlī al-Astarābādī (Manḥaj al-maqāl fī taḥqīq ahwāl al-riḥāl. Tehran, 1306/1889, 109) reports the 19 Muḥarram/26 December. This may also be the result of an error; see al-^CAmīlī, 24:223. See also al-Ḥillī, Riḥāl, 49 n. 1, where Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn is said to have given the 11 Muḥarram/18 December as the date of his father's death.

⁵ ^CAbd Allāh b. ^CIsā al-Afandī, Riḥāl al-^CUlamā' (edited by Amad al-Husaynī. Min makhtū'āt maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Mar'ashī al-^Camma, no. 5. Qum: al-Khayyām, 1401/1981), 1:363. Uljaytū died on 27 Ramaḍān 716/13 December 1316.

2
Al-Ḥillī's father was Sadīd al-Dīn Yūsuf b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī⁶ about whom not much is known, not even the date of his death. In 665/1267 he was still alive. He is said to have written several works on ḥadīth and uṣūl,⁷ but no titles are known.

The information which al-Ḥillī provides about his father indicates that he must have been a very learned man and in his time one of the leading personalities of al-Ḥilla. He reports that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī visited al-Ḥilla shortly after the fall of Baghdād on 4 Ṣafar 656/10 February 1258 in his position as a minister of Ḥūlākū. On this occasion, he asked the Muḥaqqiq al-awwal who of the scholars of al-Ḥilla was the most excellent. Following al-Muḥaqqiq's answer that all of them were excellent, Naṣīr al-Dīn specified further, asking who was the best with respect to theology and legal methodology. Al-Muḥaqqiq named al-Ḥillī's father together with Mufīd al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Jahm (d. 680/1281-2).⁸ A further indication that Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar must have been a learned man derives from al-Ḥillī's teaching permits (ijāzāt) where he cites his father frequently as an authority for his own knowledge.⁹

Al-Ḥillī's report on the role which his father played in the surrender of al-Ḥilla to the Mongol conquerors in 656/1258 suggests that he was one of the leading personalities of al-Ḥilla. When, after the fall of Baghdād, the remaining inhabitants of al-Ḥilla and Kufa decided to surrender to the conquerors, Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar together with Majd al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs and Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-ʿIzz are reported to have delivered the proposal of

⁶About him, see al-Afandī, 5:395ff.

⁷Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, "al-Ijāza al-kabīra al-maʿrūfa li-Ranī Zahra' al-Halabī," in Bihar al-anwār by Muḥammad Baqir al-Majlisī (edited by Jawād al-ʿAlwī et al. Tehran, al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya, 1376-1405 1957-85), 62; Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, "Ijāza li Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinān," *ibid.*, 151.

⁸Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 64. For this instance, see also R. Ströthmann, Die Zwölfer Schi'a (Hildesheim-New York: Olms, 1975), 47ff; al-Afandī, 5:395-6.

⁹See later.

surrender to Hūlākū. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar then went at the request of Hūlākū to the latter's residence and convinced him of the sincerity of the motives of the people of al-Ḥilla.¹⁰

Al-Ḥillī's mother was a descendant of the Banū Sa'īd.¹¹ His brother Raḍī al-Dīn 'Alī,¹² who was the author of al-ʿUḍad al-qawīyya,¹³ was 13 years older and is reported to have died before him.¹⁴ Al-Ḥillī also had a sister who was married to Majd al-Dīn al-Fawāris.¹⁵ This couple had five children,¹⁶ two of whom, 'Amīd al-Dīn 'Abd Allāh al-A'rajī al-Ḥusaynī (681/1282-3-754/1353) and Ḍiyā' al-Dīn (683/1284-5 - after 740/1339-40), became students of al-Ḥillī and wrote commentaries on a number of his works.¹⁷

10. Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-yaghīn fī faḍā'il Amīr al-mu'minin (Najaf: Dār al-kutub al-tijāriyya, 1371/1951), 28. For this incident, see also 'Abd Allāh b. Fadl Allāh Wassa'f, Kitāb al-mustatab-1 Wassa'f (Tehran, 1338/1959), 36; 'Abd al-Muhammad Ayatī, Tahrīr-1 ta'rīkh-1 Wassa'f (Tehran, 1346/1967), 19; Strothmann, 42ff. Kamāl al-Dīn 'Abd al-Razzāq b. Ahmad b. al-Fuwatī (Al-Hawādith al-jāmi'a wa-l-ta'jārīb al-nafī'a fī 'amī'a al-sabi'a). Edited by Mustafā Jawād, Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-'Arabīyya, 1351/1932, 330) does not mention Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar.

11. Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Nahj al-haqq wa-kashf al-ghidq (edited by Faraj Allāh al-Ḥusaynī and R. ḡā al-Sadr. Beirut, 1982), introduction, 8.

12. About him, see Yūsuf b. Ahmad al-Bahrānī, Lu'lu'at al-Bahrāyn (edited by Muhammad Sādiq Bahr al-'Ulūm. Najaf al-Nu'mān, 1386/1966), 266, al-Khwānsārī, 4:344-5 (no. 408).

13. See Muhammad Muhsin Agha Buzurg al-Tihirānī, al-Dharī'a 1355-1405H.), 15:232 (no. 1514).

14. Al-Bahrānī, 266 n. 1; on 28 Muḥarram 703/11 September 1303 Raḍī al-Dīn issued an iḡāza to Zayn al-Dīn al-Astarābādī (see Agha Buzurg, Dharī'a, 1:223 (no. 1170), idem, Tabagāt al-'ulam al-shī'a (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1971-5), 5:139); the date of his death is therefore between the beginning of 703/1303 and the beginning of 726/1325.

15. About him, see al-Bahrānī, 199-210 (no. 76).

16. Al-Bahrānī, 199 n. 16.

17. See later.

2. His Teachers

At first al-Hillī studied in his home town al-Ḥilla mainly under the guidance of his father¹⁸ and Najm al-Dīn Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad b. Saʿīd al-Hillī, known as al-Muḥaqqiq al-awwal (d. 676/1277),¹⁹ who was his maternal uncle.²⁰

From his teaching permits (*ijāzāt*) which were issued later to some of his pupils, it is possible to establish the contents of his studies at this time. In regard to traditions, he studied the Shiʿite legacy such as the *kāfī* of al-Kulīnī and the various collections of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and Ibn Bābūyā,²¹ together with the important Sunnite collections such as the *Muwattaʿ* of Mālik b. Anas,²² the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī,²³ the *Musnad* of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal²⁴ and the *Sunan* of Abu Dāwūd.²⁵ His studies with his father also included the science of *ḥadīth* criticism.²⁶

In theology he was introduced to the works of the earlier Shiʿite Muʿtazilites such as al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, ʿAlam al-Hudā al-Murtaḍā and al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. In all these fields, his father appears to have been his most important teacher.²⁷ In his legal study, al-Muḥaqqiq al-awwal,

18 Al-Hillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 62.

19 Ibid., 62-3; about him, see al-Afandī, 1:103ff.

20 Al-Afandī, 1:359; also al-Khwānsārī, 2:277.

21 Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, "Ijāza li-l-Sayyid Muḥanna' b. Sinān," in al-Maḡlisī, *Bihar*, 107-146.

22 Al-Hillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 90.

23 Ibid., 88-9.

24 Ibid., 86.

25 Ibid., 92.

26 Ibid., 88, 95.

27 Al-Hillī, *Riḍā*, 282, idem, "Ijāza kabīra," 68-70; 135-7.

one of the most outstanding scholars of law of his time,²⁸ also played an important part.²⁹ Al-Ḥillī also studied Qur'ān exegesis³⁰ and grammar³¹ with his father.

Among his teachers in this period were further the brothers Jamāl al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs (d. 673/1274)³² and Raḍī al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs (d. 664/1266)³³ who were descended from an important family of Imamite scholars in al-Ḥilla.³⁴ In addition to their own writings, both are also said to have taught him the works of the former Shī'ite authorities such as Ibn Bābūyā, Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Murtaḍā and al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. From the Ijāzas it is evident that Raḍī al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs was of less importance in al-Ḥillī's education than his brother Jamāl al-Dīn.³⁵ The reason for this was presumably Raḍī al-Dīn's involvement in politics. In 661/1262-3 he was appointed syndic of the Ṭālibids in Iraq (Niqābat al-Ṭālibiyyīn),³⁶ a post which he held for three years and eleven months,³⁷ and probably until his death. He left al-Ḥilla, therefore, when al-Ḥillī was only 13 years old.

Another scholar whom al-Ḥillī mentions as his teacher was Mufīd al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Jahm (d. 680/1281-2).³⁸ Al-Ḥillī wrote³⁹ that in the time when Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī visited al-Ḥilla, al-Muḥaqqiq described him, together with his father Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar, as the foremost scholar in

²⁸See H.T.Modarressi, An Introduction to Shī'ī Law: A Bibliographical Study (London: Ithaca, 1984), 65-70 for a list of his legal works.

²⁹Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Muḥanna' b. Sinān," 144-6; idem, "Ijāza kabīra," 68-9, see also al-Khwānsārī, 2:277-8.

³⁰Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 91-2.

³¹Ibid., 102.

³²About him, see al-Bahrānī, 235-45 (no.85).

³³About him, see 'Umar' Ridā al-Kaḥḥālā, Muḥjam al-mu'allifīn (Beirut, 1376-81/1957-61), 7:248; al-Khwānsārī, 4:325 ff; Strothmann, 88-168.

³⁴Al-Bahrānī, 236 n.17.

³⁵Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Muḥanna' b. Sinān," 144-6 (for Jamāl al-Dīn); idem, "Ijāza kabīra," 68-9 (for Jamāl al-Dīn), 136-7 (for Jamāl al-Dīn and Raḍī al-Dīn).

³⁶Abbās al-'Azzawī, Tārīkh al-'Irāq bayn al-ihṭilālāyīn (Baghdad, 1353-/1934-), 1:246.

³⁷Strothmann, 93.

³⁸Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 64, about him, see al-Bahrānī, 265 (no.92).

³⁹"Ijāza kabīra," 64.

theology and legal methodology.⁴⁰ From this notice and from the reports that Mufīd al-Dīn died in al-Ḥilla,⁴¹ it is evident that al-Ḥillī studied under his guidance during this early stage of his education in al-Ḥilla.

The same applies to another teacher of al-Ḥillī, Najīb al-Dīn Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd al-Hudhalī (d. 689/1290 or 690/1291),⁴² a cousin of the Muḥaqqiq al-awwal. Although he was born in Kūfa, Najīb al-Dīn moved later to al-Ḥilla where he is reported to have died. Since he primarily was a lawyer and the author of a legal compendium entitled Jāmiʿ al-sharāʾiʿ,⁴³ al-Ḥillī probably studied law with him.

Although al-Ḥillī does not indicate who were his authorities for the theological works of Ibn al-Malahimī, it is most likely that he became acquainted with these during the first stage of his studies; Ibn al-Malahimī's writings were very famous and known even to such opponents of Muʿtazilism as Raḍī al-Dīn b. Tāwūs.⁴⁴ Similarly he does not indicate when he was introduced to the Kitāb al-kamil by Taqī al-Dīn. Yet there is no doubt that he was familiar with this work.

⁴⁰Ibid., 64.

⁴¹Madarressi Ridawī, Ahwāl wa-āthār...ustūdh al-bashar wa-ʿaql ḥādī ^{Cashar} Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ^{al-Ḥasan} al-Tūsī (Intishārāt-i Danishgāh-i Tehran, no.282. Tehran University Press, 1334sh), 129.

⁴²Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 64; about him, see a. Bahrānī, 252-3 (no.88); Āghā Buzurg, Dhariʿa, 1:263-4; al-Afandī, 5:334-342, al-Khwānsārī, 2:182 ff (no.170).

⁴³See Madarressi, 70.

⁴⁴See Ibn al-Malahimī, Muʿtamad, introduction.

At the next stage of his studies, al-Hillī's teachers were Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274)⁴⁵ and the Shāfi'ite scholar Najm al-Dīn 'Alī b. 'Umar al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1277).⁴⁶ The former founded the observatory in Marāgha in 657/1258-9 during the reign of the Ilkhan Hūlākū.⁴⁷ This observatory not only served its technical purpose⁴⁸ but was also a kind of academy which attracted many scholars,⁴⁹ such as Ibn al-'Ibrī from Antioch and Tumaḥī from China.⁵⁰

⁴⁵Al Hillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 62; about him, see 'Abbās b. Muḥammad Riḍā al-Qummī, al-Kunā wa-l-aqāb (Najaf: al-Haydariyya, 1376/1956), 3:216-8; al-Bahrānī, 245-7 (no.86); Salāh al-Dīn Khalīl b. Aybak al-Safadī, al-Wafī bi-l-wafayāt (edited by H.Ritter and S.Dederling et al. Bibliotheca Islamica, vol.6. Istanbul, 1931-), 1:179ff; Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Shākir al-Kutubī, Fawāt al-wafayāt (edited by Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamid. Cairo, 1951-3), 2:307ff (no.369); al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, Ta'rīkh-i guzīda (edited by 'Abd al-Muṣayn Nawa'i. Tehran, Mu'assasat-i intishārāt i Amīr kabīr, 1362/1987), 705-6; al-Khwānsārī, 6:300-319; al-'Āmilī, 46:4ff (no.2444); also Strothmann, 16-87, Qutb al-Dīn Yūnīnī, Dhayl mir'at al-zamān (Hyderabad: Dā'irat al-ma'ārif al-'uthmāniyya, 1374-80/1954-61), 3:79-80; Agha Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 4:168-70; Ismā'īl b. 'Umar b. Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya (Cairo: al-Sa'āda, 1351-8/1932-5), 13:267-8.

⁴⁶Al Hillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 66; about him, see al-Qummī, 3:86-7, al-Kutubī, 2:134; M.Mohaghegh, "Al-Kātibī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:762.

⁴⁷Al-'Āmilī, 46:10.

⁴⁸For the scientific importance of the observatory, see E.S.Kennedy, "The Exact Sciences in Iran under the Saljuqs and Mongols," in The Cambridge History of Iran (edited by J.A.Boyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 5:668ff.

⁴⁹Abū l-Faraj b. al-'Ibrī, Mukhtasar ta'rīkh al-duwal (edited by A.Sālḥānī. Beirut, 1890), 500; Ibn Kathīr, 13:268.

⁵⁰'Abd Allāh al-Ni'ama, Falāsifat al-shī'a (Beirut: al-Hayyāt, 1962), 484; see also J.A.Boyle, "The Longer Introduction to the 'Zij-i-Ilkhani' of Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī," Journal of Semitic Studies 8 (1963):253; al-'Āmilī, 46:11; H.J.Seemann, "Die Instrumente der Sternwarte zu Marāgha nach den Mitteilungen von al-'Urdī," Sitzungsbericht der physikalisch-medizinischen Sozietät zu Erlangen 60 (1928):119.

together with numerous other students.⁵¹ It contained a large library which is said to have contained 400,000 volumes which Naṣīr al-Dīn collected from various Islamic countries.⁵²

Al-Kātibī was one of the four co-founders of the observatory who were invited to Marāgha by Hūlākū at the request of Naṣīr al-Dīn. Besides al-Kātibī, there were Mu'ayyad al-Dīn al-ʿUrdī from Damascus (d. 664/1265-6),⁵³ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Khilāṭī (d. 680/1281-2)⁵⁴ from Tiflīs and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Marāghī (d. 667/1268-9) from Mausuḥ.⁵⁵

There seem to be no reports confirming al-Ḥillī's presence at Marāgha. One of the best informed biographical sources which would probably say more about this, the Talkhīs majmaʿ al-adab of Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (d. 723/1323),⁵⁶ is partly lost and with it the section containing al-Ḥillī's biography.⁵⁷ Al-Ḥillī mentions Naṣīr al-Dīn and al-Kātibī as

⁵¹See Ibn Kathīr, 13:268; Kamal al-Dīn b. al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīs majmaʿ al-adab fī muʿjam al-aqāb (edited by Mustafā Jawād. Baghdad, 1962), 4/1, introd., 17; al-ʿAmīlī, 46:11; Mustafā Jawād, "Ihtimam Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī bi-ḥiya' al-ḥaqāfa al-Islāmiyya ayyām al-mughūl," in Yādnāmeh-i Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī (Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehran, no. 416, Tehran, Tehran University Press 1336sh.), 97-8, Sayili, "Khwāja Naṣīr Tūsī wa-raṣṣkhāne yī Marāgha," *ibid.*, 66-7, Aqnā Bazurg, Tabaqāt, 4:170.

⁵²Al-Safadī, 1:179, also Boyle, 247; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Majmaʿ, 4/2, introd., 17; al-ʿAmīlī, 46:11; Mudarris Ridawī, Ahwāl, 31; for this purpose it was helpful that he was the minister of endowments (Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 500) since as such he could transfer the endowment books from other places to Marāgha.

⁵³About him, see Seemann, 111-4.

⁵⁴About him, see Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Majmaʿ, 4/3:215-6 (no. 2175).

⁵⁵Boyle, 247; al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, 590, Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 501, Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh (edited by Bahman Karīmī, Tehran: Iqbal, 1338/1959), 2:718; see also Mudarris Ridawī, Ahwāl, 27-28; Niʿma, 483-4 for other scholars who worked at Marāgha.

⁵⁶Ibn al-Fuwaṭī stayed at Marāgha from 660/1261-2 for 13 years during which time he studied mainly philosophy and astronomy with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, see Nājī Maʿrūf, Ta'rīkh ʿulama' al-mustāfīrīyya (Baghdad: al-ʿAnī, 1379/1959), 288. For ten years he acted also as the librarian at the Marāgha observatory; see *ibid.* 299.

⁵⁷For the extant portions of the work, see F. Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Fuwaṭī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3:769.

his teachers but does not state where he met them. From the existing evidence, however, it can safely be assumed that he studied in Marāgha. Naṣīr al-Dīn worked in Marāgha from 657/1258-9 and left the town a few times only to inspect religious endowments in his function as minister of endowments.⁵⁸ Moreover, the Ilkhan Abaqa sometimes demanded Naṣīr al-Dīn's company as a political advisor on his journeys. In the year 662/1263-4 Naṣīr al-Dīn is said to have visited many places in Iraq to inspect the endowments and to collect books for the library in Marāgha.⁵⁹ In 672/1273-4 he visited Qūsān, Wāsiṭ and Baghdad together with the Ilkhan Abaqa to inspect the endowments and the situation of the teachers and the lawyers.⁶⁰ Since Naṣīr al-Dīn is known to have died in the same year in Baghdad,⁶¹ he presumably died during this visit. Al-Ṣafadī reports that this second visit to Baghdad lasted some months and that during this time Naṣīr al-Dīn took with him some students from Marāgha and taught them in Baghdad until his death;⁶² but no other historian confirms this.⁶³ Al-Ḥillī, therefore, must have studied under Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī in Marāgha but his opportunity to do so must have been limited to a few years only as he died when al-Ḥillī was only 24 years old.

It is most likely that al-Ḥillī met al-Kātibī similarly at Marāgha. Although it is reported that al-Kātibī left Marāgha shortly before his death to teach at Juwayn,⁶⁴ no exact dates are mentioned for his departure. In 670/1271-2, five years before his death, he must still have been in Marāgha.⁶⁵

58. Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 500.

59. Al-ʿAzzāwī, 1:247.

60. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Hawādith, 375.

61. Ibid., 380; also Muḥammad Mudarrisī Zanjānī, Sargudhasht wa-ʿaqā'id-i falsafī-yi Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī (Tehran: Mu'assasat-i intisharāt-i Amir kabīr, 1363/1984), 75ff.

62. Al-Ṣafadī, 1:183; see also al-Kutubī, 2:312.

63. See e.g. Sāyili, 64.

64. Mudarrisī Ridawī, Ahwāl, 137.

65. See Maʿrūf, 63, where a report is given on Muḥyī al-Dīn al-ʿAbbāsī who arrived in 670/1271-2 in Marāgha to study with both Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī and al-Kātibī; also Mudarrisī Ridawī, Ahwāl, 151; Zanjānī, 210ff.

The influence of these two scholars on al-Ḥillī must be considered as formative. He states that he studied philosophy and especially the Ilahīyyāt of Ibn Sīna's Kitāb al-shifā under Naṣīr al-Dīn⁶⁶ and he further mentions having read Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's al-Tadhkira fī 'ilm al-hay'a with him.⁶⁷ Moreover, al-Ḥillī wrote commentaries on two of the latter's works on theology, the Tajrīd al-aqā'id and the Qawā'id al-aqā'id and on his Mantiq al-tajrīd on logic, and a note in his Muntahā al-maṭlab seems to indicate that he also studied law under Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.⁶⁸ This, however, is most unlikely.

Under the guidance of al-Kātibī, al-Ḥillī studied philosophy and also logic.⁶⁹ Later he wrote commentaries on both of al-Kātibī's important works, the Risāla al-shamsīyya on logic and the Ḥikmat al-ʿayn on metaphysics and natural sciences. Al-Kātibī also introduced al-Ḥillī to three important earlier writers. One of these was Athīr al-Dīn Mufaḍḍal b. ʿUmar al-Abharī (d. 663/1264),⁷⁰ an important philosopher, mathematician and astronomer and author of Ḥidāyat al-ḥikma and Kitāb al-isāghujī. He further taught al-Ḥillī the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209).⁷¹

⁶⁶Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 62; see also ʿAbd al-Hayy b. Ahmad b. ʿImad, Shadharāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man dhahab (Cairo: al-Qudsī, 1350-1/1931-2), 5:340 where the importance of the teaching of the philosophy of Ibn Sīna at Marāgha is noted.

⁶⁷Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 62.

⁶⁸See Zanjānī, 41; some biographers, however, state that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī studied law under al-Ḥillī, see Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī, ʿAmal al-ʿāmil (edited by Ahmad a.-Ḥusaynī, Najaf: al-ʿAdāb, 1385H.), 2:81, S. Zāhir, "Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī," Revue de l'Académie Arabe de Damas 36 (1961), 241. This is very unlikely.

⁶⁹Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 66.

⁷⁰Ibid., 67-8; also Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, "Ijāza li-Muḥanna' b. Sīnān," 151; about him, see Zanjānī, 189ff.

⁷¹Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 68; also Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, "Ijāza li-Muḥanna' b. Sīnān," 151. Al-Kātibī wrote commentaries on the Muḥaṣṣal and the Mulakhkhaṣ of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī; see M. Moḥaghegh, "Al-katibī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:762.

Also with al-Kātibī, al-Ḥillī read the writings of Muḥammad b. Nāmāwar b. ʿAbd al-Malik al-Khūnjī (d. 646/1248)⁷² who wrote on astronomy and logic.

It is also possible that al-Ḥillī met Mītham al-Bahrānī (d. 699/1300)⁷³ who was an important philosopher and theologian. Since Mītham al-Bahrānī was a student of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and held frequent discussions with him,⁷⁴ it is likely that he stayed in Marāgha for some time.

It is not known when al-Ḥillī left Marāgha but there is no reason to assume that he stayed there after the death of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in 672/1274.⁷⁵

During the following twenty years, until the beginning of the eighth/fourteenth century, al-Ḥillī stayed partly in al-Ḥilla⁷⁶ where he mainly taught, and partly in nearby Baghdad where he met some more of the scholars whom he mentions as his teachers.

⁷²Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 67-8; there appears to be some disagreement about the date of his death. Al-Kahhāla (12:73) reports 646/1248 while Ibn ʿImād (5:236-7) reports 647/1249-50.

⁷³Mītham al-Bahrānī is usually mentioned by biographers as one of al-Ḥillī's teachers (e.g. al-Khwānsarī, 2:278; al-Afandī, 1:359); however, al-Ḥillī does not include him in the list of those who issued an *ijāza* to him; about Mītham al-Bahrānī, see al-Afandī, 5:226ff; al-ʿĀmilī, 49.98-9 (no.11109); al-Khwānsarī, 7:216ff; al-Bahrānī, 253-61 (no.89). Some biographers report 679/1280 as the date of his death (see Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur Supplementband* (Leiden Brill, 1937-49), 1:713 (hereafter cited as *GALS* and *GAL*); Mudarris Ridawī, *Ahwāl*, 115). However, Agha Buzurg showed that the date 699/1300 is correct, since Mītham al-Bahrānī did not complete his smaller commentary on the *Nahj al-Balāgha* until 681/1282-3 (*Tabaqāt*, 4:188).

⁷⁴Al-Bahrānī, 255.

⁷⁵This seems to be confirmed by the fact that al-Ḥillī is not mentioned among those who continued the work at the Marāgha observatory after Naṣīr al-Dīn's death in 672/1274, see Ibn al-Fuwatī, *Majmaʿ*, 4/1, introduction, 21.

⁷⁶That al-Ḥillī usually taught in al-Ḥilla is indicated when he designates himself as "al-Ḥillī ḥaulidan wa-maskanan"; see his *Rijāl*, 45.

One of these was the Shāfi'ite scholar Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Kīshī⁷⁷ who is reported to have started teaching in Baghdad in 665/1266-7 at the Nizāmiyya College⁷⁸ where he remained until he was called to Isfahan by the minister Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī.⁷⁹ He died in 695/1296 in Shīrāz.⁸⁰ Al-Kīshī was the author of a compendium on grammar together with some other treatises⁸¹ and is known to have had a correspondence with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.⁸² Having studied under the guidance of the Sufi Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Abu l-Ḥasan Mas'ūd b. Maḥmūd (d. 655/1257-8), he was well-acquainted with the works of Ibn al-ʿArabī. Some time between 678/1279-80 and 685/1286, al-Kīshī regularly attended the Sufi circle in Shīrāz which was founded by Najīb al-Dīn ʿAlī Buzghush Shīrāzī (d. 678/1279-80).⁸³ Although mysticism had no impact upon al-Ḥillī's theological thought, it is likely that through al-Kīshī he became thoroughly acquainted with the views of Ibn al-ʿArabī. It is probable that he was already to some extent familiar with Sufi ideas since his stay at Marāgha where the Sufis were represented in large numbers.⁸⁴

Another of al-Ḥillī's teachers was Burhān al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī (d. 687/1288) who wrote several works mainly on disputation (jadāl / ʿilm al-khilāf).⁸⁵

⁷⁷Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 65-6; about him, see al-Ṣafadī, 2:141 (no.491), Mudarris Ridawī, Ahwāl, 106-8.

⁷⁸Al-ʿAzzawī, 1:263; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Ḥawadith, 358.

⁷⁹Al-ʿAzzawī, 1:263; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Ḥawadith, 358; see also Mudarris Ridawī, Ahwāl, 106.

⁸⁰Al-Ṣafadī, 2:141; another report mentions 694/1294-5 as the date of his death, see al-ʿAzzawī, 1:371; also H. Landolt, "Der Briefwechsel zwischen Kāṣānī und Simnānī über Waḥdat al-Wuḥūd," Der Islam 50 (1973):34.

⁸¹Mudarris Ridawī, Ahwāl, 107.

⁸²Ibid., 108; Zanjānī, 198ff. Landolt, 34 n.21.

⁸³See Landolt, 34-5.

⁸⁴One of the outstanding mystics at Marāgha, for instance, was Qutb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311) who arrived there in 658/1259-60, see Ibn Fuwaṭī, Majmaʿ, 4/4-716 7 (no.2927).

⁸⁵Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 66-7, about him, see al-Kāhhalā, 11:297 8; al-Ṣafadī, 1:282-3 (no.185); Brockelmann, GAL, 1:615; GALS, 1:849.

He is reported to have come to Baghdad in 675/1276-7⁸⁶ where he taught, probably at the Mustanṣiriyya college, until his death in 687/1288.⁸⁷ With him, al-Ḥillī studied disputation.⁸⁸

In addition he studied grammar with Jamāl al-Dīn b. Āyāz al-Nahwī (d. 681/1282-3),⁸⁹ who is known to have been a lecturer in grammar at the Mustanṣiriyya college in Baghdad.⁹⁰ Al-Ḥillī records having read with him the works of the celebrated grammarian Jamāl al-Dīn b. al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249).⁹¹ Another of his teachers was ʿIzz al-Dīn Abū l-ʿAbbās b. Ibrāhīm b. ʿUmar al-Fārūthī al-Wāsiṭī (d. 694/1292-3)⁹² who is said to have come from Damascus to Iraq in 692/1292-3.⁹³ Al-Ḥillī presumably met him during the two years of his stay in Iraq. Since al-Wāsiṭī was a student of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190), it is likely that al-Ḥillī studied the latter's works with him. While there are no indications that al-Suhrawardī's doctrine of illumination made any impact upon him, he was certainly interested in the latter's philosophical works, indeed he even wrote a commentary on the *Kitāb al-talwihāt*.

⁸⁶ Al-Safadī, 1:283; al-ʿAzzāwī, 1:343.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 1:343-4. According to Ibn ʿImād, (5:385), he died in 684 1285-6. Kātip Çelebi (*Kesf-el-zunūn* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941-3, 1.865, 882) reports the date 688/1289 for his death.

⁸⁸ Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 66-7.

⁸⁹ Ḥusayn b. Badr b. Āyāz b. ʿAbd Allāh Abū Muhammad, known as al-ʿAllāma Jamāl al-Dīn. About him, see Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī, *Bughyat al-wuṣṭā fī tabaqat al-lughawīyyīn wa l-nuḥāb* (Cairo, 1384/1964 5), 1:532 (no.1101).

⁹⁰ Maʿrūf, 157; al-Suyūtī, *Bughya*, 1:532.

⁹¹ Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 104; about him, see H.Fleisch, "Ibn al-Ḥājib," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3:781.

⁹² Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 67; about him, see al-ʿAzzāwī, 1:371; Ibn al-ʿImād, 5:425; Ibn Kathīr, 13:342; Shams al-Dīn Abū l-Khayr M. b. M. b. al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat al-nihāya fī tabaqat al-gurrā* (edited by G.Bergstrasser. Bibliotheca Islamica, vol.8 a-c. Cairo: al-Saʿāda, 1933-5), 1:34-5 (no.140).

⁹³ Ibn al-ʿImād, 5:425.

Al-Ḥillī further states that he studied under the guidance of the Ḥanafīte scholar Taqī al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh b. Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī al-Ṣabbagh al-Kūfī.⁹⁴ With him, he read the Qurʾān commentary al-Kaṣṣhāf ʿan ḥaqāʾiq al-tanzīl of Jār Allāh Maḥmūd b. ʿUmar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144).⁹⁵

⁹⁴Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 67, Ṣalīḥ b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Jaʿfar b. Ṣalīḥ al-ʿAsadī, known as Ibn al-Ṣabbāgh who was born in 639/1241, the date of his death is unknown. See about him al-Kaḥḥāla, 5:8; Ibn al-Jazarī, 1:333 (no.1449).

⁹⁵Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 103.

3. Al-Ḥillī at the Court of Uljaytū

Ghazan (d. 703/1304), Uljaytū's brother and predecessor, became a convert to Islam in 694/1295.⁹⁶ This was a decisive step towards the revival of the Muslim community in Iran and Iraq which had suffered greatly during the reign of his predecessors who had been hostile towards Islam.⁹⁷ He attempted to restore the dominant position of Islam by re-establishing Islamic schools and mosques⁹⁸ which had been destroyed by his predecessors. Although he adhered to Sunnite Islam he also paid special attention to the Shi'ites in Iran and Iraq.⁹⁹

After his accession in Dhū al-Ḥijja 703/July-August 1304, Uljaytū, who had been baptized as a child¹⁰⁰ and had later become a Buddhist,¹⁰¹ declared Islam the religion of state.¹⁰² At this time he adhered to the Ḥanafīte school of law.¹⁰³ This was apparently due to the fact that while governor of Khurāsān¹⁰⁴ he was surrounded mainly by Ḥanafītes.¹⁰⁵ After

⁹⁶ See A. Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," in The Cambridge History of Iran (edited by J.A. Boyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 5:541-2; B. Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 154. The Ilkhān Ahmad (d. 683/1284) who ruled from 680/1282 until 683/1284 had already converted to Islam. However, he did not succeed in spreading Islam among the other members of the ruling society; see Spuler, 69ff.

⁹⁷ Concerning the religious situation of Iran and Iraq under the Mongols, see Spuler, 165ff; also Bausani, 538ff.

⁹⁸ Bausani, 542-4; also Abū l-Qāsim 'Abd Allāh b. 'Alī Qāshānī, "Ta'rīkh-i Uljaytū," translated by Maryam Parvīn-Berger, in "Die Chronik über den Ilchan Uljaytū (1304-16)" (Ph.D. Diss., Göttingen, 1968), 31.

⁹⁹ Qāshānī, 84ff; Bausani, 543; 'Abd Allāh b. Lutf Allāh Ḥāfiz al-Abṛū, Dhayl-i jāmi' al-tawārīkh-i Rashidī (edited by Khān Bābā Bayānī. Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehran, no. 88. Tehran, 1350/1971), 101 n.1.

¹⁰⁰ Spuler, 158, 184.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 158.

¹⁰² Al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, 606.

¹⁰³ Qāshānī, 89.

¹⁰⁴ Spuler, 90; Ismā'īl b. 'Alī Abū l-Fidā, The Memoirs of a Syrian Prince Abu 'l-Fidā', Sultan of Hamah [672-732/1273-1331] (translated by P.M. Holt. Freiburger Islamstudien, vol. 9. Wiesbaden. Steiner, 1983), 18, 24-5;

703/1304 when he succeeded his brother as Ilkhan, he came under opposing influences at court. The first minister, Rashīd al-Dīn, who was a Shāfi'īte and in conflict with the Ḥanafītes at court,¹⁰⁶ attempted to break their influence. For this purpose, he introduced in Ramaḍān 707/February-March 1308 the Shafi'īte scholar Nizām al-Dīn 'Abd al-Malik al-Marāghī at court¹⁰⁷ who engaged the Ḥanafīte scholars in frequent debates.¹⁰⁸ Subsequently, he gained the confidence of the Ilkhan and was appointed the chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of Iran.¹⁰⁹ He held this position until his death in Sha'ḥbān 716/October-November 1316.¹¹⁰ Apparently under his influence, Uljaytū was converted to the Shāfi'īte school of law in 707/1308.¹¹¹ Disputes between the two groups, however, did not end.¹¹² This apparently upset the Ilkhan so that he decided to abandon the Shafi'īte school also.¹¹³ Eventually he joined Shi'ite Islam in Sha'ḥbān 709/January-February 1310¹¹⁴ and ordered that the names of the twelve Imams be mentioned in the Friday prayers¹¹⁵ and that they be substituted for the

A.K.M.d'Ohsan, *Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchinguiz-Khan jusqu'à Timour Bey ou Tamerlan* (Amsterdam, 1852), 4:536.

¹⁰⁶ Qāshānī, 28, 34; Shushtarī, 2:356; also 'Abbās Zaryāb, "Struggle of the Religious Sects in the Ilkhanid Court," in *La Persia Nel Medioevo* (Rom, 1971), 465.

¹⁰⁶ Qāshānī, 89.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 74, 89.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 89; Shushtarī, 2 357, Ḥāfiz al-Abrū, 101 n.1; d'Ohsan, 4:537.

¹⁰⁹ Qāshānī, 74.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 190.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 89.

¹¹² Ibid., 89-90.

¹¹³ Ḥāfiz al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.102), d'Ohsan, 4:537-8.

¹¹⁴ Qāshānī, 93; no exact date of the conversion is known. However, in Sha'ḥbān 709/January-February 1310 (ibid., 93), the Ilkhān ordered the change of the coinage. Thus the date of his conversion must be either identical with, or precede, this event. (See also Ibn Abī l-Fadā'il al-Mufaddal, "Histoire des sultans Mamlouks," (edited and translated by E.Bloch) *Patrologia Orientalis* 20 (1929):171-2 who reports also 709/1310 as the year when the conversion took place. Other sources give earlier dates. Al-'Azzāwī (1 489), who does not mention the earlier conversion from the Ḥanafīte to the Shafi'īte school, dates the conversion in 707/1307-8. According to al-Afandī (1:361), Uljaytū joined Shi'ism in 708/1308-9.

¹¹⁵ Ḥāfiz al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.103); d'Ohsan, 4:541, Ghāzān already intended to exclude the names of the first three

names of the first four Caliphs on the coinage.¹¹⁶ Uljaytu apparently tried unsuccessfully to convert the entire population of Iran and Iraq to Shi'ism.¹¹⁷

The sources differ about al-Ḥillī's role in connection with the Ilkhan's last conversion. Some biographical accounts of al-Ḥillī suggest that he was mainly responsible for convincing him of the truth of Shi'ism¹¹⁸ and they offer two versions of how he attracted the Ilkhan's attention.¹¹⁹

One version¹²⁰ says that Uljaytū in a state of anger divorced his wife, which he soon regretted deeply. The lawyers at court, however, could not find any way to nullify this divorce according to their laws and the only suggestion they could offer was that a Shi'ite lawyer would be able to annul it. Consequently, al-Ḥillī was summoned to court where he engaged in discussions with Sunnite scholars. His success in defeating his opponents in the debate made such an impression upon Uljaytū that he adopted Shi'ism.¹²¹ According

caliphs from the Friday prayers but failed to do so following the advice of Rashīd al-Dīn (Qashānī, 87-8).

¹¹⁶Spuler, 159; Ḥafiz al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.103); d'Ohsson, 4:541.

¹¹⁷Muhammad b. 'Abd Allāh b. Batūta, The Travels of Ibn Battuta, A.D.1325-1354 (translated with revisions and notes from the Arabic text edited by C.DeFrémery and B.R.Sanguetti) by H.A.R.Gibb, Cambridge, 1958-71), 2:58-9; Abu l-Mahāsīn Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf b. Taghrīb. rdī, al-Nujūm al-ḡāhibiyya fī 'māluk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira (Cairo: Dār al-kuṭūb al-miṣriyya, 1348-92 [1929-72]), 9:238, see also Zaryab, 466 where a summary of the account of Shāh Tahmāsp Safawī's Takmilat al-akhbār is given, also Ibn Kathīr, 14:77; Spuler, 202 n.78. Apparently, Uljaytū was more successful in motivating the members of the court to embrace Shi'ism; see Qashānī, 92.

¹¹⁸E.g. al-Afandī, 1:361.

¹¹⁹Al-Khwansārī, 2:279 ff; al-Ḥillī, 24:231ff.

¹²⁰Al-Khwansārī, 2:279-80.

¹²¹The historical sources do not report such an event. However, in Muḥarram 707/July 1307 a debate took place between Nizām al-Dīn 'Abd al-Malik and his Hanafite opponents on adultery and the legality of marriage with a mother and her daughter (Qashānī, 89-90). During this debate, which was initiated by the Hanafites in order to defeat Nizām al-Dīn, both sides displayed extreme fanaticism. This event induced Uljaytū to turn away from both schools of law (ibid.). The version of the Shi'ite biographers may be based on this event, although it took place before al-Ḥillī's time.

to the other version,¹²² the Ilkhan called scholars of several Islamic schools to court and ordered them to debate various theological questions. Owing to the impression al-Ḥillī made on Uljaytū, the latter embraced Shi'ism.

The historical sources of the period do not confirm these reports. Some of these sources attribute a decisive role in Uljaytū's conversion 709/1310 to another Shi'ite, Tāj al-Dīn al-Awjī from Mashhad¹²³ who was the appointed minister of religious affairs.¹²⁴ According to another report, Uljaytū had a dream during his visit to Mashhad 'Alī in Rajab 709/December 1309 which moved him to adopt Shi'ism.¹²⁵ A thunder clap is also said to have influenced him to convert.¹²⁶ There are reports that Amīr Tarmatāsh, who has been a close advisor of Ghāzān¹²⁷ with sympathies for the Shi'ites,¹²⁸ induced Uljaytū to embrace Shi'ism; when Uljaytū abandoned the Shāfi'ite school of law Amīr Tarmatash suggested that he should consider the possibility of joining Shi'ism.¹²⁹

The sources differ also about the date of al-Ḥillī's arrival at court. Al-Afandī states that he was already at court in 708/1308-9.¹³⁰ Those sources, according to which al-Ḥillī played a decisive role in the conversion of the Ilkhan to Shi'ism, imply that al-Ḥillī arrived at court before Sha'bān 709/January 1310. In contrast, Qashanī reports that al-Ḥillī and his son, together with some other

¹²²Al-Khwānsārī, 2:279; Ibn Batūta also ascribes to al-Ḥillī a decisive role in Uljaytū's conversion to Shi'ite Islam; see Ibn Batūta, 2:57; similarly Ibn Kathīr, 14:77.

¹²³Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 101, 101 n.1; see also al-Muntawfī al-Qazwīnī, 608; al-'Azzāwī, 1:409; Shushtarī, 2:358; Ibn Taghrībirdī, 9:238.

¹²⁴Qāshānī, 116. On 2 Dhū al-Ḥijja 711/10 April 1312, he was executed because of his relations with Sa'd al-Dīn, Rashīd al-Dīn's opponent at court. The immediate occasion for his execution was a measure which Tāj al-Dīn took in his function as minister of religious affairs, which Rashīd al-Dīn disliked (ibid., 116-7).

¹²⁵Qāshānī, 92; Shushtarī, 2:359; Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p. 102).

¹²⁶Qāshānī, 91.

¹²⁷Ibid., 91.

¹²⁸Ibid., 87.

¹²⁹Ibid., 81.

¹³⁰Al-Afandī, 1:361.

Shi'ite scholars, were summoned to court only after the conversion of Uljaytū to Shi'ism.¹³¹ From among those, Uljaytū chose al-Hillī as an advisor while the other scholars were permitted to return home.¹³² Al-Hillī subsequently had many discussions with Uljaytū on theological issues and introduced him to the teachings of Shi'ism.¹³³ These discussions confirmed the Ilkhan in his decision to join this persuasion.

Despite the contradictory reports of the different historians, there are a number of sound indications that al-Hillī arrived at court before the conversion. In Rabī' II 709/September-October 1309 he issued a teaching permit (*ijāza*) to Tāj al-Dīn 'Abd al-Wahid al-Rāzī in Sulṭāniyya,¹³⁴ the city which Uljaytū had chosen for his future capital.¹³⁵ Moreover, according to the account of Rashid al-Dīn¹³⁶ al-Hillī accompanied the Ilkhan in Rajab 709/December 1309 on a visit of the tomb of Salman Fārisī. On the basis of this evidence it is likely that he had some influence in the conversion of Uljaytū.

During their stay at court, al-Hillī and his son were frequently engaged in theological discussions with other scholars. There is evidence that they took part in a lengthy debate at court on 25 Dhū al-Qa'da 710/14 April 1311,¹³⁷ which Uljaytū himself proposed. In the course of the debate, the value of poverty was discussed.¹³⁸ The Shi'ite biographical

¹³¹ Qāshānī, 93.

¹³² Ibid., 93. According to Ibn al-Fuwatī (*Majma'*, 4:318-9), Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqin stayed at court only from 710/1310 onwards.

¹³³ Qāshānī, 92.

¹³⁴ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, "Ijāza Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Rāzī," in al-Majlisī, *Bihar*, 107, 142.

¹³⁵ Qāshānī, 52ff.

¹³⁶ Khwāja Rashid al-Dīn, "Fā'idat-i ziyarat," *Farhang-i Irānzamin* 23 (1357/1978):75.

¹³⁷ See J. van Ess, *Der Wesir und seine Gelehrten* (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. XLV.4. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), 44.

¹³⁸ See van Ess, *Wesir*, 44, also Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd Amulī, *Nafa'is al-funūn fī 'arā'is al-'uyun* (edited by Abu l-Hasan Sha'rānī. Tehran, 1377-79/1958-60), 2:259.

accounts of al-Ḥillī portray his superiority in this kind of debate over his Sunnite opponents and especially over Nizām al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik.¹³⁹

During his stay at court, al-Ḥillī dedicated his Risāla al-saʿdīyya to the minister Saʿd al-Dīn who was an enemy of Rashīd al-Dīn. This is surprising since al-Ḥillī was on general on good term with Rashīd al-Dīn. The quarrels between the latter and Saʿd al-Dīn had apparently started in 710/1310-1.¹⁴⁰ On 10 Shawwāl 711/19 February 1312 Saʿd al-Dīn was executed for embezzlement.¹⁴¹ On 2 Dhū al-Ḥijja 711/10 April 1312, Tāj al-Dīn al-Awjī, his two sons and some other men were executed because of their close relations with Saʿd al-Dīn.¹⁴² However, al-Ḥillī's relations with Rashīd al-Dīn do not seem to have deteriorated. In a list of proposed recipients of presents from Rashīd al-Dīn written in 712/1312-3, al-Ḥillī is shown as due to receive a riding-horse with a saddle, a shoulder-belt and 2000 dīnār.¹⁴³

Rashīd al-Dīn's competence as a scholar and his desire to exchange views with other scholars are evident in several of his works where he collected his correspondence with the representatives of various disciplines.¹⁴⁴ Al-Ḥillī's name

¹³⁹Al-Shushtarī, 1 571-2, also Ḥāfiẓ al-Abru, 101 n.1 (on p.103), however, Nizām al-Dīn's performance cannot have been entirely unsatisfactory since he held his position as Qādī al-quḍat until his death in 716/1316 (see supra, p.24). Moreover, Qashanī reports that Uljaytu continued to appreciate his presentations after his conversion (Qashanī, 191).

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 109ff; see also al-ʿAzzawī, 1:418; Ghiyāth al-Dīn Khwāndamīr, "Dastūr al-wuzarāʾ," (translated by Ḥarbī Amin Sulaymān, in al-Muʿarrakh al-ʿIrānī al-kabīr Ghiyāth al-Dīn Khwāndamīr, by Ḥarbī Amin Sulaymān, Cairo al-Hayʾa al-miṣriyya al-ʿamma 11-1-kitāb, 1980), 373ff; Ḥāfiẓ al-Abru, 97ff.

¹⁴¹Qashanī, 114, Spuler, 94; Ḥāfiẓ al-Abru, 98.

¹⁴²Qashanī, 116.

¹⁴³Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn, Mukatabāt, Rashīdī (ed. by Muḥammad Shafīʿ, Lahore, 1364/1945), 61 (no.15); the dating of this letter in 712 was proposed by J. van Ess ("Bibliographische Notizen zur islamischen Theologie," *Die Welt des Orients* 9 (1978):267).

¹⁴⁴For these works, see van Ess, Wesir; in the introduction to his kitāb bayān al-ḥaqāʾiq, Rashīd al-Dīn stresses his own quality as a scholar and claims that he often defeated other scholars in discussions; see van Ess, Wesir, 39. Evidence for

occurs several times in the lists of scholars with whom he held discussions, or exchanged letters.¹⁴⁵ On one occasion, al-Ḥillī himself addressed Rashīd al-Dīn with two questions. First, he requested him to explain the apparent contradiction between a statement of the prophet in Qur'an XXII:4 and a tradition from the Imam Ḥalī. Secondly, he asked how the contradictions between Qur'an XV:92 and XXXVII:24 on the one hand and Qur'an LV:39 on the other in regard to man's responsibility for his sins might be resolved.¹⁴⁶ The fact that al-Ḥillī, a scholar with a high reputation, posed questions to Rashīd al-Dīn, a Jewish convert to Islam, and recorded them together with the answers,¹⁴⁷ indicates his eagerness to ingratiate himself with the vizier. The latter's appreciation of al-Ḥillī is in turn reflected by his inclusion of him in the list of those entitled to receive presents. With the sum of 2,000 dīnār assigned to him, al-Ḥillī appears to have been particularly favoured by Rashīd al-Dīn, since several others received only 1,000 dīnārs, and nobody more than 2,000 dīnārs.¹⁴⁸

The relationship between Uljaytū and al-Ḥillī was apparently excellent.¹⁴⁹ Uljaytū seems to have been most eager to acquire religious knowledge.¹⁵⁰ Al-Ḥillī was highly regarded by him as a scholar and through him, the Ilkhan was

Rashīd al-Dīn's thorough acquaintance with philosophy can equally be found in al-Ḥillī's *kashf al-khafa'* where he frequently mentions the vizier's views on philosophical questions.

¹⁴⁵ See van Ess, *Wesir*, 47 (C 9).

¹⁴⁶ See *ibid.*, 47-8.

¹⁴⁷ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, "Risāla fī su'ālayn ba'āda 'anhumā khwāja 'Rashīd al-Dīn," in: *Farhang-i Iranzamin* 19 (1352/1973): 106-117.

¹⁴⁸ See Rashīd al-Dīn, *Mukātabāt*, 57-69, the financial recompense which he and other scholars received for their services was apparently generous; see Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Ḥalī al-Asqalanī b. Hajar, *al-Durar al-kamīna fī a'yān al-ma'a al-thāmina* (edited by Muḥammad Sayyid Jādd al-Haqq, Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-hadītha, 1966-7), 2:158 (no.1618); Ibn Hajar then goes on to say polemically that al-Ḥillī was *richer*.

¹⁴⁹ See e.g. Ahmad b. Ḥalī al-Maqrīzī, *al-Suluk li-ma'rifat dawal al-muluk* (edited by Muḥammad Mustafā Ziyādeh, Cairo, 1934-58), 2:1-278; al-Khwansārī, 2:281.

¹⁵⁰ Van Ess, *Wesir*, 39.

introduced to Shi'ite theological dogmatics.¹⁵¹ For this purpose, he frequently held conversations with al-Hillī.¹⁵² Moreover, he appointed al-Hillī as a teacher in the mobile school, the madrasa sayyāka, a position which was apparently reserved for scholars with a very close relationship with the Ilkhan.¹⁵³ This school was apparently founded at the suggestion of Rashīd al-Dīn¹⁵⁴ for the purpose of accompanying the Ilkhan wherever he went.¹⁵⁵ Other scholars who were probably not so close to him were appointed to teaching positions in the numerous schools founded by him in Sultāniyya.¹⁵⁶ There is also evidence that al-Hillī used to accompany the Ilkhan on his journeys independently of the school.¹⁵⁷ On several occasions, the Ilkhan addressed a specific question to al-Hillī about which the latter then wrote a treatise for him. This was the case concerning the question of the abrogation of religious law,¹⁵⁸ the merit of the veneration of tombs¹⁵⁹ and a question related to the Imamate.¹⁶⁰ During his stay at Uljaytū's court he also wrote several polemical works which he dedicated to the Ilkhan. These were his Nahj

151 Qāshānī, 93.

152 Ibid., 93.

153 Al-Khwansārī, 2:281. Apart from him the other teachers were Nizām al-Dīn 'Abd al-Malik al-Maraghī (d. 716/1316), Nūr al-Dīn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hakīm al-Tustarī, Barhan al-Dīn al-'Ibrī (d. 743/1343) and 'Adud al-Dīn al-Ijī (d. 756/1355); Hafiz al-Abrū (101 n.1 (on p.104)) and al-Shushtarī (2:300) also include Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqin among the teachers.

154 Hafiz al-Abrū, 104.

155 Al-Shushtarī, 2:360, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Khwāndamīr, Ta'rikh-habib-i siyar fi akhbār-i afrūd-i bashar (edited by Jalāl al-Dīn Humā'ī, Tehran, Kitabkhāna-yi Khayyām, 1333/1954), 3:197.

156 Amulī, 2:258; Qāshānī, 52.

157 See supra, p.27 for the visit at the tomb of Salmān Fārisī in 709/1309; in Ramadān 712/December 1312 al-Hillī reports having stayed with the Ilkhan in Jurjān, see Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, al-Alfayn al-fāriq bayn al-siqq wa-l-mayn (edited by Husayn al-'Alamī, Beirut: Mu'assasat al-'Alamī, 1402/1982), 445.

158 Jawāb al-sū'āl 'an hikmat al-naskh fī l-shkām al-īlahiyya, this treatise is lost.

159 See van Ess, Wasir, 42.

160 Qāshānī, 93-6.

al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-siḍq, the Minhāj al-karāma fī l-imāma, the Istiqṣā' al-nazar fī l-qadā' wa-l-qadar and the hashf al-yaqīn fī faḍā'il Amīr al-mu'minīn.

It is noteworthy that al-Ḥillī's son, Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, also gained high esteem at court while still relatively young - in 709/1309-10 he was only 27 years old. Although it is not certain that he was also appointed a teacher in the madrasa sayyāra, Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that he was occasionally asked either by him or by the Ilkhan to write a treatise on various subjects.¹⁶¹

There is no definite information on the date of al-Ḥillī's departure from court. Ḥafīz al-Abrū reports that he and his son received permission to return to al-Ḥilla during the lifetime of Uljaytū.¹⁶²

This agrees with the reports of some historians that Uljaytū rejoined Sunnite Islam during his lifetime, mainly as a result of his failure to convert the people of Iran and Iraq to Shi'ism.¹⁶³ Yet the Persian historians who were best acquainted with the situation at court do not confirm this and the numismatic evidence indicates that it was only Uljaytū's son, Abū Sa'īd, who returned to Sunnite Islam.¹⁶⁴ Ḥabbās Zaryāb argues that following the execution of Tāj al-Dīn Awjī in 711/1312, Shi'ite influence at court declined and to some extent Uljaytū turned away from Shi'ism.¹⁶⁵ This opinion cannot easily be supported by the historical evidence available. As seen above, al-Ḥillī's relations with Rashīd al-Dīn, and apparently also with Uljaytū, were good at least until 712/1312-3 and it is unlikely that al-Ḥillī's departure from the court was due to Uljaytū's declining interest in Shi'ism following the disappearance of Tāj al-Dīn Awjī's influence at court. Moreover, Mufaddal reports that in 716/1316-7 Uljaytū supported a plan, proposed by Ḥumayda b. Abī Numay al-Makkī (d. 720/1320) and favoured by the Shi'ites, to march to Medina and destroy the tombs of Abū

¹⁶¹ See van Ess, *Wesir*, 44, 48 (C 10).

¹⁶² Ḥafīz al-Abrū, 103.

¹⁶³ Ibn Bāṭūta, 2:58-61.

¹⁶⁴ See al-Āzzāwī, 1:409; Ibn Kathīr, 14:77.

¹⁶⁵ Zaryāb, 466.

Bakr and Umar there. The plan failed because the Mongol attackers were defeated by an army of Arabs led by the Amīr Muḥammad b. Isā.¹⁶⁶ Uljaytū died only shortly afterwards.¹⁶⁷ The report clearly implies that Uljaytū continued to adhere to Shi'ite Islam until his death.

There is firm evidence that al-Ḥillī and his son stayed in Sulṭāniyya during the first half of the year 715/1315.¹⁶⁸ At some time between 3 Jumādā I 715/5 August 1315¹⁶⁹ and 14 Muḥarram 716/8 April 1316¹⁷⁰ al-Ḥillī apparently left Sulṭāniyya for al-Ḥilla. It is not clear how long he stayed there but he must have returned for some time to Sulṭāniyya where he is known to have been on 26 Jumādā I 716/16 August 1316,¹⁷¹ four months before the death of Uljaytū on 27 Ramaḍān 716 /13 December 1316.

¹⁶⁶Spuler, 159; Y. Rāqib, "Un épisode obscur d'Histoire Fatimide," Studia Islamica 48 (1978):131; Ibn Kathīr, 14:78; also Magrīzī, 2/1:147-8.

¹⁶⁷Ibn Taghribirdī, 9:238-9; Ibn Kathīr, 14:78.

¹⁶⁸On 6 Rabī' I or Rabī' II 715/10 June or July 1315, Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqin completed his Mi'rāj al-yaqīn fī sharḥ naḥj al-muštariḥidīn in Sulṭāniyya; see Aḥa Buzurg, Dhari'a, 21:237.

¹⁶⁹On this date, al-Ḥillī completed a section of his Tadhkira in Sulṭāniyya; see Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, Tadhkirat al-fuqahā (Tehran al-Murtadawiyya, 1984), 2:289, see also M. Shirwānī, Fihrist-i nuskhahā-yi khattī yi Kitābkhāna-yi Wazīrī (Tehran, 1350sh), 1:52-3, Fihrist-i kutub-i Kitābkhāna-yi mubāraka-yi Āstān-i Quds-i Ridawī, (Maḥḥad, 1305sh-) 5:383.

¹⁷⁰On this date, al-Ḥillī completed another section of the Tadhkira in al-Ḥilla; see his Tadhkira, 1:295. See, however, M.T. Danishpazuhī, "Nuskhahā-yi khattī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Āyat Allāh Ridawī dar shahr-i Kashan," Nashriyya-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī-yi Dānishgāh-i Tehran dar bara-yi nuskhahā-yi khattī 7 (Tehran, 1353sh): 33 and Fihrist-i Ridawī, 5:382 where no place is mentioned.

¹⁷¹On this date, he completed another section of his Tadhkira; see his Tadhkira, 2:451; see also Fihrist-i Ridawī, 5:383.

4. al-Hillī's Last Years

From various notes in the sources it is evident that al-Hillī stayed during this period mostly in al-Hilla where he was engaged in teaching. There is evidence that in 717/1317-8 Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinar, who had formerly been qādī in Medina¹⁷² and arrived in Iraq in 716/1316-7,¹⁷³ studied with al-Hillī in the latter's home in al-Hilla.¹⁷⁴ At this time al-Hillī had already compiled his answers to some questions posed by him. Sayyid Muhanna' records that he formulated his questions in Baghdad and then sent them to al-Hillī in al-Hilla.¹⁷⁵ In Dhū al-Hijja 719 January-February 1320 al-Hillī issued an ijāza to Sayyid Muhanna' which, according to his own testimony, was written in al-Hilla.¹⁷⁶ The same applies to al-Hillī's second ijāza to Sayyid Muhanna' which he wrote in Muharram 720 February-March 1320.¹⁷⁷ Further evidence that al-Hillī lived in his home town during this period is provided by his Tadhkira, parts of which he finished in al-Hilla on 6 Ramaḍān 718, 1 November 1318,¹⁷⁸ on 12 Rabi' I 719/3 May 1319,¹⁷⁹ on 19 Shawwāl 719/3

¹⁷² Al-Bahrānī, 208 n.28 (on p.209, about him, see al-Aṣfandī, 5:222-3; al-ʿAmīlī, 49:18ff (no.11077), Agha Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:223-5; Ibn Hajar, 5:138 (no.4864).

¹⁷³ Agha Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 224, *idem*, Dhārīʿa, 5:238.

¹⁷⁴ Al-Hillī, Ajwiba, 13.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 13:18.

¹⁷⁶ Al-Hillī, "Ijāza li-Muhanna' b. Sinar," 146, in the edition of this ijāza in al-Hillī's Ajwiba (117), no place is mentioned. Agha Buzurg (Dhārīʿa, 1:178 (no.9101), Tabaqāt, 5:224) reports the date as Dhū al-Hijja 709 May 1310 for this ijāza. This must be a mistake.

¹⁷⁷ Al-Hillī, Ajwiba, 157. see also *idem*, "Ijāza khraʿ li-Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinar," in al-Majlisī, Bihar, 107:149 where no place is mentioned.

¹⁷⁸ See ʿAḥmadī et al., Fihrist al-Kitābkhāna-yi Maʿlūg-i Shūrā-yi Millī (Tehran, 1305-57sh), 17:235; Danishpāhūh, "Kāshan," 33; O.Loth and R.Levy, A Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office, (London, 1877), 2:307.

¹⁷⁹ See Loth, 2:308; Agha Buzurg, Dhārīʿa, 4:44.

December 1319¹⁸⁰ and on 16 Dhū al-Ḥijja 720/17 January 1321.¹⁸¹ On 15 Sha^cban 723/19 August 1323 al-Ḥillī issued the great ijāza to the Banū Zuhra.¹⁸² Unfortunately, he does not mention the place of his writing.¹⁸³

According to Ibn Ḥajar, al-Ḥillī performed a pilgrimage to Mecca in the last years of his life where he is said to have met Ibn Taymiyya¹⁸⁴ but this report is not confirmed by any other source.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya is not known to have made a pilgrimage during the years in question.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁰ Fihrist-i Ridawī, 5:383.

¹⁸¹ Al-Ḥillī, Tadhkira, 2:661; see also M. Pādīl, Fihrist-i nuskhahay-i khattī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Danishkāda-yi Ilāhiyyāt (Mashhad, 1976-), 2:244; Āghā Buzurg, Dharrī^ca, 4:43.

¹⁸² See also al-Bahrānī, 201 n.18 (on p. 203) according to whom this ijāza was dated 25 Sha^cbān/29 August.

¹⁸³ Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 137.

¹⁸⁴ Ibn Ḥajar, 2:159, the report that al-Ḥillī met Ibn Taymiyya was later added to the margin of the Durār al-kāmīna (ibid., 153 n.2).

¹⁸⁵ Al Afandī (1:384-5) quotes the passage from the Durār al-kāmīna (without the marginal note) and expresses his doubts about it.

¹⁸⁶ See H. Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyya," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3:952.

5. Al-Hillī's Students

With his high reputation as a scholar, al-Hillī attracted a large number of students during his life.¹⁸⁷

The most important of them was his son, Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn (682/1283-771/1369),¹⁸⁸ who accompanied him everywhere until the father's death in 726/1325. According to the biographical reports on him he was an outstanding scholar. He wrote commentaries on a number of his father's works. In regard to al-Hillī's legal works, he wrote Idāḥ al-fawa'id fī ḥall mushkilāt al-qawa'id¹⁸⁹ and Sharḥ khutbat al-qawa'id which are both commentaries on al-Hillī's Qawa'id al-aḥkam. Further, he wrote Ghāyat al-su'āl,¹⁹⁰ a commentary on his father's Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl on legal methodology. Of the latter's theological works, he commented on the Nahj al-mustarshidīn.¹⁹¹ He also wrote a number of independent works on theology such as the Kafiya fī l-kalām.¹⁹² From Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn's different ijāzas it appears that he started teaching together with his father and eventually took over a number of the latter's students after his father's death.¹⁹³ Some of his ijāzas are dated between 701/1301-2 and 706/1306-7. This shows that he was recognized as an outstanding scholar while still relatively young.

¹⁸⁷ See *infra*, pp. 93-5, for a list of the ijāzat which he had issued to his different students.

¹⁸⁸ About him, see al-Bahrānī, 190-4 (no. 73), al-Khamsari, 6:330ff, al-Afandi, 5:77ff, al-Kaḥhālā, 9:228, al-ʿAmīlī, 44:32 (no. 9806); Brockelmann, GAL, 2:212; GALS, 2:209.

¹⁸⁹ See Brockelmann, GALS, 2:207.

¹⁹⁰ See Aghā Bīzār, Dharīʿa, 13:169.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 14:163.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 17:250; see also Modarressi, 76, 103, 119, 152, 163 for his legal works.

¹⁹³ See later.

Two further important students of al-Ḥillī were his nephews ʿAmīd al-Dīn (681/1282-3 754/1353)¹⁹⁴ and Ḍiḡa' al-Dīn al-ʿAḡraǵī al-Ḥusaynī (683/1284 5 after 740/1339-40). Both also appear sometimes in the ijāzas of various scholars as teachers besides al-Ḥillī and Fakhr al-Muḡaqqiqīn.¹⁹⁵ This suggests that they, too, took over some of al-Ḥillī's students after the latter's death. Since both were born around the same time as Fakhr al-Muḡaqqiqīn, it may be assumed that all three began their studies with al-Ḥillī at about the same time. However, while there is clear evidence that Fakhr al-Muḡaqqiqīn accompanied al-Ḥillī to the court of Uljaytū and on the trips of the maḡrama sayyara, no such evidence is available regarding ʿAmīd al-Dīn and Ḍiḡa' al-Dīn. Yet the possibility that they also attended this school should not be ruled out. Like Fakhr al-Muḡaqqiqīn, the two brothers wrote commentaries on several of al-Ḥillī's works. ʿAmīd al-Dīn commented on al-Ḥillī's Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl¹⁹⁶ and on the Qawāʿid al-ahkām.¹⁹⁷ Of al-Ḥillī's theological works, he wrote commentaries on the Nahj al-mustarshidīn¹⁹⁸ and the Anwar al-malakūt.¹⁹⁹ Ḍiḡa' al-Dīn wrote a commentary on the Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl,²⁰⁰ and another one on the Nahj al-mustarshidīn²⁰¹ which he completed in 703/1303-4. Moreover, he commented on the Tasīk al-nafs.²⁰² The commentaries of the brothers on al-Ḥillī's Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl were especially important. These two works were vital for the development of Shiʿite legal methodology. In

194 About him, see al-Khwānsārī, 4:264-8 (no.394), Ibn Fuwaṭī, Muḡlam, 2:925-6.

195 See later.

196 See Agha Buzurg, Dharrīʿa, 13:168.

197 Kitāb fī kanz al-fawā'id fī ḥall mushkilāt al-qawā'id, see ibid., 18:162.

198 Tafsīrat al-tālibīn fī sharḥ nahj al-mustarshidīn, see ibid., 3:318.

199 See ibid., 13:115.

200 Munyat al-labīb, see ibid., 13:168.

201 Tadhkirat al-wā'ilīn fī nahj al-mustarshidīn, see ibid., 4:51.

202 Idāh al-labs fī sharḥ tasīk al-nafs, see ibid., 2:498.

his Jāmi^c al-bayn, the Shahīd al-awwal Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Makkī (d. 786/1384) joined these two commentaries together with some additional useful notes by himself.²⁰³

Al-Hillī's ijāzas indicate that the circle of his students in al-Hilla was already large by the time he left for the court of Uljaytū.

Among these students was Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Futūḥ b. ^cAlī b. Āwī²⁰⁴ who received an ijāza from al-Hillī in 705/1305-6.²⁰⁵ Evidence exists that he studied in 703/1304 with al-Hillī²⁰⁶ and was also a student at the madrasa sayyara.²⁰⁷ He studied also with Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn who issued to him two ijāzas in 705/1305-6.²⁰⁸ Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. ^cAlī al-^cAlawī al-Ḥusaynī al-Tūsī²⁰⁹ received his ijāza in Muḥarram 704/August-September 1304 for al-Hillī's Irshād al-adhhān.²¹⁰ ^cAlī b. Isma^cīl b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ al-Gharawī²¹¹ was given an ijāza by al-Hillī on 12 Rajab 701/13 March 1302 for the latter's Irshād al-adhhān.²¹² and by Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn in 705/1305-6.²¹³ In Rajab 705/January-February 1306 al-Hillī issued an ijāza to Rashīd al-Dīn ^cAlī b. Muḥammad Rashīd al-Āwī²¹⁴ who studied the Risālat al-Ḥisāb of Naṣīr al-Dīn

²⁰³ See *ibid.*, 23:207-8; also Modarressi, 8.

²⁰⁴ See about him Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:5.

²⁰⁵ See Āghā Buzurg, Dhārī^ca, 1:176 (no.898); also al-^cĀmilī, 7:274.

²⁰⁶ He completed on 21 Ramadān 703 29 April 1304 a copy of al-Hillī's Mabādī' al-wasūl and received an ijāza for this work from al-Hillī, see Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:5.

²⁰⁷ On 20 Rajab 717/29 September 1317 he completed in Sulṭāniyya a copy of Mitham al-Bahrānī's Qawā'id al-marām; see Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:5.

²⁰⁸ See Āghā Buzurg, Dhārī^ca, 1:234-5 (no.1232); *idem*, Tabaqāt, 5:5. The two ijāzas were issued for al-Hillī's Mabādī' al-wasūl la' al-ilm al-usul and his Nahj al-mustarshidin. For the quotations of the two ijāzat, see H. A. Mahfūz, "Nafā'is al-Makhtūtāt al-^cArabiyya fī Irān," Majallat Maḥad al-Makhtūtāt al-^cArabiyya 3 (1957):19-20.

²⁰⁹ Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. ^cAlī Sharaf al-Dīn al-^cAlawī al-Ḥusaynī al-Tūsī; about him, see Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:58-9.

²¹⁰ See Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:58 for the quotation of this ijāza; see also *idem*, Dhārī^ca, 1:177 (no.903).

²¹¹ Zayn al-Dīn ^cAlī b. Isma^cīl b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ; about him, see Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:134.

²¹² See Āghā Buzurg, Dhārī^ca, 1:177 (no.904).

²¹³ See *ibid.*, 1:235 (no.1233).

²¹⁴ See al-Afandī, 4:205, Āghā Buzurg, Dhārī^ca, 1:177 (no.905).

al-Tūsī with al-Ḥillī.²¹⁵ Al-Afandī holds that this student is not to be identified with the minister Rashīd al-Dīn.²¹⁶ Aḡhā Buzurg, however, seems to identify him with the vizier.²¹⁷ Since it is known that al-Ḥillī had discussions and corresponded frequently with Rashīd al-Dīn it would be possible that he gave the latter an ijāza. However, the date seems to preclude this. Al-Ḥillī arrived at the court only in 709/1309, and it is extremely unlikely that Rashīd al-Dīn could have left the court for a while in order to study with al-Ḥillī. Another student of his at this time appears to have been Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī al-Gharawī, author of a commentary on al-Ḥillī's Mabādī' al-wuṣūl which he completed on 19 Shawwāl 697/30 July 1298.²¹⁸ Diyā' al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Hārūn al-Ṭabrisī²¹⁹ received his ijāza for al-Ḥillī's Qawā'id al-aḥkām on 17 Rajab 701/18 March 1302.²²⁰ In 707/1307-8, al-Ḥillī issued an ijāza for his Qawā'id al-aḥkām to Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī al-Hargalī.²²¹ The latter had also studied with the Muḥaqqiq al-awwal.²²² 'Izz al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn b. Ibrāhīm b. Yahyā al-Astarābādī²²³ received al-Ḥillī's ijāza on 28 Ṣafar 708/17 August 1308.²²⁴

The students to whom an ijāza was issued between the years 709/1309 and 714/1314-5 are probably those who attended al-Ḥillī's lessons at the madrasa sayyāra. Among them were

²¹⁵Al-Afandī, 4:205.

²¹⁶Ibid., 4:205.

²¹⁷Aḡhā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:147.

²¹⁸Ghāyat al-bādī fī sharḥ al-mabādī', see Aḡhā Buzurg, Dharī'ca, 16:10. About Rukn al-Dīn, see al-Ḥamīlī, 46:29 (no.2447).

²¹⁹Diyā' al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Hārūn b. Naṣr al-Dīn Ḥasan Mīr Shams al-Dīn 'Alī b. 'al Ḥasan al-Ṭabrisī, see about him Aḡhā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:42; 'al-Khwānsārī, 2:264-5.

²²⁰Aḡhā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:42; idem, Dharī'ca, 1:178 (no.912); also al-Khwānsārī, 2:264-5.

²²¹See Aḡhā Buzurg, Dharī'ca, 1:177 (no.906). See about him, idem, Tabaqāt, 5:179-80; also al-Ḥurr al-Ḥamīlī, 2:245 (no.721), he reports that al-Hargalī also studied al-Ḥillī's Mughṭalaf al-shī'ca with the author.

²²²See Aḡhā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:179-80; the Muḥaqqiq al-awwal gave him an ijāza for his Sharā'i'ca in 671/1272-3; see ibid.; idem, Dharī'ca, 1:164.

²²³See about him Aḡhā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:54-5.

²²⁴See Aḡhā Buzurg, Dharī'ca, 1:177 (no.902).

Taqī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī al-ʿAmulī²²⁵ who received his ijāza in 709/1309-10.²²⁶ Apparently, he was already studying in 706/1307 in al-Ḥilla, since Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn issued an ijāza to him on 12 Ramaḍān 706/17 March 1307.²²⁷ Among these students was also Sirāj al-Dīn Ḥasan b. Bahā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī al-Majd al-Sirābshānawī (ijāza dated Jumādā I 715/August-September 1315),²²⁸ and Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Qaḍī ʿAbd al-Wahīd al-Rāzī,²²⁹ (ijāza dated Rabīʿ II 709/September-Oktober 1309).²³⁰ The latter received his ijāza in Sulṭāniyya.²³¹

One of al-Ḥillī's outstanding students, whom he taught most likely also at the madrassa sayyara, was Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad (or: Maḥmūd) b. Muḥammad al-Rāzī al-Būwayhī (d. 766/1365),²³² who received his ijāza on 3 Shaʿbān 713/23 November 1313 in the region of Warāmīn.²³³ He is famous especially for his works on logic, such as his commentary on the Risāla al-ḥamsiyya of al-Katībī, and on philosophy. He evidently was a scholar of some repute even at this time since he was included in Rashīd al-Dīn's list of scholars entitled to receive gifts.²³⁴

A number of al-Ḥillī's students appear to have joined him after he returned from the court of Uljaytu or may have returned with him from there. Among the former was probably Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Yar who received his ijāza in Jumādā

²²⁵ Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī al-Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn al-ʿAmulī; see about him Aḡhā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:2.

²²⁶ Aḡhā Buzurg, Dharīʿa, 1:175-6 (no.897).

²²⁷ Aḡhā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:2, idem, Dharīʿa, 1:234 (no.1231).

²²⁸ Aḡhā Buzurg, Dharīʿa, 1:177 (no.900), about him, see idem, Tabaqāt, 5:49.

²²⁹ Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahīd al-Rāzī, see about him Aḡhā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:210-1.

²³⁰ Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Rāzī," 142; see also Aḡhā Buzurg, Dharīʿa, 1:178 (no.908).

²³¹ Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Rāzī," 142.

²³² About him, see al-Qummī, 3:612, al-Kahhālā, 11:215; al-Bahrānī, 195 6; Niʿma, 469ff.; Shushʿarī, 2:212-3; al-Suyūṭī, Bughya, 2:881 (no.1981), al-Khwansārī, 6:38-48; al-Afandī, 5:168-172; Abū Naṣr ʿAbd al-Wahhab b. Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, Tabaqāt al-Shaʿfiyya al-kubrā (Cairo, 1323-4/1905-6), 6:31.

²³³ Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī," in al-Majlisī, Bihar, 107:140.

²³⁴ Rashīd al-Dīn, Mukātabāt, 65 no.28.

II 724/May-June 1324 for al-Ḥillī's Tahrir al-ahkām²³⁵ and Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinān.²³⁶ Another student of al-Ḥillī was Taj al-Dīn b. al-Mu'ayya (d. 776/1374)²³⁷ according to the latter's testimony in an ijāza which he issued to one of his students.²³⁸ He reports there having studied also under the guidance of Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn and the brothers 'Amīd al-Dīn and Diyā' al-Dīn al-Aḥḥaḥī.²³⁹ Ibn al-Mu'ayya became a renowned scholar who wrote a large number of works in various fields such as tradition, law and history.²⁴⁰

According to the Shahīd al-awwal two more scholars studied with al-Ḥillī.²⁴¹ These were Raḍī al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ṭurād al-Maṭārābādī (d. 762/1360-1),²⁴² a scholar who taught later in al-Ḥilla,²⁴³ and Jamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Mazyadī (d. 757/1356)²⁴⁴ whose primary competence was in law.

235 See Aghā Buzurg, Dharī'at, 1:178 (no. 909), *idem*, Tabaqāt, 5:212.

236 About him, see *supra*, p. 33.

237 About him, see al-Afandī, 5:152-3; al-Khwānsārī, 6:324-9, al-Hurr al-ʿĀmilī, 2:294-5 (no. 887); al-ʿĀmilī, 46:196 (pp. 2630).

238 Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Mu'ayya, "Ijāza li-Sayyid Shams al-Dīn," in al-Majlisī, Bihār, 107:174.

239 Ibid., 174-5; see also al-Khwānsārī, 6:326.

240 See al-Khwānsārī, 6:325 for a list of his works.

241 See *ibid.*, 7:5.

242 About him, see al-Bahrānī, 190 n.1.

243 See *ibid.*

244 About him, see al-Afandī, 3:369; al-Khwānsārī, 4:345 ff (no. 409); al-Bahrānī, 190 n.2.

CHAPTER II WORKS OF AL-HILLI

1. General Introduction

The principal sources for our knowledge of al-Hillī's works derive from the author himself. In his biographical work Khulāṣat al-awṣāl, he offers an article on himself containing a list of his works up to Rabi^c II 693/March 1294.¹ In Muḥarram 720/February-March 1320, he issued a teaching permit to his student Muḥanna' b. Sinān authorizing him to teach his works and this ijāza includes a list of some of al-Hillī's books up to this date.²

Despite this fortunate circumstance there are a number of problems connected with the use of these two lists.

In regard to the KH list, it is evident that its contents cannot be as originally included in 693/1294. It contains a number of works which al-Hillī is known to have started to write much later. The most striking examples are

¹ Riḍā, 45. According to Aghā Buzurg (Dharrī^ca, 23.12), the list was dated 7 Rabi^c II 693/7 March 1294. This list will be referred to in the following as KH. The following copies of the khulāṣa have been consulted: (1) Riḍā al-Allāma (edited by Muḥammad Bahr al-ʿUlūm, Najaf, al-Haydariyya, 1961), 45-48 KH 1; (2) Kitāb al-Riḍā (Tehran, 1311 2/1893 5), 23-25 = KH 2; (3) MS Bibliothèque Nationale, 384r v KH 3; (4) MS Los Angeles M959, 5-7 KH 4; (5) MS Isma^cilī Institute 409, 19v-20v = KH 5; (6) MS Isma^cilī Institute 104, 14v-15r = KH 6; (7) MS Isma^cilī Institute 103, 20v-22r KH 7; (8) MS Princeton University Library New Series 770, 17r-18r KH 8; (9) MS Princeton University Library New Series 880, 23vff. KH 9; (10) MS Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Orientabteilung 9926, 25v-27r KH 10; (11) MS Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Orientabteilung 9927, 26r-28r = KH 11; (12) quotation in al-Khwānsārī, 2:271-3 = KH 12.

² This list will be referred to in the following as IM. The following copies have been used: (1) in al-Majlisī, Bihār, 107:147-149 = IM 1; (2) in al-Hillī, ʿAṭaba (Qum: al-Khayyām, 1401H.), 155-157 = IM 2; (3) MS India Office 1797 (278v-279r) = IM 3; (4) MS Princeton University Library New Series 960 (32v-33r) IM 4; (5) quotation in al-Afandī, 1:367ff = IM 5.

the works which he composed at the request of Uljaytū which he certainly did not begin before Rabī^c II 709/August-September 1309, the earliest date when there are safe indications for al-Ḥillī's presence at the court.³ This impression, already current among medieval authors,⁴ cannot therefore be explained by his statement at the end of the list that some of the works included have not yet been completed.⁵

Further evidence for frequent later additions to this list appears from its arrangement. At first sight, it lacks any internal order. The titles are often not placed in the appropriate sections but appear at random anywhere in the list. It is, however, possible to establish sections in the list which point to an originally logical arrangement.⁶ In addition to the presumably original sections, there are for some subjects, such as law and theology, additional sections which are completely detached from these original sections and which were most likely added later.⁷ Other titles are placed between or in the middle of inappropriate sections.⁸

It is likely that most of the additions were made during the author's lifetime and presumably even by al-Ḥillī himself. As a biographic work, the *Khulāṣa* belonged to the curriculum which al-Ḥillī used to teach. Evidence for this is found in teaching permits issued by him to numerous students of this work.⁹ In the course of this teaching he presumably regularly added the titles of those works which he wrote later. Later writers added even more titles to it but many of these later additions did not become standard.¹⁰ It is

³See *supra*, p.27.

⁴E.g. al-Afandī, 1:377.

⁵*Riḥāl*, 48.

⁶For the following examples, the numbers of the titles correspond to KH 1. Titles 1 - 6 are legal works, titles 7 - 9 are works on traditions, titles 11 - 14 are exegetical works, titles 17 - 25 are works on theology, titles 28 - 35, except title 32, are works on philosophy, titles 36 - 40 are works on grammar.

⁷Titles 45 - 49 are legal works, titles 51 - 53 are works on theology.

⁸E.g. titles 10, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58.

⁹See Agha Buzurg, *Dharrī'a*, 7:214-5.

¹⁰See e.g. al-Afandī, 1:372 ff.

therefore impossible to consider the list as an indication of the date of composition of the works included; it only indicates the authenticity of the titles as works by al-Hillī.

The problems of the IM list are of a different nature. Since it appears in a teaching permit and since it was written only six years before al-Hillī's death, its content seems to have remained largely unchanged. This is supported by the fact that the list is clearly subdivided into sections whereby each title appears in its appropriate section and no section is duplicated. It can, therefore, safely be assumed that the titles included were either partly or completely written before 720/1320.

Yet the IM obviously does not include all of al-Hillī's works. Owing to its nature as a teaching permit, al-Hillī appears to have included only those works which were suitable as books for the purpose of teaching. He therefore excluded, for example, his polemic writings which he composed at the request of Uljaytū and, apparently, also works which he did not consider as important enough to be included. Thus, neither of the lists are reliable, exhaustive catalogues of al-Hillī's entire works.

This defect led later authors to add the missing titles to their own lists of al-Hillī's works¹¹ and this resulted at times in erroneous attributions.¹²

11 See e.g. al-Afandī, 1:375ff; al-Khwānsarī, 2:273ff.

12 The following works were erroneously attributed to al-Hillī by some of his biographers: Rasā'il al-dala'il al-burhanīyya, Kitāb al-asrār fī l imāma, and al Kashkul. For these see al-ʿAmīlī, 24:255-6. Other works falsely attributed to him were the Muṭamad (Aghā Buzurg, Dharīʿa, 21:213-4) and the Majmūʿ al-akhbār (ibid., 5 37, 19 374). Al-Khwānsarī further attributed to him a work entitled Ḥashīyat talkhīs al-maram. Al-Afandī (1:379-80) rejected the existence of such a work, suggesting that this Ḥashīya consisted simply of a small number of marginal notes by al-Hillī on his Talkhīs. See also Aghā Buzurg, Dharīʿa, 6:47. Another work usually attributed to al-Hillī is entitled al-Huṣaḥ al-qawīyya fī ithbāt al waḡīyya (edited by Muḥammad Ḥādī al-Amīnī. Najaf: Dār al-kutūb al-tijārīyya, n.d.). Aghā Buzurg has shown (Dharīʿa, 6 265, no.1449) that this work cannot possibly have been written by al-Hillī.

Another more reliable source for establishing a complete list of his works is internal evidence which points to their authenticity.

The following discussion of al-Ḥillī's works is divided into two parts. First, each subject on which he composed works will be discussed separately; here, the main aim is to establish the chronological order of the works which belong to it and to determine the relative importance and the specific characteristic of each work.

In the appendix, a systematic alphabetical list of his writings will be given. The titles are arranged according to the Arabic alphabet. An attempt has been made to give the exact titles as used by al-Ḥillī himself. If different titles occur preference has been given to the one given in the works themselves. In regard to lost works whose titles differ in various copies of the KH list and the IM list, no reasonable preference could be exercised. Variants of titles will be mentioned. The information in this list consists first of the title of the work together with an indication of where the work has first been mentioned. IM, KH, or KH/IM shows that the work is included always in the indicated list. KH* indicates that only some copies include the title and that it is definitely known that the title has been added to the list at a very late stage. KH** indicates that none of the consulted copies of the KH include this title, but that Aghā Buzurg reports that there are some copies of the KH list which do include this title. These additions are usually very late and must almost certainly be considered erroneous. IM* indicates that not all copies of the IM list include this title. This is usually because of a fault of the copyist and as such without serious implications for its authenticity. TE signifies that the work in question is authentic on the basis of internal evidence, even though it is not to be found in either of the lists. DH signifies that Aghā Buzurg attributes this title in his Dharīʿa to al-Ḥillī without any further information why he does so. DH* signifies that the work in question was attributed to al-Ḥillī by later authors.

References are given in the appropriate section in the Dharī'Ca. RL signifies that al-Afandī attributes this work in his Riyāḍ al-ʿulamā to al-Ḥillī while it is not listed in the Dharī'Ca.

The list furthermore includes a reference to Aghā Buzurg's Dharī'Ca which contains additional valuable information about the work and especially locations of manuscripts mostly in private libraries in Iran and Iraq. Since the Dharī'Ca is accessible, the information given there will not be included in the present list. As far as it could be established in the first part, the dates of composition will also be indicated.

The most important editions of published works will be listed¹³ and the locations of manuscripts of extant works will also be given. Since most of the consulted manuscript catalogues are available in print, neither the date of the

¹³For further editions, it is advisable to consult Khān Bābā Mushār, Mu'allifīn-i kutub-i chāpī, fārsī wa-ʿarabī (Tehran, 1340-4/1961 5), 2:669-677 and ʿAbd al-Jabbār ʿAbd al-Rahman, Dhakhā'ir al-turāth al-ʿarabī al-islāmī (Basra, 1401-3/1981-3), 1:241-243.

copies nor whether they are complete will be indicated.¹⁴ Although an attempt was made to consult the catalogues of all the relevant manuscript collections, the information given cannot be considered exhaustive. For the theological works, a list of the important commentaries in Arabic will be offered. Translations into European languages will likewise be noted.

¹⁴The abbreviations which are used in this section are identical with those employed by Modarressi (218-237). The following abbreviations of catalogues are not listed there: Āghā Hakīm = "Kitābkhāna-yi Āghā yi Hakīm dar Najaf," Nashriyya-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī-yi Dānishgah-i Tehrān dar barā-yi nuskhahā-yi khattī, 5 (1346sh):420-28; Bibliothèque Nationale = G.Vajda and J.Sauvan, Catalogue des Manuscrits Arabes, (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1978-85); Chester Beatty = A.J.Arberry, The Chester Beatty Library. A Handlist of the Arabic Manuscripts (Dublin: Walker, 1955-66); Fayd Mahdawi = Ahmad al-Husayni, "Maktabat al-Fayd al-Mahdawi," Turathnā 9 (1407H.):23-69; Islamic Institute = A.Gacek, Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of the Institute of Islamic Studies (London, 1984-5); Oppenheim = Oppenheim Stiftung/Cologne, no published catalogue available; Princeton = E.Mach and E.L.Gresby, Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts (New Series) in the Princeton University Library (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Ridawi = the first volume of the catalogue referred to by Modarressi (233) is now available in a new edition: Alī Ardalān Jawān. Fihrist-i kutub-i khattī yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī yi Āstān-i Quds i Ridawī (Intisharāt-i Kitābkhāna yi Markazī-yi Āstān i Quds-i Ridawī, no.12. Mashhad, 1365/1987); Rampur = Imtiyaz 'Alī 'Arshī, Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Raza Library, Rampur (Rampur: Raza Library publications series no.12, Rampur: Raza Library Trust, 1963-77).

2. Theological Works

Al-Hillī's first work on theology was his Manāḥij al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn. This is known from the introduction to his Kitāb ghāyat al-wuṣūl, where he states that Manāḥij al-yaqīn and Asrār al-khafīyya were his first works on theology and philosophy.¹⁵ The Manāḥij were completed on 6 Rabi^c II 680/25 July 1281.¹⁶ The work was highly regarded by al-Hillī himself and it must be considered as second in importance, just after his most extensive work on theology, the Nihāyat al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām. Evidence for this is that he not only refers to the Manāḥij in his other theological and philosophical writings before he started writing the Nihāyat al-marām,¹⁷ but even in his later works he often refers both to the Nihāya and the Manāḥij.¹⁸ Moreover, al-Fāḍil al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423) who wrote commentaries on a number of al-Hillī's theological works used the Manāḥij as one of his principal sources.¹⁹

¹⁵ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Ghāyat al-wuṣūl wa-idaḥ al-subul fī sharḥ mukhtaṣar muntaha al-suʿāl wa-lʿamal (MS British Museum OR 3970), 2r.

¹⁶ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Manāḥij al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn (MS India Office Loth 471.6), 105v. See also M. A. Rawdātī, Fihrist al-kutub al-khattīya kitābkhanashay-i Isfahān (Isfahan, 1377H.), 97-8.

¹⁷ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Maʿarīj al-fahm fī sharḥ al-nuzum (MS India Office Loth 471.6), 110v, 115v, 118r, idem, Aswār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-yaqīn (edited by Muḥammad Zanjānī, Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehrān, no. 543, Tehrān: Tehrān University Press, 1338H.), 149, 193, 203; idem, Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ taqrīd al-ʿuṣqād (Qum: Maktabat al-mustawafī, n.d.), 126; idem, Idāḥ al-maqasid min h-kmat ʿayn al-qawā'id (edited by ʿA. Munzawī, Tehrān, 1378/1959), 229.

¹⁸ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Nahj al-mustarshidīn (together with al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's Irshād al-tālībīn ilā nahj al-mustarshidīn, Edited by Mahdī al-Rajānī, Min makhtūṭāt Āyat Allāh al-Marʿashī al-ʿamma, no. 10, Qum: Matbʿat Sayyid al-shuhadā', 1405H.), 216, 386; idem, "Kashf al-fawā'id," in Majmūʿat rasā'il (Tehrān: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʿazza al-Marʿashī al-Najafī, 1404H.), 86.

¹⁹ E.g. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī, Irshād al-tālībīn ilā nahj al-mustarshidīn (edited by Mahdī al-Rajānī, Min makhtūṭāt maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Marʿashī al-ʿamma, no. 10.

Another early work is his very brief treatise Nuzum al-barāhīn and the commentary on it, entitled Ma^cāriḥ al-fahm fī sharḥ al-nuzum. According to one manuscript copy, this commentary was completed on 6 Ramaḍān 678/10 January 1280.²⁰ Since it has safely been established that the Manāḥij was his first work on theology, it is likely that he started writing the Nuzum and the Ma^cāriḥ and completed them before he had finished the Manāḥij. That the Manāḥij and the Ma^cāriḥ were written more or less simultaneously is further indicated by cross references in both works.²¹ In his introduction, he states that he wrote the Ma^cāriḥ in order to elucidate the meanings of the Nuzum which is, owing to its concise style, difficult to understand.²² His method of expressing his ideas in the Ma^cāriḥ is therefore often more original than in his Manāḥij where he frequently bases his discussions directly on earlier works, such as Ibn al-Malāḥimī's Fa'iq. Yet except for very few exceptions his views do not differ in the Ma^cāriḥ from those in the Manāḥij.

In Jumādā II 684/August-September 1285 he completed the Anwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-yāqūt.²³ This is a commentary on the Kitāb al-yāqūt which was written by the otherwise unidentified Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. al-Nawbakhtī.²⁴ Since al-Ḥillī states in the introduction that he started to

Qum: Matba'at Sayyid al-shuhada', 1405H.), 52. He wrote commentaries on al-Ḥillī's Bāb al-hādī 'ashar and his Nahj al-mustarshidin both of which have been edited repeatedly.

²⁰Rawḍatī, 194-5.

²¹Manāḥij, 87r; Ma^cāriḥ, 110v, 115v, 118r.

²²Ma^cāriḥ, 106r.

²³Anwār, 230.

²⁴Ighāl (168ff) argued that this work was composed by a descendant of the Banū Nawbakht and that it was written in the first half of the 4th century. Muḥammad Khān Qazwīnī suggested orally to P.Kraus that it may have been compiled "not long before the commentary of al-Ḥillī" (P.Kraus, "Raziana I," Orientalia 4 (1935) 306 n.6). W.Madelung finally showed that the Kitāb al-yāqūt does not correspond to the theological doctrine of the Banū Nawbakht ("Imāmism," 15 n.1). He suggests that the work was written at the earliest in the 5th century or even later (ibid., 15). As a possible author he suggests (ibid., 15 n.1) a certain Ibrāhīm Nawbakhtī whom 'Abd al-Jalīl al-Rāzī mentions in his Kitāb al-naqḍ (written about 565/1170).

compose this commentary after having already written a number of works on theology,²⁵ it is likely that he started it after 680/1281.

On 16 Jumādā I 687/18 June 1288, he completed the first section of his Muntahā al-wuḡūl fī 'ilmay al-kalām wa-l-uḡūl which deals with theology.²⁶ The next section deals with legal methodology. This work, which is comparable in length with the Manāḥij,²⁷ is written in a much more concise style than the latter. Al-Ḥillī does not seem to have considered it as important as the Manāḥij since he refers to it only rarely in later works.²⁸ Moreover, in contrast to the Manāḥij, no commentary has been written upon it by later scholars.

Probably after having written at least some of the works mentioned above, al-Ḥillī started to write his famous commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Tajrīd al-ḥaqāiq, the Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ tajrīd al-ḥaqāiq; in the introduction he states that he began composing this commentary after having already written a number of theological works.²⁹ Since, however, he does not mention there his largest work, the Nihāyat al-marām fī 'ilm al-kalām, it seems most likely that he started to compose the Kashf al-murād before beginning the latter work. This is supported by the fact that he does not refer to the Nihāya throughout the first half of the Kashf al-murād but only to the Manāḥij³⁰ and the Asrār.³¹ Since he refers to it, however, in the second half of the Kashf al-murād,³² he apparently started to work on the Nihāya before having finished with the Kashf al-murād. He completed the Kashf on either 15 or 16 Rabī' I 696/11 or 12

²⁵ Anwār, 1.

²⁶ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, Muntahā al-wuḡūl fī 'ilmay al-kalām wa-l-uḡūl (MS British Museum OR 8326), 134v.

²⁷ See e.g. Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 438 where al-Ḥillī recommends both as medium-sized works on theology.

²⁸ E.g. Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 438.

²⁹ Kashf al-murād, 4.

³⁰ Ibid., 126.

³¹ Ibid., 36, 151, 209.

³² Ibid., 259, 281, 284.

January 1297.³³ The treatise belongs to the most widely read of al-Hillī's works. Its special importance lies in its being the first commentary written on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī's Tajrīd al-ʿItiqād³⁴ thus serving as a basis for the understanding of that work for numerous later commentators.³⁵

In the light of the evidence of the Kashf al-murād, al-Hillī evidently started to write his major theological work, the Nihāyat al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalam, before having completed the Kashf al-murād. When he composed his Nahj al-mustarshidīn, which was completed in 699/1299, large parts of the Nihāya must have already been written since he frequently refers to the work.³⁶ From this work onwards, references to the Nihāya are usually given.³⁷

Al-Hillī presumably completed the Nihāya at a very late stage. In his IM list written in 720/1320 he states that at that time four volumes of the work had been completed. It is unknown how much these four volumes covered of the whole Nihāya as it was planned originally, and how much more he completed during the rest of his life. None of the extant manuscript portions of the work seem to be a complete copy.³⁸

³³According to Āghā Buzurg (Dharrīʿa, 18:60) it was completed on 15 Rabiʿ I 696/11 January 1297, see also A. Husaynī, Fahrist al-nuskhahay-i khattī-yi kitābkhana-yi ʿImāmī-yi...Marʿashī (Qum, 1395H.), 2:324. According to MS India Office Loth 471/14, the Kashf was completed on 16 Rabiʿ I 1/12 January (1297) (Loth, 1:128). MS Chester Beatty 4279 is dated 16 Rabiʿ I 690.12 January 1297. (Arberry, 5:87). Since the evidence that the work was completed in 696 is quite strong, this date is most likely an error of the copyist.

³⁴Āghā Buzurg, Dharrīʿa, 18:60.

³⁵The commentator Shams al-Dīn Abū l-Thanaʾ al-Isfahānī (d. 749/1348), for instance, pointed out that if it were not for al-Hillī's commentary, it would be impossible to understand the Tajrīd (see Āghā Buzurg, Dharrīʿa, 18:60, for a list of the various commentaries on the Tajrīd, see *ibid.*, 3:352ff).

³⁶Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 123, 190, 202, 203, 216, 244, 371, 386, 393, and 438 where he recommends his Nihāyat al-marām to the reader as his most extensive work on theology.

³⁷Hasan b. Yusuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Tasliḥ al-nafs ilā hazīrat al-quds (MS British Museum OR 109711, 12r, 44v, 75r, Kashf al-fawa'id, 2, 5, 21, 37, 43, 82; Ajwiba, 22).

³⁸Āghā Buzurg, Dharrīʿa, 24:407 (no.2153), see also Rawdātī, 37, for MS Haydariyya 628. Not having seen the appropriate catalogue, I am indebted to Professor Modarressi for his information that the MS Majlis 10192 contains only the first

Moreover, some of the references to the Nihāya are suspect. This applies to those in the Kashf al-murād where it is highly unlikely that he had already reached the corresponding sections in the Nihāya. He similarly refers to the Nihāya in the works which were completed after the Kashf to the Nihāya in regard to subjects which were usually discussed by him at the end of the theological works.³⁹ In most of these instances it is unlikely that at that stage he had advanced so far in the writing of the Nihāya. It may therefore be assumed that most of these references were inserted with the intention of dealing with these points in greater detail in his Nihāya. On the basis of this evidence, the possibility that the Nihāya was never completed cannot be ruled out.

The Nihāya had only a very limited circulation. Only four incomplete manuscripts apparently exist today. Even al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī who wrote commentaries upon some of al-Hillī's theological works mentions that he did not have a chance to consult the Nihāya.⁴⁰

At the request of his son,⁴¹ al-Hillī wrote the Nahj al-mustarshidīn which he completed on 22 Rabī' I 699/17 December 1299.⁴² This work is written in a very concise style. Among later scholars, it became highly popular as is evident from the numerous commentaries which were written upon it. On 3 Dhū al-Hijja 703/7 July 1304,⁴³ he completed the Kitāb kashf al-fawā'id fī sharh qawā'id al-'aqa'id, a commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī's Qawā'id al-'aqa'id and on 12 Muḥarram 704 15 August 1304⁴⁴ he finished the medium-sized work Tasliḥ al-nafs ilā haḡirat al-quḡs. Again, both works were compiled at the request of his son.⁴⁵ All the works mentioned are included in the KH and the IM.

part of the work. MS Marḡashī 254 also breaks in the middle of the discussion on accidents.

³⁹ E.g. Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 386 (referring to the question of what is manī, Ajwiba, 22 (referring to the issue of belief and muwāfa't).

⁴⁰ Al-Miqdād, 395.

⁴¹ Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 9.

⁴² Agha Buzurg, Dhari'a, 24:424 (no.2222).

⁴³ Ibid., 18:51-2 (no.635).

⁴⁴ Tasliḥ, 82r.

⁴⁵ "Kashf al-fawā'id," 2; Tasliḥ, 3v.

As was characteristic of the theological works of this period which were heavily influenced by the philosophical tradition, al-Hillī started off most of his systematic theological works with a chapter on metaphysics.⁴⁶ An exception is his Ma^Cārī which begins with a chapter on man's obligation to reason towards the knowledge of God. This agrees with the traditional pattern of theological works.

None of the works which al-Hillī composed after Rabī^C II 709/August-September 1309 on the request of Uljaytū are included in either of the two original lists. Although some copies of the KH contain the titles of the most important works of this period,⁴⁷ they were obviously added by later writers and they regularly appear at the end of the list in these copies. The reason for not including them in the IM was apparently that most of these works were concerned mainly with polemics and as such, they were not suitable for teaching. Thus it would have been inappropriate to include them in a teaching permit.

Owing to their polemic character, the works of this period are of little significance for the investigation of al-Hillī's theological views. To this group of works belong the Minhāj al-karāma fī l-^limāma which defends the Shi'ite positions on the Imamate⁴⁸ and the Istiqsa' al-naẓar fī l-qadā' wa-l-qadar in which al-Hillī defends the

⁴⁶According to Ibn Khaldūn (3:1112), this new pattern was first introduced by al-Rāzī in his Mabāhith al-mashriqiyya. For this pattern of theological works among later theologians, see also see L.Gardet and M.M.Anawati, Introduction à la théologie musulmane (Études de philosophie médiévale, no.37 Paris: Vrin, 1948), 160ff.

⁴⁷The titles Nahj al-haqq wa-kaashf al-sidq, Minhāj al-karāma fī l-^limāma, and Istiqsa' al-naẓar fī l-qadā' wa-l-qadar are listed in KH 1, KH 2, KH 4, KH 8, KH 9, KH 11, and KH 12. They do not appear in KH 5, KH 6, KH 7 and KH 10.

⁴⁸This work has been investigated by H.Laoust in the articles "La Critique du Sunnisme dans la doctrine d'al-Hillī," Revue des études islamiques 34 (1966):35-60, and "Les Fondements de l'Imamat dans le Minhāj d'al-Hillī," Revue des études islamiques 46 (1978):3-55.

Mu'tazilite view of man's free choice in his acts against the determinists. In the Kitab nahj al-haqq wa-kashf al-ḡidq, al-Ḥillī polemically deals with the views of the Ash'arites.

The polemic character of these works provoked Sunnite authors to compose refutations of them. The refutations of the Nahj al-haqq wa-kashf al-ḡidq and the Istiqṣā' al-naẓar fī l-qadā' wa-l-qadar in turn provoked later Shi'ite authors to write counter-refutations.⁴⁹

Al-Ḥillī, moreover, wrote a number of smaller treatises on specific theological questions at the request of the Uljaytū. To these belongs a treatise which deals with the problem of abrogation of the divine laws.⁵⁰ According to Rashīd al-Dīn, al-Ḥillī formulated an answer at the request of the Ilkhan concerning the purpose of visiting the tombs of saints.⁵¹ It is not known whether he did so in writing or orally. Since the earliest definitely known date of his presence at court is Rabi' II 709/August-September 1309,⁵² it is certain that he did not start or plan to start writing any of these works before then.⁵³

Another work which is listed in only some copies of the KH and which does not appear in the IM list is the Risāla al-sa'diyya dedicated to the minister Sa'd al-Dīn. This treatise was written between Rabi' II 709/August-September 1309 and 10 Shawwāl 711/19 February 1312.⁵⁴ The very concise Risāla fī wajīb al-i'tiqād is also one of al-Ḥillī's later treatises. This title is not included in the IM and was added later to some copies of the KH.⁵⁵ Its authenticity as a work by al-Ḥillī is known since he mentions it in his Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya.⁵⁶

⁴⁹See appendix no.120 & 26.

⁵⁰Jawāb au'āl 'an hikmat al-naskh fī l-aḥkām al-ilāhiyya.

⁵¹See van Ess, Wesir, 42.

⁵²See supra, p.27.

⁵³H. A. Mahfūz records ("Nafīs al-makhtūṭāt al-ʿarabiyya fī Irān," Majma'at Ma'nad al-Makhtūṭāt al-ʿarabiyya 3 (1957):52) a MS copy of the Nahj al-haqq which is dated 704/1304. This clearly must be an error.

⁵⁴On this date, Sa'd al-Dīn was executed, see Qāshānī, 114.

⁵⁵The title is included in KH 1, KH 2, KH 4, KH 8, KH 9; KH 12.

⁵⁶See Aghā Buzurg, Dharrīʿa, 25:4.

Some copies of the KH list include another title of al-Hillī, the Kitāb al-alfayn al-fāriq bayn al-sidq wa-l-mayn.⁵⁷ The aim of this work is to prove the Shi'ite doctrine of the Imamate. In the introduction, al-Hillī states that he started to compose it at the request of his son.⁵⁸ He completed the draft (taḥwīd) of the first section on 20 Rabi' I 709/28 August 1309⁵⁹ and the draft of the whole work in Ramaḍān 712/December 1312-January 1313.⁶⁰ Yet there are clear indications that al-Hillī's contribution to this book must have been very limited. His son Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn appears to have written most of it although he claims at the end of the first and the second section merely to have made a fair copy (ṭabyīd) of his father's draft. In the first section of the book,⁶¹ Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn says that on 11 Jumādā II 726/15 May 1326 (several months after the death of his father) while editing the book he encountered a problem which perplexed him. Subsequently, his father appeared to him in a dream and clarified the point in question. This instance clearly indicates that Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn did not work on a final version which he had received from his father. It is therefore questionable whether al-Hillī made any major contribution to the work at all. Another indication that his son wrote most of the work is the considerable distance in time between the date on which al-Hillī is said to have completed the draft and the date on which Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn completed the fair copy of it, this amounts in the first section to 17 years⁶² and in the second section to 42 years.⁶³

Both lists include the titles of works which are lost and it is therefore impossible to establish the date of their composition. To these belong the Kitāb muṭṭaqad al-wāṣilīn or

⁵⁷The title is included in KH 1, KH 2, KH 4, KH 8, KH 9, KH 11; KH 12.

⁵⁸Alfayn, 11.

⁵⁹Ibid., 138.

⁶⁰Ibid., 445.

⁶¹Ibid., 125ff.

⁶²Ibid., 138.

⁶³Ibid., 445.

Maqṣid al-wāṣilīn, Kitāb al-tanāsub bayn al-firaq
al-ashʿariyya wa-l-sufiyya, Arbaʿin masʾala fī uṣūl
al-dīn, and Kitāb manāhiḥ al-hidāya wa-maʿariḥ al-dirāya.

Among al-Ḥillī's last works on theology is the short treatise al-Bāb al-ḥādī ʿashar fīma yaḥibbu ʿalā ʿammāt al-mukallafīn min maʿrifat uṣūl al-dīn which he added as the eleventh chapter to his Minhaj al-ṣalāḥ fī akhtisār al-miṣbāḥ. This work was completed on 11 Dhu al-Ḥijja 723 (11 December 1323).⁶⁴ The Bāb al-ḥādī ʿashar which was written, as the title indicates, for the general reader rather than for students of theology, is clearly the most popular among his theological works to this day. The large number of extant manuscripts as well as the numerous commentaries written upon it bear witness to this.⁶⁵ Together with its most famous commentary by al-Miqdad al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423), it has been edited frequently and translations of the two works in Persian and English are currently available.⁶⁶

A number of titles were attributed to al-Ḥillī by later writers but these works are apparently lost. The authenticity of the attribution of these works to him can therefore neither be affirmed nor denied. Those works are Risāla fī butlān al-jabr,⁶⁷ Risāla fī taḥqīq maʿna al-imān,⁶⁸ and Risāla fī khalq al-ʿamāl.⁶⁹

Furthermore, Āgha Buzurg attributes al-Khulāṣa fī uṣūl al-dīn and al-Muqaddima fī l-kalām to al-Ḥillī.⁷⁰ While he does not indicate his reference in regard to the Muqaddima, he attributes the Khulāṣa to him on the basis of a manuscript copy in the Maktabat al-Khwānsārī.⁷¹

⁶⁴See Rawḍatī, 103.

⁶⁵See appendix no.36.

⁶⁶Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, al-Bāb al-ḥādī ʿashar (edited by Maḥdī Muḥaqqiq, Wisdom of Persia, no.38, Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1365/1986), introduction, 16-7; see also appendix no.36.

⁶⁷Al-Afandī, 1:375.

⁶⁸Ibid., 1:379; also Khwānsārī, 2:275.

⁶⁹Al-Afandī, 1:375.

⁷⁰Āgha Buzurg, Dhārīʿa, 22:89 (no.6205).

⁷¹Ibid., 7:208-9 (no.1024). There exist numerous copies of an anonymous text which may possibly be the Khulāṣa by

3. Philosophical Works

Al-Hillī's first philosophical work was his Kitāb al-asrār al-khafiyya,⁷² which he dedicated to the minister Hārūn b. Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī⁷³ who died in 685/1286. Thus he must have written it before that date and there are safe indications that he began to write it, or even completed it, long before. In his Manāḥij, he frequently refers to the Asrār,⁷⁴ it is therefore likely that at least considerable parts of the Asrār were written before 6 Rabi^c II 680/25 July 1281, when he completed the Manāḥij. This is confirmed by his concluding remarks in the Qawā'id al-jaliyya,⁷⁵ a work on logic completed in Rabi^c II 679/July-August 1280,⁷⁶ where he refers to the Asrār.

The Asrār is arranged in a manner typical of philosophical works; it is divided into the three sections logic (mantiq), physics (ṭabī'iyat) and theology (ilāhiyyāt).

This work is one of al-Hillī's most important philosophical treatises and for a long time he himself considered it as his most authoritative work in this field. He refers to it frequently not only in his commentary on al-Rātibī al-Qazwīnī's (d. 675/1277) Hikmat al-Cayn, the

al-Hillī if the attribution of the manuscript mentioned by Aghā Buzurg is correct. One of these is MS Princeton University Library New Series 1886 (39r-48r) contained in a collection of works which were all written either by al-Hillī or by his son Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn (see Mach, 128-9). Mach and Ormsby mention further copies of the same work in two Iranian libraries, one of which is anonymous whereas the other is attributed to al-Shahīd al-thānī (ibid.). Another copy of the same treatise is extant in MS British Museum OR 10968/2. The theological positions in this treatise agree with al-Hillī's views.

⁷²This is known from his introduction to his Ghāyat al-wuḡūl (2r) where he states that the Manāḥij and the Asrār were the first works he compiled on theology and philosophy.

⁷³Aghā Buzurg, Dharī'a, 2:45.

⁷⁴E.g. Manāḥij, 89r, 90r, 91r.

⁷⁵Quoted in Jawān, 1:348.

⁷⁶See later.

Idāh al-maqāsid fī sharh hikmat al-ʿayn⁷⁷ (completed on 8 Shawwāl 694/21 August 1295)⁷⁸ but also in most of his theological works.⁷⁹ Even al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī sometimes refers to the Asrār in his commentaries on al-Ḥillī's Nahj al-mustarshidīn.⁸⁰ In his later theological works, however, al-Ḥillī rarely refers to the Asrār. Instead, he advises his readers to consult his extensive theological work Nihāyat al-marām which similarly contained detailed discussions on philosophical questions. This indicates that he did not compose another work on philosophical issues after the Asrār which he considered its equal in authority.

In this work, al-Ḥillī is highly critical of the philosophical propositions whenever they disagreed with vital theological views.

In the Idāh al-maqāsid, the author refers to two other works on philosophy. These therefore must have been written before 8 Shawwāl 694/21 August 1295, the date when the Idāh was completed. They are his Muqāwamāt al-hikmiyya⁸¹ and his Tanqīh al-abḥāth fī l-ʿulūm al-thalātha,⁸² neither of which is extant. Both works are mentioned in at least some copies of the KH⁸³ but not in the IM. Al-Ḥillī possibly did not consider them as important enough to be included in the IM list. The Muqāwamāt al-hikmiyya were apparently completed even before Rabīʿ II 693/March 1294 since he mentions in the KH that this work had already been completed.⁸⁴ In his Idāh al-maqāsid, he further refers to his "Asrār together with its summary" (al-Asrār wa-khulāṣatuhu).⁸⁵ It is not evident which work is meant to be this summary.

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Idāh al-maqāsid, 114; 132; 220, 222, 224.

78 Ibid., 385.

79 E.g. Manāḥij, 89r, 90r, 91r, Kashf al-murād, 36, 151, 209; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 48; Maʿārij, 111r.

80 Al-Miqdād, 54.

81 Idāh al-maqāsid, 307.

82 Ibid., 246, 268.

83 Although none of the copies of the KH consulted contain the Tanqīh al-abḥāth, Aghā Buzurg mentions (Dharrīʿa, 4:460) that some of the KH copies do include this title.

84 Rijāl, 47.

85 Idāh al-maqāsid, 10.

Of his Kitāb kashf al khafā' min kitāb al-shifā', only the second portion is extant; this starts off with a discussion about the ten categories and deals subsequently with substance (jawhar) and the accidents of quantity (kam) and of relation (mudāf). This portion was completed on 9 Rabi^c II 717/21 June 1317.⁸⁶ At its end, a third section on the accident of quality (kayf) is announced.⁸⁷ Al-Hillī mentions in the IM list that only two volumes (muja'lladān) of this work had been written up to then.⁸⁸ The possibility that this work was never completed cannot therefore be ruled out.

Of his Marā'id al-tadqīq wa-maqāsid al-tahqīq, which originally contained sections on logic, physics and theology, only the section on logic is extant.⁸⁹

All his remaining philosophical works are lost. In so far as the titles indicate, a large number of his works are concerned with the works of Ibn Sina and especially with the latter's al-ishārāt wa-l-tanbihāt or with commentaries on this work. This applies to al-Hillī's Muhākamat bayn shurrah al-ishārāt, the ishārāt ilā ma'ani al-ishārāt, Idāh al-muqḍilāt min sharh al-isharat, and the Baṣṭ al-ishārāt. His works Kashf al-talbīs wa bayān sayr al-ra'is⁹⁰ and Idāh al-talbīs min kalām al-ra'is⁹¹ appear to be similarly

⁸⁶ Hasan b. Yusuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, kashf al khafā' min kitāb al-shifā' (MS Chester Beatty 5151), 102r.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 102r.

⁸⁸ See IM 2. According to IM 4, only one volume had been written until then. This is unlikely since the second portion was completed before the IM was written. IM 1 and IM 4 do not specify how many volumes had been written to that date. According to IM 5 "a number of volumes" (muja'lladāt) had been written.

⁸⁹ M.T. Dānishpazhīh and 'A.N. Munzawī, Fihrist-i nuskhahā-yi khattī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī-yi Danishgāh-i Tehrān (Tehran, 1330 57sh), 9 934-5.

⁹⁰ The IM copies differ regarding the exact title of this work. According to IM 1 the title is Kashf al talbīs wa bayān sayr al ra'is, according to IM 2 it is kashf al talbīs fi bayān sayr al-ra'is. IM 3 reads kashf al talbīs min sahar al-ra'is. Al-'Amili (24.252) suggests the reading sahw. Another possibility which would make sense would be to read it as shubah.

⁹¹ Agha Buzurg suggests (Dharī'ā, 18-24) that these two titles refer to the same work. This possibility should not be ruled

concerned with the views of Ibn Sīnā. Al-Ḥillī wrote two further works entitled Hall al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt and Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt which seem to be commentaries on the Kitāb al-talwīḥāt by al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190).⁹² His Tahṣīl al-mulakhkhaṣ may possibly be a commentary on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Mulakhkhaṣ.⁹³

For those titles which appear both in the KH list and in the IM list, there is no indication of their date of compilation. To these belong the titles Kashf al-talbīs min kalām al-ra'īs, and the Muhākamat bayn sharrāḥ al-ishārāt. Those titles which appear only in the IM list, were presumably written just before 720/1320. These are the Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt, Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra'īs, Ishārāt ila ma^{cani} al-ishārāt, Idāḥ al-mu^qdilat min sharḥ al-ishārāt, Bast al-ishārāt, Tahrīr al-abḥāth, Tahṣīl al-mulakhkhaṣ,⁹⁴ and Lubb al-ḥikma.⁹⁵

out since the different copies of the two lists are consistent in the wording of the two titles. The KH lists all agree in the title Idāḥ al-talbīs..., while all IM copies list the work under the title Kashf al-talbīs...

⁹²It is possible that these two titles refer to the same work. Indication for this is that all KH copies list the work as Hall al-mushkilāt whereas all IM copies list it under the title Kashf al-mushkilāt.

⁹³See also al-^{cani}Amīlī, 24:252.

⁹⁴Tahṣīl al-mulakhkhaṣ is mentioned in IM 3 and IM 5 only, in IM 5 it is moreover mentioned that only one volume had until then been written.

⁹⁵The title Lubb al-ḥikma occurs only in IM 2 and IM 5. In IM 3 Kutub al-ḥikma appears instead as a heading for the following four titles. IM 4 offers at this position Kitāb al-ḥikma. IM 1 does not mention either of the titles. Since there does not appear to be any substantial difference between the four titles which are listed after the title in question (Kitāb al-ta^{cani}im al-thānī, Kitāb kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān al-ra'īs, Kitāb idāḥ al-mu^qdilat min kitāb al-ishārāt and Kitāb kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt) and the titles of the previous section which is headed kutub al-^quḡl and in which al-Ḥillī's remaining works on philosophy as well as on logic are listed, there does not seem to be any justification for the reading kutub al-ḥikma or kitāb al-ḥikma. The reading of Lubb al-ḥikma as a separate title seems therefore preferable.

Al-Ḥillī's Taʿlīm al-ṭhānī belongs to the more extensive works of this later period; according to the IM list this consists of a number of volumes. Since it is mentioned there that to that point only some of the sections had been written, it is likely that this work was never completed.

The reason why most of al-Ḥillī's philosophical works are lost was presumably that they were of little originality. Since he was a theologian rather than a philosopher, it is most likely that he composed most of his philosophical works as books of instruction for his students. This impression is confirmed by the titles of some of the lost works.

4. Works on logic

Besides those philosophical treatises which include a separate section on logic,⁹⁶ al-Ḥillī composed a number of works exclusively concerned with logic.

The Qawā'id al-ḡalīyya fī sharḥ al-risāla al-shamsiyya which he completed in Rabī' II 679 July-August 1280⁹⁷ was apparently the earliest. This work is a commentary on the Risāla al-shamsiyya by al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1277).

Presumably after 680/1281, he composed his commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Tajrīd on logic, entitled al-Jawḥar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd. The time of composition suggested can be justified in so far as al-Ḥillī mentions in this work, from among his other writings, only his Asrār⁹⁸ and his Manāḥij.⁹⁹ Since the Manāḥij was completed in 680/1281 and the Asrār presumably even earlier, it is likely that the Jawḥar was written shortly after these two works. The Qawā'id and the Jawḥar are the only works on logic which are extant.

In his KH and his IM list al-Ḥillī furthermore lists the Nahj al-ḡirfan fī 'ilm al-mīzan. His Kashf al-asṭār fī sharḥ kashf al-asrār, which is equally included in both lists, is presumably a commentary on the Kashf al-asrār 'an ghawāmiḍ al-afkār by Muḥammad b. Namawār b. 'Abd al-Malik al-Khūnjī (d. 646/1248). Another work on logic, the Kitāb nūr al-mushriq, is to be found only in the IM list. It was possibly written only just before 720/1320. His Kitāb al-durr al-maknūn fī 'ilm al-qānūn appears only in the KH list.

⁹⁶Such as the Asrār or the Marāḡid al-tadqīq.

⁹⁷See Jawān, 1:348.

⁹⁸Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭaḥhar al-Ḥillī, al-Jawḥar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ manāḥij al-tajrīd (edited by Muḥsin Saydārfar. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Baydār, 1363sh.), 13, 23, 35.

⁹⁹Ibid., 35.

5. Legal works

Al-Hillī's contribution to the development of Shi'ite law was formative.¹⁰⁰ He composed numerous and extensive legal works.

His first work in this field was the Muntahā al-maṭlab which was also his most extensive one although the extant portions cover only the field of acts of devotion (ʿibādāt).¹⁰¹ The first part was completed in 684/1285-6¹⁰² and the second part on 11 Jumādā II 688/2 July 1289.¹⁰³ The Mukhtalaṭ al-ahkām which is also one of his more extensive works, was completed between 4 Jumādā II 699/26 February 1300¹⁰⁴ and 15 Dhu al-Qa'da 708/26 April 1309.¹⁰⁵ This work, which in contrast to the Muntahā covers all fields of law, also differs from the latter in its purpose; while the Muntahā deals systematically with the relevant legal questions, the Mukhtalaṭ is confined to those questions about which there was disagreement among the Shi'ite lawyers.¹⁰⁶

His Qawā'id al-ahkām which al-Hillī compiled at the request of his son¹⁰⁷ is of a more concise style. The work, which covers all areas of the law, enjoyed high popularity among later scholars which is indicated by the large number

¹⁰⁰Modarressi, 47-8.

¹⁰¹In the KH (Riḍā, 45), al-Hillī states that by Rabi' II 693 March 1294 he had completed the seventh portion of this work. Since the extant portion includes only the sixth part, it is likely that he wrote at least one more portion of this work. Yet this portion is apparently not extant, see also Aghā Buzurg, Dharī'ā, 23:12.

¹⁰²Hasan b. Yūsuf L. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Muntahā al-maṭlab fī ṭahqīq al-madhhab (Tehran, 1333 1915), I 192, the date given there is 784 which is clearly an error. Most likely, 684 is meant.

¹⁰³Aghā Buzurg, Dharī'ā, 23:12.

¹⁰⁴Hasan b. Yūsuf L. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Mukhtalaṭ al-ahkām fī ṭahqīq al-madhhab (Tehran, 1323 1905-6), I 171.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 5:274.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 1:2.

¹⁰⁷Hasan b. Yūsuf L. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Qawā'id al-ahkām fī ma'rifat al-halāl wa-l-haram (Qum, 1984 (Repr. of the 1315/1898 edn), 2.

of commentaries on it.¹⁰⁸ Al-Ḥillī concluded the work with a wasīyya for his son in which he states that he completed the work when he (al-Ḥillī) was at the end of his fifties and the beginning of his sixties.¹⁰⁹ This suggests that he completed the work around the year 700/1300-1. This is confirmed by one manuscript copy which is dated 24 Dhū l-Ḥijja 699/10 September 1300.¹¹⁰ In regard to one question on a legal issue connected with the Qawā'id, al-Ḥillī is reported to have had a correspondence with 'Abd Allāh al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286).¹¹¹

Āghā Buzurg suggests¹¹² that the Tahrīr al-aḥkām and the Talkhīs al-maram fī ma'rifat al-aḥkām were both written before the Mukhtalaf al-shī'a, which al-Ḥillī started shortly before 699/1299-1300. The Tahrīr which covers the field of acts of devotion ('ibādāt) and mutual relations (mu'amalāt) is described by the author as a summary of the Muntahā al-matlab.¹¹³

The KH further includes the title Ghāyat al-iḥkām fī tashīḥ talkhīs al-maram which apparently is lost. The title suggests that this work was a commentary on al-Ḥillī's Talkhīs al-maram. It is, however, worth noting that the title appears only in some KH copies¹¹⁴ while it is not included in the IM. Its attribution to al-Ḥillī is therefore doubtful. Since the work is not extant, however, it is difficult to decide this matter. Al-Ḥillī's Irshād al-adhhān, comparable in length to the Qawā'id, enjoyed great popularity among later scholars. This is indicated by the vast number of commentaries on this work.¹¹⁵ According to Āghā Buzurg, the Irshād was completed either in 676/1277-8

¹⁰⁸ See Modarressi, 73-4; Āghā Buzurg, Dharī'a, 14.17-26.

¹⁰⁹ Qawā'id, 2:346.

¹¹⁰ See M.T.Dānishpazhūh, "Fihrist-i nuskhahāy-i khattī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Dr.Husayn Miftāh," Nashriyya-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī-yi Danishgāh-i Tehrān dar bara-yi nuskhahay-i khattī 7 (Tehran, 1353sh): 203.

¹¹¹ Al-'Amalī, 24:237.

¹¹² Dharī'a, 20:220.

¹¹³ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, Tahrīr al-aḥkām al-shar'īyya 'ala madhhab al-imāmiyya (Tehran, 1314/1096), 2.

¹¹⁴ KH 1, KH 2, KH 5, KH 6, KH 10.

¹¹⁵ See Āghā Buzurg, Dharī'a, 1:511-2.

or in 696/1296 7.¹¹⁶ The year 676/1277 8 seems unlikely since al-Hillī's first legal work, the Muntahā al-maṭlab, was completed only in 688/1289. Moreover, at the end of the Irshād, the author refers to the Muntahā al-maṭlab, the Tahfīr al-aḥkām, the Qawā'id al-aḥkām and the Tadhkirat al-fuqahā.¹¹⁷ most of which al-Hillī had not even begun writing in 676/1277-8. The Taba'irat al-muta'allimīn, his shortest systematic exposition on law, was written for non-specialists and novice students.¹¹⁸

The Tadhkirat al-fuqahā which al-Hillī wrote at the request of his son¹¹⁹ is one of his most extensive legal works. The first section was completed on 24 Ṣafar 703/7 October 1303¹²⁰ and the last section was finished on 16 Dhū al-Ḥijja 720/17 January 1321.¹²¹ Because of a reference in one of Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn's legal writings, it has been suggested that he continued the Tadhkirat after his father's death.¹²² Yet the printed edition of the work and apparently also the manuscripts available contain only the portions of the book which al-Hillī himself had written. These end with the section on marriage (nikāḥ).¹²³ The Nihāyat al-aḥkām which al-Hillī wrote also at his son's request was another late work.¹²⁴ In 720/1320, al-Hillī states in his IM that so far only the first two sections on ritual purity (ṭahāra) and prayer (ṣalāt) had been written. The work was apparently not continued.¹²⁵

Al-Hillī further composed some shorter treatises on specific legal points, such as his Risāla fī manāsik al-ḥajj which is included in the KH. In addition later writers ascribed to him a treatise entitled Wājib al-wudū'

116Ibid., 1:510.

117See Shīrwānī, 1:13.

118Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Taba'irat al-muta'allimīn fī aḥkām al-dīn (Tehran: al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya, 1372H.), 2.

119Tadhkira, 1:2.

120Ibid., 1:70.

121Ibid., 2:661.

122Aghā Buzurg, Dhari'a, 4:43.

123Tadhkira, 2:661; also Fādil, 2:244.

124See quotation in Fādil, 2:318.

125Al-Khwānsārī, 2:275.

wa-l-ṣalat¹²⁶ and the Risāla fī wājibāt al-ḥajj wa-arkanihī min dūn dhikr al-adʿiya wa-l-mustaḥabbāt.¹²⁷ Modarressi also records a manuscript entitled Risāla fī l-mawārith which contains evidence that it was written by al-Ḥillī,¹²⁸ as well as two other treatises entitled Ajwibat al masā'il al-fiqhiyya and Ajwibat masā'il Ibn Zuhra.¹²⁹

His Tasliḥ al-adhḥān and Tahdhīb al-naḥs appear to be lost. Both titles are listed only in the IM which suggests that they were written shortly before 720/1320 and both were apparently shorter works.¹³⁰ His Tasliḥ al-afḥām which is also lost is listed only in the KH. This may indicate that the author considered it less important. His Madārik al-aḥkām, which is lost as well, is included in both lists. Since al-Ḥillī states in the IM that until then he had written only the first section on ritual purity (ṭahara), he must have started it just before 720/1320. It is doubtful whether he completed any more sections during the rest of his life.¹³¹

¹²⁶Al-Afandī, 1:378.

¹²⁷Ibid., 1:378.

¹²⁸Modarressi, 204.

¹²⁹Ibid., 103.

¹³⁰In the IM list, both are characterised as consisting of one volume (mujallad).

¹³¹See also al-Khwānsārī, 2:275.

6. Works on Legal Methodology (Uṣūl al-Fiqh)

The Ḥayāt al-wuṣūl wa-idāh al-subul fī sharḥ mukhtaṣar muntahā al-su'āl wa-l-ajal, which is a commentary on the Mukhtaṣar muntahā al-su'āl wa-l-ajal of Ibn al-Ḥājjib (d. 646/1249), was al-Ḥillī's first work in this discipline. This is indicated by his statement in the introduction to this work that after having written the Manāḥil on theology and the Asrār in philosophy, he now turns to legal methodology.¹³² It is likely, therefore, that he began to write this work after 680/1281. According to Aghā Buzurg, the Ḥayāt al-wuṣūl was completed on 12 Rajab 697/25 April 1298.¹³³ The second portion of the middle-sized work Muntahā al-wuṣūl ilā 'ilm al-kalām wa-l-uṣūl was presumably written after 16 Jumada I 687/18 June 1288, the date when al-Ḥillī completed the first portion on theology.¹³⁴ The Mabādī' al-wuṣūl ila 'ilm al-uṣūl is a summary of the Minhāj al-wuṣūl fī ma'rifat 'ilm al-uṣūl of 'Abd Allah al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286),¹³⁵ which he composed at the request of Taqī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Baqrī.¹³⁶ It was written at least before 705/1305-6.¹³⁷

At the request of his son,¹³⁸ al-Ḥillī started his most extensive work in this discipline, the Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā 'ilm al-uṣūl, which he completed on 8 Ramaḍān 704/4 April 1305.¹³⁹ Since he states in the introduction to this work

132 Ḥayāt, 2r.

133 Dharī'at, 16:24-5.

134 Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 134v. The MS copy is incomplete at the end of the work.

135 Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, Mabādī' al-wuṣūl ilā 'ilm al-uṣūl (edited by 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad 'Alī al-Baqqāl, Najaf, al-Adāb, 1390/1970), introd., 35.

136 Aghā Buzurg, Dharī'at, 19:44.

137 In this year, the work was already studied by his students, see Mabādī', introd., 41.

138 Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā 'ilm al-uṣūl (MS Bankipore 1567), 2v.

139 Ibid., 316v.

that he had already written a number of shorter and more extensive works in this field, he began to compose it at a later stage of his career.¹⁴⁰

During or after the composition of the *Nihāya*, he wrote the more concise *Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl* which was very popular among later scholars. Since al-Ḥillī refers in it to his *Nihāya*¹⁴¹ it must be one of his later works. The afore-mentioned works are extant and included in both lists.

Al-Ḥillī wrote two further works both of which are lost. The *al-Nukat al-badīʿa fī tahrīr al-dharīʿa* may possibly have been a commentary on al-Murtadā's *Dharīʿa ilā uṣūl al-sharīʿa*. Since it is listed in the KH only, al-Ḥillī may not have considered it as very important. The *Nahj al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl* is listed in both the KH and the IM.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 2v.

¹⁴¹See *Ḥā'irī*, 13:21.

7. Biographic Works

Around Rabi^c II 693/March 1294¹⁴² al-Hillī wrote his Khulāṣat al-aqwāl fī ma^crīfat al-rijāl which lists in the first part reliable transmitters, and unreliable transmitters in the second.¹⁴³ Since the work is designed as a short work (mukhtaṣar)¹⁴⁴ the author does not offer complete biographical and bibliographical dates for every transmitter. An exception is the article on himself in which he offers a list of his own works.¹⁴⁵

His Idāh al ishtibāh fī ahwāl al-ruwāt was completed on 19 Dhū al-Qa^cda 707/11 May 1308.¹⁴⁶ This work is much more concise than the Khulāṣa.¹⁴⁷ Although it is not included in the IM list, its authenticity as a work by al-Hillī is established by internal evidence.¹⁴⁸

The Kaṣḥf al maqāl fī ma^crīfat ahwāl al-rijāl is described by the author as his most extensive biographic work. He refers to it both in his Idāh al ishtibāh¹⁴⁹ and in his Khulāṣa.¹⁵⁰ This work is apparently lost.¹⁵¹ Moreover, although al-Hillī refers to it frequently he does not include it in either of the lists of his works.¹⁵² Since the work must

142 Rijāl, 45.

143 Ibid., 3.

144 Ibid., 2.

145 Ibid., 45-8.

146 Aghā Buzurg, Dharī^ca, 2:493.

147 See Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al Mutahhar al-Hillī, Idāh al ishtibāh fī aḥwāl al-ruwāt (MS Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Orientabteilung 10164), lv.

148 Ibid., lv, where al-Hillī states that he is the author of the work.

149 Ibid., 60v: "Whoever seeks the coverage and thorough examination of the knowledge of all transmitters and their states,...he should refer to our book entitled Kaṣḥf al-maqāl fī ma^crīfat al-rijāl."

150 Rijāl, 2-3.

151 Agha Buzurg mentions in fact (Dharī^ca, 18:63 4) that there is a MS copy listed in the catalogue of the Khizana al-Ridawīyya in Mashhad. However, he expresses doubt about this.

152 Agha Buzurg mentions that al-Hillī included the title in his KH according to some manuscripts (Dharī^ca, 18:64). But none of the consulted copies includes this work.

have been considered very important by al Hill, this is striking and the possibility that he never wrote this work but rather intended to do so should therefore not be ruled out.

8. Works on Grammar

Of al-Ḥillī's works on grammar, none appears to be extant. His Baṣṭ al-kāfiya was a summary of the Sharḥ al-kāfiya by Raḍī al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Astarābādī (d. 686/1287)¹⁵³ which in turn was a commentary on the Kāfiya by Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249). Al-Ḥillī's Kashf al-maknūn min kitāb al-maknūn was a summary of the Sharḥ al-muqaddima al-jazūliyya which is a commentary by Ibn al-Ḥājib on the Muqaddima al-jazūliyya by ʿIsā b. ʿAbd al-Azīz b. Yūmarīlī al-Jazūlī (d. 610/1213). His Kitāb al-maḥqāṣid al-wafiya li fawā'id al-qānūn wa-l-kāfiya was based on the above mentioned Muqaddima al-jazūliyya and the Kāfiya of Ibn al-Ḥājib. Except for the Kashf al-maknūn and the Durr al-maknūn fī sharḥ al-qānūn which are mentioned only in the KH, all works are listed in the KH and the IM. His Kitāb al-matālib al-ʿaliyya fī ʿilm al-ʿarabiyya is similarly mentioned in both lists.

Since most of al-Ḥillī's works on grammar were largely based on works of earlier grammarians, they were presumably of little originality. It is likely that he composed most of them as textbooks for his own students. This is presumably also the reason why none of the works have survived.

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Rajāl, 47.

9. Mystical Works

Although al-Hillī had contacts with Sufis and was almost certainly acquainted with the mysticism of Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) and the philosophy of illumination (ishrāq) of al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190),¹⁵⁴ their views did not make any impact on his thought. Later authors attributed to him a work entitled Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq which is said to be a commentary on al-Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-ishrāq.¹⁵⁵ This attribution seems doubtful; the title is not listed in any of al-Hillī's works. Moreover, given his limited interest in mystical ideas, it seems unlikely that he wrote such a work.

¹⁵⁴ See supra, p. 20-1.

¹⁵⁵ Aghā Buzurg, Dharīʿa, 13:211 (no. 750).

10. Exegetical Works

Al-Ḥillī wrote two exegetical works, the Kitāb al-qawl al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān and the Kitāb nahj al-īmān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān, neither of which is extant. The Nahj al-īmān is described in the KH as a work in which he abridged the Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl of Jār Allāh Maḥmūd b. 'Umar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), the Tafsīr al-tibvān of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) and other exegetical works.¹⁵⁶

Since both titles are listed only in the KH but not in the IM, it may be assumed that al-Ḥillī did not consider them very important. Moreover, the fact that both are lost seems to indicate that they were of little originality and significance.

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Riḥāl, 46.

11. Works on Traditions

Al-Hillī wrote a number of works on traditions, of which all but one are lost. The extant work is entitled Idāh mukhālafat al-sunna which was completed in 723/1323.¹⁵⁷ Because of the extremely late date of its compilation, the work is not included in either of the lists. Later authors ascribed it to al-Hillī.¹⁵⁸

Of his remaining works on tradition which are all lost, the Kitāb maṣābīh al-anwār and the Kitāb nahj al-waddāh fī l-ahādīth al-sihāh are listed only in the KH. The Istiqṣā' al-ṣṭibār li-tahrīr maṣānī al-akhbār and the Kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fī l-ahādīth al-sihāh wa-l-ḥisān are listed in the KH and the IM. His Tanqīh qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'khūḍha 'an Āl Yāsīn is included only in the IM list. This latter work may have been based on al-Hillī's al-Durr wa l-marjān fī l-ahādīth al-sihāh wa-l-ḥisān; IM 1 reports the title of the work as Tanqīh qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'khūḍha 'an kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fī l-ahādīth al-sihāh wa-l-ḥisān. Yet no other copy agrees with this version. According to IM 4 its title is Tanqīh al qawā'id al ma'khūḍha 'an al ra'isayn.

¹⁵⁷ Aghā Buzurg, Dharī'ah, 2:499.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 2:498-9. Not having seen a copy of the work, I cannot say whether it contains internal evidence for its authenticity as one of al-Hillī's works.

Appendix: Alphabetical List of al-Hillī's Works

(1) al-Abhāth al-mufīda fī taḥsīl al-ʿaqīda (KH/IM).
{theology}

Dharīʿa, 1:63 (no.310).

MSS. Hakīm M599 (cat.16); see also the locations of the following commentaries.

Commentaries: (1) Sharḥ al-abhāth al-mufīda by Nagīr b. Ibrāhīm al-Aḥmāʿī (d. 853/1449) (Dharīʿa, 1:57, no.182), MSS: Bīnīsh 13 (cat.852) - Ridawī Hikma 13 (cat.1:14 132 new edition); (2) Sharḥ al-abhāth al-mufīda by Ḥadī b. al-Mahdī al-Sabzawārī (d. 1289/1872) (Dharīʿa, 1:57, no.183), MSS. Ridawī Hikma 2 (cat.1:17 133 new edition) - Bīnīsh 27 (cat.852).

(2) Ithbāt al-raʿa (DH).

Dharīʿa, 1:92 (no.442).

MSS: Madrasat Fāḍil Khān (see Dharīʿa).

(3) al-Ijāza li-ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ al-Gharawī.

Dharīʿa, 1:177 (no.904).

(issued on 12 Rajab 701/13 March 1302)

MSS. no MS known.

(4) al-Ijāza li-Taḥqīq al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī al-ʿAmulī.

Dharīʿa, 1:175-6 (no.897).

(issued in 709/1309-10)

MSS: no MS known.

(5) al-Ijāza li-Taḥqīq al-Dīn Ḥasan b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan al-Sirābshānawī al-Kāshānī.

Dharīʿa, 1:177 (no.901).

MSS: no MS known.

(6) al-Ijāza li-Taḥqīq al-Dīn Mahmūd b. al-Mawḥab Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahīd al-Rāzī.

Dharīʿa, 1:178 (no.908).

(issued in Rabīʿ II 709/September-October 1309)

Editions: al-Majlisī, Bihār, 107:142.

(7) Ijāza thāniya li-Majmūʿ al-Dīn Muḥanna' b. Sīnān b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Ḥusaynī al-Madanī.

Dharīʿa, 1:178 (no.911).

(issued in Muḥarram 720/February-March 1120 in al-Hilla)

Editions. in al-Majlisī, Bihār, 107:147-149, in al-Hillī, Ajwibat al-masāʾil al-muḥanna'iyya, Qum. al-Khayyam, 140H. 155-157.

MSS. Majlis 5192 (4) (cat.16:20), Ridawī fiqh 120 - 121 (cat.2:36); Princeton New Series 960 (cat.77).

(8) al-Ijāza li-Jamāʿ al-Dīn Abī al-Futūḥ Aḥmad b. al-Shaykh Abī ʿAbd Allāh Balkū b. Abī Tālib b. ʿAlī al-ʿAwī.

Dharīʿa, 1:176 (no.898).

(issued in 705/1305-6)
Editions: quoted in H. A. Mahfūz, "Nafā'is al makhtūṭāt fī Irān," 19-20.

(9) al-Ijāza li-Rashīd al-Dīn 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Rashīd al-Awī.
Dhārī'a, 1:177 (no.905).
(issued in Rajab 705/January-February 1306)
MSS: no MS known.

(10) al-Ijāza li-Sirāj al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Bahā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī al-Majd al-Sirābshānawī.
Dhārī'a, 1:177 (no.900).
(issued in Jumādā I 715/August-September 1315)
MSS: no MS known.

(11) al-Ijāza li-Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Aḥawī al-Ḥusaynī al-Taṣī.
Dhārī'a, 1:177 (no.903).
(issued in Muharram 704 August-September 1304)
Editions: quoted in Agha Buzurg, Tabaqat, 5:58-9.
MSS: Majlis 4941 (1) (cat.14:170).

(12) al-Ijāza li-Diyā' al-Dīn Abī Muḥammad Ḥārūn b. Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥasan b. al-Amīr Shams al-Dīn 'Alī b. al-Ḥasan al-Tabarī.
Dhārī'a, 1:178 (no.912).
(issued on 17 Rajab 701/18 March 1302)
MSS: no MS known.

(13) al-Ijāza li-'Izz al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn b. Ibrāhīm b. Yanḡā al-Astarābādī.
Dhārī'a, 1:177 (no.902).
(issued on 28 Ṣafar 708/17 August 1308)
MSS: no MS known.

(14) al-Ijāza al-kabīra li-Banī Zuhra.
Dhārī'a, 1:176 (no.899).
(issued on 15 Sha'bān 723/19 August 1323)
Editions: in al-Majlisī, Bihār, 107:60-137.
MSS: Berlin 152 (cat.1:56), Dānishgāh 3108(3) (cat.11:2063) - 5396(5) (cat.15:4238) - 6955(4) (cat.16:410), Majlis 4873(14) (cat.14:13) - 5138(104) (cat.15:181).

(15) al-Ijāza al-kabīra li-Najm al-Dīn Muḥanna' b. Sirāj b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Ḥusaynī al-Madanī.
Dhārī'a, 1:178.
(issued in Dhū al-Ḥijja 719/January-February 1320 in al-Hilla)
Editions: in al-Majlisī, Bihār, 107:143-146; al-Hillī, Aḥwāḥ, 114-117.
MSS: Ḥakīm M534 (cat.22), Majlis 4566(4) (cat.12:259) - 5192(2) (cat.16:19), Princeton New Series 960 (cat.77).

(16) al-Ijāza li-Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī al-Hargalī.
Dhārī'a, 1:177 (no.906).

(issued in 707/1307-8)
MSS: no MS known.

(17) al-Ijāza li-Mahmūd b. Muḥammad b. Yār.
Dharrī^C, 1:178 (no.909).
(issued in Jumādā II 724/May-June 1324)
MSS: no MS known.

(18) al-Ijāza li-Qutb al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad
al-Rāzī al-Buwayhī.
Dharrī^C, 1:177-8 (no.907).
(issued on 3 Sha'bān 713/23 November 1313)
Editions: al-Majlisī, Bihār, 107:136-141.

(19) Ajwibat masā'il Ibn Zuhra.
(see Modarressi, 103)
MSS: Dānīshgāh 1474(3) (cat.8:125) - 3514(17) (cat.12:2526),
Ḥakīm M548 (cat.28); Huqūq J178(1) (cat.460).

(20) Ajwibat al-masā'il al-fiqhiyya.
(see Modarressi, 103)
MSS: Dānīshgāh 2621(5) (cat.9:1497), Majlis 5642(2)
(cat.17:97).

(21) Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muḥanna'iyya (IE).
Dharrī^C, 5:236-8 (no.1136) & 5:238 (no.1137).
(a collection of answers on a variety of topics, these
answers on questions posed by Najm al-Dīn Muḥanna' b. Sinān
b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Husaynī al-Madanī were given orally in
717/1317-8 in al-Hilla and subsequently written down by
al-Hillī. The first portion was completed in Dhū al-Ḥijja
719/January-February 1320, the remaining portion in Muḥarram
720/February-March 1320.)
Editions: Qum: al-Khayyām, 1401H.
MSS. Bīnīsh 2330 2331 2332 2822 2727 (cat.689);
Dānīshgāh 741 1474(4) - 2144(3) 2477(6) - 5396(1)
-6710(59) - MF2068 (cat.1:380), Dār al Kutub B 19178
(cat.3:58); Huqūq D10 (cat.459); Ilāhiyyāt D246(4)
(cat.1:266); India Office 1797 (cat.2:309), Isfahān
Dānīshgāh 291(1) (cat.937), Majlis 4566(3) (cat.12:259)
-4566(5) (cat.12:260) -5192(1) (cat.16:19) 5192(3) (cat.16
20), Malik 5210 (cat.1:666-7), Mar'ashī 1409(8) (cat.4:187)
1409(9) -1409(10) (cat.4:188), Mashhad Ilāhiyat 1744(3)
(cat.3:812), Nawwāb cat.475, Princeton New Series 524
(fol.15v -21r) - 960 (fol.1v-32v) (cat.6), Ridawī Fiqh 582
-583 -584 (cat.5:396-8) - Fiqh 120 - 121 122 - 123 124
-125 -126 (cat.2:36); Rampur 930 MK (cat.3:470).

(22) al-Ad'iya al-fākḥira al-maḡūla 'an al-A'imma al-tāhira
(KH).
Dharrī^C, 1:398 (no.2066).
MSS: no MS known.

(23) Arba'in mas'ala fī usūl al-dīn (DH).
Dharrī^C, 1:435-6 (no.2205).
(theology)

MSS: Maktabat al-Sayyid Rajah Muḥammad Maḥdī Ṣāḥib (see Dhārīʿa, 1:435-6).

(24) Irshād al-adhḥan fī aḥkām al-īman (KH/IM).

Dhārīʿa, 1:510-512 (no.2509).

(law; completed in 696/1296-7)

Editions: together with al-Ardabīlī's Majmūʿat al-fāʿida wa l-burhān, Qum, 1403 4h.; edited by Shaykh Firis al-Ḥassanī. Qum: Maṣḥūrāt muʿassasat al-nashr al-islāmī, forthcoming (see Turāthunā, 16 (1409):234).

MSS: ¹Abd al-ʿAzīm 130(1) (cat.439), Adabīyyat (1960) J28 -D132 (cat.23ff); Aghā Ḥakīm 77 (cat.424); Ambrosiana C 134 (cat.2:187); Adabīyyat (1965) 382 (cat.69); Berlin 4590 -4591 (cat.4:133 4); Binīsh cat.586-7 (29 copies); Dānshgāh 1548 (cat.8:173-4) - 1706 (cat.8:254) 1983 (cat.8:592) -3560 (cat.12:2580) - 3665 (cat.12:2675) - 4145 (cat.13:311) 6273 (cat.16:221) - 6340(3) (cat.16:246) 6369(2) (cat.16:253) 6775 (cat.16:358) - 6853 (cat.16:382-3) 7123 (cat.16:460) -7316 (cat.16:511) - 7720 (cat.16:683) -8629(1) (cat.17:182) -9503 (cat.17:385) MF2544 (cat.1:281); Dār al-kutub D23235 -B21262 (cat.1:34); Farḥad 62 (cat.148); Gawḥarshād cat.210 1; Gulpayīgānī 39 (cat.46) -50 (cat.63); Ḥakīm 1671 (cat.44) -1424 -1730 - 1018 - 611 -477 - 121 -537 - 695 - 1562 - 1619 -1803 - 1899 (cat.45-6); Huquq J34 J41 J287 -J345 (241); Ilahīyyat J10 -B83 J243 D75 - D273 -D505 (cat.1:450ff); India Office 1794 1795 -1796 (cat.2:308-9); Isfahān Dānīshgāh 75 (cat.882) - 113(3) (cat.925); Isfahān ʿUlumī 2882 (cat.176) 2966 2972 2995 3051 (cat.177) -3067 3093 - 5350 (cat.178); Ismaʿīlī Institute Af399) -B(504) (cat.2:62); Kāshān 2 (cat.32); Kāshānī 8 (cat.59); Los Angeles M161 M818 M855 M1118 -M1148 (cat.147-8); Maʿārif 53 (cat.1:74); Maḥfūz 1 (cat.3:17) - 95 (cat.3:24) -39 (cat.3:22) - 15 (cat.4:196) 354 (cat.4:232) - 30 (cat.4:255) 25 (cat.4:257); Majlis 1287 (cat.4:62) -2869(1) (cat.10/1:218) -3086 (cat.10/2:641) - 3445 (cat.10/3:1304) -3462 (cat.10/3:1426) - 3770 (cat.10/4:1755) - 4404 (cat.12:104) - 4645(1) (cat.13:33) 4673(2) (cat.13:56) -4941(2) (cat.14:171) - 5819 (cat.17:239) - 5848 (cat.17:256) - 5863 (cat.17:268); Malīx 1961 -2127 2120 2612 -5872 (cat.1:29-30); Maʿashī 961 (cat.3:153) -1248 (cat.4:47) -1285 (cat.4:83) - 1487 (cat.4:284) - 1588 (cat.4:393) - 1728 (cat.5:116) - 2805 (cat.8:7) - 3363 (cat.9:138) - 3400 (cat.9:184) - 3981 (cat.10:360) 4136 (cat.11:155) - 4357 (cat.11:355) 4408 (cat.12:10) - 4827 (cat.13:26); Mashḥad Adabīyyāt 9 (cat.8); Mashḥad Ilāhīyyāt 1621 (cat.3:745) -1751 (cat.3:836) -19 (cat.1:10) 548(1) (cat.1:296); Maṣūdī 1 Jāmiʿ 43 (cat.311) - 44 (cat.312); Miṭṭāḥ 108 (cat.100) -157(1) (cat.224); Milli Arabic 1157 (cat.9:146) Arabic 1446 (cat.9:478) Arabic 996 (cat.8:483) - Arabic 845 (cat.8:348) - Arabic 402 (cat.7:343); Mīrzā Jaʿfar cat.34,43; Nawwab cat.449, 469; Oppenheim (n.n.), Princeton New Series 87 -111 - 122 - 318 -602 - 826 - 836 -1170 - 1329 - 1444 -1840 (cat.81); Ridawī Fiqh 487 488 489 - 490 - 491 -492 483 (cat.5:357-9) cat.2:3-6 (16 copies); Rampur 10275 D -10239 D 1009 D - 657 D 987 MK (cat.3:464-6); Sīpāhsālār 447 -448 - 449 450 - 451 (cat.1:355,359); Sulayman Khān cat.4-5, Tabrīz Milli 3377 (cat.1:46); Topkapı Serayı A 1082

(cat.2:746), Tustariyya 696 - 720 - 730 - 901 915 (cat.789) - 618(2) (p.869) - 841(2) (cat.876); ; Ustādī cat.5; Wazīrī 12 (cat.1:13) - 13 (cat.1:17) - 387 (cat.1:351-2) - 277 (cat.1:284-5) - 502 (cat.2:437) - 660 (cat.2:568) - 831 (cat.2 702) - 871 (cat.2:725) -1023 (cat.3:1023) -1153 (cat.3:874) -1254 (cat.3:907) - 1605 (cat.3:1000) -1139 (cat.3:870); Zanjānī cat.198,206.

(25) Istiqsā' al-ṣṭibār fī taḥqīq ma'ānī al-akḥbār (KH IM).
(also: Istiqsā' al-ṣṭibār fī taḥqīq ma'ānī al-akḥbār;
Dharī'Ca, 2:30 (no.120).
(traditions)
MSS: no MS known.

(26) Istiqsā' al-naẓar fī l-baḥṭh 'an al-qada' wa-l-qadar (KH).
Dharī'Ca, 2:31-2 (no.122).
(theology; written after Rabī^C II 709/September-October 1309)
Editions: edited by 'Alī al-khākānī al-Najafī. Najaf, 1354/1935.
MSS: Adabīyyāt (1960) D136 (cat.27); Bīnīsh 314 (cat.590); Dānīshgāh 2091(2) (cat.8:714) - 5896(1) (cat.16:137) -7243(6) (cat.16:498) - MF2314(2) (1:671) -MF2992(1) (cat.1:776); Ḥakīm M1087 M294 (cat.51); Huqūq J227 (cat.244), Iṣma'īlī Institute 631 (fol.1v-16v) (cat.2:64); Majlis 4232(2) (cat.11:250) - 4322(2) (cat.12:16) - 4763(3) (cat.13:149) - 4953(1) (cat.14:225) - 4954(13) (cat.14:237) - 5168(5) (cat.15 306); Mar'ashī 2796(2) (cat.7:362); Mashhad Ilāhiyyat 936(1) (cat.2:86); Princeton New Series 461 (fol.25r-31r) -1084 (fol.154r-162r) - 1886 (fol.57v-65v) (cat.87); Ridawī Ḥikma 328 (cat.4 15) - Ḥikma 45 (cat.1 21 206 new edition); Tustariyya 562(4) (cat.866).
Commentaries: Nūr Allāh al-Shuṣhtarī (d. 1019/1610), al-Nur al-anwar wa l nūr al-azhar fī tanwīr khafayā al qada' wa l qadar (Dharī'Ca, 24.362, no.1952), written against objections by some Indian scholars against al-Ḥillī's Istiqsā' al-naẓar.

(27) al-Aṣrār al-khafīyya fī l-'uḥūm al-'aqlīyya (KH IM).
Dharī'Ca, 2:45 (no.175).
(philosophy; written before 680/1281)
MSS: Ḥaḥā Ḥakīm 179 (cat.420); Bankipore XXI, 2384; Ḥakīm 380 -1295 (cat.51); Maḥfūz 49 (cat.4:217).

(28) al-Ishārāt ilā ma'ānī al-ishārāt (IM).
Dharī'Ca, 2:98.
(philosophy, written after Rabī^C II 693 March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(29) al-Alfayn al-fāriq bayn al-sīdīq wa-l-mayn (KH⁺).
Dharī'Ca, 2:298-9 (no.1199).
(theology)
Editions: edited by Ḥusayn al-'Aḥlāmī. Beirut Mu'assasat al-'Aḥlāmī, 1402/1982.
MSS: Adabīyyāt (1965) 94 (cat.71); Adabīyyāt (1341) 197 (cat.74), Bīnīsh 29 - 28 - 30 - 340 (cat.603-4); Dānīshgāh 4551 (cat.13:3493), Gawharshad cat.218; Ḥakīm 669 (cat.67);

Hujjatīyya 171(1) (cat.100); Isma^Cil; Institute 283 (cat.2.2); Los Angeles M1028 M1129 (cat.154); Majlis 1686 (cat.5.4) - 1687 (cat.5.8) - 1688 (cat.5.9); Malik 2132 (cat.1.57); Miftāh 1040 -1047 (cat.103); Millī Arabic 268 (cat.7.241); Nūrbakhsh 189 (cat.1.190); Princeton New Series 1028 (cat.115), Ridawī Hikma 363 (cat.4.31) - Hikma 28 -29 -30 (cat.1.18 45-47 new edition); Wazīrī 1556 (cat.1.988).

(30) Anwār al-malakūt fī sharh al-yāqut (KH/IM).

Dhari^Ca, 2:444-5 (no.1725).

(Theology, completed in Jumādā II 684/August-September 1285)
Editions: edited by Muhammad Zanjānī, Intishārāt-i Danishgāh-i Tehrān, no.543. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1338H.

MSS: Bīniah 31 - 32 (cat.609); Būhār 95 (cat.2.106); Danishgāh 1046 - 4271 (cat.13 3240-1) - MF3081 (cat.2.62); Hakīm 1096 (cat.76); Huqūq J146 (cat.257); Ja^Cfarīyya 29 (cat.437); Mahfūz 60 (cat.4.218) - 82 (cat.3.34) - 34 (cat.3.59); Majlis 81 (cat.2.41) 1689 (cat.5.10), Malik 479 - 1292 (cat.71); Mar^Cashī 1241 (cat.4.40); Princeton New Series 1128 (cat.9-10); Ridawī Hikma 31 32 (cat.1.18 49-50 new edition); Tabriz Millī 3511 (cat.1.111)
Commentaries: Nahj al-^CAmidī ^Cala anwar al-malakūt, by ^CAmīd al-Dīn ^CAbd al-Muttalib al-A^Craji al-^CHusaynī al-^CHillī (d. 754/1353) (Dhari^Ca, 13.115, no.366).

(31) Idāh al-ishtihāh fī asmā al-ruwāt (YE).

Dhari^Ca, 2:493 (no.1934).

(Biographic work, completed on 19 Dhū al-Qa^Cda 707 11 May 1308).

Editions: Tehran, 1318H.

MSS: Adabīyyāt (1341) 138 (cat.74); Adabīyyāt (1960) B107 -J127 - D22 - D133 (cat.38 ff); Berlin 10164 (cat.9.517-8); Bīniah 8266 (cat.612); Adabīyyāt (1965) 151(2) - 309 - 452(3) (cat.77); Danishgāh 2359(3) (cat.9.964) - 2945(4) (cat.10.1829) -6290(2) (cat.16.235) - MF1441(1) (cat.1.601); Majlis 25/12 (cat.7.23) -1599 (cat.4.300) - 3153(3) (cat.10.2.738) -5903 (cat.17.296), Fu'ād Sayyid 589 (cat.2.2.18); Mahfūz 51 (cat.4.203) - 21(2) (cat.4.209); Mar^Cashī 108(2) (cat.1.129) -443(1) (cat.2.45) - 1176(4) (cat.3.348), 2548(2) (cat.7.130) - 3029(2) (cat.8.217) -4772(2) (cat.12.336) -4910(2) (cat.13.90) 4952(2) (cat.13.151); Mashhad Ilahīyyāt 1429(3) (cat.2.578) -1862(2) (cat.3.931) - 30 (cat.1.16); Millī Arabic 1433(3) (cat.9.455), Ridawī Rijāl 39 - 40 (cat.6.641-2) - Rijāl 3 (cat.2.353); Sulaymān Khān 108(3) (cat.18); Saryazdi 66(2) (cat.427).

(32) Idāh al-talbīs fī kalām al-ra'īs (KH).

Dhari^Ca, 2:493 (no.1938).

(philosophy)

MSS: no MS known.

(33) Idāh mukhālafat al-sunna (DH^{*}).

Dhari^Ca, 2:498-9 (no.1954).

(traditions; completed in 723/1323).

MSS Bīnīsh 6096 (cat.613); Dānīshgāh MF1751 - MF2970 (cat.1.288), Majlis 5070 (cat.15 30); Sinā 29 (cat.1:14).

(34) Idāh al-mu^qḍāt min sharh al-īsharat (IM).

Dharī^ḥa, 2:500-1 (no.1960).

(philosophy, written after Rabī^ḥ II 693.March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(35) Idāh al-ma^qṣūd fī sharh hikmat 'ayn al-qawā^ḥid (KH).

Dharī^ḥa, 2:501 (no.1962).

(philosophy; completed on 8 Shawwal 694/21 August 1295)

Editions: edited by ^{CA}A.Munzawī. Tehran, 1378/1959.

MSS. Dānīshgāh 4792 (cat.14.3831) - MF71 (cat.1 289);

Rīdāwī Hikma 47 (cat.1:22 = 53 new edition); see also above mentioned edition, introduction, 25-33.

(36) al Bāb al-hadī 'ashar fīmā yajibū 'alā 'ammāt

al-mukallafīn min ma^rḥifat unūj al-dīn (IE).

(being the 11th chapter of nō.110)

Dharī^ḥa, 3:5-7 (no.4).

(theology, completed on 11 Dhū al-Hijja 723.11 December 1323).

Editions: together with the commentaries al-Nafī^ḥ yawm al-hashr by al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī and Miftāḥ al-Bāb by Abū l-Fath b. Makhdūm al-Husaynī. Edited by Mahdī Muḥaqqiq. Windom of Persia, no.38. Tehran 1365/1986.

Translations English: al-Bāb al-Hadī 'Ashar, A Treatise on the Principles of Shi'ite Theology. Translated by W.M.Miller. London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1928.

MSS 'Abd al-'Azīm 212(2) (cat.444) - 287(3) (cat.447);

Bīnīsh 48 - 356 - 357 - 355 - 352 - 353 (cat.614); Bodleian

MS arab f.64 (ff.109-112); Dānīshgāh 328 - 4176(3)

(cat.13:3143) - 7274(2) (cat.16:503) - 8596(7)

(cat.17 169), Gawharshād cat.224, Gulpayigānī 387(4)

(cat.320); Hakīm M1757 - M1927 - M725 - M1177 - M1705

(cat.85), Isfahān Dānīshgāh 122(2) (cat.926), Kāshānī 22

(cat.83); Los Angeles M97(2) (cat.663) - M1051(1) (cat.707),

Majlis 109(12) (cat.7.325) - 2767(3) (cat.9/1 178) - 3149(1)

(cat.10/2:729) 4339(1) (cat.12:38) - 4954(26) (cat.14 243) -

5344(4) (cat.16:256) - 5384(2) (cat.16:290) - 5417(10)

(cat.16 127), Mar^ḥashī 69(2) (cat.1:82) - 1003(2) (cat.3 194)

- 2247(4) (cat.6:232) - 5148(1) (cat.13:353); Mashhad

Ilāhiyyāt 1577(3) (cat.2:712) - 668(2) (cat.1:467);

Mullī 1190(6) (cat.9:178), Nawwab Hikma 79 (1) (cat.518)

Oppenheim (n.n.); Princeton New Series 1550 (fol.150v- 156r)

- 1886 (fol.48v- 51r) (cat.24), Rīdāwī Hikma 371- 372 373

- 374 - 375 - 376 (cat.4 33-4) - Hikma 48 (cat.1:22 53-4

new edition); Wazīrī 2085(4) (cat.4:1159) - 2284(4)

(cat.4:1232) - 2520(1) (cat.4:1326).

Commentaries: (1) Al-Fādā al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423),

al-Nafī^ḥ yawm al-hashr fī sharh al-bāb al-hadī 'ashar (2)

Miftāḥ li l-bāb al-muḥaq bi-makhtasar al-miṣbāḥ by

Abū l-Fath b. Makhdūm al-Rhādīm

al-Husaynī al-'Arabshāhī (d. 976 1568 9); (3) Ishād

al-hashr fī sharh al-bāb al-hadī 'ashar by Sulaymān b. Ahmad

b. al-Husayn al-'Abī al-Jabbar al-Qatīfī (d. 1266/1850)

(Brockelmann, GALS 2 794, Dharī^ḥa, 2:794), (4) Sharḥ al-bāb

al-hādī 'Cashaar by Mīrzā Ibrāhīm b. Kāshif al-Dīn Muḥammad L. al Yazdī (d. after 1063/1653) (Dhārī'ā, 13:118, no.378); (5) Matālī' al-naẓar by Saḥī al-Dīn b. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Tarīhī; (Dhārī'ā, 13:121); (6) Sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Dildār b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad Ma'īn al-Dīn al-Hindī al-Nasirābādī (d. 1235/1820) (Dhārī'ā, 13:120, no.382); (7) Ma'īn al-fikar fī sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Ibn Abī Jumbūr al-Aḥsā'ī (d. after 904/1499) (Dhārī'ā, 21:286, no.5097); (8) Sharḥ ma'īn al-fikar fī sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar, a supercommentary by Ibn Abī Jumbūr al-Aḥsā'ī on (7); (Dhārī'ā, 14:73, no.1803); (9) Miftāḥ al-fikar al-fath sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Ibn Abī Jumbūr al-Aḥsā'ī (Dhārī'ā, 21:319, no.5371); (10) Sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Ibn Abī Jumbūr al-Aḥsā'ī; (11) al-Zad al-muddakḥar fī sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Muḥammad Ridā b. Qasīm al-Gharawī al-Najafī (written in 1349/1930-1) (Dhārī'ā, 12:7, no.381); (12) Naṭā'ij al-fikar fī sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Ṭahā al-Karamī (written around 1376/1956-7) (Dhārī'ā, 24:46, no.228); (13) Fath al-bāb fī sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by 'Abd al-Wahid b. Ni'mat Allāh al-Jilānī or al-Astarābādī (Dhārī'ā, 16:105, no.134); (14) Hādī al-bashaar fī sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Muḥsin b. Muḥammad al-Gilānī (written in 1207/1792-3) (Dhārī'ā, 25:151, no.11); (15) Sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Mīrzā 'Alī Aghā al-Tabrizī (d. around 1340/1921-2) (Dhārī'ā, 13:122 no.3901); (16) Sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Sulaymān b. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Alī b. al-Husayn b. Ahmad b. Yūsuf b. 'Ammār al-Huwayzī al-Bahrānī (d. 1121/1709/10) (Dhārī'ā, 13:120, no.383); (17) Sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Muḥammad b. Ahmad al-ma'ruf bi-Khawā'akī (completed on 5 Shā'ban 952/23 November 1545) (Dhārī'ā, 13:122, no.391); (18) Jamī' al-durar fī sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Khidr b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Rāzī al-Habālūdī (d. around 850/1446) (Dhārī'ā, 5:51, no.202); (19) Miftāḥ al-ghurar al-fath al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Khidr b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Rāzī al-Habālūdī (d. around 850/1446) (Dhārī'ā, 21:226, no.5358); (20) Sharḥ al-bāb al-hādī 'Cashaar by Amīr Abī l-Fath al-Sharīfī al-Shī'ī b. al-Nāsib al-Mīrza Makhdūm (d. around 976/1568-9) (Dhārī'ā, 13:119).

(37) Bast al-ishārāt (IM/KH**).

Dhārī'ā, 3:108 (no.358).

(philosophy, written after Rabī' II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(38) Bast al-kāfiya (KH/IM).

Dhārī'ā, 3:109 (no.360).

(grammar)

MSS: no MS known.

(39) Tabṣirat al-muta'allimīn fī ahkām al-dīn (KH/IM).

Dhārī'ā, 3:321 - 323 (no.1180).

(law)

Editions: Tehran, al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya, 1372H.

MSS: Amīr al-Mu'minīn 25 (cat.412) - 26(2) (cat.412); Bīnīsh 2261 - 2280 - 6432 - 2279 - 3515 (cat.627); Chester Beatty 4359 (cat.5:113); Dānīshgāh 7192 (cat.16:480) - MF2594 (cat.1:295 & 2:11) - MF2992(5) (cat.1:777); Fayd Mahdawī (cat.27); Hākīm M1669 - 1852 (cat.100); Huquq D27 (cat.281); India Office 1793 (cat.2:308); Los Angeles M652 (cat.164); Majlis 2767(2) (cat.9/1:177) - 4254 (cat.11:269) - 4953(9) (cat.14:229) - 5396 (cat.16:302); Malik n.n. (cat.1:106); Mar^Cashī 2074(2) (cat.6:87); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1121(4) (cat.2:258) - 994(2) (cat.2:145); Nawwāb cat.451; Princeton New Series 1372 (cat.314); Ridawī Fiqh 530 (cat.5:374) - Fiqh 69 -70 - 71 (cat.2:21); Rampur 984 MK (cat.3:462); Sīpāhsālār 457 (cat.1:369); Wazīrī 1350 (cat.3:936) - 2013 (cat.4:1128) - 2656 (cat.4:1379).

(40) Tahrīr al-abbāth fī ma^Crifat al-^Culūm al-tha^Cātha (IM^{*}). Dhari^Ca, 3:351 (no.1272).

(philosophy, written after Rabī^C II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(41) Tahrīr al-ahkām al-shar^Cīyya ^Calā madhhab al imāmiyya (KH/IM).

Dhari^Ca, 3:378-9 (no.1375).

(law; completed on 10 Rabī^C I 690/13 March 1291)

Editions: Tehran, 1314/1896.

MSS: 'Abd al-^Cazīm 45 (cat.73); Adabīyyat (1965) 322(2) -497 (cat.78); Bīnīsh 2276 2277 - 2703 - 2705 2704 -2708 2707 - 5705 - 2706 (cat.630); British Library OR 8405 - OR 8329; Dānīshgāh 872 - 1516 (cat.8:151) -2730 (cat.10:1603) - 2923 (cat.10:1782-3) - 6670 (cat.16:330) - 6790 (cat.16:360) 7632 (cat.16:660) - 8168(1) (cat.17:46) - MF2756 (cat.1:297); Farhād 34 (cat.158); Fayd Mahdawī (cat.27); Gawharshad cat.233; Gulpāyigānī 130 (cat.123) - 261 (cat.227) - 262 (cat.228); Hākīm 858 859 -1771 - 1779 - 1579 (cat.102); Haydariyya 671 (cat.48); Kawhān 9 (cat.33); Los Angeles M162 (cat.166); Ma^Cārif 55 (cat.1:78); Mahfūz 49 (cat.3:22); Majlis 2841 (cat.10/1:168) - 3396(1) (cat.10/3:1261) 4007 (cat.11:10) - 4710 (cat.13:91) -5010 (cat.14:317) - 5171 -5172 (cat.15:311) -5218(2) (cat.16:50); Malik 975 - 1249 -1373 - 1429 - 9122 -3053 (cat.1:109); Mar^Cashī 272 (cat.1:301) - 385 (cat.1:402) -543 (cat.2:146) - 915 (cat.3:104) - 1008 (cat.3:202) - 1084 (cat.3:263) -1279 (cat.4:80) - 1556 (cat.4:359) - 1598 (cat.4:400) - 1639 (cat.5:41) - 2631 (cat.7:205) -3535 (cat.9:330) - 3572 (cat.9:359) 3751 (cat.10:144) - 3822 (cat.10:200) - 4831 (cat.11:29); Mashhad Ilāhiyyat 1165 (cat.2:296) -1701 (cat.3:864) - 58 (cat.1:28); Millī Arabic 925 (cat.8:425); Nawwāb cat.451; Nūrbakhsh 159 (cat.1:173-4) - 436 (cat.2:132); Princeton New Series 528 - 552 -1231 1518 (cat.123-4); Ridawī Fiqh 531 - 532 533 - 534 - 535 -536 -537 - 538 (cat.5:374-6) - Fiqh 66 (cat.2:20); Rampur 1278 D (cat.3:464); Sīpāhsālār 458 (cat.1:370); Sulaymān Khān cat.6; Tabriz Millī 3352 (cat.1:192); Topkapı Serayı A 1143.1 - A 1143/2 - A 1143/3 -A 1143/5 - A 1143/6 - A 1143/7 (cat.2:747-8); Tustariyya 807 (cat.791) - 808 (cat.792); Wazīrī 386 (cat.1:351) -368 (cat.1:336) 2589 (cat.4:1355); Zanjānī cat.206.

(42) Taḥṣīl al-mulakhkḥam (IM).

Dhārīʿa, 3:397-8 (no.1427).

(philosophy; written after Rabīʿ II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(43) Tadhkirat al-fuqahāʾ ʿalā talkhiṣ fatāwī al-ʿulamāʾ
(KH/IM).

Dhārīʿa, 4:43-4 (no.169).

(law, completed between 24 Safar 703 / 7 October 1303 and 16
Dhū al-Ḥijja 720/17 January 1321)

Editions: Tehran: al-Maktaba al-Murtaḍawīyya, Tehran 1984
(repr. of the 1388/1968 edn.).

MSS: Bīnīsh 2713 6672 - 2267 - 5776 2298 7495 -7496
-2266 - 2264 - 2265 - 2263 (cat.641); Būhār 180 (cat.2.204);
Dānīshgāh 6245 (cat.16:225) - 6617 (cat.16:313) -6666
(cat.16.329); Dar al-Kutub B20018 (1.149); Gawharshād
cat.236; Ḥakīm 318- 844 882 - 884 1433 - 1961 - 1991 -1617
(cat.110-113), Ḥuqūq J4 -J24 (cat.287); India Office 1791
-1792 (cat.2.307); Isfahān ʿUmūmī 2913 (cat.201) -2974 -5416
(cat.202); Kāshān 10 (cat.33); Los Angeles M801 (cat.168);
Maḥfūz 6 (cat.4.251); Majlis 3227 (cat.10/2:810) 3228
(cat.10/2:811) 3229 (cat.10/2.811) - 4466 (cat.12.140) 4517
(cat.12:185) - 5810 (cat.17.234) 5811 (cat.17.235); Malik
1916 - 2460 -2461 - 2463 - 2464 - 2465 -2466 - 2490
(cat.1:130 ff); Marʿashī 1071 (cat.3:254) - 2309
(cat.6:291-2) - 3745 (cat.10:141) - 4832(1) (cat.13:30) -1611
(cat.5:14); Mashhad Ilahīyyāt 1070(1) (cat.2:225) - 1108
(cat.2.244) - 78 - 79 (cat.1:39); Masjid-i Jamī 55 56
(cat.314); Miṭṭāh 1033 (cat.118); Princeton New Series 44
-599 -1829 (cat.315); Ridāwī 546 - 547 - 548 - 549
(cat.5:382-3) - 53 - 54 - 55 - 56 - 57 - 58 (cat.2:16);
Sinā 1117 (cat.2.123); Sipahsālār cat.1:371-5; Topkapı Serayı
A1143/1 -A1143/2 A1143/3 A1143/5 - A1143.6 A1143/7
(cat.2:747-8); Wazīrī 41 (cat.1:48).

(44) Tasliḥ al-adhḥān ilā aḥkām al-īmān (IM).

Dhārīʿa, 4:174 (no.865).

(law)

MSS: no MS known.

(45) Tasliḥ al-afḥām fī maʿrifat al-aḥkam (KH).

Dhārīʿa, 4:179 (no.887).

(law)

MSS: no MS known.

(46) Tasliḥ al-nafs ilā ḥazīrat al-quḍāʾ (KH/IM).

Dhārīʿa, 4:180 (no.889) & 26.209 (no.1056).

(theology; completed on 12 Muḥarram 704/15 August 1304)

MSS: Aghā Ḥakīm 166(1) (cat.428); British Library Or 10.971;

Dānīshgāh MF1523 (cat.1.299) - MF2913(1) (cat.1:740); Ḥakīm

M929 (cat.120); Haydariyya 724 (cat.67); Maḥfūz 50(1)

(cat.4:217); Majlis 5384(1) (cat.16:289).

Commentaries: (1) Idāh al-labḥ fī sharḥ tasliḥ al-nafs
ilā ḥazīrat al-quḍāʾ by Nizām al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b.
Abī l-Fawaris Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Aʿrajī (Dhārīʿa, 2:498,
no.1952).

(47) al-Ta^Clīm al-thānī (IM^{*}).

(also al-Ta^Clīm al-tāmm)

Dharī^Ca, 4:226-7 (no.1137).

(philosophy, written after Rabī^C II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(48) Talkhīs al-marām fī ma^Crīfat al-aḥkām (KH, IM).

Dharī^Ca, 4:427 (no.1893).

(law)

MSS Bīnīsh 2274 - 2275 (cat.667); Majlis 4253 (cat.11:268)

4818 (cat.13:229) - 5314 (cat.16 228-9); Mar^Cashī 472 (cat.2:77); Rīdāwī Figh 64 - 65 (cat.2:20).

(49) al-Tanāsūb bayn al-Ash^Cariyya wa-l-fīraq al-sūfiyātā'iyya (KH).

Dharī^Ca, 4:435 (no.1934).

(theology)

MSS: no MS known.

(50) Tanqīh al-abḥāth fī l-^Culūm al-thalātha (KH^{*}).

Dharī^Ca, 4:460 (no.2053).

(philosophy; written before 8 Shawwāl 694/21 August 1295)

MSS: no MS known.

(51) Tanqīh qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'khūdhā 'an al-A'imma al-tāhirīn (IM).

(also: Tanqīh qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'khūdhā 'an Āl Yāsīn and Tanqīh al-qawā'id al-ma'khūdhā 'an kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fī l-ahādīth al-ḡibāh wa-l-ḥisān).

Dharī^Ca, 4:464 (no.2061).

(traditions; written after Rabī^C II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(52) Tahdhīb al nafs fī ma^Crīfat al-madhāhib al-khamṣa (IM).

Dharī^Ca, 4:515 (no.2285).

(law; written after Rabī^C II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(53) Tahdhīb al-wusūl ilā ^Clīm al-uṣūl (KH/IM)

Dharī^Ca, 4:511-514 (no.2280).

(legal methodology)

Editions. edited by 'Abd al-Husayn al-Baqqāl. Najaf al-Ādāb, 1970.

MSS: Adabiyyāt (1965) 303 (cat.81); Dāniṣṣḡāh 872 - 1637

(cat.8:216-7) - 1670(2) (cat.8.236) - 1702(3) (cat.8 252)

- 1876 (cat.8 481) 3534 (cat.12 2554) - 7691 (cat.16 672)

- 8307 (cat.17:103) - 9254(1) (cat.17:332), Farhad 3(2)

(cat.169), Gawharshād cat.247; Makīm 1949 - 554 - M1310 1286

- 1578 - 1158 - 1226 (cat.146-7); Huḡūq J330 (cat.311);

Isfahān 'Umūmī 3076 (cat.213-4), Isma'īlī Institute A(493)

- B(648) (cat.2 187); Kashānī 41 (cat.112), Los Angeles M69

- M894 - M1340 (cat.182), Majlis 3427(1) (cat.10/3.1288) - 4529

(cat.13:21) - 5756 (cat.17 195), Mūza 4321(2) (cat.202);

Ma.ik 2014 (cat.1.185); Mar^Cashī 119(3) (cat.1:143) 126

(cat.1:148) - 4170(1) (cat.11:181), Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1536(2)

(cat.2:676) - 1538 (cat.2:680) - 1540(1) (cat.2.680-1); Nawwāb

cat.453; Ridawī Usūl al-Fiqh 114-5 (cat.6:110) -Usūl al Fiqh
150 - 151 152 (cat.6:20) Usūl 5 6 (cat.2:186-7),
Sipahsālār 674 -675 (cat.1.562); Tabriz Millī 3363
(cat.1.310); Tustariyya 867(2) (cat.877); Wazīrī 650
(cat.2:561) - 1846 (cat.3:1073) - 2040 (cat.4:1138) -2240
(cat.4:1215); Zanjānī cat.211.

(54) Jawāb al-su'āl 'an ḥikmat al-naskh fī l-ahkām
al-ilāhiyya (DH).
Dharī'ca, 5:183 (no.805).
(theology; written after Rabī' II 709/September-October 1309)
MSS: no MS known.

(55) Jawāhir al-matālib fī fadā'il Anīr al-mu'minīn 'Alī b.
Abī Tālib (DH).
Dharī'ca, 5:280-1 (no.1313).
(on the virtues of the Imam 'Alī)
MSS: no MS known.

(56) al-Jawhar al-nadīd fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd (KH).
Dharī'ca, 5 290 (no.1356).
(logic)
Editions: edited by Muḥsin Baydārfar. Tehran: Intishārāt-i
Baydār, 1363sh.
MSS: 'Abd al-'Azīm 255 (cat.461); Adabīyyāt (1965) 265
(cat.83); Bīnīsh 1140 1141 (cat.695); Dānīshgāh MF5217(2)
(cat.3:143); Ḥakīm 448 - 1668 (cat.176); Isfahān 'Umūmī 2814
- 5400 (cat.218); Los Angeles M1263 (cat.191); Mahfūz 54
(cat.4:217); Majlis 3909 (cat.10/4:1939) - 4319 (cat.12:14);
Mar'ashī 4680 (cat.12:268); Mashhad Ilāhiyyat 152 153
(cat.1:81), Princeton New Series 591 - 715 (fol.2v-5lv) -1127
(cat.103); Ridawī Mantīq 182 - 183 (cat.4:370), Rampur 1442 D
(cat.4:258); Tustariyya 165 (cat.796); Wazīrī 1284
(cat.3:916) - 1593 (cat.3:997) - 1981 (cat.3:1116).

(57) Hāshiyat talkhīs al-ahkām (DH*).
Dharī'ca, 6:47 (no.233).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.

(58) Ḥall al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt (KH).
Dharī'ca, 7:74-5 (no.399).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(59) Khulāṣat al-awwāl fī ma'rifat al-rijāl (IM/IE).
Dharī'ca, 7:214/5 (no.1040).
(biographic work; written around Rabī' II 693/March 1294)
Editions: edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-'Ulūm. Najaf:
al-Haydariyya, 1972.
MSS: Adabīyyāt (1341) 205 (cat.78), Adabīyyāt (1965) 151(1)
-178 (cat.87); Berlin 9926 - 9927 (cat.9.385-6), Bibliothèque
Nationale 1108 (2) (cat.2 323); Bīnīsh 6890 -3606 - 8181
-3605 -3607 - 3629 - 3630 - 3631 - 5736 - 6589 7323 - 6614
(cat.743-4), Būḥār 277 (cat.2:307) -466 (cat.2:527),
Dānīshgāh 194 - 1772 (cat.8:312) - 4198 (cat.13.3167)
-5385(1) (cat.15:4232) -6714(1) (cat.16:343) -7170

(cat.16:472) - 7682 (cat.16:670) - 8308 (cat.17:103) MF3027
 (cat.2:31) - MF3573 (cat.3:226); Dār al-Kutub B26297
 (cat.1:297); Fu'ād Sayyid 1593 - 1594 (cat.2/4:166);
 Gawharahad cat.293, Isfahān 'Umūmī 3266 (cat.243); Isma'īlī
 Institute A (409) - B (103) - C (104) (cat.2:74); Los Angeles
 M959 (cat.218); Maḥhad 280(2) (cat.29), Maḥfūz 4 (cat.3:9)
 -19 (cat.3:38) - 52 (cat.4:203) -35 (cat.4:241) - 21
 (cat.4:257) 184 (cat.4:224), Majlis 2936(2) (cat.10/1:347)
 - 3153(1) (cat.10/2:737) -4406 (cat.12:105) - 5432
 (cat.16:333) -5761(3) (cat.17:201); Malik 3543 (cat.1:280);
 Mar'ashī 108(1) (cat.1:129) - 137 (cat.1:156) - 221
 (cat.1:249) - 773 (cat.2:381) - 418 (cat.2:23) - 1452(2)
 (cat.4:241) -2282 (cat.6:267) -2548(3) cat.7:131 -3436
 (cat.9:221) - 4135 (cat.11:154) -4147(1) (cat.11:163)
 -4952(1) (cat.13:151); Mashhad Ilahīyyāt 200 - 201 -202
 (cat.1:104-5) - 518(1) (cat.1:270) - 881 (cat.2:53) -886
 (cat.2:55) - 1381 (cat.2:529), Miṭṭāh 242(1) (cat.230) - 110
 - 538 (cat.149) - 1002(2) (cat.265), Millī Arabic 862(1)
 (cat.8:365) - Arabic 1272 (cat.9:262) -Arabic 1878
 (cat.10:511); Mīrzā Ja'far cat.39; Nawwab cat.547; Nūrbakhsh
 580 (cat.2:231); Princeton New Series 770 880 (cat.130);
 Ridawī Rijāl 57 - 58 - 59 - 60 - 61 -62 - 63 -64 - 65 - 66
 (cat.6:599-602) -Rijāl 15 - 16 -17 -18 (cat.2:357-8);
 Sulaymān Khān cat.11; Tabrīz Millī 3139 (cat.1:461);
 Tustariyya 175 (cat.798), Ustadi cat.17; Zanjanī cat.199,236.

(60) al-Khulāṣa fī usūl al-dīn (DB).

Dharī'ah, 7:208-9 (no.1024).

(theology)

MSS: no MS known.

(61) al-Durr al-maknūn fī sharh al-qānūn (IM).

(grammar; written after Rabī' II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(62) al-Durr al-maknūn fī 'ilm al-qanūn (KH).

Dharī'ah, 8:73 (no.253).

(logic)

MSS: no MS known.

(63) al-Durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīth al-sihāb wa-l-hisan
 (KH/IM).

Dharī'ah, 8:87 (no.312).

(traditions)

MSS: no MS known.

(64) al-Risāla al-ma'dīyya (KH*).

Dharī'ah, 12:183 (no.1211).

(theology; written between Rabī' II 709 September-October
 1309 and 10 Shawwāl 711/19 February 1312)

Editions in Kalimat al-muḥaqqiqin (Tehran, 1315/1898),
 338-379.

MSS: Adabīyyāt (1960) D136 (cat.313), Bīnīsh 600 - 602
 (cat.818) - 5655 (cat.819), Būhār 451(1) (cat.2:495);
 Dānīshgāh 415 - 3819(1) (cat.12:2798); Ilāhiyyat 245D
 (cat.1:561); Isfahān Dānīshgāh 87(3) (cat.924); Majlis
 4322(3) (cat.12:16), Mar'ashī 4099 (cat.11:116) - 1530

(cat.4.332) - 454(2) (cat.2:56) 514(2) (cat.2.119); Miṣṭāḥ
198(2) (cat.228); Riḍawī Hikma 656 - 657 - 658 - 659
(cat.4:129-30).

(65) Risāla fī adab al-baḥṭh al-mukhtaṣar (DH).

Dharīʿa, 1:13 (no.60).

MSS: see Dharīʿa, 1:13.

(66) Risāla fī butlān al-jabr (RU).

(theology)

MSS: no MS known.

(67) Risāla fī taḥqīq maʿnā al-īmān (RU).

(theology)

MSS: no MS known.

(68) Risāla fī khalq al-ʿālmā (DH^{*}).

Dharīʿa, 7:243 (no.1177).

(theology)

MSS: no MS known.

(69) Risāla fī suʿālayn saʿala ʿanḥuma al-Khwaja Rashīd
al-Dīn (IE).

(theology; written after Rabīʿ II 709/September-October 1309;
for this treatise, see J.v.Ess, Wezir, 47-8).

Editions: in Farhang-i irānzamin 19 (1952):106-117.

MSS: Dānīshgāh 1795(3) (cat.8:368); Gawharshād cat.250;

Lucknow Nāsiriya 714; privat library of Mahmud Shihabī (for
the latter two references, see van Ess, Wezir, 48).

(70) Risāla fī l-mawārīth.

(see Modarressi, 204)

(legal treatise)

MSS: Masjid-i Aʿzam 3085 (7).

(71) Risāla fī wājib al-ʿitqād ʿalā jamīʿ al-ʿibād. (KH^{*})

Dharīʿa, 25:4 (no.19).

(theology)

Editions. together with al-Miqdād al-Suyūri's ʿItimād
fī sharḥ wājib al-ʿitqād, in Kalimāt al-muḥaqqiqīn (Tehran,
1315/1897), 380-422.

MSS: Dānīshgāh 7693(7) (cat.16:673); Gawharshād cat.428;

Isfahān Dānīshgāh 81(3) (cat.924) -126(4) (cat.928) -182(7)

(cat.930), Immaʿili Institute 361 (cat.2 206); Majlis

4953(11) (cat.14.230); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 658(6) (cat.1:449);

Princeton New Series 1886 (fol.128v-137r) (cat.357);

Ustādī cat.65.

Commentaries: (1) Nahj al-sadād fī sharḥ wājib al-ʿitqād by

ʿAbd al-Wāhid b. al-Safī al-Nuʿmānī (d. after 1130/1718)

(Dharīʿa, 14:163); (2) Tahsil al-sadād fī sharḥ wājib

al-ʿitqād by Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd

al-ʿAlī al-ʿAmīlī al-Maysī (d. after 1020/1611) (Dharīʿa,

3.396-7, no.1424); (3) al-ʿItimād fī sharḥ wājib al-ʿitqād

by al-Fāḍil al-Miqdād al-Suyūri (d. 826/1423) (Dharīʿa,
2:230, no.908).

(72) Risāla fī wājibat al-hajj wa-arkānihī min dūn dhikr al-ad^Ciya wa-l-mustahabbāt (RÜ).

Dhārī^Ca, 25:1 (no.6) & 22:260 (no.6962).

(law)

MSS: no MS known.

(73) Sharh hikmat al-ishrāq (DR^{*}).

Dhārī^Ca, 13:211 (no.750).

(mysticism)

MSS: see Dhārī^Ca, 13:211.

(74) al-Risāla al-^Cizzīyya (KH^{**}/IM^{**}).

Dhārī^Ca, 15:262 (no.1701).

MSS: no MS known.

(75) Ghāyat al-ihkām fī tashīh talkhīs al-marām (KH^{*}).

Dhārī^Ca, 16:6 (no.24).

(law)

MSS: no MS known.

(76) Ghāyat al-wusūl wa idāh al-subul fī sharḥ mukhtasar muntahā al-su'āl wa-l-amāl (KH/IM).

Dhārī^Ca, 16:245.

(legal methodology; completed on 12 Rajab 697/25 April 1298)

MSS: Aghā Hākīm 180 (cat.428); British Library OR 3970;

Dānīshgāh 2771 (cat.10:1628); Los Angeles A446 (cat.297);

Mahfūz 133 (cat.4:221); Nawwāb cat.462; Ridawī Usūl 63 -64

(cat.2:203-4); Topkapı Serayı A 1244 - A 1299 - A 1300 (cat.

2:318-9); Wazīrī 1955 (cat.3:1105-6).

(77) Qawā'id al-aḥkām fī ma'rifat al-halāl wa-l-ḥarām (KH/IM).

Dhārī^Ca, 17:176-7 (no.930).

(law; completed on 24 Dhū l-Hijja 699/10 September 1300)

Editions: Qum, 1984 (Repr. of the 1315/1898 edn.).

MSS: Adabīyyāt (1965) 34 - 49 (cat.101), ^CAbd al-^CAzīm 6 - 18

- 47 (cat.78) - 402 (cat.473); Amīr al-Mu'minīn 61

(cat.415); Bīnīsh cat.942-3 (27 copies), British Library OR

8341 - OR 8403; Dānīshgāh 918 - 1382 (cat.8.69) -1408

(cat.8.84) - 1503 1504 - 1505 (cat.8:145-6) -1850

(cat.8:446) -1857 (cat.8.450) - 2112 (cat.8:748) - 6350

(cat.16.247) - 6362 (cat.16:252) - 6698 (cat.16:335) - 6743

(cat.16.349-50) - 6880 (cat.16:388) - 7314 (cat.16:510) -8955

(cat.17.261) MF2537 (cat.1.361), Fayḍ Mahdawī (cat.37);

Gawharshad cat.370-1; Gulpayīgānī 136 (cat.129); Huqūq J8 -J9

- J64 J346 (cat.414 ff), Ilāhiyyat 38B - 57J - [64J]

175J - (cat.1.630); India Office 1798 (cat.2.309) - 1799

(cat.2.310), Infahān ^CUmūmī 2910 (cat.278) - 2925 (cat.279)

- 2941 (cat.279); Isma'īlī Institute A(448) - B(449)

(cat.2:126), Mashān 62 (cat.38), Los Angeles M655 - M1065

-M1316 (cat.321); Ma'ārīf 67 (cat.1:93); Mahdawī 798

(cat.165); Mahfūz 59 (cat.3:23) - 70 (cat.3:23) - 373

(cat.4:233); Majlis 144(1) (cat.7:330) 170 (cat.7.218-9)

-2748(2) (cat.9:1.118) -2748(3) (cat.9:1.119) - 2839

(cat.10/1:166) - 3275 (cat.10/2:884) - 3276 (cat.10/2.884.5)

- 4196 (cat.11.211) - 4471(4) (cat.12.145) 4545

(cat.12:217) - 4809 (cat.13:218) - 5219(2) (cat.16:51)

-5642(1) (cat.17:97); Malik 1096 - 1803 - 1919 - 1948 (cat.1:572-3); Mar^{Ca}shī 1077 (cat.3:258) - 1112 (cat.3:283) -1163 (cat.3:337) - 1206 (cat.4:6) - 1292 (cat.4:88) -1310 (cat.4:98) - 1413 (cat.4:195) - 1622 (cat.5:26) -1706 (cat.5:99) -1711 (cat.5:102) -1729 (cat.5:116) -1881 (cat.5:258) - 1937 (cat.5:303) - 2145 (cat.6:153) -2528 (cat.7:115) - 2616 (cat.7:195) - 2886 (cat.8:90) -4094 (cat.11:111) - 4273 (cat.11:275), Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1111 (cat.2:245) - 1730 (cat.3:821) - 1896 (cat.3:950) - 441 (cat.1:222); Miftah 138 (cat.203); Muīlī Arabic 173 (cat.7:152) - Arabic 373 (cat.7:325) -Arabic 474 (cat.7:396) - Arabic 475 (cat.7:397) -Arabic 538 (cat.8:34) - Arabic 537 (cat.8:33) -Arabic 721 (cat.8:179) - Arabic 977 (cat.8:468) -Arabic 1490 (cat.9:509) -Arabic 1832 (cat.10:414); Mīrṣā Ja^{Ca}far cat.38; Nawwāb cat.463 - Fiqh 51(1) (cat.466), Nūrbakhsh 195 (cat.1:193) -213 (cat.1:203) -580 (cat.2:231); Oppenheim (n.n.); Princeton New Series 43 -107 - 529 -649 -693 (cat.206-7); Ridawī fiqh 302 - 303 -304 - 305 -306 - 307 - 308 - 309 -310 -311 - 312 -313 -314 (cat.2:94) - fiqh 770 - 771 - 772 - 773 - 774 - 775 -776 -777 (cat.5:476-9); Rampur 985 MK (cat.3:468); Saryazdī 69 (cat.424); Sinā 1389 (cat.2:242); Sīpāhsālār 608 -609 -610 - 611 - 612 - 613 - 614 (cat.1:496-9); Sulaymān Khan cat.16; Topkapı Serayı A 1090 (cat.2:746); Tustariyya 711 (cat.808); Wazīrī 275 (cat.1:283) - 322 (cat.1:313) - 349 (cat.1:328) - 443 (cat.1:393) - 464 (cat.1:409) - 466 (cat.1:410) - 1609 (cat.1:1001) - 2350 (cat.4:1260); Zanjānī cat.191.

(78) al-Qawā'id al-jaliyya fī sharh al-risāla al-shamsiyya (KH/IM).

Dharī^{Ca}, 17:182 (no.955).

{logic; completed in Rabī^C II 679/July-August 1280}

Editions: Edited by Fāris al-Ḥassun (forthcoming) (see Turāthunā, 17 (1409):243-4).

MSS: Bināsh 1144 (cat.943); Ridawī Mantīq 1114 (cat.1:43 - 348 new edition); see also Turāthunā, 17 (1409):243-4 for further MSS.

(79) Qawā'id wa-maqāsid fī l-mantiq wa-l-tabī'ī wa-l-ilāhī (KH/IM).

Dharī^{Ca}, 17:195 (no.1031).

{philosophy}

MSS: no MS known.

(80) al-Qawl al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-^{Ca}zīz (KH).

{also: al-Sirr al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-^{Ca}zīz).

Dharī^{Ca}, 17:216 (no.1173), 12:170-1 (no.1138).

{exegesis}

MSS: no MS known.

(81) Kāshif al-astār fī sharh kashf al-asrār (KH/IM).

{also: Kashf al-astār fī sharh kashf al-asrār}

Dharī^{Ca}, 17:233-4 (no.37).

{logic}

MSS: no MS known.

(82) Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra'īs (IM).

(also Kashf al-talbīs fī bayan sayr al-ra'īs).

Dharī'Ca, 18:24.

(philosophy; written after Rabī' II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(83) Kashf al-khafā' min kitāb al-shifā' (KH/IM).

Dharī'Ca, 18:34 (no.549).

(philosophy, completed on 9 Rabī' II 717/21 June 1317)

MSS: Chester Beatty 5151 (cat.7:51).

(84) Kashf al-fawā'id Calā Idāh mā ishtamalat Calayhī al-rigala al-mawsūma bi-qawā'id al-'aqqā'id (KH/IM).

Dharī'Ca, 18:52-3 (no.635).

(theology, completed on 3 Dhū al-Hijja 703/5 July 1304)

Editions: in Majmu'at rasā'il (Tehran Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-'Uẓmā al-Mar'ashī al-Najafī, 1404H.), 2-97.

MSS: Dānishgāh 128; Gawharshād cat.377; Isma'īlī Institute

450 (fol.24v-105r) (cat.2:73); Majlis 81(2) (cat.7:234) -179

(cat.7:232); Ridawī Hikma 482 - 483 - 484 - 485 (cat.4:340);

Tustariyya 860 (cat.808).

Commentaries: (1) by Muḥammad al-'Aẓẓār al-Tibrānī (Dharī'Ca, 18:52).

(85) Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ tajrīd al-i'tiqād (KH/IM).

Dharī'Ca, 18:60 (no.668) & 3:353.

(theology, completed on 15 or 16 Rabī' I 696/11 or 12 January 1297)

Editions: Saīda. Maṭba'at al-'irfān 1353/1934, Qum; al-Maktaba al-Mustawfiyya, n.d.

MSS: Adabiyyāt (1341) 17 (cat.83); Adabiyyat (1960) J60

(cat.394); 'Abd al-'Azīm 337 (cat.475); Būhār 87 (cat.2:99);

Chester Beatty 4279 (cat.5:87); Dānishgah 1104 - 1869

(cat.8:475) - 1865 (cat.8:472) - 6738 (cat.16:348) - 6997

(cat.16:423) - 9336 (cat.17:350); Gawharshād cat.378, India

Office 471(14) (cat.1:127); Los Angeles M661 (cat.330);

Mahfūz 20(4) (cat.3:29) 74 (cat.3:44), Majlis 630(12)

(cat.1:390) - 4741 (cat.10/4:1726); Malik 806 - 2543

(cat.1:597-8); Mar'ashī 727 (cat.2:324); Mashhad Adabiyyāt

200 (cat.110); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 819 (cat.2:11) 457

(cat.1:231); Miftāḥ 1002(1) (cat.265), Nawwāb cat.511,

Qādiriyya 559 (cat.2:398) - 560 (cat.2:399), Ridawī Hikma 220

(cat.1:67) 118 new edition) - Hikma 221 (cat.1:68 = 189 new

edition) - Hikma 486 - 487 - 488 (cat.4:340-1), Sinā 525

(cat.1:324); Wazīrī 2622 (cat.4:1366-7).

Commentaries: (see also Dharī'Ca, 6:118) (1) by Abū Qasīm

al-Husayn al-Radawī al-Qummi al-'Ha'irī (d. 1324/1906), (2) by

Mirza 'Abd al-Razzāq b. 'Alī al-Muḥaddith al-Wā'iz.

(86) Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt (IM).

Dharī'Ca, 18:62 (no.679).

(philosophy, written after Rabī' II 693/March 1294).

MSS: no MS known.

(87) Kashf al-maḡāl fī maʿrifat al-rijāl (KH**).
Dharrīʿa, 18:63-4 (no.689).
(biographic work)
MSS: no MS known.

(88) Kashf al-maknūn min kitāb al-qānūn (KH).
Dharrīʿa, 18:64 (no.692).
(grammar)
MSS: no MS known.

(89) Kashf al-vaḡīn fī fadāʾil Amīr al-muʾminīn (IE).
Dharrīʿa, 18:69-70 (no.721).
(on the virtues of the Imam ʿAlī)
Editions: Najaf n.d.
MSS: Dānīshgāh 128 - 1627(2) (cat.8:210) - 1796 (cat.8:368) -
MF3856(1) (cat.2:270); India Office 471(4) (cat.1:123);
Marʿashī 980(2) (cat.3:172); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1804
(cat.3:874); Mahfūz 31 (cat.3:41); Millī Arabic 1379(1)
(cat.9:378); Princeton New Series 61 (cat.113);
Riḍawī akhbār 245 (cat.1:80); Wazīrī 1700 (1) (cat.3:1025).

(90) Lubb al-hikma (IM*).
Dharrīʿa, 18:286 (no.131).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(91) al-Mabāhith: arbaʿūn masʾala fī ʿuṣūl al-dīn (DH).
Dharrīʿa, 19:37 (no.198).
(theology)
MSS: Maktabat al-Samāwī (see Dharrīʿa, 19:37).

(92) al-Mabāhith al-saniyya wa l-muʿaradāt al-nasīriyya (KH).
Dharrīʿa, 19:39-40 (no.207).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(93) Mabādīʾ al-wusūl ila ʿilm al-uṣūl (KH/IM).
Dharrīʿa, 19:43-4 (no.229).
(legal methodology)
Editions: edited by ʿAbd al-Husayn Muḥammad b.
ʿAlī al-Baqqāl, Najaf: al-ʿĀdāb, 1390/1970.
MSS: ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm 382 (cat.475); Berlin 4427 (cat.4:39);
British Library OR 10963; Chester Beatty 3788(2) (cat.4:12);
Dānīshgāh 1395 (cat.8:75) - 1690(3) (cat.8:247) - 4798
(cat.14:383) - 7312(3) (cat.16:510) - 9262(1) (cat.17:334)
- MF3043(2) (cat.2:41), Fayḍ Maḥdawī (cat.38); Gawharshād
cat.384; Huḡḡatīyya 252(2) (cat.102) - 441(1) (cat.107)
- 569(2) (cat.114); Huḡḡ J217 - D56 (cat.452); Isfahān
Dānīshgāh 148(2) (cat.929); Ismaʿīlī Institute 417
(cat.2:92); Kāshān 82(2) (cat.41); Mahfūz 30 (cat.3:19) - 2
(cat.4:253); Majlis 3850 (cat.10/4:1884) - 5406(1)
(cat.16:311); Malik 2813 (cat.1:630); Marʿashī 4(2)
(cat.1:19) - 28(3) (cat.1:40) - 49(3) (cat.1:61) - 119(2)
(cat.1:143) - 482(2) (cat.2:87); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1191
(cat.2:320) - 1206(1) (cat.2:341) - 1209(2) (cat.2:345);

Millī Arabic 800(4) (cat.8.304) -Arabic 1678 (cat.10:261);
Mūza 4321(1) (cat.212); Princeton New Series 150 - 874
(cat.139-40); Ridawī Esul al-Fiqh 323(2) (cat.6:140) -Usul 92
(cat.2:212); Rampur 963 MK (cat.3:68); Tustariyya 867(1)
(cat.877); Ustādī cat.34.

(94) Muhakamāt bayn shurrāh al-shārāt (KH/IM*).
Dharī^{Ca}, 20:132 (no.2256).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(95) Mukhtasar sharh nahj al-balāgha (KH).
(also: Mukhtasar nahj al-balāgha)
Dharī^{Ca}, 10:198 (no.2559) & 14:124 (no.1959).
MSS: Mahdawī 795 (158).

(96) Mukhtalaf al-shī^{Ca} fī ahkām al-sharī^{Ca} (KH/IM).
Dharī^{Ca}, 20:218 - 221 (no.2666).
(law, written between 4 Jamādā II 699/26 February 1300 and 15
Dhū l-Qa^{Ca}da 708/26 April 1309)
Editions: Tehran, 1322-24/1905-6.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1965) 121 (cat.105); ^{Ca}Abd al-^{Ca}Azīm 20 - 29
-39 (cat.79-80); Binish cat.996 7 (17 copies), Bodleian MS
arab D.108; British Library OR 7811; Dānīshgāh 778 1472
(cat.8:122) - 1594 (cat.8:195) -1855 (cat.8:449) - 6653
(cat.16:326) - 6690 (cat.16:334) -6735 (cat.16:347) - 6769
(cat.16:357) - 6888 (cat.16:689-90) - 7717 (cat.16:638);
Gawharshād cat.389; Gulpāyigani 151 (cat.140); India Office
1790 (cat.2:306); Isfahan Dānīshgāh 70 (cat.915), Isfahān
^{Ca}Umūmī 2831 (cat.298); Isma^{Ca}īlī Institut 743 (cat.2:109);
Ja^{Ca}farīyya 14 (cat.435); Kāshān 88 (cat.43); Los Angeles
M1281 (cat.349); Ma^{Ca}ārīf 69 (cat.1:97); Mahfūz 1 (cat.4:250);
Majlis 157 (cat.7:335) -1316 - 1317 (cat.4:90-1) - 3504
(cat.10/3:1458) -4003 (cat.11:7) - 4225 (cat.11:244) -4235
(cat.11:253) - 4511 (cat.12:183) - 4733(1) (cat.13:113);
Malik 2082 - 2198 (cat.1:657); Mar^{Ca}ashī 963 (cat.3:154) - 964
(cat.3:155) - 1052 (cat.3:241) - 1195 (cat.3:363) - 1196
(cat.3:363) - 1229 (cat.4:30) -1545 (cat.4:347) - 1715
(cat.5:105) 2609 (cat.7:190) - 3252 (cat.9:43), Mashhad
Ilāhiyyāt 1379 (cat.2:526) -1479 (cat.2:623); Masjid-i Jāmi^{Ca}
171 (cat.337), Millī Arabic 442 (cat.7:375) -Arabic 530
(cat.8:28), Arabic 911 (cat.8:415), Arabic 928 (cat.8:427);
-Arabic 952 (cat.8:445); Mīrzā Ja^{Ca}far cat.41; Nawwāb cat.475;
Ridawī fiqh 347 348 349 - 350 - 351 352 -353 - 354 -355
(cat.2:108) - 803 - 804 - 805 - 806 - 807 -808 - 809 -810
- 811 (cat.5:492 5); Rampur 10247 D - 986 M (cat.3:470);
Sipahsālār 632 - 633 - 634 - 635 -636 - 637 (cat.1:515 8);
Sulaymān Khān cat.20; Tustariyya 816 (cat.810);
Ustādī cat.34; Wazīrī 346 (cat.1:323) - 684 (cat.2:584) 686
(cat.2:588) - 687 (cat.2:588) - 1596 (cat.3:997) - 2930
(cat.4:1476).

(97) Madārak al-ahkām (KH/IM).
Dharī^{Ca}, 20:239 (no.2764).
(law)

MSS: no MS known.

(98) Maṛāsīd al-tadqīq wa-maqāṣīd al-tahqīq (KH).

Dharīʿa, 20:300 (no.3073).

(philosophy)

MSS: Dānīshgāh 2301 (cat.9:934-5).

(99) Maḡābīh al-anwār (KH).

Dharīʿa, 21:85 (no.4056).

(traditions)

MSS: no MS known.

(100) al-Matālib al-ʿaliyya fī maʿrifat al-ʿarabiyya
(KH/IM).

(also: al-Matālib al-ʿaliyya fī ʿilm al-ʿarabiyya)

Dharīʿa, 21:140 (no.4324).

(grammar)

MSS: no MS known.

(101) Maʿārīj al-fahm fī sharh al-nuzum (KH/IM).

Dharīʿa, 21:183 (no.4517).

(theology; completed on 6 Ramadān 678/10 January 1280)

MSS: Berlin 1796 -1797 (cat.2:348-9); India Office 471(6)

(cat.1:124); Bankipore, cat.10, no.618; British Library OR

8478(1) (fol.1r-93v) (fragment); Dār al-Kutub (general

catalogue) 1:208; Chester Beatty, 3788 (1) (cat.4:12); ʿAbd

al-ʿAzīm 362(1) (cat.450); Āghā Hakīm 166(1) (cat.428),

Dānīshgāh MP2448 (cat.1:283); Maḥfūz 50(2) (cat.4:217);

Rawḍatī 46 (cat.194); Wazīrī 956 (cat.2:786).

(102) al-Maqāṣīd al-wāfiya bi-fawa'id al-qānūn wa-i kāfiya
(KH/IM).

Dharīʿa, 21:386 (no.5579).

(grammar)

MSS: no MS known.

(103) al-Muqaddīma fī l-kalām (DH^a)

Dharīʿa, 22:89 (no.6205).

(theology)

MSS: see Dharīʿa, 22:89.

(104) Maḡṣad al-wāsilīn fī usūl al-dīn (KH/IM).

(also Muʿtaḡad al-wāsilīn)

Dharīʿa, 22:112 (no.6312).

(theology)

MSS: no MS known.

(105) al-Muqāwamāt al-hikmiyya (KH).

Dharīʿa, 22:9 (no.5759).

(philosophy, written before Rabīʿ II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(106) Mukātaba bayn al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥallī wa-l-Qādī al-Bayḍāwī
(see al-ʿAmīlī, 24:237-9).

(law)

Editions: quoted in al-^CAmilī, 24:237-9.

(107) Manāḥij al-yaqīn fī usūl al-dīn (KH/IM).

Dhārī^Cā, 22:352 (no.7402).

(theology; completed on 6 Rabi^C II 680/25 July 1281)

Editions: Bombay, 1290H. (see Brockelmann, GALS, 2:207);
edited by Muhammad Ridā al-Anṣārī (forthcoming) (see
Turāthunā, 17 (1409):243).

MSS: Amīr al-Mu'minīn 3 (cat.410), Bīnash 251 (cat.1037) -252
(cat.1038), Huquq J146 (cat.480); India Office 471(5)
(cat.1:124); Kitābkhāna-yi Majlīd-i A^Czam/Qum 656 (see
Turāthunā, 16 (1409):87); Mahfūz 424 (cat.4:235); Maktabat
Shāh Jirāgh/Shīrāz 548 (see Turāthunā, 16 (1409H.) 88); Malik
736 (1:740); Ridawī Hikma 251 (cat.1:80 = 238-9 new edition);
-Hikma 252 (cat.1:81 = 240 new edition); Rawdatī 29 (cat.95)
Commentaries (1) al-Idāh wa l-tabyīn fī sharḥ minhāj

al-yaqīn, by Kamāl al-Dīn ^CAbd al-Rahman b.
^CAtā'i^q al-Hillī (d. after 788/1386) (completed on 12
Dhū al-Qa^Cda 789/24 November 1387) (Dhārī^Cā, 2:502, no.1965);
(2) Ta^Cliqat by Sayyid ^CAbd al-Hasan
al-Kaahmīrī (d. 1313/1895) (Dhārī^Cā, 20:352)

(108) Muntahā al-maṭlab fī taḥqīq al-madhḥab (KH/IM).

Dhārī^Cā, 23:11-2 (no.7841).

(law; completed on 11 Jumādā II 688/2 July 1289)

Editions: Tehran, 1333/1915.

MSS: ^CAbd al-^CAzīm 16 (cat.82); Āghā Ḥakīm n.n. (cat.420);
Bīnash 2850 (cat.1041); British Library OR 9854; Gawharshād
cat.416; Dānīshgāh 1929(1) (cat.8:544); Isfahān Dānīshgāh 41
(cat.918); Majlis 2840 (cat.10.1:166) - 3309 (cat.10'2:961)
- 4755 (cat.13:141); Malik 1012 - 1228 - 1370 - 1371
(cat.1:745-6); Mar^Cashī 4461 (cat.12:48); Mashhad Ilāhiyyat
878 (cat.2:52); Millī Arabic 370 (cat.7:323); Princeton New
Series 798 (cat.184); Ridawī Fiqh 872 (cat.5:520); Wazīrī 39
(cat.1:47-8) - 523 (cat.2:455) - 1592 (cat.3:996) -1798
(cat.3:1057); Tustarīyya 772 (cat.813).

(109) Muntahā al-wusul ilā ^Cilmay al-kalām wa l-^Cusūl (KH/IM).

Dhārī^Cā, 23:15 (no.7848).

(theology, legal methodology; the first portion on theology
was completed on 16 Jumādā I 687/18 June 1288)

MSS British Library OR 8326; Dānīshgāh 1807 (cat.8:394);
Mahfūz 128 (cat.3:48).

(110) Minhāj al-salāh fī ikhtisār al-misbāḥ (IE).

Dhārī^Cā, 23:164-5 (no.8510).

See also Ridawī Usūl 6 (cat.2:210) where a work entitled
Ma^Carī^C al-dīn wa-manāḥij al-yaqīn is listed. It is suggested
there that this work is identical with al-Hillī's Manāḥij
al-yaqīn. The manuscript is, however, described as a legal
work. It is therefore impossible that it is identical with
the Manāḥij. It is moreover likely that it is not a work of
al-Hillī at all. See also Āghā Buzurg, Dhārī^Cā, 21:181
(no.4508).

Ilaw; completed on 11 Dhū al-Hijja 723 11 Decemler 1323).
 MSS: Bīnīsh 8019 - 3288 (cat.1047); Dānīshgāh 9603
 (cat.17:433); India Office 342 (cat.1:87) - 371(10)
 (cat.1:96); Mahfūz 20 (cat.3:18); Majlis 4405 (cat.12:105);
 MarCāshī 1157 (cat.3:328); Miftah 1044 (cat.302); Princeton
 New Series 53 (cat.167); Ridawī AdCīya 493 (cat.6:298);
 -AdCīya 201 (cat.2:296); Rawdātī 30 (cat.100) - 31 (cat.106).

(111) Minhāj fī manāsik al-hajj (KH).

DharīCā, 23:171 (no.8531).

(legal work).

MSS: Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1017(2) (cat.2:174).

(112) Minhāj al-karāma fī maCrifat al-imāma (KH).

DharīCā, 23:172-3 (no.8534).

(theology; written after RabīC II 709/September-October 1309)
 Editions: in Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya, by Ibn Taymiyya
 (edited by Rashīd Salīm, (Cairo: 1962/64), introduction,
 77-202.

MSS: Adabiyyāt (1960) D136 (cat.503); Bīnīsh 263 - 264 -938
 -939 -5668 (cat.1047); Dānīshgāh 889 - 1627(1) (cat.8:210)
 -1990(3) (cat.8:599) - 2603(6) (cat.9:1458) -4543(4)
 (cat.13:3488) - 5396(9) - 5398(2) (cat.15:4241) -6817(2)
 (cat.17:377) - 7033(1) (cat.16:434) 8971(16) (cat.17:267)
 - MF2120(2) (cat.1:645); Farhād 153(2) (cat.230); Gawharshād
 cat.417; Huqūq J227 -D15 (cat.485 ff), India Office 471(3)
 (cat.1:123) - 2089 (cat.2:396); Los Angeles M1050(8)
 (cat.707); Mahdawī 543(2) (cat.122); Mahfūz 20 (cat.3:18);
 Majlis 1932(3) (cat.9:637) 4322(1) (cat.12:16); Malik 500
 -2235 (cat.1:753-4); MarCāshī 49(2) (cat.1:60) 620(3)
 (cat.2:220) - 593(2) (cat.2:186) - 895 (cat.3:90) 2523(1)
 (cat.7:109) -2843(2) (cat.8:46) - 3160(1) (cat.8:391);
 Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1154 (cat.2:282) - 756 (cat.1:583); Nawwāb
 166 Akhbar (2) (cat.496) - cat.521; Millī Arabic 159(3)
 (cat.7:142); Princeton New Series 456 (cat.166-7);
 Ridawī Hikma 1043 - 1044 1045 (cat.4:261) Hikma 263
 (cat.1:84 = 240 new edition) -Hikma 264 (cat.1:85 = 241 new
 edition); Sinā 164(3) (cat.1:82); Tustariyya 855(2)
 (cat.876); Ustādī cat.39; Wazīrī 1222 (cat.3:899) -1562(2)
 (cat.3:989-90) - 2262(2) (cat.4:1222-3) -2738(2)
 (cat.4:1409-10).

Refutations: (1) Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), Minhāj al-sunna
 al-nabawiyya fī naqd kalām al-shīCā wa-l-qadariyya; (2)
 Sarīja b. Muḥammad al-Malaṭī al-Māridīnī (d. 788/1386),
Sadd al-fatīq al-muzahhar wa-sadd al-fasīq Ibn al-Mutahhar
 (see Kātip Çelebi, 2:1872)

(113) Minhāj al-hidāya wa-maCraj al-dīrāya fī Cilm al-kalām
 (KH/IM).

(also: Minhāj al-hidāya wa-maCarij al-hidāya)

DharīCā, 22:351 (no.7398).

(theology)

MSS: no MS known.

(114, Nuzum al-barānīn fī usūl al-dīn (KH/IM).

Dharīʿa, 24:200 (no.1048).

(theology)

MSS: Maḥfūz 104(2) (cat.4:220); together with Maʿārīj al-fahm, see there.

Commentaries: Maʿārīj al-fahm fī sharḥ al-nuzum by the author himself.

(115) al-Nukat al-badīʿa fī taḥrīr al-dharīʿa (KH).

Dharīʿa, 24:303 (no.1586).

(legal methodology)

MSS: no MS known.

(116) Nihāyat al-ihkām fī maʿrīfat al-aḥkām (KH/IM).

Dharīʿa, 24:394 (no.2108).

(law)

MSS: Aghā Hākīm 40 (cat.423); Bīnīsh 2659 2661 (cat.1063); Dānīshgāh 6662 (cat.16:328) - MF2438 (cat.1:395), Isfānān ʿUmūmī 2989 (cat.320); Majlis 5487 (cat.16:385), Malik 1928 - 2967 (cat.1:779), Mashhad Lāhīyyāt 1100 (cat.2:318), Nawwāb cat.480; Nūrbakhsh 374 (cat.2:95), Princeton New Series 1256 (cat.194-5), Ridāwī 449 - 450 - 451 (cat.2:138-9); Wazīrī 531 (cat.2:461).

(117) Nihāyat al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām (KH/IM).

Dharīʿa, 24:407 (no.2153).

(theology)

MSS: Haydariyya 628 (cat.37); Majlis 10192; Marʿashī 254 (cat.1:280); Ridāwī 11606 (cat.11:419).

(118) Nihāyat al-wusūl ilā ʿilm al-usūl (KH/IM).

Dharīʿa, 24:408-9 (no.2160).

(legal methodology; completed on 8 Ramadān 704/4 April 1305).

MSS: Dār al-Kutub (general catalogue) 1:568, Bankipore XIX, I, 1567; ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm 12 (cat.82); Bīnīsh 2952 6975 8170 - 2951 - 2662 (cat.1064), Chester Beatty 3054 (cat.1:22), Dānīshgāh 801 1176 MF4215 (cat.3:32), Galpayigani 200 (cat.179) - 229 (cat.198), Maḥfūz 121 (cat.4:221); Majlis 3418 (cat.10/3:1281) - 3842 (cat.10/4:1879) - 4052 (cat.11:52), Malik 1879 (cat.1:785), Marʿashī 277 (cat.1:305), - 384 (cat.1:401) - 1356 (cat.4:132) - 1642 (cat.5:43) - 1908 (cat.5:278) - 1927 - 1926 (cat.5:296) - 2217 (cat.6:207) - 4566 (cat.12:142) - 4875 (cat.13:59), Mashhad Lāhīyyāt 1243 (cat.2:377) - 1873 (cat.3:937); Miḥṭāh 1262 (cat.308); Oppenheim 29214 (Opp.1116.1988), Princeton New Series 376 (cat.195); Ridāwī Usūl al-Fiqh 353 - 354 - 355 (cat.6:92-3) - Fiqh 452 (cat.2:139) - Usūl 96 - 97 (cat.2:213), Sinā 1385 (cat.2:241 2); Sulaymān Khān cat.23, Topkapı Serayı A 1271 (cat.2:346), Tustariyya 492 (cat.814); Istādī cat.41; Wazīrī 48(1) (cat.1:63) - 550 (cat.2:470).

(119) Nahj al-īmān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān (KH).

Dharīʿa, 24:412 (no.2170).

(exegesis)

MSS: no MS known.

(120) Nahj al-haqq wa-kashf al-ḡidq (KH^a).

Dharrī^a, 24:416 (no.2183).

(theology, written after Rabī^c II 709/August-September 1309)
Editions. edited by Faraj Allāh al-Ḥusaynī and Ridā al-Ṣadr
(Beirut, 1982).

MSS: 'Abd al-^cAzīm 162 (cat.474); Āghā Ḥakīm 83 (cat.424);
Bīnīsh 8062 - 952 - 274 - 275 - 951 - 950 - 8061 - 8063
(cat.1065-6); British Library OR 8057; Dānīshgāh 1088 - 1896
(cat.8:505) - 7212 (cat.16:490) - 8947 (cat.17.260) 8971(14)
(cat.17.266) - MF3856(2) (cat.2.271), Haydariyya 618
(cat.35); Ilāhiyyāt D847 (cat.2.88); India Office 437
(cat.1.113) - 471 (II) (cat.1.123); Isfahān Dānīshgāh 154(1)
(cat.930); Isfahān ^cUmūmī 3252 (cat.288); Ma^cārīf 86
(cat.1.115); Mahfūz 17 (cat.3:18) - 31 (cat.3:41) - 175
(cat.3.52) - 48^c (cat.4:217); Majlis 1866(18) (cat.9:548);
2970 (cat.10/1:418) - 3277 (cat.10/2.885) - 4349 (cat.12:63);
Mar^cashī 980(1) (cat.3:172) - 4905 (cat.13:85), Mashhad
Ilāhiyyāt 991 (cat.2:143), Miftāḥ 183 (cat.208); Millī
Arabic 277 (cat.7:247) - Arabic 990 (cat.8.477); Nawwāb
cat.522; Princeton New Series 29 - 95 (cat.191), Ridawī Hikma
1062 - 1063 1064 (cat.4:267-8) - Hikma 273 (cat.1.88 - 251
new edition) - Hikma 274 - 275 (cat.1.89 - 252-3 new edition);
Wazīrī 1238 (cat.3:903) - 2978 (cat.4:1492-3).

Refutations: (1) by Fadl b. Rūzbahān, Nahj al-ta^ctīl
(Brockelmann, GALS 2.207) or Ibtāl al-bātil (Dharrī^a, 8:251)
or Ibtāl nahj al-bātil (Dharrī^a, 1:290) (written in
909/1503 4); (2) this latter work was later refuted by Nūr
Allāh al-Shuṣṭarī (d. 1019/1610) in his Iḥqāq al-haqq
(written in 1014/1605 6) (Brockelmann, GALS, 2:207; Dharrī^a,
1:290, no.1521) (3) and also by Muhammad b. 'Abd Alīsh b.
Muzaḥḥar al-Najafī (d. 1357/1938) in his Dalā'il al-sidq
fī nahj al-haqq (Dharrī^a, 8 251, no.1033); (4) an anonymous
commentary entitled Sharḥ nahj al-haqq (Dharrī^a, 14:161,
no.2020)

(121) Nahj al-ḡirfān fī 'ilm al-mizān (KH/IM).

Dharrī^a, 24:422 (no.2210).

(logic)

MSS: no MS known.

(122) Nahj al-mustarshidīn fī uḡūl al-dīn (KH/IM).

Dharrī^a, 24:424 (no.2222).

(theology; completed on 22 Rabī^c I 699/17 December 1299)

Editions: together with Irshād al-tālibīn ilā nahj
al-mustarshidīn by al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (edited by
Mahdī al-Rajānī. Min makhtūtāt maktabat Āyat Allāh
al-Mar^cashī al-^camma, no.10. Qum: Maktabat Sayyid
al-shuhadā', 1405H.).

MSS: Adabīyyāt (1965) 154 (cat.69) (Irshād al-tālibīn);
Bīnīsh 955 - 956 - 940 - 953 - 954 (cat.1066); British
Library OR 10964; Būhār 94 (cat.2.105); Dānīshgāh 503
- 1645(1) (cat.8.222) - 8596(3) (cat.17:169) MF3043(3)
(cat.2:41); Gawharshād cat.428; Gulpāyīgānī 293(2) (cat.254);
Ilāhiyyāt D272 (cat.1:453) (Irshād al-tālibīn), Isfahān

Dānishgāh 126(2) (cat.928) - 153(1) (cat.929); India Office 471(7) (cat.1:124) - 2094 (cat.2:398); Isma'īlī Institute 342 (cat.2:114); Kashān 82(1) (cat.41); Los Angeles M910(2) (cat.700) M1050(9) (cat.707) M1306(3) (cat.723); Mahfuz 23 (cat.3:18) - 70 (cat.3:65) - 31 (cat.3:19) - 30 (cat.4:202) - 80 (cat.4:218); Majlis 3256(2) (cat.10/2:848) (Irshād al-tālibīn) - 3427(2) (cat.10/3:1289) (Irshād al-tālibīn) 4954(2) (cat.14:237) - 5466 (cat.16:367); Mar'ashī 4(3) (cat.1:19) - 750(7) (cat.2:355) - 1467(6) (cat.4:259) - 2494(3) (cat.7:84) 4081(3) (cat.11:94) - 3427 (cat.9:214) (Irshād al-tālibīn); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1219(1) (cat.2:356) - 1834(1) (cat.3:903-4); Millī Arabic 856 (cat.8:358) - Arabic 1691(3) (cat.10:274); Princeton New Series 1308 - 1886 (cat.191) - 367 (Irshād al-tālibīn); Ridawī Hikma 1065 - 1066 - 1067 - 1068 - 1069 (cat.4:268-9); Tustariyya 247(7) (cat.845); Wazirī 1304 (cat.3:923) - 1069(2) (cat.3:843).
 Commentaries (1) Sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Khawā'inī al-Zanjānī (Dharrī^Ca, 14:162, no.2023); (2) al-Tahqiq al-mubīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Khidr b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Rāzī al-Habārudī (d. around 850/1446) (Dharrī^Ca, 3:484, no.1799); (3) Tadhkirat al-waqīfīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Nizām al-Dīn al-A'rajī al-Ḥusaynī (Dharrī^Ca, 4:51, no.206); (4) Tabqirat al-tālibīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by 'Amīd al-Dīn al-A'rajī al-Ḥusaynī (d. 754/1353) (Dharrī^Ca, 3:318, no.1174); (5) Sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Fakhr al-Dīn b. Muḥammad 'Alī al-Tarayhī (d. 1085/1674) (Dharrī^Ca, 14:63); (6) Mi'raṭ al-waqīfīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn Muḥammad b. al-'Allāma (d. 771/1369) (Dharrī^Ca, 14:163); (7) Irshād al-tālibīn by al-Fāḍil Mīqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1421) (Dharrī^Ca, 1:515, no.1520); (8) Kashf al-ḥawāl al-dīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn, by Jawād b. Sa'īd b. Jawād al-Kāzīmī (written in 1029/1619).

(123) Nahj al-wusūl ilā 'ilm al-usūl (KH/IM).

Dharrī^Ca, 24:426 (no.2227).

(legal methodology)

MSS. no MS known.

(124) Nahj al-waddah fī l-ahādīth al-ḥaṣṣah (KH).

Dharrī^Ca, 24:427 (no.2229).

(traditions)

MSS. no MS known.

(125) al-Nūr al-mushriq fī 'ilm al-mantiq (IM).

Dharrī^Ca, 13:376 (no.2025).

(logic, written after Rabī^C II 693/March 1294)

MSS. no MS known.

(126) Wājib wuḍū' wa-l-salāt (DH^W).

(also: Wājibat al-wuḍū')

Dharrī^Ca, 25:5 (no.23).

(law)

MSS. no MS known.

CHAPTER III

JUSTICE

1. Ethical Objectivism Versus Divine Subjectivism

Al-Hillī and al-Rāzī disagreed about the origin and character of the ethical standards for good and evil.

Al-Hillī supported the Muṭazilite position of ethical objectivism. He presents the views of the different parties and clarifies his own position:

The Muṭazilites agree that there are things the goodness and evil of which are necessarily known such as the goodness of beneficial truth, of fairness (inqāf), of doing good (ihsān) and of thanking the benefactor and [like] the evil of harmful lying, oppression (zulm), corruption (fasād), and the imposition of something as obligatory which cannot be fulfilled (taklīf ma la yutāq). There are other things whose goodness and evil is known by deduction from reason, such as the goodness of harmful truth and the evil of beneficial lying. Other things are known by revelation. This does not mean that [revelation] is the cause (ʿilla) of the goodness and the evil, rather it uncovers it....

The Ashʿarites maintain that both good and evil are standards determined by the law (sharʿiyyāt). Thus good is what the Lawgiver commands and evil is what He prohibits, because this knowledge is not reached by reasoning nor by consensus and it is not necessary.¹

This passage highlights the difference of view between the Muṭazilites and the Ashʿarites.² According to Muṭazilite doctrine, good and evil have real existence and are independent of revelation. Through reason, man knows in

¹ Taslīk, 62r, see also Maʿārī, 121v.

² For the Muṭazilite and the Ashʿarite views on ethical values in general, see G.F.Hourani, "Two Theories of Value in Early Islam," in Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, by G.F.Hourani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp. 57-9; and R.Frank, "Moral Obligation in Classical Muslim Theology," The Journal of Religious Ethics 11 (1983): 204-223.

general terms certain primary propositions of good and evil.³ In regard to acts which are apparently affected by contradictory judgements, man can through reasoning arrive at further conclusions about their status. He may assess the weight of various aspects and thus arrive at a conclusion about the value of the act as a whole.⁴ In addition to these two categories, there were certain acts whose goodness cannot be known by reason, and here revelation serves to teach man what he is unable to know by himself. This category contains for instance the acts of worship.⁵ Revelation is, thus, understood by al-Hillī and the Muṭtazilites as a detailed explanation of what man already knows in a general way by reason. It does not determine moral standards but rather reveals them to man. Through revelation, God therefore assists man to gain access to the full knowledge about objective values to which He is subject Himself.⁶

In the Ashʿarite view, God determines what is good and evil through His command and prohibition. He does so solely on the basis of His will.⁷ Man is therefore unable to know what is good and what is evil by reason prior to revelation.⁸ God Himself is not bound by any laws or values since He is sovereign above them.

When al-Rāzī discussed the origin of ethical values he differentiated between three different types of good and evil. He states:

It is important in regard to this question [about the origin of ethical values] to determine the place of disagreement. We say there is no disagreement that we know by reason that certain things agree with our nature while others disagree with it. Thus, pleasure

³See also G.F.Hourani, "The Rationalist Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbar," in *Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics*, by G.F.Hourani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 103; Frank, "Moral Obligation," 205.

⁴See Hourani, "Ethics," 104.

⁵Al-Hillī, *Manāḥil*, 98v.

⁶See Hourani, "Ethics," 101, 104; Frank, "Moral Obligation," 206-7.

⁷Al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.5, pt.9 107. For references to earlier Ashʿarite texts, see Frank, "Moral Obligation," 207ff.

⁸For references, see *ibid.*, 208.

(ladhdha) and whatever leads to it agree [with man's nature]; pain and whatever leads to it disagree [with it] and there is no need for the law to recognize this agreement and this disagreement. We know further by reason that knowledge is characterized by the attribute of perfection (kamāl) while ignorance is characterized by the attribute of deficiency (nugṣān). The disagreement concerns, therefore, [the issue] that some acts are connected with blame (dhamm) in this world and punishment (ʿiqāb) in the hereafter while others are connected with merit (madh) in this world and reward (thawāb) in the hereafter. Is this so because of an intrinsic characteristic of the act or is it rather the case that this is only the judgement of the law about this or the statement of the people of knowledge about it? The Muʿtazila maintain that the effector for these judgements (aḥkām) are intrinsic attributes of the act. Our view is that it is determined only by the judgement (ḥukm) of the law.⁹

The first type of ethical values, according to al-Rāzī, applies to human beings only.¹⁰ Whatever suits a person's advantage, such as pleasure or joy, is perceived to be good by this person. Whatever disagrees with it, like pain and grief, is evil from the subjective point of view of this person.¹¹ Since these values differ in their meaning from person to person, al-Rāzī argued, not even two people could ever agree about the ethical value of a certain act.¹² This type of ethical values does not contain any objective aspect. Nor do they indicate for which act man deserves praise or blame. They are, therefore, not related to the knowledge of ethical values as known by revelation.

In regard to the second type of values, al-Rāzī defined good in terms of perfection and evil in terms of deficiency. This concept, which derived from the philosophical tradition, was of no significance in his discussion on ethics.

In his discussion of the third type of values, al-Rāzī strictly adhered to the traditional Ashʿarite position of divine subjectivism. God alone determines the

⁹ Arbaʿīn, 246; see also his al-Ishāra fī ʿilm al-kalām (MS Alexandria 519/2), 32v-33r.

¹⁰ Maʿālīm, 86-7.

¹¹ Ibid., 86-7; Maʿālīm, 3:21ff, 289ff.

¹² Ibid., 3:32.

ethical values through His command and prohibition. The subjective standards for good and evil which man knows by reason are unrelated to this type. Man is, therefore, unable rationally to know any of the values laid down by God.¹³

The acknowledgment of merely subjective human standards for good or evil which are not related to the ethical standards as they are determined by God originated from al-Juwaynī who adhered to this view in his Caqida.¹⁴ His position was later adopted by al-Ghazālī.¹⁵

On the basis of this notion of subjective ethical values, al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī disagreed with their predecessors why man is obliged to obey the religious law. The earlier Ash'arites held that this obligation is founded in the law itself.¹⁶ Al-Juwaynī was the first to reject this view. He argued that because of the subjectivity of his own standards for good and evil man feels the

13. Tafsi'r, vol. 7, pt. 14-130, vol. 13, pt. 25-34.

14. Abu l Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī, al-Ḥaqida al-nizāmiyya (edited by Muhammad Zahid al-Kawtharī, Cairo: al-Anwār, 1367/1948), 26, 41; 45ff. In his earlier work, the Irshād, al-Juwaynī still adhered to the traditional Ash'arite position that good and evil are founded only in God's command and prohibition; see G.F. Hourani, "Juwaynī's Criticisms of Mu'tazilite Ethics," in Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, by G.F. Hourani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 125ff.

15. See Abū Ḥamid Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Kitāb al-Iqtisād fī l-ḥaqīqāt (Cairo: Maktabat al-Husayn al-ḥijāriyya, n.d.), 73ff. The relevant passages have been analysed by G.F. Hourani, "Ghazālī on the Ethics of Action," in Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, by G.F. Hourani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 137ff.

16. Abū Bakr Muhammad al-Bāqillānī, Kitāb al-tamhīd (edited by R. McCarthy, Manshūrāt jāmi'at al-hikma fī Baghdād, no. 1, Beirut: Maktaba sharqiyya, 1957), 105, 116-8, 341-2; Abū l Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī, Kitāb al-irshād ilā qawāt al-adilla fī usūl al-ḥaqīqāt (edited by M.Y. Mūsā and A. 'Abd al-Ḥamid, Cairo: al-Khānjī, 1369/1950), 258; see also Hourani, "Ghazālī," 139.

necessity to act according to the law in order to avoid the punishment for disobeying it.¹⁷ This view was adopted by al-Ghazālī¹⁸ and al-Rāzī. The latter argues:

Do you agree that it is reason which demands precaution (ihtiyāz) against punishment or do you say that this obligation is established only by the law?

If you adhere to the first alternative, you agree that good and evil are established by reason in the visible world (fi l-shāhid).

If you adhere to the second alternative, man is not obliged to avoid punishment except by another obligation while the meaning of this obligation is again the punishment following upon it. This necessitates an endless chain in the sequence of punishments which is absurd. This proves that reason is the judge for good and evil in the visible world.¹⁹

¹⁷He states (CAqīda, 45): "Our predecessors held that God's command must be obeyed only when it is specifically given, and that it is because of His power and divinity that God's order deserves to be obeyed. But this is an attitude towards which an intelligent person should be cautious, if his aspiration makes him guard against blindly following authority....Rather I say that were it not that the law states the threat of punishment (wa'id) for those who fail to do what He orders, man would not understand [that he has] an obligation....Indeed, when a man becomes aware of a threat of punishment, his reason induces him to recognize the obligatory nature of those things for the omission of which he would suffer what is more than unbearable."

¹⁸See Bourani, "Ghazālī," 139-40.

¹⁹Ma'ālīm, 87; see also Arba'īn, 249, Matalīb, 3:18, 289-90.

2. The Nature of God's Justice

As a result of their differences regarding the character of ethical values and God's relationship to these values, al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī supported different views about God's relation towards His creation.

Al-Ḥillī maintained that objective ethical standards apply to God as well as to man and so God's justice must be measured in accordance with these values. He therefore defined God as just in the sense that He neither commits any evil nor falls short in His obligations²⁰ acting only for the purpose of pure goodness and for the benefit of others²¹ or, as al-Ḥillī expressed it, because of the "motive of wisdom" (idāʿī al-ḥikma).²²

The Muʿtazilites traditionally argued that God does not commit any evil since He is self sufficient (ghanī) and omniscient. Thus He does not have any motivation to do evil.²³ Al-Ḥillī argues accordingly when he states:

The proof of the doctrine chosen by the Muʿtazila is that God has a motive for the good and no deterrent (ḡarīf) from it and He has a deterrent from the evil without any motive for it, while

²⁰Maʿārīj, 122r; for this notion among earlier Muʿtazilites, see Abu l Husayn Ahmad b. Abī Hashim Mānakdīm, Sharḥ al-usūl al-khamsa (edited by ʿAbd al Karīm ʿUṭmān as a work of ʿAbd al Jabbar, Cairo Wahba, 1965), 132; ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Ahmad b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī al-Asadābādī, al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa l-ʿadl (edited by M. Mustafā Ḥilmī et al. Cairo. al-Muʿassasa l-ʿamma l-miṣriyya li-l-ṭaʿlīf wa-l-nashr, 1961), 6/1:177ff; 1453.

²¹Maʿārīj, 122r, for this notion among earlier Muʿtazilites, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/1:3, 1453, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol. 5, pt. 9:143, see also R. Frank, "Reason and Revealed Law. A Sample of Parallels and Divergences in Kalam and Falsafa," in Recherches d'islamologie, recueil d'articles offert à Georges C. Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs collègues et amis (edited by S. van Riet and R. Arnaldez, Louvain Bibliothèque Philosophique de Louvain, 1978), 125; idem, "Moral Obligation," 206.

²²Maʿārīj, 122r.

²³ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Ahmad b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī al-Asadābādī, Faḍl al-ʿaṭīzāt wa-tabaqāt al-muʿtazila (edited by Fuʾād Sayyid, Tunis Dār al-tunisiyya li-l-nashr, 1993/1974), 348, Ibn al-Malahimī, Faʿiq, 80r-v.

having power over everything subject to power; and when power and motive are joined, the act is necessary.

We say so because God is self-sufficient, as need is impossible with regard to Him and He knows the goodness of good and the evil nature of evil. [And] it is necessarily known that from someone who knows evil without needing it, it will not issue. [It is] furthermore [known] that one who knows good over which he has power, will produce it, when it is free from aspects of corruption. The explanation (*tahrīr*) of this is that an act is contingent (*muḥkin*) with regard to itself and necessary (*wājib*) with regard to its cause and every contingent is dependent (*muṣṭanid*) on a capable agent. Its cause (*ʿilla*) becomes complete through the means of capability and the motive. When they are present the means (*sabab*) is complete, and when the means is complete the existence is necessary.²⁴

Al-Hillī argues here on the basis of his theory of acts. Acts necessarily occur when motive and power come together and they cannot occur when either power or motive are lacking.²⁵ Thus God cannot commit evil or fall short in His obligations since He does not have a motive for doing so.

His argument is directly based on Ibn al-Maḥḥimī's discussion in which the latter similarly argued that God is a capable agent (*qādir*) who cannot act without a motive. Since He does not have a motive to commit evil or to fall short in His duties because of His self-sufficiency and His omniscience, He cannot possibly commit evil.

This argumentation differed from that of the Bahshamiyya who supported the same position, arguing by analogy from man to God (*qiyās ʿalā l-shāhid*).²⁶ Ibn al-Maḥḥimī held that it is redundant to argue on the basis of analogy from man to God once it has been acknowledged that God has no motive to do evil.²⁷ The reason for this difference is to be found in the differing theories of acts. Ibn al-Maḥḥimī and

²⁴Kashf al-murād, 237; see also Manāḥij, 97r; Maʿārīj, 122r.

²⁵See later.

²⁶ʿAbd al-Jabbar, Muḥḥinī, 6/1-177ff, 186, Mānakdīm, 303, 316ff.

²⁷Fāʾiq, 69r-v.

al-Ḥillī both maintained that a capable agent cannot act without a motive. The Bahshamiyya, in contrast, allowed that a capable agent may produce an act without a motive.²⁸

Al-Rāzī differed fundamentally from al-Ḥillī's view on God's relation towards His creation. According to his concept of divine omnipotence, God is the sole creator of everything existing, including every evil.²⁹ Moreover, since God determines what is good and evil, He Himself is not subject to any ethical values and His acts therefore cannot be judged. For this reason, God is also not obliged to perform any act.³⁰ Al-Rāzī rejected, therefore, the Mu'tazilite view of justice which he considered as an infringement of the principle of divine omnipotence. In doing so he was in agreement with the Ash'arite tradition. On this basis, al-Rāzī was concerned to show that God's acts cannot be judged as either evil or good. He argues:

Know that when it has been established that the judgement of good and evil has no meaning except [in relation to] gaining benefits (jalb al-manāfi)³¹ and repelling of harmful matters, this can reasonably be affirmed only in regard to one for whom benefit and harm apply. Since God is exalted above this judgement of good and evil it cannot be affirmed in His regard.³¹

This argument is based on al-Rāzī's concept of rational good and evil. These standards have a meaning only in regard to man and are irrelevant in relation to God who is self sufficient and therefore exalted above them. Al-Juwaynī³² and al-Ghazālī,³³ who also affirmed purely human rational values, likewise argued that since good and evil apply only to men, God's acts cannot be judged by these standards.

²⁸ See later.

²⁹ Arba'in, 237ff, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.5:219.

³⁰ E.g. Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2 140, for this notion among earlier Ash'arites, see also Hourani, "Juwaynī," 133.

³¹ Ma'ālīm, 87; see also Matālib, 3 66, 293 ff; also his "al-Masā'il al-khamsūn," in Majmū'at rasā'il (Cairo, 1328H.), 376.

³² Aqīda, 26, 41.

³³ Iqtisād, 74.

Elsewhere, al-Rāzī argued also that God cannot be judged according to the non-rational ethical values known from revelation. Since He determined them and since they are relevant to mankind only, God is not bound by them.³⁴ In this regard, too, His acts cannot be subject to the standards of good and evil.³⁵ This second point was traditionally employed by earlier Ash'arites as an argument that God's acts cannot be judged to be evil.³⁶

It is noteworthy that al-Rāzī unambiguously maintained here that God's acts can neither be evaluated as evil nor as good. While this was correct on the basis of Ash'arite principles, most of his predecessors had in fact argued that since all of God's acts are beyond evaluation and as such cannot be evil, they must be qualified as good.³⁷

³⁴Arba'īn, 246; Ishāra, 32v-33r.

³⁵"Maṣā'il," 376.

³⁶See Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī, "Kutāb al-luma' fi l-radd 'alā ahl al-zaygh wa l-bida'," in The Theology of al-Ash'arī (edited by R. McCarthy. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), §170, Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Baḥillānī, al-Insāf fīma yajīb 'atīqāduhu wa-lā yajūz al-jahl bihi (edited by 'Ummād al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Rayḍar. Beirut: 'Ālam al-kutub, 1407/1986), 231; idem, Tamhīd, 283, 341-2. See also 'Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/1, 115ff; also Hourani, "Two Theories," 65.

³⁷E.g. Abū Bakr b. Fārak, Mujarrad maqalat al-Ash'arī (edited by D. Gimaret. Recherches. Nouvelle Série. A. Langue arabe et pensée islamique, vol. 14. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1987), 130 where all of God's acts are qualified as wise (*ḥikma*), Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī, "Risāla ilā ahl al-thaḡr bi-bab al-abwāb," Ilāhiyyat fakultesi mecmuası 8 (1929) 99, where God is labelled as just ('ādil) in all His actions, 'Alī b. Muḥammad Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Statio Quinta et Sexta et appendix libri Mevākif cum commentario Gorgānī (edited by Th. Soerensen. Leipzig, 1894), 148-9 where a similar conclusion is drawn; see also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 213 for further references. Elsewhere, al-Rāzī draws, however, the conclusion in the traditional Ash'arite way that all of God's acts are good, see Ishāra, 32v, where he maintains that God's actions are all good in the sense that He acts without any obstruction, also Tafṣīr, vol. 5, pt. 9 144 5 where he calls God's acts all wise since He acts in His own property (*malik*). Al-Juwaynī was among the few Ash'arites who pointed out that good and evil, both of which are standards applicable only to man but not to God, cannot be applied to any of God's acts. He states ('Agāida, 26): "If it were not that the community of the Truth ('usbat al-ḥaqq)

In contrast to al-Hillī, al-Rāzī further denied that God acts for a purpose³⁸ and with this he was in agreement with the Ash'arite tradition.³⁹ He therefore rejected the notion that God ever acts either for the purpose of pure goodness or for the benefit of others.⁴⁰ As seen above, al-Hillī considered these the only admissible motivations for God's actions. In support of his position, al-Rāzī employed the argumentation deriving from the philosophical tradition that God's actions emanate from Him only because of His own essence, not for any extraneous consideration. If God acted for a purpose, this would necessarily imply that God is deficient in Himself and perfecting Himself through this act.⁴¹ However, in contrast to the philosophers who maintained that God is Himself the most perfect goodness so that only goodness emanates from Him, al-Rāzī and the Ash'arites held that God acts in accordance with His will (*irāda*). Men have neither the right to ask, nor the possibility to know, what God's motivations are.⁴²

upheld that God is the creator of good and evil, the doctrine of unity (*tawhīd*) would require that one should say that there is nothing among God's actions which is good and evil in relation to (His) divine rule. For all actions are alike

³⁸ His ruling. Their ranks vary only in relation to men."

³⁹ *Arna'ūn*, 249ff, *Tafsīr*, vol.7, pt 14.192: "Masa'il," 377.

³⁹ See Frank, "Moral Obligation," 209-10 for references.

⁴⁰ *Tafsīr*, vol.5, pt.9:143-4, *Maṭālib*, 371.

⁴¹ *Maṭālib*, 88, see also al-Hillī, *Manāhil*, 97r where he notes the philosophical argumentation and its adoption among later Ash'arites. By this, he had undoubtedly al-Rāzī in mind.

⁴² *Tafsīr*, vol.12, pt.13 196. See also Abu 'Abbās Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Halīm Taqī al-Dīn b. Taymiyya, "al-Ihtijāj bi-l-qadar," in *Majmū'at al-rasā'il al-kubra* by Ibn Taymiyya (Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-misriyya, 1348-92/1929-72), 2:120-1.

3. God's Obligation to Act in Man's Best Interest (Aslah)

According to the Mu'tazilite theory of justice, God acts only out of pure goodness and for the benefit of others. Moreover, having imposed on man a moral obligation as an act of grace, God is obliged to render man every possible facilitation enabling him to fulfil that obligation. On this basis, the question arises whether God's obligation to act in man's interest is restricted to assisting man to fulfil his moral obligation or whether this obligation applies also to purely worldly matters.⁴³

Al-Hillī held that God's obligation goes beyond the religious sphere affirming that God always acts for man's best interest whenever He knows that His act will result in pure benefit free of any harm. His argument rested on his theory that action must occur when motive and power come together. God thus acts necessarily for man's best interest whenever He has the motive to do so, regardless of whether the act is beneficial to man in regard to the fulfilment of his moral obligation or in any other respect.⁴⁴ When al-Hillī surveyed the various positions held by his Mu'tazilite predecessors, he ascribed the view which he himself favoured to Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka'bī (d. 319/931):

If God knew that if He gave Zayd money he would gain benefit and there was neither cause of corruption (mafsada) nor harm (maḍarrah), nor any evil aspect in it, the Baghdadis and Abū l-Qāsim held that God would be obliged to give [Zayd this

⁴³The question of God's obligation to act for man's best interest has been the subject of a number of studies; see in particular R. Brunschwig, "Mu'tazilisme et optimum (al-aslah)", Studia Islamica 39 (1974): 5-23; G. Vajda, "Le problème de l'assistance bienveillante de Dieu, du 'mieux' et de la nécessité de la loi révélée selon Yūsuf al-Basīr," Revue des études juives 134 (1975): 31-74; E. L. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Theology: The Dispute over al-Ghazālī's 'Best of all Possible Worlds' (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), see index.

⁴⁴Manāhij, 98v.

money] but the Bagrans denied this. The former argued that if the motive exists and there is no deterrent, the act is necessary.⁴⁵

The positions of al-Hillī's Mu'tazilite predecessors, however, were not as clear cut as he presents them.

The view that God is obliged to act in man's best interest in the realm of religion only, which became later associated with the school of Baṣra, was in fact shared by all of the earlier Mu'tazilites. They discussed God's obligation to act in man's best interest only in terms of facilitating favours (*ḥuṣṣ*, pl. *al-ḥuṣṣ*) which assist man to fulfil his moral obligation.⁴⁶ They agreed that God's actions reach the limit of the beneficence He is capable of rendering in this realm.⁴⁷ The founder of the early school of Baghdad, Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir (d. 210.825) who in substance agreed with this view, further refined the Mu'tazilite position. He pointed out that there is no limit to the beneficence which God is capable of rendering. It is, therefore, absurd to say that God is obliged to act in man's best interest since this implies an obligation for the infinite. He therefore held that although God acts in the most beneficial way for the

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶See e.g. Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī, *Kitāb maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn* (edited by H.Ritter, Bibliotheca Islamica, vol.1. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980), 576-7.

⁴⁷Ibid., 247, 574. To safeguard the notion of divine omnipotence they commonly argued that although God's beneficial actions are the most beneficial He is capable of rendering, He has the capacity of rendering infinite acts of similar beneficial acts (*amthāl*); see *ibid.* An exception was Abū l-Hudhayl who differed from the other Mu'tazilites when he held that the similar beneficial acts God is capable to render are also finite; see *ibid.*, 249, 576-7. Abū l-Humayn al-Khayyāt (*Kitāb intisār* (edited by H.Nyberg, Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-misriyya, 1925), 16ff) explains that Abū l-Hudhayl's assertion of the finitude of creation resulted from his view that God differs from the contingent in His being infinite. Therefore, nothing other than God can be infinite. See also R.Frank, "The Divine Attributes According to the Teaching of Abū l-Hudhayl al-'Alīf," *Le Muséon* 82 (1969):473ff; J.van Ess, "Abū l-Hudhayl in Contact: The Genesis of an Anecdote," in *Islamic Theology and Philosophy* (edited by M.Marmura, Studies in Honor of G.Hourani, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 23ff; also S.Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomtheorie* (Gräfenhainichen: A.Heine, 1936), 14-5.

morally-obliged to assist him in the fulfilment of his moral obligation and although He is obliged to do so, God is capable, yet not obliged, of rendering a further facilitation which would induce an unbeliever to become a believer.⁴⁸ The generality of the earlier Mu'tazilites had denied God's capability to do so.⁴⁹ Bishr's objection to the view of the other Mu'tazilites was decisive for the position of Abū 'Alī and the Bahshamiyya. Abū 'Alī maintained that God's obligation applies only to acts which facilitate man's fulfilment of his moral obligation. In this respect, God acts in the most beneficial manner of which He is capable. Although Abū 'Alī disagreed with Bishr when he held that God is incapable of granting a facilitation to someone who is morally-obliged with the object of making him a believer when He knows that he will be an unbeliever,⁵⁰ he accepted Bishr's argument that it is absurd to say that God acts in man's best interest in the utmost possible manner. He further elaborated this reasoning arguing that since God is omnipotent, what is subject to His power is infinite. If He were under obligation to act for man's best interest while being capable of providing unlimited benefit in that respect, His obligation would be infinite. To create an infinite number of things, however, is impossible. Moreover, creation could not have had a beginning, since God could always be said to be capable of providing the most beneficial effects before any beginning.⁵¹ Abū 'Alī therefore held that although God renders the utmost beneficial facilitations to the morally obliged to assist him in his fulfilment of the moral obligation, God is

⁴⁸Al-Ash'arī (Maqālāt, 246) reports Bishr's view: "God is capable of a facilitation which, when He would render it to someone whom He knows that he does not believe, would induce him to believe. And it is not obligatory for God to render this [facilitation]....God is not obliged to do the best of things for man. Indeed it is absurd because there is no limit and no term to the beneficence which God is able to perform. He is obliged to do for them only what is best for them in their religion."

⁴⁹Ibid., 247, 574.

⁵⁰Ibid., 247-8, 575.

⁵¹Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:56.

capable of rendering additional favours which would help him to increase his reward. Yet He is not obliged to render these.

The followers of the later school of Baghdad founded by Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka^Cbī (d. 319/931) maintained a different position. They held that God always acts for men's best interest both in religious and worldly matters.⁵² In contrast to the Basrans, they moreover held that God does not do so because He is obliged to do so but rather out of generosity (juḍ).⁵³ Presumably in reply to objections by the Basrans that God's acts cannot be the most beneficial He is able to render, the Baghdadis substituted the benefits of the collective for those of the individual. A morally-obliged person may never become a believer but the imposition of moral obligation upon him may still be beneficial as it might induce others to believe.⁵⁴

Al-Ḥillī's statement that Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka^Cbī argued for his view on the basis of the theory that an act necessarily occurs when power and motive come together, is therefore mistaken. With this presentation, al-Ḥillī followed Ibn al-Malāḥimī who first ascribed this view to Abū l-Qāsim and his followers.⁵⁵

Having adopted the view that God necessarily acts for man's best interest when He has the motive to do so, al-Ḥillī was confronted with the Basran objection that God's obligation cannot comprise the infinite. In reply to this, he correctly pointed out that the infinite is not contingent (imḥkin) but impossible (imḥtanī^C); therefore, it does not belong to what is obligatory for God to perform.⁵⁶

Al-Ḥillī's position on God's obligation to act for man's best interest is directly based on the view of Ibn al-Malāḥimī. Maintaining that an act occurs necessarily

⁵²Manakdīm, 134, see also McDermott, 72ff; Brunschwig, 11.

⁵³Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iḳ, 146r, McDermott, 73-4.

⁵⁴Manakdīm, 518; McDermott, 73 n.1.

⁵⁵See later.

⁵⁶Manāḥij, 98v, this passage is extremely corrupt in the manuscript.

when motive and power come together, the latter argued that when God has the power for a beneficial act and the motive to do it, He necessarily produces it.⁵⁷ Since this principle is not restricted to the realm of what is beneficial for the fulfilment of man's moral obligation, Ibn al-Malāḥimī concluded that God's obligation to act for man's best interest applies equally to worldly matters.⁵⁸ He further attempted to show that his view agreed with the position of both the Baghdadis and the Basrans.

He argued that his own principle of the motive and power necessitating the act underlies the position of both schools. Although the Basrans denied God's obligation to act for man's best interest in every respect, they acknowledged, according to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, that a beneficence has to be done in the presence of capacity and motive and the absence of a deterrent even if God is not obliged to do so on account of His justice.⁵⁹ Since this is in conflict with the Basran position, he presumably meant here that according to the Bahshamiyya, God often acts out of generosity (jūd) beyond the obligatory which He does out of justice (ʿadl).

In regard to the Baghdadis, Ibn al-Malāḥimī suggested that they maintained that God acts for man's best interest in every respect owing to the theory of capacity and motive necessitating the act.⁶⁰ Since the Baghdadis certainly did not adhere to the principle of power and motive necessitating the act, which was introduced only by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī into the theological discussion, Ibn al-Malāḥimī's claim is not correct. His conclusion was that the disagreement between Basrans and Baghdadis can be reduced to a mere verbal disagreement (khilāf fī l-ʿibāra).⁶¹

Dealing with the Basran objection that God cannot be said to create an infinite number of things, Ibn al-Malāḥimī argued like al-Hillī that it is impossible for

⁵⁷ Fa'iq, 146r-v.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 147r.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 147v.

⁶¹ Ibid.

the infinite to exist. Therefore, it cannot fall under the obligation of a capable agent.⁶² According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, this reply originated with the Baghdadis:

If they would say 'the motive calls for the act only in so far as its existence is feasible in itself and the existence of the infinite is not feasible in itself; the motive can therefore not call for it', it should be said to them 'the Baghdadis, too, say that the act is obligatory for the agent [only] in so far as it is feasible in itself. The infinite is not feasible in itself, therefore its obligation upon the capable agent is not admissible'.⁶³

The position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī which was adopted by al-Ḥillī, differed to some extent from the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. There are clear indications that the latter hesitated to support the view that God necessarily acts in every instance in man's best interest. He rather held a position between the Baghdadī and the Baṣran views. When he was confronted with the objection that God cannot possibly be under obligation to act infinitely for man's best interest, Abū l-Ḥusayn argued that in such cases God may or may not act for man's best interest. Ibn al-Malāḥimī comments:

As for our master Abū l-Ḥusayn, he maintained that the doing of the most beneficial is only necessary in some of the cases in which the motives for it exist. He said that if [rendering of] the additional amount to the [initial amount of] 1000 contained an evil aspect, it is obligatory that the [initial] 1000 should be given because he [i.e. the agent] has no deterrent from it. If it [i.e. the additional amount] infinitely [repeated] does not contain any evil aspect this is like a deterrent from giving the 1000. He [i.e. the agent] say therefore sometimes render it and sometimes not.⁶⁴

With this answer, Abū l-Ḥusayn did not go as far as the Baghdadis who maintained that God acts in principle always for man's best interest and who would not have considered infinity as a deterrent from giving the additional amount. He did, however, go further than the Baṣrans who would have

⁶² Ibid., 147r.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 147r; see also al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-murād*, 270 l.

denied that God is obliged to render the initial amount since this amount would not facilitate the fulfilment of the moral obligation of a morally-obliged.

A further indication that Abū l-Ḥusayn held a view between the Baghdādī and the Basran position is found in al-Rāzī's Maṭālib al-ʿAlīyya and his Tafsīr.⁶⁵ Al-Rāzī mentioned Abū l-Ḥusayn in connection with the famous story of the three brothers. This story deals with the fate in the hereafter of a believer, an unbeliever and one who died young. The one who died young and earned a position in heaven below that of the believer complains to God that He let him die early and deprived him thus of the chance to earn a higher position. God answers that He knew that he would sin, so He let him die early. Thereupon the unbeliever asks God from hell why He did not make him die likewise since He must have known that he would not become a believer.⁶⁶ This story, as R.Gwynne has shown,⁶⁷ was told for the first time by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's contemporary ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baḡhdādī (d. 429/1037).

Al-Rāzī reports that Abū l-Ḥusayn dealt with this argument in his Kitāb ghurar al-adilla.⁶⁸ Abū l-Ḥusayn is reported to have answered the objection from the point of view of both positions.

⁶⁵ Maṭālib, 3.326-7; Tafsīr, vol.7, pt.13:195-6.

⁶⁶ For the various versions of this story, see R.W.Gwynne, "Al-Jubbā'ī, al-Ashʿarī and the Three Brothers' The Use of Fiction," Muslim World 75 (1985):132-61.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 133.

⁶⁸ The printed edition (Maṭālib, 3.326-7) has the reading Kitāb al-qadar. No such title is among the books attributed to Abū l-Ḥusayn. The reading Kitāb al-ghurar is confirmed by a manuscript copy of the text (MS Chester Beatty 3114, 141r). This work is lost (see W.Madelung, "Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Suppl.Fasc. 1-2:25). In his Tafsīr, al-Rāzī does not mention his source for Abū l-Ḥusayn's answers. As Gwynne remarks (132), no Muʿtazilite text known so far mentions this argument. If al-Rāzī's information is correct, Abū l-Ḥusayn's Ghurar al-adilla would therefore be presumably the earliest and as far as is known the only Muʿtazilite text where this argument is mentioned.

According to the Baghdadis who substituted the best interest of the community for the best interest of the individual, God let only the brother die young who would have caused harm to the community. The other one who turned out to be an unbeliever constituted no harm to the community. There was therefore no need to let him die early.⁶⁹

According to the Basran view, the act of God to let the one brother die young was an act of grace which He was not obliged to perform. The fact that He did perform an act of grace to one person does not mean that He is obliged to do the same to another.⁷⁰

⁶⁹Matālib, 3:327; Tafsir, vol.6, pt.13:195.

⁷⁰Matālib, 3:327-8; Tafsir, vol.6, pt.13:195.

4. Pain and Compensation

As a Mu^tazilite, al-Ḥillī was confronted with the problem that pain unavoidably occurs in the world generated by man and by God. In particular the existence of suffering caused by God gave rise to questions about His justice.

Al-Rāzī as an Ash^carite was not concerned with this problem. Since God's acts are above any standards for good and evil God can inflict as much pain as He pleases without being obliged to recompense the sufferer in any way.⁷¹

Al-Ḥillī enumerated five categories of pain which he considered as good. His list appears to be directly based on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's Fā'iḳ.⁷²

The Mu^tazilites say that it [i.e. pain] is good under [certain] conditions. First, if [the pain] is deserved (mustahagq); secondly, if it results in great benefit exceeding it [i.e. the pain]; thirdly, if it prevents a greater harm; fourthly, if it occurs according to custom like God's act with regard to a living being when we throw him into fire; fifthly, if it is done in self-defence such as when we cause pain to someone who intends to kill us. For if we know that the pain contains one of these aspects, we definitely judge it to be good.⁷³

From the elaborations of Ibn al-Malāḥimī in his own discussion, it is evident that cases two and three concern pain inflicted by a person to himself. Ibn al-Malāḥimī referred to the examples of drinking medicine to repel illness and of striving for knowledge to repel ignorance.⁷⁴ Case one clearly refers to pain inflicted by God as punishment on a sinner.⁷⁵ Case four equally refers to pain

71 "Masā'il," 377-8; Tafsiṛ, vol.8, pt.16:88-9; also Matālib, 4:423-4. For this notion among the Ash^carites in general, see Mānakdīm, 483; Bourani, "Juwaynī," 113.

72 Fā'iḳ, 131v.

73 Kashf al-murād, 259.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

inflicted by God such as the burning of a living being in the fire. Since the burning occurs, however, according to custom, God cannot to be blamed for this specific burning.⁷⁶

As for pain inflicted specifically by God, al-Ḥillī stipulated that it must be inflicted for a benefit (*ṭaʿf*) either for the sufferer or for another person. In the second case, the sufferer must receive a compensation exceeding the pain suffered. God may further inflict pain because it was deserved.⁷⁷ This was also the general Muʿtazilite view.⁷⁸ In contrast to man, God cannot inflict pain with the purpose of removing harm (*dafʿ al-ḡarar*) even if the latter is greater than the pain. The reason for this is God's omnipotence which enables Him to prevent evil by other means. Moreover, while man may inflict pain on the mere presumption (*ẓann*) that it will either result in a greater benefit or be deserved, this is impossible for God since He is omniscient.⁷⁹ Al-Ḥillī's Muʿtazilite predecessors adhered to the same position.⁸⁰

When God inflicts pain for a benefit, al-Ḥillī maintained, God is obliged to render the sufferer compensation (*ʿiwāḍ*) exceeding the pain. Moreover, the pain itself must result in a facilitating favour (*lutf*) either for the sufferer himself or for a morally-obliged person (*mukallaf*).⁸¹ This was also the established position of the Bahshamiyya and Ibn al-Malāḥimī.⁸² They all disagreed with Abū ʿAlī who maintained that God may inflict pain upon man for the sake of mere compensation.⁸³ In arguing against his

76 Ibid.

77 *Tawḥīd*, 67r; *Manāḥij*, 98r.

78 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 13:377; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fāʾiq*, 134v; *Mānakdīm*, 485-6.

79 *Manāḥij*, 98r; *Muntahā al-wusūl*, 99r; *Kaṣṣī al-murād*, 259.

80 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 13:369; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fāʾiq*, 134v; *Mānakdīm*, 486; see also Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī, *Kitāb al-ḡanaʾ al-fī l-khilāf bayn al-Baḡriyyīn wa l-Baḡhdādīyyīn* (edited by Maʿn Ziyādeh and Ridwan al-Sayyād. Beirut: Maʿhad al-ʿilmī al-ʿarabī, 1979), 169-70.

81 *Manāḥij*, 98r; *Muntahā al-wusūl*, 99r.

82 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fāʾiq*, 133r, 138r; *Mānakdīm*, 485.

83 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 13:390; *Mānakdīm*, 493.

father's position, Abū Hāshim had admitted that pain ceases to be unjust when it is compensated. Even with compensation, however, it would by itself still be futile (ḥabath)⁸⁴ and thus evil and inadmissible for God. Pain inflicted by God thus must result in some kind of benefit (maṣlahah) in addition to compensation.⁸⁵

In regard to whether God may inflict illnesses (amrād/aaqām) or other calamities (masā'ib) upon men because they are deserved, al-Ḥillī, following the position of Ibn al-Maḥṣinī, disagreed with the Bahshamiyya.

The discussion originated with Abū 'Alī who held that illnesses inflicted upon infidels and sinners may serve either as a punishment (ḥiqāb) or a trial (miḥna).⁸⁶ This punishment could, in his view, be appropriate in so far as God would render to man there and then some of the punishment he deserves in the hereafter.⁸⁷

Abū Hāshim, in contrast, maintained that every illness inflicted by God on men, regardless of whether they are morally obliged or not, can only have the purpose of a trial and never of a deserved punishment.⁸⁸ He supported this view by pointing to the principal difference between undeserved pains (ālām) and deserved punishment (ḥiqāb): men must be content with their illnesses and bear them patiently and they are not allowed to be distressed about them just as in regard to favours (niḥām) which God bestows on them. This is, however, not necessary in regard to pains which are a deserved punishment. Owing to these different characteristics, man would therefore be unable to recognize whether a specific illness or calamity is inflicted upon him as a trial or as a deserved punishment. Thus, Abū Hāshim

⁸⁴Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:390.

⁸⁵Ibid., 13:390-2; Manakdīm, 493.

⁸⁶Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:431.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Ibid.

concluded, illnesses can be inflicted by God only for the purpose of trial (mihnat⁸⁹/imtihan).⁸⁹ This position was generally accepted among his followers.⁹⁰

Ibn al-Malāḥimī and al-Ḥillī allowed that God may inflict illnesses upon a morally obliged person either for a trial or as a deserved punishment (muḥāqabāt).⁹¹ Al-Ḥillī summarizes the disagreement and states his own view:

This is the doctrine of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī. He admitted that illnesses may occur among infidels (kuffar) or sinners (fussāq) as a punishment for the infidel and the sinner, because it is a pain reaching somebody who deserves it. Thus it is possible that it is [for the sake of] punishment. And its advance (taḥḥīl) [i.e. its occurrence in this world] may contain a benefit for some morally obliged persons as it is the case with the Qur'anic punishments (ḥudūd). The chief judge [Abd al-Jabbar] considered this impossible and affirmed that their illnesses [are inflicted upon them] as trials (mihnat), not as punishments, because they are obliged to be content with them and to bear them patiently, to submit to them and not to be distressed about them. This is unnecessary for them with regard to punishments. [Our] answer is that we deny that this is unnecessary with regard to punishment because 'contentment' (ridā) is applied in two senses. First, the belief that an act is good. This meaning is shared by punishment and trial. Secondly, that the act should agree with desire (shahwa). This is not subject to capability and this is not obligatory either in trial or in punishment.⁹²

Al-Ḥillī's ascription of this view to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī is not verifiable. In his Fā'iqa, Ibn al-Malāḥimī fails to mention the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn.

Al-Ḥillī further dealt with the situation where God could either cause a pain comprising a facilitating favour (lutf) and compensate for it or cause a pleasure (ladhdha) containing the same facilitating favour. He held that it would be evil for God to choose the pain instead of the pleasure. Pain in combination with facilitation and

⁸⁹ Ibid., 13:413-4, 431-2.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 13:435.

⁹¹ Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iqa, 135r.

⁹² Kashf al-murād, 259-60.

compensation is only good if there is no alternative way to achieve the purpose without pain.⁹³ Here, al-Ḥillī adhered to the position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī⁹⁴ who stated that this view was also upheld by an unspecified group of Baghdadis.⁹⁵

In contrast, Abū Hāshim had maintained that both options are equally admissible. God could in this case inflict pain instead of pleasure, since such pain would neither be unjust (ẓulm) nor futile (ʿabath) as it was neutralized by a facilitating favour and compensation.⁹⁶

Al-Ḥillī stipulated that the compensation (ʿiwad) God is obliged to render to the victim must be limited in duration (munqatīʿ).⁹⁷ The same view was held by the Bahshamiyya⁹⁸ as well as by Ibn al-Malāḥimī.⁹⁹ Abū ʿAlī, had initially maintained that compensation is unlimited in time. Later, he reviewed his position, maintaining that it is limited in time.¹⁰⁰

In agreement with his Muʿtazilite predecessors, al-Ḥillī maintained that God is obliged to compensate for pain which He either caused directly or which He had

93. Manāḥij, 98r.

94. Fāʾiq, 137r.

95. Al-Mufid who usually adopted the position of the school of Baghdad backed this position and reported that this view was held by many of the "people of justice;" see McDermott, 183.

96. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fāʾiq, 137r.

97. Manāḥij, 98r.

98. Manakdīm, 494.

99. Fāʾiq, 138vff.

100. Manakdīm, 494; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:508; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fāʾiq, 138v.

ordered,¹⁰¹ made licit,¹⁰² or caused through constraint (al-ijā').¹⁰³ In addition, God is also obliged to compensate for pain caused by those who lack reason,¹⁰⁴ that is beasts, animals, the insane and children. Al-Ḥillī supported the latter view by pointing out that God enabled these to inflict pain while withholding from them reason (ʿaql), which is needed to recognize that pain is evil. Yet it was possible for Him not to enable them to do evil.¹⁰⁵ Here, he followed the view of Ibn al-Malāḥimī¹⁰⁶ in preference to the view of the Bahshamiyya.

The debate originated with some followers of Abū ʿAlī who maintained that God is obliged to compensate for every harm caused by such creatures because He created their appetites which drive them to commit this harm, while He did not give them reason which would enable them to distinguish between good and evil. According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, they ascribed this view even to Abū ʿAlī himself.¹⁰⁷ The Bahshamiyya, however, held that these creatures are in principle responsible for their own acts. Only when God compels them to commit evil does He have to compensate for the resulting harm.¹⁰⁸

In regard to injustice inflicted by man upon another person, al-Ḥillī, in concord with his Muʿtazilite predecessors, stipulated that the victim (mazlūm) must be

¹⁰¹ Al-Ḥillī gives the example of slaughtering of a vowed sacrifice (dhābh al-mandhūr) (Manāḥij, 98r) and of the offering during the minor pilgrimage (ḥady al-tamattuʿ) (Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 279). For these examples, see Manāḥid, 502.

¹⁰² Manāḥij, 98r. For this principle among earlier Muʿtazilites, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muḥnī, 13:440ff, 452ff, Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 89; idem, Tamhīd, 236.

¹⁰³ Taslīk, 67r. For this principle among earlier Muʿtazilites, see Manāḥid, 502, Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 90, idem, Tamhīd, 237; ʿAlam al-Huda al-Murtadā, "Majmūʿa fī funūn ʿin ʿilm al-kalam," in Nafāʾis al-makhtūṭāt, vol. 5 (edited by ʿAl Yāḡīn, Baghdad: al-Maʿarif, 1955), 62-3.

¹⁰⁴ Manāḥij, 98r; Taslīk, 67r.

¹⁰⁵ Manāḥij, 98r; Taslīk, 67r.

¹⁰⁶ ʿAʿlā, 140r-v.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 140r-v. See also ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muḥnī, 13:475ff where Abū ʿAlī's view is not mentioned.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 13:475.

compensated by the wrongdoer (ẓālim) in a proper way, just as it is when pain is inflicted by God upon man.¹⁰⁹ If no compensation is made on earth, justice must be restored (intimaāf) in the hereafter by God who enabled men to commit injustice although He could have prevented it. If He failed to do so He would be acting unjustly.¹¹⁰ This compensation is taken from that which the wrongdoer would have received for pain inflicted by God in this world. In this way, justice between a wrongdoer and his victim is secured.¹¹¹

This principle gave rise to the question of what happens if the wrongdoer does not deserve sufficient compensation to recompense his victim. Al-Hillī presents the problem and surveys the views of the different theologians:

Is it admissible that God enables a certain person to do wrong while this person does not own compensation exceeding his wrongdoing at the time he commits that wrongdoing? The author [Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī] denies this and the people of the truth disagreed about this. Abū Hāshim and al-Kaʿbī held this to be possible [in principle]. However, they disagreed [in so far] as al-Kaʿbī maintained that it is possible that [the wrongdoer] may die without owning compensation exceeding his injustice. God would render what is deserved out of generosity and give it to the victim. Abu Hāshim denied this possibility. God must rather prolong [the wrongdoer's] life because the restoration of justice is obligatory and generosity is not obligatory. It is therefore impossible to suspend the obligatory by the possible. Al-Sayyid al-Murtadā said that the prolongation of the life is likewise a generosity and that therefore the restoration of justice cannot be connected with it. In his view, it is necessary that the compensation is owned [by the wrongdoer] at the time (fī l-hāl) [i.e. when the injustice is inflicted]. This is the choice of the author [Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī] according to what we have mentioned.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Manāḥij, 98r; Tasliḥ, 66v. For this notion among earlier Muʿtazilites, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:483ff.

¹¹⁰ Manāḥij, 98r; for this principle among earlier Muʿtazilites, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:472, 485, 526ff; Mānakdīm, 505.

¹¹¹ ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:486, 530; Ibn al-Maʿāḥimī, Fāʾiq, 141v; Mānakdīm, 505.

¹¹² Kashf al-murād, 264; see also Manāḥij, 98r.

Neither in this text nor in any of his other texts where he considered this problem, can a clear indication of his own position be found and it seems likely that he was undecided about this question. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who, like al-Ḥillī, usually followed the views of Ibn al-Malāḥimī or Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in his theological works, did not do so in this case, but adopted the view of al-Murtaḍā. Ibn al-Malāḥimī adhered to the position of Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaḥḥāl.¹¹³ The position of al-Murtaḍā had apparently been upheld before him by Abū Ḥalīl.¹¹⁴

It seems that the difference between the position of Abū Ḥāshim and that of Abū Ḥalīl, al-Murtaḍā and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī was minor. Both rejected the Baghdadī admission that God may compensate the victim instead of the wrongdoer out of grace (*tafaḍḍul*)¹¹⁵ on the basis that injustice can be compensated only by the wrongdoer. Since the restoration of justice may be deferred to the hereafter it is of minor importance whether the wrongdoer earns the compensation for his injustice prior to committing it, or whether he earns it later during his life.¹¹⁶ The position of the Bahshamiyya may be viewed as a mere elaboration out of the doctrine ascribed to Abū Ḥalīl.

113 *Ḥāṣi*, 141vff.

114 *Khulāṣat al-naṣar* (author unknown. MS Bibliothèque Nationale 1252), 36v-37r.

115 See also Ḥabīb al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 13:540.

116 See e.g. *ibid.*, 13:542.

5. Free Choice versus Determinism

One of the conclusions deriving from the Mu^tazilite view of divine justice is that man is the sole author of his acts. Since God does not commit any evil it must be man who produces his acts both good and evil.¹¹⁷ Moreover, if man were not the author of his actions, God would be unjust in imposing moral obligation upon him and in rewarding and punishing him for them. Al-Ḥillī firmly adhered to this Mu^tazilite principle.¹¹⁸

The Mu^tazilites disagreed whether it is known compulsorily (bi-l-ḍarūra) or by deduction (bi-l-istidlāl) that man is the author of his actions. Al-Ḥillī reports the different views and states his own position:

The second investigation [concerning] that we are the producers [of our actions]. Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī and a group [of Mu^tazilites] argued that this is compulsory (ḍarurī) [knowledge] and this is the truth in my view. A group among the Mu^tazilites, some of the Imāmites and the Zaydis maintained that this is acquired (kasbī) [knowledge]....What supports our view is that every reasonable person knows compulsorily (bi-l-ḍarūra) that it is good to praise for good action and evil to blame for it, and that it is good to blame for evil action. If our knowledge that the act originated from us were not compulsory, this [i.e. the knowledge that it is good to praise and to blame] would not be sound for us.¹¹⁹

The principal argument in this proof is that the fact that man is the author of his own actions is the necessary premise for the admissibility of his being praised and blamed for them. The connection between these two elements is based on the Mu^tazilite notion of justice which affirms that someone can only be praised or blamed for a deed which he himself performed. Otherwise, the praise and blame would be

¹¹⁷ Mānakdīm, 345.

¹¹⁸ Manāḥij, 96v; Ma^cṣarīj, 122r.

¹¹⁹ Manāḥij, 96v; see also Taṣliḥ, 63v-64r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 94v; Ma^cṣarīj, 122r.

undeserved and, as such, evil. Since it is compulsorily known that it is good to blame for wrongdoing and also good to praise for good actions, al-Ḥillī concluded that the premise for this, the knowledge that man is the author of his actions, must equally be known by compulsion.

As al-Ḥillī indicated, he shared this view with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī. Ibn al-Malaḥimī reports his master's reasoning and expresses his agreement:

Our master Abū l-Ḥusayn said that knowledge of this [i.e. that man is the author of his actions] is compulsory and we choose this opinion. What proves by way of indication (*tanbīh*) that the rational men know by their minds that men are the authors of their actions is that they know compulsorily that it is good to blame and to praise men for them. The knowledge that it is good to blame and to praise them for [their acts] is a branch (*farʿ*) of the knowledge that they are the producers of [their acts] because it is impossible that they should know the branch compulsorily (*bi-l-idtirār*) without knowing the root (*asl*) compulsorily.¹²⁰

The alternative position to which al-Ḥillī alluded, that the knowledge of man's being the author of his actions is acquired, was maintained by the Bahshamiyya. They started off from the premise that man's actions depend upon his intention (*qaṣd*) and his motives (*dawāʿī*). This is known compulsorily. If the act were not performed by the one whose motives and intention it reflects, it would not be connected at all with him. This, however, is contrary to what is compulsorily known. ʿAbd al-Jabbār explains:

This [i.e. that man is the producer of his actions] is indicated by the fact that if [the action] did not occur on his part [i.e. the person whose intention the act reflects] it would follow that it has no connection with him. This would necessarily contradict our knowledge that his action must occur in accordance with his intention.¹²¹

120 *Fa'iq*, 70r.

121 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 8:13; see also R. Frank, "The Autonomy of the Human Agent in the Teaching of ʿAbd al-Jabbār," *Le Muséon* 95 (1982):326 n.7 for further references.

In al-Hillī's view, an act necessarily occurs when capability (qudra) and the motive (dā^{ci}) for it exist together. To support his point, he employed the principle of causality as it derived from the philosophical tradition. An act is a contingent thing (mumkin) which must necessarily occur when the cause (ʿilla) for its occurrence exists, which is the combination of power and motive. Al-Hillī explains:

The act is contingent in regard to itself (bi-l-nazar ilā dhātihī) and necessary (wājib) in regard to its cause (bi-l-nazar ila ʿillatihī). The cause (ʿilla) of every contingent which depends upon a capable agent (qādir) is completed by the medium of capability (qudra) and motive (dā^{ci}). When they are present the means (maḥab) is complete, and when the means is complete the existence is necessary.¹²²

Power without a motive attached to it is therefore mere potential efficacy which becomes actual as soon as it is joined with a motive. The function of the motive is described as that of the preponderator which necessitates the act (al-murajjih al-mūjib li-l-fī^{ci}).¹²³

This requirement of both power and motive for the occurrence of an act applied, in al-Hillī's view, to both God and man. While he defined a motive in regard to God as knowledge that a certain act is either purely good or beneficial for someone else without comprising any harm,¹²⁴ he allowed that man's motive may be his knowledge, his belief (ʿitiqād) or his presumption (ẓann) that the act contains a benefit either for himself or for another person.¹²⁵

Having produced a motive for a specific act, man develops a longing (shawq) or inclination (mayl) towards it which is his will (irāda) for it.¹²⁶ This longing occurs owing

¹²² Kanḥ al-murād, 237.

¹²³ Manāḥij, 96v; Maʿārīj, 117r.

¹²⁴ Manāḥij, 98v.

¹²⁵ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Istiqṣāʾ al-nazar fī l-qadāʾ wa-l-qadar (edited by ʿAlī Khāqānī al-Najafī, Najaf, 1354/1935), 32-3; Tasliḥ, 31r.

¹²⁶ Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar, al-Asrār al-khafiyya fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya (MS Bankipore 2384), 223 v; Manāḥij, 87v, 91v; Tasliḥ, 31r.

to man's imperfect nature.¹²⁷ Since God, because of His self-sufficiency, does not share this characteristic there exists no will in addition to His motive.¹²⁸

With regard to man, al-Ḥillī often treated motive and will as equivalent, describing both as the preponderator (muṣājiḥ) for the action.¹²⁹

His notion of the condition for man's acts to occur is largely based on the views of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī. According to this school an action cannot occur but for a motive joined to power. Ibn al Malāḥimī states:

The capacity is attached to two opposites in such a way that the existence of both is possible.... Neither of the two occurs but for something which specifies (am mukhaṣṣis) the capacity to produce it. This is the motive (dāʿī) and this [motive] is a condition for the capacity to effect one of the two [opposites].¹³⁰

The followers of this school distinguished therefore between two meanings of efficacy (ṣiḥḥa) for capacity. Power without a motive attached to it is potentially efficacious either to produce or not to produce an act. As such, it is defined as the mere denial of the impossibility either to produce or not to produce.¹³¹ The actuality of the efficacy to produce a specific act requires the motive attached to it as a further condition (ḡhart).¹³²

The function of the motive is described as that of a preponderator; because of this motive a certain act preponderates over another. Taqī al-Dīn states:

The reality of a capable agent (ḥaqīqat al-qādir) is that doing and failing to do the act and its opposite are equal in so far as he is capable. It

¹²⁷ Asfār, 223v.

¹²⁸ Manāḥij, 88r, Tasliḥ, 31r, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 118.

¹²⁹ E.g. Tasliḥ, 24v, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 118 where will is called the specifier (mukhaṣṣis) or preponderator. Also Manāḥij, 88r where will is said to necessitate the act (irāda muḥibba) when the power for the act exists.

¹³⁰ Fa'iq, 122v; see also Muṭamad, 510.

¹³¹ Ibid., 104, 229, 511.

¹³² Ibid., 229, 511; Fa'iq, 71r, 122v.

is therefore inevitable that the choice of one of the two [alternatives] is caused to preponderate in regard to him by the motive.¹³³

Like al-Hillī, the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn regarded this principle as valid with regard to man and God.¹³⁴ There was disagreement however, whether will (irāda) in regard to man is identical with his motive or not. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī held the latter view. Since man is a corporeal being he feels for the action for which he is motivated a pleasure (maṣarrā) or longing (ṭalab, ṭaliba) which is his will for this deed.¹³⁵ Ibn al-Malāḥimī, in contrast, held that will with regard to both man and God is identical with the motive.¹³⁶

The position of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was in conflict with that of the Bahshamiyya on a number of points.¹³⁷ The latter maintained that power is the efficacy to act and that it is sufficient as such to produce an act even without a motive.¹³⁸ Examples for this are the category of unconscious acts,¹³⁹ such as the movement of a sleeper¹⁴⁰ or the action of an inattentative agent (sahī)¹⁴¹ who acts without

¹³³ Taqī al-Dīn, 55; see also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iḡ, 17r, idem, Muṭamad, 510. It is noteworthy that Taqī al-Dīn's exposition is not entirely coherent. The opposite of the act in the present discussion is normally considered to be failure to perform it. Taqī al-Dīn's second juxtaposition of "the act and its opposite" is therefore redundant.

¹³⁴ See e.g. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iḡ, 69r v, 146r v where this principle is applied to God.

¹³⁵ Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muṭamad, 240-1, 249; idem, Fā'iḡ, 22r, Taqī al-Dīn, 221.

¹³⁶ Muṭamad, 249; Fā'iḡ, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 220.

¹³⁷ For the position of the Bahshamiyya on human actions, see generally Frank, "Autonomy," 323-355, Gimaret, *Théories*, 39ff. The two authors differ in their conclusions.

¹³⁸ R. Frank, *Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Baṣran School of the Muṭazila in the Classical Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), 127 (quoting Abū Rashīd), Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muṭamad, 510ff.

¹³⁹ cAbd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 8:48ff.

¹⁴⁰ Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muṭamad, 511-2.

¹⁴¹ Mānakdīm, 31), Abū Muhammad b. Mattawayh, *Kitāb Majmūc fī l-muḥīt b. l-taklīf* (volume 1. Edited by J.J. Houben as a work of cAbd al-Jabbār. Recherches. Série 1: Pensée arabe et musulmane, vol. 25. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1965. Volume 2. Edited by J.J. Houben and D. Gimaret. Recherches.

apparent motive. Abū l Husayn and his followers argued that even in such cases there is a motive although the agent does not realize it.¹⁴² The Bahshamiyya apparently considered further futile (Cabath) acts to be produced for no motive although the producer acts in a state of consciousness.

Beside these two categories, according to the Bahshamiyya, are the acts that man would not do but for a motive.¹⁴³ Although they asserted that motives have an effect upon man's actions,¹⁴⁴ they denied any causal relation between motive and action.¹⁴⁵ Having a motive for an action rather means that man has a better reason to perform it than its opposite. There is no need for a motive, contrary to the view of the school of Abū l-Husayn al-Baghrī, to turn power from potential into actual efficacy to produce a specific action. Abū al-Jabbār states:

Motivations are not determinant causes (mūjibāt) but rather they entail (yaghtadi) simply that the given action is more appropriate (awla) than another to be chosen by the one who is able to act.¹⁴⁶

The view of the school of Abū l Husayn al-Baghrī that power cannot produce an effect but for a preponderator, and that with the existence of a preponderator the action necessarily occurs has therefore no parallel among the Bahshamiyya. It is very likely that Abū l Husayn

Nouvelle Série A. Langue arabe et pensée islamique, vol. 12. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1981), 1:364; Ibn al-Malāhimī, Muṭamad, 511.

¹⁴² Ibid., 511-2.

¹⁴³ Abū al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/1:186-7; 6/2:109. As Ibn Mattawayh points out (Majmūʿ, 1:364), this category is divided into two types. When the force of the motive is overwhelming man acts under impulsion (iljāʾ). Otherwise, he can evaluate his different motives and choose among them. For the notion of impulsion, see D. Gimaret, "La Notion d'impulsion irrésistible" (iljāʾ) dans l'éthique muʿtazilite," Journal Asiatique 259 (1971):25-62, M. Schwarz, "Some Notes on the Notion of iljāʾ" (Constraint) in Muʿtazilite Kalām" Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972):413-427.

¹⁴⁴ Abū al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/1:99.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 6/1:189. See also Frank, "Autonomy," 341ff.

¹⁴⁶ Mughnī, 9:93 (translated in Frank, "Autonomy," 348).

al-Baṣrī was under the influence of Ibn Sīnā when he affirmed that power requires a preponderator (muraḥḥih) in order to produce an action.¹⁴⁷

The Bahshamiyya asserted, moreover, a meaning of will (irāda) which substantially differed from Abū l-Ḥusayn's notion.

They held that simultaneously with the motive, a will arises in man through which he is in a state (ḥāl) of being willing.¹⁴⁸ This state has an effect upon the act in so far as it occurs in a specific manner (waḥḥ).¹⁴⁹ A sleeper, for instance, may utter words without any motive. He is therefore not willing and his words are a simple sequence of words. Someone who has the motive to issue a command (amr) is simultaneously in a state of being willing to command. He therefore utters a certain sequence of words because of his motives, and owing to his state of being willing this sequence has the specific characteristic of a command.¹⁵⁰ In this case, his action is defined as an intentional act.

Al-Ḥillī agreed with the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers concerning human acts wherever they were at variance with those of the Bahshamiyya. In comparison with the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, however, he employed philosophical terminology much more extensively. This difference most likely resulted from the impact of al-Rāzī's notion of human acts which is largely similar to, and most likely based upon, that of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn but which employed philosophical terminology to a greater extent.

¹⁴⁷See e.g. Abū Ḥalī b. Sīnā, Taḥḥiqāt (in the recension of Bahmanyār b. Marzubān. Edited by Ḥabīb al-Rahmān al-Badawī. Cairo. al-Maktaba al-ʿArabīyya, 1392/1973), 20, 50, 51 where Ibn Sīnā puts forth a notion of human action which bears striking similarity to the notion of Abū l-Ḥusayn.

¹⁴⁸For the notion of states (ahwāl) according to the Bahshamiyya, see later.

¹⁴⁹Al-Nisābūrī, Masā'il, 352-3, 363.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 363.

Al-Rāzī maintained¹⁵¹ that power, without a motive joined to it, is potentially efficacious for an act and its opposite, both of which are equally contingent. However, it is not actually efficacious to produce one act rather than the other.¹⁵² If a motive for a specific act is joined to it, this act necessarily occurs (wājib al-wuqūʿ) while its opposite becomes impossible (imṭanī al-wuqūʿ). He states:

The occurrence of the act after the coming together of power and motive (majmūʿ al-quḍra maʿ l-daʿi) is necessary (wājib). This is so because (for) the capable, in so far as he is capable, the action instead of failure to perform it and vice versa is possible. With the occurrence of this equality (al-tawā) the preponderance of one of the two sides over the other is impossible. If the occurrence of a motive is attached to it, the preponderance of the side of existence occurs. With this, the act must necessarily occur (wājib al-wuqūʿ). This is the view we have chosen.¹⁵³

Once the motive is joined to power, the cause for the act is the combination (majmūʿ) of power and motive.¹⁵⁴ Al-Ḥillī agreed with al-Rāzī on this point when he maintained that power and motive together are the cause (ʿilla) for the occurrence of the act.¹⁵⁵ Here, they differed from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī and his school who defined the motive as only a condition (shart) for the power to turn from potentiality into actuality. The effector (muʾaththir) of the act is only power.¹⁵⁶ This disagreement was minor as all agreed that the act must occur whenever power and motive are present and that it cannot occur when either of the two elements is not present.

In regard to the motive itself, al-Rāzī denied that man might act for the sake of pure goodness (dāʿiyat al-iḥsān).¹⁵⁷ Al-Ḥillī as a Muʿtazilite disagreed with al-Rāzī on this

151 His doctrine on man's actions has been investigated by Gimaret; see his *Théories*, 134ff.

152 *Matālib*, 3:10, 41, 45ff, 55.

153 *Ibid.*, 9:11. See also Gimaret, *Théories*, 140ff.

154 *Maʿālīm*, 83; *Matālib*, 3:10, 55ff, 73; 9:9.

155 Al-Rāzī, *Matālib*, 3:10 1; al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-murād*, 237.

156 See also *Matālib*, 3:10-1.

157 *Ibid.*, 3:21, 65ff.

point. Every action, according to al-Rāzī, is performed because the agent knows, believes, or presumes that it comprises a benefit for himself.¹⁵⁸ This view rests on his notion of rational good and evil which does not include any objective standards.

In addition to the motive and the deterrent, al-Rāzī asserted the reality of will (*irāda*). As soon as a motive for a certain act occurs in man, he develops a longing (*mayl shawq*) for it which is his will (*irāda*) or decisive decision (*imāc jāzim*) for the action.¹⁵⁹ Al-Hillī's identical terminology to describe man's will was most likely directly adopted from al-Rāzī. Like al-Hillī, al-Rāzī also treated wil. and motive as equivalent when he described either as the preponderator of the act.¹⁶⁰

Having explained how a human action occurs, al-Rāzī's main concern was to show that man's acts are created by God. With this he supported the Ash'arite view that God is the sole creator of everything which occurs. Man, according to this view, therefore cannot be the producer of his acts. Al-Rāzī started off from the assumption that man's power cannot produce an effect unless a motive is attached to it. Basing his argumentation on the philosophical principle that every contingent needs a cause other than itself and that anything contingent must ultimately be caused by God, the Necessary Existent, al-Rāzī argued that man's motives cannot be produced by himself who is also contingent. They must, therefore, be caused by a Necessary Existence which is God. Al-Rāzī states:

If the capability is valid both for the act and for failure to perform it, the preponderance of one of the two sides over the other depends either on a preponderator or not. If it depends on a preponderator [reading *muraḥḥ* for *taḥaḥ*], this preponderator derives either from God or from man, or without an effector.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 9:39.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 3:175; 9:40. See also Gimaret, *Théories*, 146-7.

¹⁶⁰ See *ibid.*, 146.

In the first case, the act is necessary when the motive occurs and impossible without it, and this is what we wanted to show. If it came from man...the creation of this motive would need another motive and this would necessarily lead to an endless chain. If this motive existed without an effector...this would mean that the contingent does not need an effector. This would necessarily imply the negation of the creator.¹⁶¹

Man's motives are therefore created by God either directly or through intermediaries.¹⁶²

On the basis of this assumption, al-Rāzī concluded that although man appears to be a choosing agent as he acts in accordance with his motives, he is in reality compelled in all his actions (mudtarr fī sūrat mukhtār)¹⁶³ since his motives do not originate from him. This conclusion was in direct opposition to al-Hillī's view of man's free choice.

With this notion of the occurrence of man's actions, al-Rāzī deviated substantially from the traditional Ash'arite view of human acts.¹⁶⁴ It is most likely that he adopted Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's basic notion of man's acts in order to launch an attack against the Mu'tazilite view of man's free choice. He argued that the view that an act must necessarily occur when the motive for it is attached to power, entails a necessity in action which is incompatible with the Mu'tazilite notion of free choice. The agent must either act when he has the motive to do so, or it is impossible for him to act in the absence of a motive. Thus free choice has no longer any meaning. Rather, the theory of Abū l-Ḥusayn on human action supports the view that all of man's acts are performed under compulsion. Al-Rāzī concludes:

It is astonishing that Abū l-Ḥusayn disagreed with his companions in regard to their doctrine that the act of someone capable of two opposites doing one of them but not the other does not depend on a preponderator. Rather, he claimed that it is

¹⁶¹Ma'ālīm, 78-9; see also Matālib, 3:73.

¹⁶²See ibid., 3:73; 9:13, 42:3, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.6:220; vol.7, pt.13:15, 128, 197; vol.8, pt.16:23.

¹⁶³E.g. ibid., vol.4, pt.7:142; vol.7, pt.13:89.

¹⁶⁴See Gimaret, Théories, 138ff.

necessarily known that this [i.e. the act] depends on the motive. Moreover, he claimed that the occurrence of the action following the motive is necessary. Acknowledging these two premises, he is forced to accept that man is not the author of his act as is our doctrine.¹⁶⁵

In an attempt to refute al-Rāzī's conclusion, al-Hillī correctly pointed out that the same conclusion must apply to God. Since He, too, acts necessarily when He has the motive to do so, He would equally have to be compelled in His acts.¹⁶⁶ Al-Hillī's objection is a very serious one. Gimaret pointed out¹⁶⁷ that al-Rāzī was in fact confronted with this objection and that he was unable to offer a satisfactory answer to it.

Al-Rāzī's notion of man's actions and his conclusion that man is compelled in all his actions did not originate with him. The same argument had been presented by Ibn Sīna whose views on man's actions bear a striking similarity to al-Rāzī's position. In his view, man's power can only effect an act when a motive or a will is attached to it which makes one act preponderate over another.¹⁶⁸ This motive for the act cannot originate from man but comes to him from outside himself (*wārid min al-kharīj*). Therefore it must ultimately have been ordained by God (*bi l taqdīr min Allah*).¹⁶⁹ Ibn Sīna drew the same conclusion as al-Rāzī that although man may believe that he is a choosing agent, he is in reality compelled in all his actions (*mukhtār fī hukm muqtār*).¹⁷⁰

Among al-Rāzī's Ash'arite predecessors al-Ghazālī supported a similar view on man's acts in some of his works which led him to the formulation that man is "compelled to choose" (*majbūr 'alā l-ikhtiyār*).¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁵Al-Jurjānī, 111 (quoting from al-Rāzī's *Nihāyat al-Quḥūl*); see also al-Rāzī, *Arba'īn*, 227.

¹⁶⁶*Manāhij*, 96v.

¹⁶⁷*Theories*, 149ff.

¹⁶⁸Ibn Sīnā, *Ta'liqāt*, 20.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 50, 51, 53.

¹⁷¹See B. Abrahamov, "Al-Ghazālī's Theory on Causality," *Studia Islamica* 67 (1988):75-98.

CHAPTER IV
PROPHECY

1. Purpose of the Mission

On the basis of his view of divine justice, al-Ḥillī disagreed with al-Rāzī about the purpose of the mission of prophets in every respect. Al-Ḥillī upheld the Muṭazilite view that man rationally knows ethical values in a general way. Man moreover knows that it is blameworthy to do evil and worthy of praise to do good, but not that God will punish evildoers and reward the obedient in accordance with their actions in the hereafter. Furthermore, besides the acts whose moral value is known to man by reason, there are some which will either hinder or help man to fulfil his moral obligation. Man is not able to discern their value by reason. God therefore dispatches prophets in order to reveal these things to man.¹ With this view, al-Ḥillī followed his Muṭazilite predecessors.² He states.

As for the benefits (faḥā'id) of [i.e. the mission of the prophets] contains, there are different aspects. First, they [i.e. the prophets] bring certain notification about the occurrence of punishment and reward, because reason points to the desert but not to its actual occurrence. And there is no doubt that this notification contains a benefit by abstention [of the morally obliged] from committing sins, second, reason admits [omitting ba'ḍ which is redundant] that some of our acts may be beneficial for us and [that they may be] a motive for doing what we are morally obliged to do by reason like fasting and [performing] the prayer, and [it admits] that some of our states may be [harmful] [word missing] for us [like] the drinking of wine. Thus, it is beneficial for us that He should inform us of these benefits and harms through the tongue of someone of our kind;...there are things which are good in themselves yet we do not know their goodness and other things which are

¹Taslīk, 68v.

²See Mānakdīm, 564ff; 'Abd al-Jabbār, Muḥḥnī, 6/1:64-5; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'ig, 149r-v, al-Murtadā, "Majmū'a," 64, Shaykh al-Rūsī, Iqtisād, 152-3; idem, Tamhīd, 313.

evil while we do not know their evil nature. There must therefore inevitably be a prophet through whom this can be learned.

In agreement with the Ash'arite tradition, al-Rāzī considered God as the sole lawgiver. Thus, revelation has the purpose to inform man of what God has determined by His will to be good or to be evil.⁴

Besides the basic purpose of uncovering certain truths to men, al-Hillī counted among the additional benefits coming from the mission of prophets their task of confirming what is already known by reason. He states:

Rational knowledge such as the [doctrine of] unity and the [divine attributes of] knowledge and power are acquired in accordance with reason. With regard to it, revelation has the purpose of confirming [reading li-l-ta'kid for al-ta'kid].⁵

The earlier Mu'tazilites disagreed as to whether a prophet may be dispatched only to confirm what is already known by reason. Abū 'Alī considered such a mission as beneficial.⁶ This view was shared by al-Murtaḍā and Shaykh al-Tūsī.⁷ Abū Hāshim and his followers disagreed. They argued that prophetic mission is only beneficial when it conveys something supplementary to reason. Otherwise, it would be futile ('abath) and thus evil.⁸

⁴Manāhij, 98v, see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 296.

⁵Arba'īn, 328.

⁶Manāhij, 98v; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v. For further benefits of the prophetic mission, see Manāhij, 98v.

⁷Al-Jurjānī, 182.

⁸Al-Murtaḍā, "Maḥmūḍa," 64, Shaykh al-Tūsī, Tamhīd, 313. Al-Murtaḍā and Shaykh al-Tūsī further allowed that there is a benefit in the mission when a prophet teaches men such matters as languages or the difference between lethal drugs and healthy food which could likewise be known by reason or experience (ibid.). The same view was held by Abū l-Qasim al-Baikhī, see al-Qasim b. Ahmad al-Muhallī, Ta'līq 'alā sharh al-imām a. mashhūr bi-'arā'idīn al-adhī sharaha bihi al-ṣulū al-khamṣa li-Qadī al-quḍāt 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Ahmad (MS Ambrosiana F192), 174r.

⁹'Abd al-Jabbār, Muḥallī, 15-20 l, al-Jurjānī, 182. For this disagreement, see also Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iḍ, 162r-v. Here, Ibn al-Malahimī refrains from indicating his own position on this issue.

On account of his view on divine justice, al-Ḥillī argued that God is obliged to send a prophet. Having imposed a moral obligation (taklīf) upon man, He must render him every possible assistance to enable him to fulfil his obligation. The mission of prophets belongs to this category of assistance. He states:

Concerning the necessity (wujub) of the mission the Muṭʿazila agreed upon this....Our proof is that it contains a favour (ʿiṭf) in regard to the moral obligation by reason and by revelation (taklīf ʿaqlī wa-samʿī), and a favour is obligatory according to what has previously been said.⁹ Thus, prophecy is obligatory [upon God].

This argument was traditionally put forth by the Muṭʿazilites.¹⁰

Al-Ḥillī further argued for the obligatoriness of the mission on the basis of his theory of acts. God does by necessity a beneficial act whenever He has the motive for it. A motive for God is His knowledge that a specific act is beneficial and does not contain any harm. Since the mission of prophets is purely beneficial, God must necessarily arrange it. He argues:

Moreover, when the power and the motive are realized, the mission is obligatory....As for the motive, it [i.e. revelation] contains an aspect of benefit and no evil aspect. As for the former, [the benefit] is the purpose; as for the latter, because the aspects of evil are limited in our view and none of them is established here.¹¹

Al-Ḥillī had adopted the basis for this second proof, that is that God must necessarily act whenever He has the motive to do so, from Ibn al-Malāḥimī. It is, however, noteworthy, that the latter did not refer to this principle when he argued for God's obligation to dispatch a prophet. He rather restricted his reasoning to the traditional Muṭʿazilite argument.¹²

⁹Manāḥij, 98v, see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v; Taslīk, 69r; Naḥj al-mustarshidīn, 296.

¹⁰Manāḥij, 564; ¹¹Abd al-Jabbār, Muḥnā, 15:50ff; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fāʾiq, 150r; Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 153, idem, Tamhīd, 313; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 124.

¹¹Manāḥij, 98v.

¹²Fāʾiq, 150r-151r.

Al-Rāzī denied any obligation for God. Arguing against the philosophers who maintained that God is obliged to send a prophet because of His providence (ḥināya), he states.

If you mean by necessity (wujūh) when you say "since men need a lawgiver, his existence is necessary" essential necessity (wujūh dhātī), 'that is impossible. If you mean by it that it is obligatory for God, like the Mu'tazilites say, that is not [in accordance with] your school doctrine. If you mean by it that it is obligatory on His part because it is a cause of order which is a kind of good, and God is the origin (mabda') of every good, this is likewise wrong because the most beneficial (ṭaḥṣīl) does not necessarily exist. Otherwise all people would be created innately good since this is the most beneficial.¹³

Since he adhered to the traditional Ash'arite notion that God acts only in accordance with His will, al-Rāzī presumably agreed with his predecessors that God might perfectly well not have sent any messenger if He had willed not to do so.¹⁴

The two theologians furthermore differed on whether the mission of prophets conveys benefits for all men. Al-Hillī adhered to the Mu'tazilite view that God created man and put him under moral obligation for his own benefit. Since man is the producer of his acts he is able to choose either to fulfil or not to fulfil his moral obligation. Revelation is a favour rendered by God equally to all morally obliged which is intended to assist them in this task. Whether they will accept it or not depends entirely on themselves.¹⁵

Although al-Rāzī claimed that the mission of the prophets is a beneficial act (iḥṣān) on the part of God,¹⁶ he categorically denied that God acts for the purpose of man's

¹³ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt (Cairo, 1326H.), 2:107-8. Yet in his early philosophical work al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya fī 'ilm al-ilāhiyyāt wa-l-tabi'iyyāt (Hyderabad: Dār al-ma'arif al-uthmāniyya, 1343H.), 2:523-4, al-Rāzī asserts that God is obliged to dispatch a prophet because of His providence (ḥināya).

¹⁴ For this Ash'arite view, see Ibn Furak, 174-5.

¹⁵ Manāḥil, 97v.

¹⁶ Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:80.

benefit. Moreover, God determines through His will who will be punished in hell and who will be in heaven in the hereafter. Man has no influence upon his eventual fate as he is not the producer of his acts. On the basis of this predestinarian view, al-Razī maintained that the mission is beneficial only for the faithful whom God wants to lead towards belief and piety. He states:

We observe two people who listen to the summons (da'wa) of the prophet in the same session by the same word. The speech turns in regard to one of them into a cause (sabab) to obtain guidance and longing and desire [for the true faith], in regard to the other it turns into a cause of increased impertinence and presumption and to further aversion. It should not be said that this aversion and desire occur through the choice of the morally-obliged. This would be an arbitrary negation of what is perceived because the person who developed aversion finds his heart as if it were compelled (mudtarr) towards this aversion; and the person who developed the desire finds his heart as if it were compelled towards the desire. When aversion occurs, rebelliousness and opposition necessarily follow. If desire occurs submission and obedience necessarily follow. We know therefore that the fact that the hearing of the summons leads to a desire in regard to one person which necessitates obedience and submissiveness, and to an aversion in regard to the other which necessitates rebelliousness and insubordination is in accordance with God's decision and decree (bi qada' Allāh wa-qadārih).¹⁷

This notion is characteristic of the Ash'arite view of the purpose of prophecy.¹⁸ Maimonides correctly observed that in the Ash'arite view revelation is in principle useless. Those for whom God has determined a fate in heaven will get there, regardless of whether God sends them a prophet or not.

¹⁷ Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:135-6.

¹⁸ See e.g. Ibn Fūrak (175) "And he [i.e. an Ash'arite] used to say the benefit of the mission is for man. [God] seeks through [the mission] the benefit of him whom He knows will accept the mission. For the man about whom He knows he will not accept the mission, He seeks through [the mission] his ruin, balak and corruption (fasād)...this what He wanted when He created them will be accomplished in accordance with what is known about what they will be, as far as good and evil, obedience and sin, happiness (sa'ada) and misery (shaqāwa) is concerned."

Those who are predestined to be punished eternally do not need revelation, since they are unable to act in accordance with the rules laid down by it.¹⁹

¹⁹Moses Maimonides states (The Guide of the Perplexed {translated with an Introduction and Notes by S.Pines. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963}, 467): "It also follows necessarily from this opinion that what the Laws entail is quite useless; for man for whose benefit every law has come, has not the ability to do anything either to fulfil what he has been commanded or to avoid what he has been forbidden."

2. The Impeccability (ʿIṣma) of Prophets

Al-Ḥillī and al-Razī agreed that a prophet must be impeccable. They disagreed, however, about the extent of this immunity. Al-Ḥillī stipulated that the prophets must not commit grave or light sins either before or after their mission. He states

The acts of prophets are of four types. First, [the type] of religious beliefs; secondly, their religious actions; thirdly, delivery of rules and transmission of laws; fourthly, the actions which are attached to them in worldly matters. As for the first part, the rational people are agreed that error in it is not possible [for them].... In regard to the second category, people disagreed. Some allowed that they may commit major sins while others denied this allowing, however, the commission of minor sins. The Imamites denied [that the prophets may commit a sin] in either of the two categories be it intentionally or by inadvertence, before and after the mission. As for the third category, all parties agreed that error is impossible [both] intentionally and by inadvertence. As for the fourth category, most people allowed that inadvertence may occur on their part. The Imamites denied this and this is the truth.²⁰

Although al-Ḥillī presented his own position as being generally accepted by the Imamites, the first Shiʿite theologian who maintained this strict view was in fact al-Murtadā.²¹ Their position was at variance with the view of the Muʿtazilites who allowed that prophets may commit minor

²⁰Maʿārīj, 124v, see also Manāhij, 99v, Muntahā al-wuḡū, 102r v, Taṣlīk, 69v 70r. Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 101.

²¹Ḥishām b. al-Ḥakam (d. 179/796) held prophets, in contrast to Imams, not to be protected from sins, mistakes or negligence (al-Ashʿarī, Maqālat, 48). Although Ibn Bībūyāh maintained that prophets are prevented from grave and small sins as well as from defilement (adanah), he allowed that they may be distracted from prayer (see McDermott, 356-8). Al-Mufid denied this but allowed that prophets other than Muḥammad may commit small sins which do not bring any discredit upon them (ibid., 100-1).

sins.²² As al-Murtadā pointed out,²³ the Muṣṭazilite position rested on the principle of mutual cancellation (*ihbāt*).²⁴ Punishment which is deserved for minor sins is automatically cancelled out by deserved praise exceeding it; thus, the commission of minor sins would not bring any discredit upon them. Since al-Ḥillī and al-Murtadā denied mutual cancellation, they could not allow that prophets may commit any sin because they would deserve blame and punishment for it.

Al-Rāzī held that the prophets are infallible in their beliefs; in the transmission of the divine message and in their judgement of matters of religious law they are free from any error, whether intentional or not.²⁵ This, he says, had been generally agreed among the Ashʿarites.²⁶ It appears, however, that this statement is not correct. Al-Bāqillanī allowed that prophets may commit errors inadvertently or through forgetfulness in the transmission of the message to mankind.²⁷ When al-Rāzī admitted that they may unintentionally commit minor sins after their mission and grave sins before their mission,²⁸ he was in agreement with his Ashʿarite predecessors.²⁹

²²Al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, 276, *Mānakdīm*, 575ff, Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fāʾiq*, 151r; see also McDermott, 99.

²³ʿAlam al-Hudā al-Murtadā, *Tanzīh al-anbiyāʾ* (edited by Muḥammad Sādiq al-Kātibī, Najaf: al-Ḥaydariyya, 1961), 34; see also McDermott, 385-6.

²⁴For this principle, see later.

²⁵Arbaʿīn, 329, *Tafsīr*, vol. 9, pt. 17:200-1.

²⁶Arbaʿīn, 329.

²⁷Al-Jurjānī, 218; Ibn Mūsā al-Yahsubī al-Andalusī al-Qādī ʿIyād, *Kitāb al-shifāʾ bi-taʿrīf huqūq al-Muṣṭafa* (edited by Muḥammad Amin ʿAlī et al. Damascus, 1972), 2:286.

²⁸Arbaʿīn, 330, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, pt. 3.8; ʿIsmat al-anbiyāʾ (Homs: al-Isḥāmiyya, 1969), 3.

²⁹E.g. ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Tāhir al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn* (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIshāq al-Jadida, 1401/1981), 167 8; an exception was Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī who held a much wider extent of impeccability; see W. Madelung, "Al-Isfarāyīnī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4:108.

Al-Ḥillī further differed from al-Rāzī in his understanding of impeccability.

Al-Rāzī maintained that a prophet becomes impeccable when God creates for him the motive to obey and not to commit sin. A prophet acts subsequently by necessity in accordance with this preponderating motive.³⁰ Thus, in accordance with al-Rāzī's notion of man's actions, the prophet is compelled to obey and not to commit a sin. The personal character of the prophet is therefore irrelevant. His view agreed with the traditional Ash'arite position that impeccability does not rest on the prophet's quality but on the fact that God does not create for him the power (qudra) to commit a sin.³¹

Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, defined impeccability as a facilitating favour (lutf) rendered by God because of which the prophet has a motive not to commit a sin. It is, however, the messenger himself who develops the motive not to commit sins. Thus, it is not through constraint from God but owing to the prophet's personal quality that he abstains from committing sins. Al-Ḥillī states this principle and envisages three possibilities why a prophet would abstain from committing a sin:

Impeccability is a personal quality (kayfiyya nafsanīyya) which induces [its owner] to adhere to obedience and to abstain from committing sins although he has the power for its opposite and although the occurrence of contrary acts from him is possible. It is inadmissible that he is constrained in the act of obedience and in the omission of the act of disobedience. Otherwise [his] desert for reward and punishment would be negated and it would necessarily have to follow what [Muḥanna' b. Sinan] - may God prolong his life - said in his question that one of us would deserve more reward than the prophet. This is false by consensus.

There is no doubt that the prophet is equal to the common people as regards power (qudra) and capacity (rukna) and it may be that he receives a facilitation (lutf) from God which exceeds those that other morally obliged persons receive. That facilitation is a favour (tafaddul) from God. It is not incumbent upon God. And it is not obligatory

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³⁰ Tafsīr, vol. 11, pt. 21:23.

³¹ Ibn Fārak, 109, 122-3; al-Ash'arī, "Risāla," 100; al-Jurjānī, 236; al-Baghdādī, Usūl al-dīn, 169.

that others share this [favour] with him. It is also possible that the reason for the specification of the facilitation is God's knowledge that the locus [i.e. the prophet] will accept it while another will not. Or it [i.e. the impeccability] can come from themselves in so far as they do not choose disobedience although they have the power for it. Disobedience cannot issue from them because of the abundance of their reason, the plenitude of their knowledge, their persistence in thanking and reasoning and their perseverance in obedience, in contrast to others of mankind.³²

Al-Hillī's view was in agreement with the position of the Mu'tazilites who equally maintained that the prophet is not prevented from committing a sin, as the Ash'arites said, but rather abstains from it.³³

Al-Hillī argued for the impeccability of the prophets on the basis of divine justice. The mission of the prophets is a facilitation by God to mankind which He is obliged to render and which is intended to serve man's benefit. Its desired effect can only be achieved if men accept the prophet and his statements as the commandments of God. If the prophets were to commit sins, men would not trust their statements. This would contravene God's purpose and to allow it would be evil on His part, therefore it is impossible. He states:

And the proof for the doctrine of the Imamites is that if God were to send somebody who is not impeccable, this would contravene His aim; the consequence is false and likewise the premise. The explanation of the conditional sentence is that the purpose of the mission is the acquisition of reward (thawāb) by obedience to their [i.e. the prophets] orders. This can only be accomplished when men trust their statements. This can only happen after knowledge that sin does not issue from them. Moreover, if he were not impeccable, it would be possible that he ordered what he was not commanded to order or that he failed [to mention] some parts of the law.³⁴

³² Ajwiba, 74.

³³ ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muḥnā, 13 17, ʿAlam al-Hudā al-Murtadā, Amālī al-Murtadā (edited by M. Abū Faḍl Ibrāhīm. Cairo: ʿInā al-Balabī, 1954), 2:347.

³⁴ Manāhij, 100r; see also Maʿārij, 124v, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 300.

The same argumentation was traditionally employed by the Muṭazilites.³⁵

Al-Rāzī further supported his view by a number of arguments which do not rest on his Muṭazilite concept of justice. None of these proofs were employed by the Muṭazilites. He says:

If they were to commit a sin they would be on a lower rank than common people because their punishment would be harder on account of their knowledge about God being more complete. The conclusion is false by agreement and therefore is the premise. Moreover, if they were to commit a sin their testimony (shahāda) would no longer be accepted [reading maḡbūl al-shahāda for maḡbūl al-shahāda] [by God] because of His words 'if an ungodly man comes to you with a report, investigate' [Qur'an XLIX:6]. Moreover, it would be obligatory [for men] to rebuke them for sinning. Thus, it would not be forbidden to hurt them [reading idhā'uhum for idhā'uhum] [referring to Qur'an XXXIII:57]. Moreover, it would be obligatory not to follow them. The conclusion is false and therefore also the premise.³⁶

In order to support his thesis of the impeccability of prophets, al-Rāzī offered a list of fifteen proofs. These consist of purely rational proofs, proofs from the Qur'an, from tradition and from consensus.³⁷ In employing rational proofs, al-Rāzī differed from his predecessors, who only

³⁵ Mānakdīm, 573-4; 'Abd al-Jabbar, *Mughnī*, 15 300, 303, 304-312, al-Murtadā, *Tanzīh*, 6ff, Shaykh al-Tūsī, *Iqtisād*, 161; Mitham al-Baḡrānī, 125-6. See also T. Andrac, *Die Person Muhammads in Lehre und Glauben seiner Gemeinde* (Archives d'études orientales, vol. 16, Stockholm Norstedt, 1918), 139ff.

³⁶ *Manāḥij*, 100r, see also *Munṭahā al-wuḡūl*, 102v.
³⁷ *Isma*, 3 7, *Arbaʿīn*, 310 314, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, pt. 3 8-10 where all fifteen proofs are mentioned. See also *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, pt. 4: 47-8, vol. 6, pt. 11 44; *Muhannaḡ*, 318-322, *Maʿāḡim*, 102 3 where only some of them are mentioned. See also I. Goldziher, "Aus der Theologie des Fachr al-dīn al-Rāzī," *Der Islam* 3 (1912): 238ff. Also a. Jurjānī, 220ff where he quotes al-Rāzī's proofs and criticizes them *ibid.*, 222-3.

resorted to proofs by revelation³⁸ or consensus³⁹ in order to show that impeccability goes beyond the conveying of revelation.

On the basis of reason, al-Rāzī argued that if the prophet were to commit a sin man would either have to follow him or not. Both possibilities, however, are unacceptable.⁴⁰ He argued further that since the prophets occupy a higher rank in relation to God and receive greater bounty (ni^Cma) from Him than others, the punishment they would deserve for a sin would be more severe than that of ordinary men.⁴¹ Al-Rāzī argued further that if the prophets were to commit sins, their testimony (shahāda) would no longer be acceptable to God. This would be in conflict with Qur'an XLIX:6 where men are warned not to accept the witness of a liar.⁴² He also argued that if the prophets were to commit sins, men would be obliged to rebuke them on the basis of the Qur'anic obligation of "commanding what is proper and prohibiting what is reprehensible" (al amr bi l-ma^Crūf wa-l-nahy ^Can al-munkar). This would disagree with Qur'an XXXIII:57 where men are warned not to hurt the prophets.⁴³

In view of the striking similarity of these proofs to the non traditional arguments employed by al-Ḥillī, it is most likely that the latter directly took them from al-Rāzī.

³⁸Such as al-Bāqillānī, see al-Jurjānī, 219.

³⁹Al-Baghdādī, Usūl al-dīn, 167-8. There was, however, no such consensus among the Ash'arites, see W. Madelung, "Cisma," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:183.

⁴⁰E.g. Arba^Cin, 331.

⁴¹E.g. Ibid., 330.

⁴²E.g. Ibid., 331.

⁴³E.g. Ibid.

3. The Proofs for Muhammad's Prophethood

In addressing the question of how to prove Muhammad's prophetic mission, al-Ḥillī referred to the miracles God created for him in order to manifest his veracity. With this, he was in agreement with the earlier Muṭtazilites and Ashʿarites.⁴⁴ Among these miracles, he considered the Qur'an the most outstanding one. He states:

The fourth investigation concerning the proof of Muhammad's prophethood. To this points that he appeared and claimed prophethood and subsequently a miracle appeared on his hand. Whoever is like this, is truly a prophet. As for his claim of prophethood, this is known by widespread reports (tawātur). As for the occurrence of a miracle, there are a number of aspects. First, the Qur'an appeared from him and it is a miracle. The minor premise is the widespread reports. The major premise is that he challenged by it the Arabs who were unable to match it despite their exceeding eloquence.... Secondly, he reported about hidden matters as is known by widespread reports and by Qur'anic verses which point to this.... And this is definitely a miracle. Thirdly, those miracles which were reported of him by widespread reports in their generality even if the details were not transmitted by widespread reports like the splitting of the moon (inshiqāq al-qamar), the saturation of many people with little food,... and the welling of water (inubūʿ al-māʾ) from between his fingers and other [miracles] besides these.⁴⁵

In regard to the miracle which proves the veracity of a claimant to prophethood, al-Ḥillī stipulated that it must follow his claim and must further correspond to it. By this he meant that the claimant requests from God a specific miracle as verification for his claim. If it then occurs the

⁴⁴E.g. al-Murtadā, "Maḥmūd," 64ff, Mitham al-Bahrānī, 127; Abū Saʿd b. Abī Saʿīd al-Mutawallī, "al-Mughnī fī ḥuṣūl al-dīn ʿalā tariqat Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī," edited by Marie Bernard, *Supplément aux annales islamologiques*, no. 7, Cairo Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1986, 50.

⁴⁵Manāẓir, 98v 99r; see also Muntahā al-wusūl, 101v 102r; Maʿarīf, 123v; Nahj al-mustarshidin, 311-2, Tasliḥ, 70r-v.

claim is verified but if God created a different miracle this would prove its falsity. The miracle must be created by God and consist of a breach of His custom.⁴⁶ These conditions were traditionally recognized by both Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites.⁴⁷ Some miracles such as the Qur'an may furthermore be accompanied by a challenge (tahaddī) to the people to match it⁴⁸ which cannot be met by them. When these conditions are fulfilled, al-Hillī argues, the veracity of the prophet is established:

Everyone to whom this applies, is a prophet because the creation of a miracle on the part of God following the claim of prophethood is equivalent to [the prophet's] verification. For if a man claims to be a messenger of a king and says "Oh king! If I am right in claiming to be your messenger,

⁴⁶Nahj al-mustashdīn, 306, Muntahā al-wusūl, 108v-109r.

⁴⁷See e.g. Manakdim, 569ff; 'Abd al-Jabbar, Muḥnā, 15:199, Ibn al-Malahimī, Fā'iḳ, 153ff, 155vff; al-Murtadā, "Majmū'a," 65; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 127ff; Manakdim (569) reports that Abū Qāsim al-Kātibī allowed that the miracle could precede the claim. For examples of these conditions in Ash'arite works, see 'Abd al-Qāhir b. Tāhir al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayn al-firaq (edited by M. Muḥyi al-Dīn 'Abd al-Hamid, Cairo: Dār al-turāth, n.d.), 344; idem, Usūl al-dīn, 171-2; Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī, Kitāb al-bayān 'an al-farq bayn al-mu'jizat wa-l-karāmāt (edited by R. McCarthy, Manshūrāt jam'iyyat al-hikma fī Baghdād, Silsilat 'ilm al-kalām, no. 2, Beirut: Maktaba sharqiyya, 1958), §§51-56, al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 307ff; al-Isfarāyīnī, 152, al-Mutawallī, 501, see also generally R. Gramlich, Die Wunder der Freunde Gottes: Theologien und Erscheinungsformen des islamischen Heiligenwunders (Freiburger Islamstudien, vol. 11, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1987), 23-37.

⁴⁸Manāhiḳ, 98v-99r; Taslīk, 70r-v. In his Anwār (184) al-Hillī maintains that the challenge is a condition required for every miracle. By the challenge, the prophetic miracle can be distinguished from a non-prophetic miracle. This condition is not stipulated by the Mu'tazilites, who rather confined the challenge to the Qur'an. Ash'arites, in contrast, usually considered the challenge as one of the required conditions for every prophetic miracle (see P. Antès, Prophetenwunder in der Ash'ariya bis al-Gazālī (Alqazālī) (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 2, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz, 1970), 36-9; Gramlich, Wunder, 28-9; also al-Mutawallī, 51). In their view, the challenge attached to a prophetic miracle distinguishes it from a non-prophetic miracle (see al-Baghdādī, Farq, 344; also Gramlich, Wunder, 41ff). Presumably under the influence of the Ash'arites, the condition that a challenge must be attached to a prophetic miracle tended to be accepted by later Imamate theologians (see e.g. al-Miqdād, 307).

contravene your custom!" and then the king does so, and if the question of the messenger and the act of the king are repeated [reading takarrara for yukarrara], rational people affirm the veracity of the messenger. The same applies here. And everyone whom God shows to be veracious, is veracious, because God Himself is veracious and if He were to show the veracity of a liar, He would not be veracious. Moreover, God does not commit any evil. The manifestation of a miracle for a liar would be an incentive to evil; therefore it is evil.⁴⁹

Al-Ḥillī's concluding argument is based on the Mu'tazilite concept of justice according to which God never commits any evil. The analogy he drew to the king and his messenger was apparently not referred to by earlier Mu'tazilites. Al-Ḥillī most likely adopted it from the Ash'arites who commonly employed it.⁵⁰

In his Manāḥij al-yaqīn and Muntahā al-wuqūf, al-Ḥillī adds a different proof for Muhammad's mission pointing out that he had such superiority in his theoretical (quwwa 'ilmiyya) and practical faculties (quwwa 'amaliyya) that this was already a sufficient indication for his veracity. He states:

Secondly, the proof by his character (akhlāq) and his actions for the truth of his statements. The personal perfections are twofold, what is related to the person himself and what is related to the perfection of others. The absolutely perfect is the one who is perfect in regard to the two faculties and who perfects others. Muhammad was from the beginning of his mission until its end [reading akhlāqihā for akhlāqih] devoted to good acts and beautiful ethics; after the appearance of his status he persevered [reading mutawajjih for mutawajjih] in worshipping his Lord while turning [reading mutawajjih for mutawajjih] to Him totally and renouncing the world. [Moreover], he summoned the people to this...and this is based on the perfection of his practical faculty and his perfection of others in it. As for the theoretical faculty, there is no doubt that in the time of the appearance of the Prophet the Arabs were quarrelling among themselves and of different religions. Some of them worshipped idols, others

⁴⁹Ma'arī, 123v; see also Manāḥij, 99r; Taslīk, 70r.

⁵⁰E.g. al-Juwaynī, Irbād, 313; al-Jurjānī, 181; see also Antes, 36 n.4, 80, 95.

the stars [and they also adhered to] other false religions. [The Prophet] spread among them divine sciences and inquests of knowledge including [those about] God's unity, the denial of anthropomorphism, justice and other questions relating to the truth and he clarified in their regard what had been obscure to them. He commanded them to meditate and to strive towards the truth. This is utmost perfection for him in his theoretical faculty and the perfection of others.⁵¹

It is almost certain that al-Ḥillī adopted the latter proof from al-Rāzī. The latter similarly argued that people are of three classes, first, the ordinary people who are deficient in their practical and theoretical faculties; secondly, those who are perfect in both faculties but unable to lead anybody else to this stage. These are the saints (*awliyā'*). The third class are those who are perfect in both qualities and able to perfect the deficient (*mukammil*). These are the prophets.⁵² Like al-Ḥillī, al-Rāzī maintained that men can rationally judge the veracity of a prophet by the mere consideration of his superb qualities.⁵³ However, when al-Ḥillī considered this proof as an equivalent to the traditional proof, he did not follow al-Rāzī's view in his later works *Maṭālib al-ʿAlīyya* and *Maʿālīm uṣūl al-dīn* and in his *Tafsīr* where he preferred this proof to the traditional proof by a miracle. Al-Rāzī says:

Those who uphold prophethood are two groups: one of them are those who say that the appearance of a miracle on the part of a prophet proves his veracity.... This claim is the "first path" and most people of the various religions adhere to it. The second opinion is that we say that we [should] know first what the [right] position is in beliefs and what the sound view about acts is. If we know this and then see someone calling mankind to the true religion and if we see that his speech has a strong impact in diverting mankind from falsehood to the truth we know that he is a veracious prophet who has to be followed. This path is nearer to reason and doubts are fewer in it.⁵⁴

⁵¹ *Manāḥiḥ*, 99r, see also *Muntaha al-wuṣūl*, 102r.

⁵² *Tafsīr*, vol.9, pt.17:120; *Maṭālib*, 8:104; *Maʿālīm*, 93.

⁵³ *Tafsīr*, vol.5, pt.9 81-2, vol.9, pt.17:120; *Maʿālīm*, 94-5; *Maṭālib*, 8:103.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 8:103; see also *Maʿālīm*, 94-5; *Tafsīr*, vol.9, pt.17 121. In his *Muḥaṣṣal* (301-2), al-Rāzī still considers this proof as equivalent to the traditional proofs. Moreover,

Al-Rāzī claimed that al-Jāhiz and al-Ghazālī in his Munqidh had already referred to the character of the prophet as a safe criterion for his veracity.⁵⁵ With regard to the latter, this can be confirmed from his Munqidh min al-dalāl where he maintains that miracles are an uncertain criterion for the veracity of a prophet⁵⁶ and that it is safer to ascertain it by considering the character traits and states of the prophet.⁵⁷ Al-Ghazālī supports his view by comparison with professionals:

If you know medicine and law, you can gain knowledge about the lawyers and the doctors by considering their conditions and by listening to their speech....Likewise if you understand the meaning of prophecy and if you frequently consider the Qur'an and the tradition, you will necessarily know that Muhammad is in the highest rank of prophecy.⁵⁸

Al-Rāzī, followed by al-Ḥillī, shared with al-Ghazālī the supposition that man knows enough to be able to consider and to evaluate the personal qualities of a claimant to prophethood and to ascertain prior to revelation and without God's help that he is veracious.

Ibn al-Maḥḥimī was acquainted with a view similar to al-Ghazālī's which he ascribed to "someone (or some people) indulging in philosophy" (ba'd al-mutafalsifa).⁵⁹ In his refutation he pointed to the shortcomings of this position. Its supporters maintained that man should investigate the laws of the prophet as to their agreement with the general interest (maṣlaḥa).⁶⁰ They justified this procedure by comparison with a craftsman whose veracity in his claim of craftsmanship is known best by investigation of his

he does not elaborate this argument in this work as he does in his Matalib, the Ma'ālīm and in his Tafsīr.

⁵⁵ Muḥaṣṣal, 302.

⁵⁶ Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh min al-dalāl (edited by Jamāl Salībā and Kāmil 'Ayyād. Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1401/1981), 147-50.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 148.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 148-9.

⁵⁹ Fā'iḡ, 153v-155v.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 153v.

products.⁶¹ Ibn al-Malaḥimī rejected this comparison, pointing out that man, prior to revelation, does not have sufficient knowledge of the law to evaluate the prophet.⁶² They further argued that if someone applied the laws of the claimant of prophecy and discovered that they help him to discipline his soul and to develop piety, he would experience the veracity of this prophet.⁶³ Ibn al-Malaḥimī countered that people are not obliged to follow the law of a claimant of prophecy whose veracity is not yet known to them. Not having any motive to apply it, they would not do so and therefore would not arrive at the knowledge of his veracity.⁶⁴

Neither al-Rāzī nor al-Ḥillī dealt with these objections.

⁶¹Ibid., 154v-155r.

⁶²Ibid., 155r.

⁶³Ibid., 155r-v.

⁶⁴Ibid.

4. The Miraculous Character of the Qur'an (I^Cjaz al-Qur'an)

Al-Hillī considered the Qur'an as the principal miracle of the Prophet.⁶⁵ This view was shared by almost all theological schools.⁶⁶ The proof of its miraculous character was men's inability to match the Qur'an despite the challenge to do so.⁶⁷ The question was why they were unable to match it. Al-Hillī maintained that the miraculous aspect of the Qur'an consists in its incomparable eloquence (fasāḥa) which man is unable to match.⁶⁸

His main concern was to refute the position of those who maintained that the miraculous character of the Qur'an is not due to its intrinsic quality but to God's preventing mankind from matching it. This position was known as the doctrine of prevention (sarfa). Al-Hillī summarizes the different views of its proponents

The advocates of the doctrine of prevention disagreed among themselves. Some held that God deprived them of the power for this [i.e. matching the Qur'an]. Others said that God deprived them of the motive for this together with the occasion (sabab) necessitating its existence. Others held that He deprived them of the knowledge by which they would have been able to match it. This is the position of the Sayyid al-Murtadā.⁶⁹

The first position, that God deprived the people of the power to match the Qur'an, is usually ascribed to Abū Ishāq al-Nazzām (d. around 221/836).⁷⁰ The second view, as will be

⁶⁵See supra, p. 148.

⁶⁶The only exceptions are 'Abbad b. Sulaymān and Hishām al-Fuwaṭī who denied the miraculous character of the Qur'an and that it is a proof of the prophet or of God, see al-Ash'arī, Maqālāt, 225-6; Abī Bakr Muḥammad al-Baḡillānī, I^Cjaz al-Qur'an (edited by Ahmad Sagr, Dhakhḥar al-ʿArab, pp. 12, Cairo: Dar al-maʿārif, 1954), 99.

⁶⁷Manāhil, 98v-99r, Muntahā al-wuḡūl, 101v-102r; Tasīlīk, 70r v, see also Manakdim, 586ff; Ibn al-Maḡhīrī, Fa'iq, 164rff.

⁶⁸Manāhil, 99v; see also al-Miqdād, 109.

⁶⁹Manāhil, 99v, see also Kashf al-murād, 281.

⁷⁰E.g. al-Ash'arī, Maqālāt, 225, see also R.C. Martin, "A Mu'tazilite Treatise on Prophethood and Miracles Being

seen, was most likely al-Rāzī's explanation. Al-Hillī's ascription of the third view to al-Murtaḍā is not quite accurate. Although al-Murtaḍā often defended the doctrine of prevention against the upholders of the doctrine of eloquence,⁷¹ he allowed in a number of his works that the miraculous aspect of the Qur'an may be either its eloquence or the prevention from matching it.⁷² Moreover, when he defended the doctrine of prevention, he maintained at times

Probably the Bāb 'alā l-nubuwwah from the Ziyādāt al-sharh by Abu Rashīd al-Nisābūrī." (Ph.D. diss., New York University 1975), 37 (quoting Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī). J. Bouman has pointed out (Le Conflict autour du Coran et la Solution d'al-Baqillānī, Amsterdam 1959, 23) that according to the accounts of al-Ash'arī, al-Khayyāt and al-Baghddādī, al-Nazzām did not maintain that prevention of matching the Qur'an was a miracle. This was ascribed to him first by al-Baqillānī. According to the earlier accounts his main concern was to explain why there were no imitations of the Qur'an although its style was imitable.

⁷¹In his Masā'il al-rassiyya al-ūla (MS Princeton Yehuda 2751, 140r-141v), al-Murtaḍā defends this doctrine against an unidentified follower of the Bahshamiyya whom Martin tentatively identifies as Abu Rashīd al-Nisābūrī or 'Abd al-Jabbār (Martin, 91). Moreover, in his Ziyādāt al-sharh, Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī argues against al-Murtaḍā on the question of the miraculous aspect of the Qur'an presenting al-Murtaḍā as a staunch defender of the doctrine of prevention. (See *ibid.*, 95ff for an analysis of this discussion. Martin's analysis is based on MS British Museum 8613 (fol.1-69) which he identifies as a portion of Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī's Ziyādāt al-sharh (*ibid.*, 7ff). For a description of this MS, see A.S. Tritton, "Some Mu'tazilite Ideas about Religion," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 14 (1952):612-22. W. Madelung suggested ("Abu Rashīd al-Nisābūrī," Encyclopaedia Iranica, 11:367) that this text is more likely a supercommentary of a later unknown author on Abū Rashīd's Ziyādāt al-sharh. In his Jumal al-Qa'im wa-l-Qama, (edited by Ahmad al-Husaynī, Najaf: al-Ādab, 1387H.), 401, al-Murtaḍā further refers to another work of his entitled Kitāb al-sharh. This work is lost and nothing is known about its contents. A. Aleem ("I'āzu 'l-Qur'an," Islamic Culture 7 (1933):227), Bouman (23), al-Himsi ("Ta'rīkh fikrat al-'ajāz al-Qur'an," Revue de l'Académie Arabe de Damas 28 (1953):69ff) and Martin (37 n.25) further support the view that al-Murtaḍā adhered to the doctrine of prevention by the evidence of a passage in MS Ahlwardt 4977 (4v) which is ascribed to al-Murtaḍā. McDermott (387 n.3) has shown, however, that this passage was not written by him.

⁷²"Majmū'a," 68, see also Jumal, 41 (transl. in McDermott, 387 n.3) where prevention is equally not his only explanation.

that God deprives men of the knowledge which is required to match the Qur'an, whereas elsewhere he is reported to have held that God rather deprived men of their motives to match it.⁷³

Al-Ḥillī rejected the doctrine of prevention arguing that if God had prevented mankind from matching the Qur'an, this act of prevention rather than the Qur'an would be the miracle.⁷⁴ Moreover,

if the miracle were the prevention the Qur'an would necessarily have to be at the height of weakness [in eloquence], since prevention from matching weak speech is a greater miracle than prevention from matching eloquent speech.⁷⁵

He further pointed out that if the Arabs were prevented from matching the Qur'an they would have produced something equal to the Qur'an in pre Islamic times. But nothing like this is known.⁷⁶

Al-Ḥillī's arguments against this doctrine were not original but had already been employed by earlier defenders of the doctrine of eloquence such as the Basran Muṭazilites⁷⁷ and the Ash'arite al-Baḡillānī who played a leading role in the discussion on the miraculous eloquence of the Qur'an.⁷⁸

73 Al-Murtadā, Masā'il, 140v (quoted in Martin, 91 2); there he holds that God deprived men of their knowledge required to match the Qur'an. According to Abū Rashid al-Nisāburī, al-Murtadā rather held that God deprived men of their motives to match the Qur'an; see Martin, 93. Neither in his "Majma'ā" (68) nor in his Jumal (41) does al-Murtadā indicate how he defined arfa.

74 Manāḥil, 99v; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 102r.

75 Manāḥil, 99v; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 102r.

76 Manāḥil, 99v.

77 See Martin, 85, for 'Abd al-Jabbār's arguments against the doctrine of prevention, see his Mughnī, 16:322-328.

78 See generally G.E.von Grunebaum, A Tenth-Century Document of Arabic Literary Theory and Criticism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), XVIII; Bouman, *passim*, also Aleem, 224ff. For al-Baḡillānī's arguments against the doctrine of prevention some of which were used by al-Ḥillī, see al-Baḡillānī, ʿIjāz, 41ff.

In upholding the view that the eloquence is the sole miraculous aspect of the Qur'an, al-Hillī disagreed with his contemporary Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who considered all doctrines on its miraculous character as acceptable.⁷⁹

In his Nihāyat al-ījāz⁸⁰ and in some instances in his Tafsīr, al-Rāzī also rejected the doctrine of prevention in favour of the doctrine of eloquence.⁸¹ The arguments he puts forward in order to defend this view against the doctrine of prevention agree with al-Hillī's.⁸² In addition he argues against this position that

the forgetting of acquired skills in a short time points to a lapse of minds (zawal al-ʿaql). But it is known that the minds of the Arabs did not lapse after the challenge.⁸³

This argument is apparently meant to counter a statement attributed to al-Nazzām that God deprived the people of their minds in order to prevent them from matching the Qur'an.⁸⁴

Elsewhere, however, al-Rāzī maintained that eloquence is not the only miraculous aspect of the Qur'an. In his Tafsīr he approves the view that the reports of the Qur'an about hidden matters (ghuyūb) as well as about religious matters (umūr dīniyya) are aspects of its miraculous quality.⁸⁵

Elsewhere in his Tafsīr,⁸⁶ he admits that the Qur'an may be a miracle either by its intrinsic miraculous character or because God prevented mankind from matching it.⁸⁷

⁷⁹ Tafsīr, I, 181, "Qawā'id al-ʿaqlīya," 73-4.

⁸⁰ Nihāyat al-ījāz al-Rāzī, Nihāyat al-ījāz fī dirāyat al-ʿaql, edited by Bakr Shaykh Amin, Beirut, 1485), 79ff, 82.

⁸¹ Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:203.

⁸² Nihāya, 79-80; Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:203.

⁸³ Nihāya, 80, the same argument was also used by ʿAbd al-Jabbār; see his Mughnī, 16:325.

⁸⁴ See Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī, al-itqān fī ʿulum al-Qurʾān (edited by Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo: al-Mashhad al-Busaynī, 1387/1967), vol.2, pt.4:6-7.

⁸⁵ Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:100.

⁸⁶ Ibid., vol.11, pt.21:55, also ibid., vol.14, pt.28:259.

⁸⁷ Ibid., vol.11, pt.21:55.

Al-Razī's notion of prevention is based on his theory of acts. Although the people had the power and motives to match the Qur'an which under normal circumstances necessitates their action, they were prevented from doing so. Al-Rāzī states:

Concerning the clarification of the miraculous character of the Qur'an, men have two opinions about this. Some say that the Qur'an is a miracle in itself. Others say that it is not a miracle in itself but that, when God removed the motives [of the people] to match [reading *ityān* for *ithbāt*] the Qur'an although these motives were strong, this prevention was a miracle. Our choice in this matter is to say that the Qur'an is either a miracle in itself or it is not; in the first case, what we seek to show has been achieved. If [the Qur'an] is not a miracle [in itself], and [they i.e. the people] had the capacity and abundant motives to match it and there was [nothing] to deter and to prevent them, the matching necessarily follows. The fact that this matching did not occur in spite of the considerations mentioned, is a breach of the custom. Thus, it is a miracle.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Ibid., vol.11, pt.21:55.

5. Non-prophetic Miracles

In agreement with their respective school traditions, al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī maintained that miracles are created by God not exclusively for prophets but also for non-prophets. The occurrence of miracles of saints was disputed between and even within the various schools. Al-Ḥillī summarizes the different views and argues for his own position:

On the question of miracles of saints (*karāmāt*). The generality of the Muṭazilites denied them except Abū l Husayn al-Baṣrī. The generality of the Ashʿarites considered them to be possible except for Abū Ishaq [al-Isfarāyīnī]. This is also the doctrine of the philosophers. The proof for [the possibility of non prophetic miracles] are the miracles which appeared on the part of Mary and for the seven sleepers (*aṣḥāb al-kahf*).⁸⁹

The positions of the various groups were not as clear-cut as al-Ḥillī presents them.

Among the Muṭazilites, Abu Hashim was the staunchest opponent of the possibility of non-prophetic miracles. His opposition was based on his view of the significance of a miracle as a sign for prophethood. He defined a miracle as an indication for a prophet "by way of elucidation and specification" (*ṭarīq al-ibana wa-l-takhsīs*).⁹⁰ By this he meant that a prophet must necessarily appear together with a miracle; a miracle, in turn, cannot signify anything but prophethood and it is impossible for it to occur for any other purpose. This implies that it does not simply prove the veracity of a claim, otherwise any claim could be verified by a miracle. ʿAbd al-Jabbār explains Abu Ḥāshim's view:

Our master Abu Ḥāshim mentioned in many of his books that miracles signify prophethood by way of elucidation and specification, not in the way other signs signify, because they must occur and must signify someone's prophethood. This necessity does not apply to other signs. Moreover, if they were to

⁸⁹Manāḥij, 100r; see also Maʿarīj, 124v-125r.

⁹⁰ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muḥarrīf, 15-217, 234; also Taqī al-Dīn, 267-8; Ibn al-Maḥāmī, Faʿiq, 159r-v.

become numerous they would cease to be an indication. This is not the case with other signs.

Among Abū Hashim's followers, this view aroused criticism. Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī and apparently already Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Baṣrī had rejected the view that miracles exclusively signify prophethood, holding that their purpose is rather to verify the claim to prophethood.⁹² Having made this distinction, Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī apparently accepted the possibility of miracles of saints.⁹³ As evidence, he referred to traditions which support their actual occurrence.⁹⁴

Abū l Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī definitely broke with the view of Abū Hāshim by admitting the possibility of miracles of saints both on grounds of reason and tradition.⁹⁵ His view was generally accepted among his followers.⁹⁶ Ibn al-Malāhimī, therefore, differentiated between various types of miracles.⁹⁷ First are those which are preceded by a claim to prophethood and which are therefore exclusive to prophets; secondly, non-prophetical miracles which are intended to prove the veracity of a claim to righteousness (ṣalāh), thirdly, non prophetical miracles which occur as an honour (ikrām) to the person who receives them. Each type may only occur, however, if a benefit (maṣlaḥa) for men is attached to it.⁹⁸

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⁹¹Mughnī, 15 217.

⁹²For Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Baṣrī, see 'Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 15:222. For Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī, see Martin, 68, 77ff. His analysis is based on MS British Museum OR 8613. For the identification of this manuscript, see supra, p.155 n.71.

⁹³Martin, 78-9.

⁹⁴Ibid., 79.

⁹⁵Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iḳ, 158v.

⁹⁶Ṭaḳī al-Dīn, 266ff.

⁹⁷Fā'iḳ, 160r. Gramlich (Wunder, 98) identifies him erroneously as the famous commentator of the Qur'an, Abū l-Qasim al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144).

⁹⁸Fā'iḳ, 160r. Among the earlier Mu'tazilites, Ibn al-Ikhshīd, who apparently was a follower of Abū 'Alī strongly opposed to Abū Hashim's views (Madelung, "Imamism," in Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (by W.Madelung. London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 29 (addenda to p.24)), accepted on rational grounds the possibility of miracles of saints. (ibid., 24, Gramlich, Wunder, 98) However, on grounds of scriptural

Moreover, in contrast to the Bahshamiyya, the Baghdadiis accepted the possibility of miracles as premature signs heralding a prophet still to come.⁹⁹ This was also allowed by Ibn al-Malaḥimī.¹⁰⁰ Al-Ḥillī followed him in this respect.¹⁰¹

In respect to the Ashʿarites, al-Ḥillī correctly stated that the possibility of miracles of saints was generally accepted among them. An exception was Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) who held that non-prophetic miracles do not reach the degree of prophetic miracles,¹⁰² an opinion also held by Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥalīmī (d. 403/1012).¹⁰³ The Ashʿarites argued for the possibility of non-prophetic miracles that in view of God's omnipotence the creation of miracles for non-prophets is possible.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, scriptural evidence points to their actual occurrence.¹⁰⁵ A number of Ashʿarite theologians allowed that God may create a miracle in order to verify the claim of its recipient.¹⁰⁶ They further asserted the possibility of miracles as premature signs heralding a prophet still to come.¹⁰⁷

evidence he denied the possibility of their actual occurrence. (Ibn al-Malaḥimī, Fāʾiq, 158v, 160v).

⁹⁹Ibid., 160v.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 160v-161r.

¹⁰¹Maʿārij, 124v.

¹⁰²W. Madelung, "Al Isfarāyīnī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4:108, Gramlich, Wunder, 98-9.

¹⁰³Ibid., 98-9; L. Gardet, "karāma," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4:616.

¹⁰⁴Al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 319, al-Jurjānī, 243.

¹⁰⁵The usual examples from the Qurʾān are the story of Mary (XXVIII 9ff) and the story of the seven sleepers (XVII:40ff), see al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 320, al-Matawallī, 50-1; al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, 385-6; idem, Tafṣīr, vol. 11, p. 21:82ff, 86ff; see also Gramlich, Wunder, 74ff for the various Qurʾānic miracles and ibid., 81ff for the different proofs from traditions.

¹⁰⁶E.g. al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 185, al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 316, 319.

¹⁰⁷Al-Jurjānī, 178.

Another group which espoused the possibility of non-prophetic miracles were the Sufis¹⁰⁸ who, like the Ash'arites, stressed God's omnipotence which includes the creation of miracles of saints.¹⁰⁹ In agreement with the defenders of non prophetic miracles among the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites, they allowed that these may either serve to verify a claim to righteousness (ṣalāh) or sainthood (wilāya),¹¹⁰ or as an honour for a saint (walī).¹¹¹

In view of their doctrine of the Imamate, the Imamite theologians, too, traditionally affirmed the possibility of non-prophetic miracles.¹¹² However, in contrast to the school of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, the Ash'arites, and the Sufis, they held that miracles serve only to verify a claim. Al-Murtaḍā explains:

What points to the truth of our view is that miracles indicate the veracity of a claim corresponding to it. If a claimant makes a claim to prophethood with a miracle it signifies his prophethood. If he makes a claim to the Imamate, it signifies his being an Imam. If he makes a claim to righteousness (ṣalāh), excellence, and station, it indicates his veracity in this [claim]. Thus,

¹⁰⁸Al-Ash'arī, Maqālāt, 438-9.

¹⁰⁹E.g. Abū l-Qasim 'Abd al-karīm al-Qushayrī, al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya fī 'ilm al-taṣawwuf (Bulak, 1287/1870), 206; Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. 'Uthmān al-Hujwiri, Nashf al-mahjūb li arbāb al-qulūb (translated by R.A.Nicholson, E.J.W.Gibb Memorial, vol.17, London: Luzac, 1911), 218; see also Gramlich, Wunder, 95ff for further references.

¹¹⁰Most Sufis held that a saint should not be allowed to claim sainthood in public because this could endanger his psychological state; see al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21 93; see also Gramlich, Wunder, 43-9 on this issue.

¹¹¹Al-Hujwiri (212-3) says: "The passages [of the Qur'an and traditions on the exalted position of the saints in relation to God] show that God has saints (awliyā) whom He has specially distinguished by His friendship and whom He has chosen to be the governors of His kingdom and has marked out to manifest His actions and has peculiarly favoured with diverse kinds of miracles (karamāt) and has purged of natural corruptions...." See also R.Hartmann, Al-Rushairis Darstellung des Sufismus (Turkische Bibliothek, vol.18, Berlin Mayer & Müller, 1914), 154-5.

¹¹²An exception were the Bana Nawbakht who denied this possibility under the influence of the Mu'tazilite position. See Madelung, "Imāmism," 16.

there must inevitably be a clear or conclusive claim corresponding to all [three types of miracles].¹¹³

This definition excludes the possibility of non-prophetic miracles which are not preceded by a claim and which serve simply to honour their receiver. On the basis of their restriction of miracles to the purpose of verification, the Imamites did not distinguish between the terms mu^cjiza and karāma but used the term mu^cjiza for both prophetic and non-prophetic miracles.¹¹⁴

Within these different views about non-prophetical miracles, al-Ḥillī's position had more in common with the doctrine shared by the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, the Ash'arites and the Sufis than with the position of his Imamite predecessors. In arguing his view he did not resort to the doctrine of the Imamate but rather referred to the scriptural evidence from the Qur'an.¹¹⁵ Moreover he distinguished between the terms mu^cjiza and karāma and admitted that a non-prophetical miracle may either serve to verify a claim to righteousness or to honour a righteous person in which case they are not preceded by a claim.¹¹⁶ It is therefore very likely that al-Ḥillī followed in this question the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers.

113 "Majmū'a," 66-7, see also Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 158-9; idem, Tamhīd, 318, idem, Talkhīs al-shāfi (edited by Ḥusayn Baḥr al-'Ulum, Najaf al-ʿAlamayn, 1383/1963), 1:143.

114 See Khuṣṣat al-nazar, 68v, also Gramlich, Wunder, 39.

115 Manāḥij, 100r (quoted supra, p.159); Ma'ārīj, 124v-125r; Muntahā al-wusūl, 108r. Following the text of Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. al-Nawbakhtī, al-Ḥillī refers to the function of the non-prophetical miracle in regard to the concept of the Imamites in his Anwār, 186-7.

116 Manāḥij, 100r; Muntahā al-wusūl, 108v; Ma'ārīj, 125r. See also Gramlich, Wunder, 39 about this differentiation among later Shi'ites.

In his concept of non prophetic miracles al-Razī was distinctly influenced by the Sufi tradition.¹¹⁷ Besides using scriptural evidence,¹¹⁸ he argues in his *Tafsīr* on the basis of the concept of sainthood (wilāya). He begins with a definition of a saint (walī) as a friend of God who commits no sin, either because of his own saintly nature or because God guards him.¹¹⁹ He further allows that God may create for such a saint a miracle (karama) which may or may not be preceded by a claim.¹²⁰ After these preliminary definitions, al-Razī proceeds to put forth his proofs for the possibility of such karāmāt which he designates as rational. These may be summarized as follows.¹²¹ When a saint is fully devoted to God, God will also be fully devoted to him and create miracles for him.¹²² God bestows upon the saint much greater favours such as His love and knowledge of Himself¹²³ and if He loves him He becomes the face, hearing and seeing of the saint.¹²⁴ If the saint reaches such a close relation to God, how can God fail to create for him a mere trifle like a miracle?¹²⁵ Moreover, the soul of the obedient saint becomes so strong that it loses any connection with the corporeal world and instead receives the light of the world of majesty. Being thus strengthened, the soul of the saint is able to perform miracles.¹²⁶

Al-Hillī was decisively influenced in the question of non prophetic miracles by the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Thus, he agreed with al-Razī on all those basic points where the latter's view was in agreement with the position of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Yet

¹¹⁷For al-Razī's discussions on non-prophetic miracles, see his *Arbaʿīn*, 384-8 and esp. his *Tafsīr*, vol. 11, pt. 21: 85-93, this passage has been translated by R. Gramlich "Fahr ad-Dīn al-Rāzī's Kommentar zu Sure 18, 9-12," *Orientalische Studien* 33 (1979): 99-152).

¹¹⁸*Tafsīr*, vol. 11, pt. 21: 86ff, *Arbaʿīn*, 385ff.

¹¹⁹*Tafsīr*, vol. 11, pt. 21: 85-6.

¹²⁰*Arbaʿīn*, 387, *Tafsīr*, vol. 11, pt. 21: 86.

¹²¹See also Gramlich, *Hunder*, 94-5.

¹²²*Tafsīr*, vol. 11, pt. 21: 90.

¹²³*Ibid.*, 90-1.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 91.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, 91.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, 92.

al Rāzī's elaborations of the issue based on mixing theological and Sufi concepts did not have any impact on al-Hillī.

CHAPTER V
DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

1. God's Essential Attributes and Their Referent

One of the fundamental disagreements between the Mu^ctazilite and the Ash^carite theologians concerned the relationship of God's essential attributes to His essence.

The Ash^carites held that God's essential attributes are neither entailed by, nor identical with, His essence. Rather, they are entailed by eternal essences (dhawāt) or entitative determinants (ma^canī) which subsist in God's essence (qa'ira bi-dhātihī).¹ Thus, God's being knowing and powerful etc. are founded upon a knowledge (ilm) and a power (qudra) which inhere in His essence.² These entitative determinants are described as being neither identical with, nor other than God.³

The Mu^ctazilites rejected the existence of such entitative determinants as inconsistent with God's unity (tawhīd). They held that the notion of eternal attributes in God which are not entailed by His essence must necessarily negate the oneness of God's essence by affirming the existence of external essences besides it.⁴ They also considered as absurd the formula of the upholders of such entitative attributes (sifātīyya) that these are neither identical with, nor other than God. Against the view of the sifātīyya, the Mu^ctazila maintained that the divine

¹Al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 195, al-Baghdādī, Farq, 334.

²Al-Ash^carī, Luma^c, 551ff, al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 194ff, al-Isfārāyīnī, 146; al-Mutawallī, 21; al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 90.

³Sa^cd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ...al-Taftāzānī 'alā mān al-Caqā'id (Istanbul, 1326/1908), 77; al-Mutawallī, 31, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, Uṣūl al-dīn (edited by H. P. Linsch, Cairo, 1383/1963), 35-6; al-Isfārāyīnī, 147, see also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 37r.

⁴Abd al-Jabbār, Fadl, 347, see also al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:46; al-Isfārāyīnī, 60; al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 90.

attributes of essence are entailed by the essence itself.⁵ They commonly expressed this by the formula that God is eternally knowing (ʿālim), powerful (qādir) and living (ḥayy) etc. by His essence (lī-nafaihi) rather than by entitative attributes of knowledge, power, life etc.⁶

This formula, however, gave rise to other difficulties. If these different attributes are equally founded in God's unitary essence, the question arises of how they relate to, and differ from, one another.⁷ Moreover, the Qur'an speaks of God's knowledge (ʿilm)⁸ and power (quwwa)⁹ so that reducing these two attributes to the divine essence was open to objection on scriptural grounds.¹⁰ The Muʿtazila had, therefore, to find a conceptual framework analysing the ontological quality of the attributes and their relation to His essence which would do justice to the notion of unity and which at the same time would avoid those difficulties.

Al-Hillī fully supported the traditional Muʿtazilite notion that God's essential attributes are entailed by His essence (lī-dhatihi). He states:

The Ashʿarites maintain that God is knowing through a knowledge, powerful through a power, living through a life etc. The Muʿtazilites deny this. They hold that God is knowing through His essence, not through an entitative determinant subsisting in His essence. [They maintained the same] with regard to His remaining attributes. And this is the truth.¹¹

⁵There was no strictly defined list of essential attributes recognized by the Muʿtazila. Disagreement arose, for instance, in regard to the attributes of hearing (ṣam) and seeing (basar); see later.

⁶E.g. al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 486, 503, 505; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Fadl, 347.

⁷Al-Baghdādī, ʿUlūl al-dīn, 91-2; al-Isfarāyīnī, 67.

⁸E.g. Qur'an IV:166; II:255.

⁹E.g. Qur'an LI:58; XLII:15.

¹⁰See e.g. al-Bazdawī, 37. Owing to these considerations, the Muʿtazilites were often accused of denying any attributes of God on principle, see e.g. al-Baghdādī, Faṣṣ, 334; al-Bazdawī, 35; Abū l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn, (edited by R. Frank. Wisdom of Persia, no.27. Tehran: Vaydārī Press, 1360/1981), 80.

¹¹Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 215; see also Taslīk, 54v.

Although he denied that the attributes exist in addition to God's essence al-Hallī guarded himself against the view of the philosophers that the attributes are not existential matters. He clarifies:

He [i.e. al-Hallī in his *Nuzum al-barāhīn*] said, "Abū l-Husayn and the philosophers said that these attributes are not existential (*laysat wujūdīyya*). Others said that they are existential. And this is the truth."....I [i.e. al-Hallī in the *Maḥārīf*] say, people disagreed whether God's attributes are existential or not. The Ashʿarites maintained that they are existential matters (*amr wujūdīyya*). This is likewise the view of the bulk of the Muʿtazilites. The philosophers and Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī denied this.¹²

The philosophers' notion of attributes with no existential reality arose from their view of God as the primary mover. They denied that God, whose sole activity consists in self reflection, can be described by attributes which are additional to His essence.¹³ When one describes God as knowing, willing or powerful etc., all these descriptions merely signify His self-reflection which is the cause of the emanation of the world.¹⁴ Attributes are ascribed to God either in negation (*salb*) of the opposite, or as signifying a relation (*idāfa*) of contingent things to God, or in a combination of both aspects.¹⁵ To describe God, for instance, as eternal (*qadīm*) is to negate non-existence, the quality of being caused, and the quality of having a beginning from God.¹⁶ He is a creator (*khāliq*) in the sense that the creation

¹²Maḥārīf, 121r; see also *Taghlik*, 54r.

¹³Abū ʿAlī b. Sīnā, al-Risāla al-ʿarshīyya fī haqāʾiq al-tawhīd wa-ṭibāʾat al-mubawwa (edited by Ibrāhīm M. Iṣṣāḥ, Dīrāsāt fī l-Islām, no. 2, Cairo, 1980), 21ff. This treatise has been analysed by E. Meyer, "Philosophischer Gottesglaube Ibn Sīnas Thronsschrift," *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 130 (1980): 226-77. See also Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* (edited by M. Bouyges, Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, Série arabe, no. 2, Beirut: Imprimerie catholique, 1927), 161.

¹⁴Ibn Sīnā, *Taʿlīqat*, 18-9, idem, *Risāla*, 24ff, 28-9, Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Maqāsid al-falāsifah* (edited by S. Dunya, Cairo: Dār al-Maḥārīf, 1961), 241.

¹⁵Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla*, 23-4; idem, *Shifāʾ* (*Ilāhiyyāt*) (edited by Ibrāhīm Madkūr et al., Cairo: 1380/1960), 2.367-8; also Meyer, 245-6; al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, 153; idem, *Maqāsid*, 224ff.

¹⁶Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla*, 24.

of everything is related to Him in so far as He is its ultimate cause. Were it not for the world produced by Him, God would not be described by any attribute.

The evidence provided by Ibn al-Malāḥimī does not corroborate al-Ḥillī's claim that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī shared the philosophers' view of attributes not having any existence in addition to God's essence.

Describing the reality of God's attributes, al-Ḥillī employed the philosophical notion of mental existentiality in contrast to existence in the external world; God's attributes are additional to His essence in ratiocination (zā'idā 'an al-dhāt fī l-ta'addul). It is, however, not permissible to reify these mental concepts and to ascribe to them any reality besides His essence in the external world (fī l-khārij).¹⁷

When discussing the ontological foundation of the essential attributes, al-Ḥillī maintained that they are founded in God's essence which differs by itself from all other essences. He rejected the position of the Bahshamiyya who held that God's essence is distinguished from others not because of itself but owing to an attribute of essence attached to it. Al-Ḥillī presents their view and expresses his disapproval of it:

The third investigation: concerning the attribute of essence (ṣifa dhātiyya). Know that Abū Ḥāshim maintained that God has an attribute of essence through which He differs from whatever He differs, like the atomicity (jawhariyya) of the atom. Moreover, [he held] that He has four other attributes which are His being eternal (qadīm), living (ḥayy), knowing (ʿālim) and powerful (qādir). These attributes are entailed by the attribute of essence (ṣifāt muqtadāt 'an ṣifat al-dhāt)....This view is foolish...because it is based on the false principle that essences are equal.¹⁸

¹⁷Ma'ārīj, 121r-v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 222; Taḥlīk, 54r. In his Manāḥij (92v) he designates the attributes as mental conceptions (ṭibārat dhahniyya) which are in contrast to things existing externally (umūr kharijiyya).

¹⁸Manāḥij, 90v; see also ibid., 94v; Ma'ārīj, 120r.

With the rejection of the notion of the attribute of essence, al-Ḥillī closely followed the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his school. They held that essences differ from each other by virtue of themselves and do not require an attribute of essence.¹⁹ Thus, God is distinguished by His distinctive essence (dhāt muḥammadiyya) which sets Him apart from others.²⁰ By His essence (li-dhātihī) He is capable and knowing.²¹

Ibn al-Malāḥimī, therefore, held that the divine attributes have a reality as qualities of God's essence. Yet he denied that they have an independent reality in addition to it. He states:

[Our statement that He is powerful and knowing] is an assertion of His essence (ithbāt li-dhātihī) together with a[n additional] qualification (amr) which is included in [His] being described by these attributes.²²

The Bahshamite concept of the attribute of essence was based on the concept of states (ḥāl, pl. ahwāl). The notion of states²³ as it was developed by the Bahshamiyya was one attempt to create a conceptual framework for analysing the

¹⁹ Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fa'iq, 42r; also al-Shahrastanī, Milāl, 1:85.

²⁰ Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fa'iq, 36v, 42r; Taqī al-Dīn, 148ff.

²¹ Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fa'iq, 35r, 36r-v, 41r-v, 43v; Taqī al-Dīn, 148, 173.

²² Fa'iq, 38r; also *ibid.*, 37r, 39r, 42v

²³ Abū Ḥāshim's theory of states has been the subject of thorough investigation by R. Frank on which the following discussion will largely be based. See mainly his Being, also his "Abū Ḥāshim's Theory of 'States': its Structure and Function," in Actas do Congresso de Estudos Árabes e Islâmicos (Coimbra, Lisboa 1 a 8 setembro de 1968. Leiden: Brill, 1971):85-100; and his "Hāl," Encyclopaedia of Islam, suppl.fasc.5-6 343-348. For earlier investigations on this issue, see M. Horten, "Die Modus-Theorie des abū Ḥāshim," Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 63 (1909):303-324; *idem*, "Neues zur Modus-Theorie des abū Ḥāshim," in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Supplementband 191 (Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Festgabe Clemens Baeumker), 45-53, D. Gimaret, "La Théorie des Ahwāl d'Abū Ḥāshim al-Gubbā'i d'après sources ash'arites," Journal Asiatique 258 (1970):47-86.

ontological quality of God's attributes and their relation to His essence within the established Mu^ctazilite view of divine attributes.²⁴

For this purpose, Abū Hāshim adapted the concept of state (ḥāl, pl. ahwāl) employed by the grammarians for a complement in the case of the accusative occurring in a sentence which consists of a subject and a form of kāna (to be) as a complete verb. In this case, the accusative cannot simply be taken as a predicate to kāna as it would be if kāna were incomplete and transitive; it must rather be understood as a ḥāl.²⁵

On this foundation, Abū Hāshim elaborated a system of five different categories of states which he applied to both God and man. These categories are distinguished by the different ontological basis which brings forth their actuality.²⁶

The first category is the attribute of essence (ṣifa dhatiyya/ ṣifat al-dhat/ ṣifat al-nafs) through which the essences (dhawāt) differ from each other.²⁷ The atom (jawhar), for instance, is described as an atom not through its essence but through its attribute of essence. The same applies to God who does not differ from other essences through His mere essence, but rather through His attribute of essence.²⁸

²⁴Frank, *Beings*, 5.

²⁵Ibid., 20ff.

²⁶According to Abū Hāshim, a state is not an entity or a thing (dhāt, shay') and can thus neither be said to be existent (maʿjūd) nor non-existent (maʿdūm) (ibid., 26-7). Not being entities themselves, the states can likewise not be known in isolation. Rather, the essence is known to be qualified through them (Mānakdīm, 184). Thus, Abū Hāshim speaks of the actuality (tahqul) of the states and their initiation (tajaddud) while he refrains from asserting for them a coming to be (huduth) which would imply their coming into existence (B. Frank, "Hāl," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, suppl. fasc. 5-6:345).
²⁷Al-Nisābūrī, *Fī l-tawḥīd*, 590; ²⁸Abd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 7.83; Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," in al-Dhikrā al-alfiyya li l-Shaykh al-Tūsī (Mashhad, 1391/1970), 2.204; Taqī al-Dīn, 156ff; Frank, *Beings*, 53-5, also ibid., 55 n.1 for the different technical terms used for the attribute of essence.

²⁸Ibn Mattawayh, *Majmūʿ*, 1:153.

The second category of states are the essential attributes (ṣifāt muqadāt ^{Can ṣifat al dhāt}) which are by necessity entailed by the attribute of essence as soon as it becomes existent.²⁹ The attribute of essence of being an atom which is attached to an essence entails the spatiality of the atom whenever it exists. Thus, occupying a space is an essential attribute of an atom. In regard to God, the specific divine quality of His attribute of essence entails His essential attributes. These are His being powerful, knowing, living and existing.³⁰ Thus, God must necessarily and eternally be described by these attributes which cannot cease as long as His eternal attribute of essence lasts.³¹

Man's attributes of being powerful, knowing and living differ in their quality from the corresponding attributes in God. They belong to the third category of states which gain actuality through an entitative determinant (ma^Cnā) or cause (ʿilla) in the subject.³² Thus, the qualification of these attributes in man differs from the corresponding attributes in God.³³ Since man's states are caused by entitative determinants, he cannot be described as permanently or necessarily powerful, knowing etc. Moreover, since these determinants inhere in parts of man's body, he needs his

²⁹ Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 205; Frank, *Beings*, 58-64. It seems that this was not agreed upon by all followers of Abū Hashim. Some of them are reported to have maintained that essential attributes may be asserted of the essence in the state of its non-existence, see Taqī al-Dīn, 106-7. Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī is said to have asserted the essential attribute of an atom, i.e. its spatiality (tahayyuz), in the state of its non-existence, yet in no space (ghayr ḥāḍir fī l-ha); see *ibid.*, 107; al-Rāzī, *Muhassal*, 84.

³⁰ Ibn Mattawayh, *Majmūʿ*, 1:162. A number of writers list instead of "existent" (mawjūd) the attribute of being eternal (qadīm); e.g. *ibid.*, 162, 152, 153, also Taqī al-Dīn, 148; al-Hallī, *Manḥāḥ*, 90v. As Ibn Mattawayh explains (*ibid.*, 160) qadīm is in principle identical with mawjūd whenever it is characterized by the quality of being necessary. By this he means that God's attribute of existence is an essential attribute which cannot cease, since it is entailed by His attribute of essence which cannot cease. Thus, the quality of His existence is such that He is eternal.

³¹ Ibn Mattawayh, *Majmūʿ*, 1:162.

³² Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 206, *Mānakdīm*, 191, Frank, *Beings*, 107-8.

³³ *Ibid.*, 69, 87 n.63.

limbs as tools for his actions and his heart in order to know. The determinant itself is therefore not sufficient to actualize man's being powerful and knowing. Further conditions like the health of heart and limbs have to be fulfilled for them to serve as tools in carrying out actions.³⁴ Thus, the realms of man's power and knowledge are limited by the natural deficiencies of his body. God, in contrast, is unconditionally powerful and knowing since His attributes of being powerful and knowing are essential attributes which do not inhere in any locus and, thus, do not require any limbs.³⁵ Yet, the Bahāmiyya applied this category to God when they asserted that God is willing or disapproving through a determinant which is His will or His disapproval. Since it is impossible that a determinant may inhere in God, they maintained that God is willing or disapproving through a determinant which does not inhere in a substrate (lā fī mahall).³⁶

The fourth category of states are those which are actualized by the action of an agent (bi-l-fāʿil), in particular the existence of a temporal thing which is founded in its producer's capability.³⁷ This category is inadmissible in God. While the existence of all created beings is considered as belonging to this category, God's existence is counted as an essential attribute entailed by His attribute of essence.³⁸

The fifth category are states which gain actuality neither by virtue of the essence nor by an entitative determinant (lā li-l-dhāt wa-lā li-maʿnā). To this category belongs the attribute of 'being perceiving' (kawnuhu mudrikan) which is entailed by the perceiver's being living.³⁹

³⁴Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:160.

³⁵Ibid., 1:157.

³⁶See later.

³⁷Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 205; Frank, Beings, 124ff.

³⁸See R. Frank, "Al-Maʿdūm wal-Mawjūd: the Non-Existent, the Existent and the Possible in the Teaching of Abū Hāshim and his Followers," Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales du Caire 14 (1980):198.

³⁹Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 205; Mānakdīm, 170, al-Nisaburī, Fī l-tawhīd, 562, 564; Ibn al-Maʿāshimī, Muʿtamad, 215, Frank, Beings, 153ff. Frank ("Hāl," Encyclopaedia of Islam,

In regard to God, it gains actuality when the condition (shart) of the presence of the perceptible is fulfilled.⁴⁰ Man, in order to perceive, must possess healthy senses in addition to the existence of the perceptible.⁴¹ This is not required for God whose being alive is an essential attribute. Thus, He perceives without senses.⁴²

Al-Ḥillī, following the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī,⁴³ rejected the notion of states. In his view, the states imply an inadmissible reification of the divine attributes. He considered the position of the Bahshamiyya to be very close to that of the Ash'arites who viewed the divine attributes as eternal determinants additional to God's essence.⁴⁴ The same objection had been put forth against the school of Abū Hāshim by Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers.⁴⁵

The Bahshamiyya were confronted with the objection of the opponents that on the basis of the Mu'tazilite view of God's attributes there is no way to distinguish between them. They responded by developing a concept of characteristics (ḥukm, pl. aḥkam) of attributes, which was adopted by the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and by al-Ḥillī.

suppl.fasc.5-6 345) seems to have doubts whether this category was introduced by Abū Hāshim or only by his followers.

⁴⁰ Mānakdīm, 170, 173, al-Nisābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 562ff, 564; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muḥnī, 5:242.

⁴¹ Mānakdīm, 173; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:131, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muḥnī, 4:51, 55.

⁴² Al-Nisābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 562, 564-5; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:130-1.

⁴³ Taqī al-Dīn, 162, al-Muḥallī, 72r, al-Shahrastānī, Mi al, 1:85.

⁴⁴ Manāḥij, 92r-v; Kashf al-murād, 229-30; Nihāyat al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām (MS Marʿashī 254), 15r v.

⁴⁵ Taqī al-Dīn, 162.

The Bahshamiyya defined a ḥukm as the manifest characteristic of an attribute or state through which it is possible to recognize the attribute.⁴⁶ We recognize, for instance, a person's being capable only through the characteristic of this state, namely the feasibility (ṣiḥḥa) of a simple act by that person.⁴⁷

God's attributes may equally be known through their characteristics. Thus, the characteristic of His attribute of essence is that it entails the four attributes of His being powerful, knowing, living and existing.⁴⁸ By the feasibility of the occurrence of a well-wrought act (ṣiḥḥat wuqūʿ al-fīʿl al-muḥkam) on His part He is recognized to be knowing⁴⁹ just as the feasibility of a simple act (ṣiḥḥat al-fīʿl) points to His being powerful.⁵⁰ That He is not incapable of being knowing and powerful indicates His being alive.⁵¹

Al-Ḥillī, following Ibn al Malāḥimī and possibly Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, affirmed these characteristics in regard to God. However, in contrast to the Bahshamiyya, Ibn al-Malāḥimī and al-Ḥillī denied that these characteristics are entailed by or indicate any states or attributes in addition to God's essence. Rather, they are entailed by and point to God's essence which is qualified as being knowing and powerful. Al-Ḥillī states:

We say that there must inevitably be an additional qualification (amr zāʿid) in the conceptualization [of God's attributes]....Why should this additional qualification not be the characteristics which are effected by God's essence like the feasibility of a simple act [reading ṣiḥḥat al-fīʿl for ḥiṣṣat al-ʿaql] which is included in the knowledge that

⁴⁶Al-Nisābūrī explains (Fī l-tawḥīd, 287) "We infer the attribute from its characteristic, for when the attribute is not perceptible nor found by intuition (maʿjūda min al-naḥṣ), it can be reached only through its characteristic." See also Frank, Beings, 61.

⁴⁷Mānakdīm, 165; al-Nisābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 488; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:157; Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 207.

⁴⁸Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:162.

⁴⁹ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 5:219; 12:14, 21.

⁵⁰Ibid., 13:267; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:157.

⁵¹ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 5:219. For the distinguishing characteristics of the various attributes, see also Frank, Beings, 62ff; Shaykh al Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 207-8.

God is powerful; and His awareness (tabayyun) of what is subject to knowledge, and His connection (ta'alluq) with it which is included in the knowledge that He is knowing?⁵²

Al-Hallī disagreed with the Bahshamite definition of the characteristic of God's being knowing by describing it as His awareness of what is subject to knowledge and His connection with it. Here, he followed the definition of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.⁵³ The first term merely designates His potential omniscience, while the term connection (ta'alluq) designates the actual relation between Him and the objects of His knowledge.

The notion of connection between God's essence and the object of His knowledge as a distinctive characteristic of His being knowing was apparently introduced into Mu'tazilite kalām by Ibn al-Malāḥimī.⁵⁴ The Bahshamīyya apparently did not consider this connection as a distinctive characteristic (ḥukm) of God's state of being knowing.⁵⁵ Ibn al-Malāḥimī reports, however, that they employed a concept of connection which they defined as the connection between God's state of being knowing and its objects.⁵⁶

Ibn al-Malāḥimī refrained from asserting a similar connection between God's essence and the objects of His power. In his view, the attribute of power is basically confined to the capable agent who is described as able to do, or to refrain from, acts under certain conditions.⁵⁷ These conditions are in turn confined either to the act insofar as

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⁵²Manāḥil, 92v.

⁵³Al-Hallī's account is most likely directly based on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's ḥā'iq (42v).

⁵⁴Mu'tamad, 201, 205, 206. Abū l-Ḥusayn designated this connection as a ḥāl, but not as a ḥukm. See *ibid.*, 200-1, 205; al-Muḥallī, 63v.

⁵⁵The only instance I could find where the notion of the connection as a characteristic is referred to is Shaykh al-Tūsī's "Muqaddima," 207. There al-Tūsī affirms that the characteristic of an attribute to which a connection is attached is this specific connection (al-ta'alluq al-makhḥūṣ). He applies this to belief (al-ḥaqāq), presumption (ẓann), will (irāda) and disapproval (karāha).

⁵⁶Mu'tamad, 200-1.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 206.

it needs to be feasible, or to the agent in so far as he needs to have a motive for the act. Thus, the ability to act or not to act is the characteristic of a capable agent.⁵⁸

In his Ma^Cārij al-Ḥillī affirms a connection between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge and is undecided whether this notion may similarly be affirmed in regard to other attributes.⁵⁹ In his other works, however, he draws the parallel between knowledge and power. He affirms a connection between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge as well as the objects of His power.⁶⁰ In this, he presumably was secondarily influenced by al-Rāzī and earlier Ash^Carites.⁶¹

Al-Rāzī agreed with the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī that God's essence differs from other essences by itself.⁶² He defended this notion especially against the Bahshamiyya.⁶³

He further adopted the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn that God's distinctive essence (dhāt mahsūsa) entails His attributes of being knowing and powerful.⁶⁴ He defined these as connections (ta^Calluqat) between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge and power.⁶⁵ With his affirmation of connections between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge and power, he is only partly in agreement with Ibn al-Malāḥimī who asserted such a connection only between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge. Al-Rāzī rather followed his Ash^Carite predecessors in this

⁵⁸It is noteworthy that later representatives of the school draw the parallel from knowledge to power when they asserted a connection between God's essence and His potentials; e.g. Taḳī al-Dīn, 127. Moreover, later authors sometimes held that Abū l-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Malāḥimī themselves drew this parallel between God's knowledge and His power. See e.g. ^CAbd Allāh b. Zayd al-^CAnsī, Kitāb al-mahajja al-bayḍā' fī usūl al-dīn (MS Munich Glaser 148), 28v-29r.

⁵⁹Ma^Cārij, 121r-v.

⁶⁰E.g. Manāhil, 92r v; Nihāyat al-marām, 79v-80r; Taḳīk, 56r.

⁶¹See later.

⁶²Arba^Cin, 96; Ma^Cālīm, 47; Matālib, 1:315, 317.

⁶³Arba^Cin, 96ff; Matālib, 1:313ff.

⁶⁴Ma^Cālīm, 58.

⁶⁵Arba^Cin, 155; Matālib, 3:223.

respect who asserted connections also for other attributes.⁶⁶ In some instances, al-Rāzī substituted the philosophical term idāfa and the term nisba for the term ta'alluq.⁶⁷ However, his notion of idāfa and nisba in this context fully agrees with the theological concept of ta'alluq and has nothing in common with the philosophical notion of idāfa.

Having adopted Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's and Ibn al-Malāḥimī's concepts of attributes, al-Rāzī repudiated the view that God's essential attributes are entailed by entitative determinants.⁶⁸ Moreover, he rejected the view of those Ash'arites who adhered to the notion of states (ahwāl), presumably having al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī in mind.⁶⁹ As al-Rāzī presents their view, they held that the entitative determinants of power or knowledge entail the states (ḥāl) of God being powerful and knowing. Between these states and the objects of His knowledge and power, they affirmed a connection (ta'alluq).⁷⁰

Al-Rāzī, in contrast, maintained that God's distinctive essence directly entails connections (ta'alluqāt) or relations (idāfāt/ nisab) between His essence and the objects of His being knowing and His being powerful.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Al-Ghazālī, Iqtisād, 39ff; Sayf al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī, Ghāyat al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām (edited by Ḥasan Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Latīf, Cairo, 1391/1971), 85; see also ʿOrnaby, 151-2.

⁶⁷ Arbaʿīn, 155.

⁶⁸ Matālib, 3:233-4. In some of his more traditional works, however, he affirmed entitative determinants; e.g. "Masā'il," 366-7.

⁶⁹ See Arbaʿīn, 155-6, there, he attributes the notion of states to al-Bāqillānī. In his two extant works, the Tamhīd and the Inṣāf, al-Bāqillānī rejects the validity of this theory. However, in later works, especially his Hidāyat al-mustarshidīn which is only partly extant in manuscript, he appears to have adopted a theory of states which shares only some elements with the theory of the Bahshamiyya. See R. Frank, "Māl," Encyclopaedia of Islam, suppl. fasc. 3 6:346; al-ʿAmīdī, 27; also Gimaret, "Ahwāl," 76ff. His notion of states was later adopted by al-Juwaynī; see Frank, loc. cit., 366ff.

⁷⁰ Matālib, 3:223-4; Maʿālīm, 56; Arbaʿīn, 155-6.

⁷¹ Ibid., 155.

Yet on the basis of the notion of connection, al-Rāzī defended the traditional Ash'arite position that God's attributes have a reality of their own other than His essence. He identified the connection or relation between the essence and the objects of His being knowing and powerful as knowledge (ʿilm) and (power) and further pointed out that this connection is other than the essence. From this he concluded that God has a knowledge which is distinct from His essence. Thus, whereas al-Ḥillī considered God's attributes and their characteristics as additional to God's essence merely in ratiocination without any separate existence, al-Rāzī fully reified them. He states.

Know that we do not assert in this question more than that what is understood by God's being knowing, powerful and living is not the same as what is understood by His essence. Rather, it is a matter which differs from His essence. If the Muʿtazilites go along with us to this extent, accord has been reached and disagreement ceases We say, whoever knows a certain matter, there must inevitably occur a specific relation (nisba makhsūsa) or a specific relationship (idāfa makhsūsa) between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. The theologians call this specific relation "connection" and they say that the knowledge is connected to the object of knowledge. In our view, this knowledge is an expression for this connection itself and for this specific relationship (idāfa) itself and we claim that this relationship (idāfa) and relation (nisba) is different from the essence.⁷²

Al-Ḥillī further disagreed with al-Rāzī about which divine attributes are essential. Whereas he affirmed only God's being knowing, powerful and living as essential attributes, al-Rāzī, following the Ash'arite tradition, also counted the attributes of speech⁷³ and will.⁷⁴

⁷²Arbaʿīn, 155; see also Matālib, 3:223, Maʿālīm, 56.

⁷³Ibid., 61; "Masā'il," 368-9.

⁷⁴See later.

2. God as Existent (Mawjūd)

In his notion of existence (wujūd) al-Ḥillī followed the Avicennan tradition.

According to Ibn Sīnā and his followers, God who exists necessarily by virtue of Himself (iwājib al-wujūd) is the primary, absolute and perfect existence,⁷⁵ or pure existence (muṣarrad al-wujūd)⁷⁶ / (wujūd maḥd).⁷⁷ It is, therefore, the strongest form of existence. Contingent things require an effector for their existence as they are, in contrast to God, unable to necessitate their existence by virtue of themselves.⁷⁸ Thus, their existence is not pure and of a much weaker kind than God's existence.⁷⁹ Owing to this difference, the existence of God and of the contingents is not the same in a univocal manner (bi-l tawāṭu') but it can be said to be the same only by analogy (bi-l-taṣṭīk).⁸⁰

⁷⁵Abū 'Alī b. Sīnā, Kitāb al-naǧāt (edited by Majid Fakhrī, Beirut: Dār al-ʿIfāq al jadīda, 1405/1985), 261, 265, 266; for this view in al Ḥillī's writings, see Maṣāriḥ, 112v, Taslik, 51r.

⁷⁶Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 2:347.

⁷⁷Al-Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 251-2, 289.

⁷⁸Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 2:347; idem, Naǧāt, 261, al Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 289; for this view in al-Ḥillī's writings, see Maṣāriḥ, 79r.

⁷⁹Al-Ḥillī, Idāh al-maqāṣid, 5-6. For Ibn Sīnā's view on existence, see also generally E. Behler, Die Ewigkeit der Welt. Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Kontroversen um Weltanfang und Weltendlichkeit im Mittelalter. Teil 1: Die Problemstellung in der arabischen und jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters (München 1965), 95ff, 98. The relevant passages on existence of Ibn Sīnā's principal works have been translated by G. Hourani, "Ibn Sīnā on Necessary and Possible Existence," The Philosophical Forum 4 (1972):74-86.

⁸⁰Abū Fath Allāh Muhammad b. 'Abd al Karīm al-Shahrastānī, Muṣāraʿat al-falāsifa (edited by Suhayr Muhammad Mukhtār, Muṭallafāt al-Shahrastānī, no.1. Cairo, 1976), 45, see also W. Madelung, "Al-Shahrastānī's Streitschrift gegen Avicenna und ihre Widerlegung durch Naṣir ad-Dīn at-Tūsī," in Akten des VII. Kongresses für Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft (Göttingen, 1974. Edited by A. Dietrich. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Phil. hist. Klasse, dritte Folge, 98. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), 253. For this notion in al-Ḥillī's writings, see Maṣāriḥ.

God's existence, according to Ibn Sīnā, is identical with His essence (māhiyya) itself⁸¹ while the existence of contingent beings is other than their essence.⁸² The relationship between their essence and existence is described in such a way that existence is accidental to the essence.⁸³

Al-Hillī presents the views of the philosophers together with other positions and states his own preference:

People disagreed about existence. Is it an additional matter or not?

The generality of the philosophers held that existence as such is applied by analogy (bi-l tashkīk) to [omitting juz' which is superfluous] all existent things which are specified each by an essence in the sense that they differ in it [i.e. existence], either through precedence (taqaddim) or posteriority (ta'akhkhur), like the existence of cause and effect, or through priority (awwaliyya) and its non-existence, like these two mentioned existences [reading wujūdāyn for wujūd]; or through greater intensity (ashaddiyya) and greater weakness (ad'afīyya) like the existence of the necessary and the existence of the contingent. Whatever is asserted of them by analogy cannot possibly be either a [n integral] part of them or themselves. For the essence itself or a part of it is not subject to disparity. Rather, it [i.e. existence] is an accidental matter to it [i.e. essence].

As for the existences which are specific to each single essence, they are additional to this [reading tilka for dhālika] essence, except for the existence of the Necessarily Existent which is specific to Him. For, it is, in their view, identical with His reality itself (naḥw haqīqatihī) ...As for the theologians, most of the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites held that existence is additional to the essence in regard to the Necessarily Existent and all contingent matters besides Him.

Others, among them Abū l-Husayn al-Baḡrī, maintained that existence is identical with the essence both in regard to the Necessarily Existent and the contingent things.

113r; Manāḥij, 93r; Nihāyat al-maram, 12r; Kashf al-khafā', 34v-35r.

⁸¹ Ibn Sīnā, Riṣāla, 18-9; Ilāhiyyat, 2:344; al-Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 252, 289. For this view in al-Hillī's writings, see Asrār, 208v; Manāḥij, 79v, 93r.

⁸² Al-Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 289. For this view in al-Hillī's writings, see Asrār, 172v; Manāḥij, 79v, 93r; Tasīlīk, 6r.

⁸³ Ibn Sīnā, Riṣāla, 19; al-Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 289.

If you have recognized this, we say: The opinion which we choose [reading yadhhabu for yadhhabu] is that existence in regard to the Necessarily Existent is identical with His essence.⁸⁴

Essence (māhiyya) was understood by al-Ḥillī, again like Ibn Sīnā,⁸⁵ as a concept which is not attached to individual entities as long as existence is not attached to it. When existence is attached to it, the essence inheres in the individual entities (kā'ina fī l-a^Cyān) and can be discerned through consideration of the existent being.⁸⁶ Thus, individual things occur only when existence is attached to the essence.⁸⁷ Moreover, the essence cannot be discerned in the external world (fī l-khārj) when existence is not attached to it. This is only possible in ratiocination.⁸⁸ Essence itself is neither existence nor non-existence.⁸⁹ The existent entity is, therefore, to be understood as a sample of the essence which occurs in the external world.⁹⁰

Having adopted the Avicennan notion of existence, al-Ḥillī was in disagreement with his Muṭazilite predecessors. With the Bahshamiyya, he differed on a number of points. They held that an attribute of essence is necessarily attached to every essence (dhāt). This is not conditional on existence but is asserted prior to it. The same applies to God. His state of being existent is understood to be an essential attribute which is entailed by

84. Maṣāriḥ, 112v-113r.

85. For Ibn Sīnā's notion of essence and existence, see the studies of F. Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna," Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958):1-16, and P. Morewedge, "Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā's 'Essence Existence' Distinction," Journal of the American Oriental Society 92 (1972):425-435.

86. Nihāyat al-marām, 9v.

87. Ibid., 8v-9r.

88. Ibid., 15r.

89. Ibid., 9v, also Rahman, 9; Morewedge, 432.

90. Nihāyat al-marām, 15r, 18r; see also Rahman, 7, 11, Morewedge, 432.

His attribute of essence.⁹¹ Thus, His existence is not identical with His essence. This was unacceptable for al-Ḥillī.

In respect to beings other than God, the Bahshamiyya asserted that they have an individual reality prior to their existence owing to the attribute of essence.⁹² Al-Ḥillī disagreed holding that things gain individual reality only when they occur. A non-existent (ma^cdūm) can, therefore, not be asserted to be a thing.⁹³

He further disagreed with them as to whether existence is the same in regard to all existent beings in a univocal manner or by analogy. Although the followers of Abū Hāshim considered existence as an attribute which in man is caused by an agent (bi l-fā^cʿil) and in God by virtue of His attribute of essence,⁹⁴ existence as such was in their view univocal with regard to all.⁹⁵ They argued that the characteristic (ḥukm) of existence is in regard to everything that it constitutes the condition (shart) for the actuality of the essential attributes.⁹⁶ Al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī summarizes this difference:

The philosophers, Abū Hāshim and his followers among the Mu^ctazila and the generality of the Ash^carites held the second view [i.e. that existence is a shared meaning (ishtirak ma^cnawī)] for all existent beings. Then they disagreed. The philosophers said that it is predicted by analogy to the existent things which fall under it.

The Bahshamiyya and Athīr al-Dīn al-Abhari held that it is applied univocally (bi l-tawatu') [to all existent beings]. The author [i.e. al-Ḥillī] and al-Muḥaqqiq [Nasīr al-Dīn] al-Ṭūsī chose the position of the philosophers.⁹⁷

⁹¹See supra, p.210.

⁹²See Frank, "Non-Existent," 205ff.

⁹³Asrar, 172v-173r; Idāh al-maqāṣid, 20ff; Nihāyat al-marām, 8v-9r, 18r.

⁹⁴See supra, p.173.

⁹⁵See Frank, "Non-Existent," 197.

⁹⁶Ibn Mattawayh, Majmū^c, 1:135-6, also *ibid.*, 137 where Ibn Mattawayh argues further that existence cannot differ since it is not connected to anything (lā muta^callaq laha).

⁹⁷Al-Miqdād, 38-9; see also al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-khafa', 34v-35r. Al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's account of Athīr al-Dīn al-Abhari's view seems to be mistaken. In his Hidāyat al-ḥikma, the latter maintained the Avicennan view on existence. God's existence which is essentially necessary is absolute (mutlaq).

Al-Ḥillī equally disagreed with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī on a number of points. Repudiating Abū Ḥāshim's notion of states, the latter affirmed that "thing" (shay') or "essence" (dhat) and "existent" (mawjūd) are identical.⁹⁸ Thus, God's being existent is not an additional attribute above His essence. Rather, it is identical with His essence.⁹⁹ So far, al-Ḥillī agreed.

Yet in contrast to al-Ḥillī, Abū l-Ḥusayn did not envisage the philosophical notion of essence. Thus, the existence of a thing also constitutes its characteristics. The difference of the things is, therefore, founded in their existence only. Thus, the existence of any existent entity must differ from the existence of everything else. The existences of the things have, therefore, nothing in common but their name.

Thus, whereas al-Ḥillī held that the meaning of existence is by analogy shared by all existent entities (ishtirāk ma' nawī), Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī maintained that only the term is shared (ishtirāk lafzī).¹⁰⁰

and therefore different from the existence of contingent things. Existence can therefore be asserted of them only by analogy (itashkik); see Ḥusayn b. Mu'īn al-Ḥin Kādīmī Maybudhī, Commentary on al-Abharī's Hidayat al-ḥikma (Constantinople, 1283/1867), 106-7.

⁹⁸ Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iḡ, 24r, 49r, Taqī al-Dīn, 118; al-Muḥallī, 71r. Abū l-Ḥusayn is usually said to follow in this matter the Baṣran theologian Abū Ishāq al-Nasībī (or. al-Nasībī) (d. 408/1017); see Ibn al-Malāhimī, Mu'tamad, 254. (For al-Nasībī's position, see Abū l-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn (edited by A.S. al-Nashar et al. Alexandria: Mansha'at al-ma'ārif, 1969), 124-5, 134; J. van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Aḥmadaddīn al-Ḥanbalī (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Veröffentlichungen der orientalischen Kommission, vol. 22. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1966), 199). According to Ibn al-Malāhimī's Fā'iḡ (24r), however, Abū l-Ḥusayn rather followed Abū Ishāq b. 'Ayyāsh. This must be a mistake since Abū Ishāq b. 'Ayyāsh is known to have held a view similar to Abū Ḥāshim's, see al-Ḥillī, Nihāyat al-narām, 18r; Taqī al-Dīn, 106.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 104-5; Ibn al-Malāhimī, Mu'tamad, 254ff.

¹⁰⁰ Manāḥij, 79v; kashf al-khafā', 33v-34r.

With his notion of existence, al-Ḥillī not only disagreed with the earlier Muṭazilites but equally with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. The latter held that existence is additional to essence both in regard to man and God. Since this view was not shared by earlier Ashʿarites,¹⁰¹ al-Ḥillī had presumably al-Rāzī in mind when he ascribed this view to the Ashʿarites.¹⁰² Al-Rāzī summarizes the different views and states his own preference:

To speak about God's existence must necessarily be understood in one of the following three ways:

The first is to say that the term "existence" which applies to the Necessary by itself and to the contingent by itself does not convey a single meaning which is shared by both categories. Rather, only the term is shared.

The second view is to say that the term "existence" has a single meaning. However, in respect to the Necessarily Existent by Himself it is pure existence [reading wujūd mujarrad for wujūd mujarradan], i.e. an existence with the condition that it is not accidental to any essence but rather an existence which subsists in itself. On that consideration, God's existence is identical with His reality itself (nafs haqiqatīhī).

The third view is to say that the existence is one of the attributes of the reality (haqīqa) of God and one of the qualities (naṭl) of His essence (māhiyya). On that consideration, God's existence is other than His essence.

Each of the three positions was upheld by a multitude of people. The first one is the doctrine of a large group of theologians such as Abū l-Ḥasan

¹⁰¹The traditional Ashʿarite view was that "thing" (shayʾ) and "existent" (mawjūd) are synonymous and that the non-existent (maʿdūm) cannot be defined as a real thing; see Ibn Fūrak, 252ff; al-Baḡillānī, Tamhīd, 15, al-Baḡdādī, Farg, 170; al-Juwaynī, Shāmī (edited by A.S.al-Nashar), 124, 610, see also van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 198-9. Thus, they did not treat God's existence as an attribute. Al-Ashʿarī apparently adhered in his Muṭazilite period to the view that a thing is a thing prior to its existence and wrote a treatise in support of this position. Later, he repudiated it. See O.Pretzl, Die frühislamische Attributenlehre (München: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1940), 60; D.Gimaret, "Bibliographie d'Ashʿarī un réexamen," Journal Asiatique 273 (1985):256 no.49.

¹⁰²Maṣṣarif, 113r (quoted supra, p.181-2). The editor of al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's Irshād suggests that by the Ashʿarites, al-Baḡillānī and al-Juwaynī are meant (al-Miqdād, 33 n.3). This is evidently wrong, since both asserted that thing (shayʾ) and existent (mawjūd) are identical. Al-Miqdād, like al-Ḥillī, had undoubtedly al-Rāzī in mind.

al Ash'arī and Abū l-Husayn al Baṣrī. The second position was chosen by Abū 'Alī b. Sīnā in all of his works. The third is the doctrine of a large group of theologians and we have backed it in most of our books.¹⁰³

103. -----
Matālib, 1:290-1. Al-Rāzī upheld the same position in his Arba'in (100), his Muṣṣakhkhaṣ (85v) and his Mabāḥiṭh al mashriṣiyya (1:31). See, in contrast, his Ishāra (10v) and his "Masā'il" (345ff, 348) where he refrains from taking a position. In his Tafsīr (vol.6, pt.12 182-3) al-Rāzī argues in traditional Ash'arite terms when he says that God's existence is identical with His essence ('ayn dhātihī).

3.The Range of God's Power

All parties basically agreed that God has power over everything which is subject to power.¹⁰⁴ For al-Rāzī as an Ash'arite, this principle was self-evident since in their view everything which occurs is solely dependent on God's power.¹⁰⁵ The Mu'tazilites, on the other hand, were confronted with a problem arising from their view of justice. If God has power over everything which may be subject to power, this applies necessarily also to man's acts. However, if God had power over man's acts there would be no way to ascertain whether these acts are performed by man's power or rather created by God's power as affirmed by the Ash'arites.

Upholding that God, in view of His omnipotence, has power over everything which is subject to power,¹⁰⁶ al-Ḥillī affirmed that the specific acts of man are also subject to God's power.¹⁰⁷ With this view, al-Ḥillī adhered to the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers who drew the same conclusion.¹⁰⁸

Most of the earlier Mu'tazilites denied that God has power over acts subject to man's power. Al-Ḥillī summarizes the different positions of the earlier Mu'tazilite theologians:

¹⁰⁴An exception among the Mu'tazilites was al-Nazzām who held that God does not have the power to do evil. His view has recently been investigated by J.van Ee ("Wrongdoing and Divine Omnipotence in the Theology of Abū Ishāq an-Nazzām," in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy (edited by T.Rudavsky, Synthese Historical Library, Texts and Studies in the History of Logic and Philosophy, vol.25, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Reidel, 1985), 53-67) and R.Frank ("Can God do What is Wrong?" *ibid.*, 69-79).

¹⁰⁵Ma'ālīm, 52ff; Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53.

¹⁰⁶Manāḥij, 90v.

¹⁰⁷Manāḥij, 91r.

¹⁰⁸Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iqa, 45r.

Al-Ka^cbi held that God does not have power over the like of what is subject to man's power (mithl maqdūr al-^cabd) because what is subject to his power is either obedience or foolishness or... [reading unclear] and these are negated [reading manfiyya for mithbata] in regard to God.... Abū ^cAli, Abū Hāshim and their followers maintained that God has no power over the very acts of men (mafs maqdūr al-^cabd). Abū l-Hudhayl, Abū l-Husayn and the Ash^carites allowed this.... Abū ^cAlī and his son argued that [if God had power over man's acts], it would necessarily follow that two capable agents would have jointly power over a single possible act. And this is impossible.¹⁰⁹

The principal difference between the Baghdadi and the Basrans, then, was that the former argued that God has no power over all classes (ajnas) of acts which are subject to man's capability.¹¹⁰ The Basrans, in contrast, argued that since God enabled men to perform various classes of acts, He must likewise have power over these. Thus, they affirmed that God in principle has power over an infinite number of the class (jnas) of acts which man is capable of performing. They maintained, however, that God does not have power over the specific acts which are subject to man's capability (a^cyan al-af^cāl).¹¹¹ Their principal argument for denying God's power over the acts of man was, as al-Ḥillī pointed out, that a possible act (maqdūr) cannot be subject to the power of two capable agents.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹Manāḥij, 91r. For Abū Hudhayl's view on God's omnipotence, see Frank, "Attributes," 473ff.

¹¹⁰Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53.

¹¹¹Mānakdīm, 375-6, also al-Ash^carī, Maqālāt, 199-200; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53.

¹¹²Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 4:254ff; Mānakdīm, 375ff.

4. God as Knowing

a. The Proofs of God's Being Knowing

Al-Hillī puts forth two proofs for God's being knowing

The proof for God's being knowing is that God performed well-wrought and perfect acts. Everyone who is like this is necessarily knowing. Thus, God is knowing.¹¹³

This proof which is based on man's witnessing God's well-wrought acts was commonly employed by the earlier Muṭʿazilite and Ashʿarite theologians.¹¹⁴ Al-Hillī goes on to put forth his second proof:

[There is] a second proof for God's being knowing. Its elaboration is that God is powerful and every powerful [agent] is knowing...As for the major premise, the powerful [agent] is he who acts by means of the motive (daʿī) and the intention (qasd) for one side rather than the other. The intention for one side is necessarily conditional on knowledge. Thus, power is only complete with knowledge.¹¹⁵

This proof was apparently first introduced by Ibn al-Malāhimī.¹¹⁶ He had argued¹¹⁷ that the fact that an agent is knowing may be deduced from a single act regardless of whether it is well-wrought or not. The argument is based on the view that a capable agent cannot perform an act without having a motive for it. Here, Ibn al-Malāhimī differed from the Bahshamiyya who allowed that a capable agent can perform

¹¹³ Maʿārīj, 116r; see also Asrār, 210r. Manāḥij, 91r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 81v. Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 194; Taslīk, 51v.

¹¹⁴ For its use among Muṭʿazilites, see Ibn Mattawayh, Maḥnūḥ, 1:113ff. al-Nisaburī, Fī l-tawhīd, 493. For its use among Ashʿarites, see al-Ashʿarī, Lumaʿ, §13; al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 26; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt. 30-58.

¹¹⁵ Maʿārīj, 116r; see also Asrār, 210r. Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 81v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 194; Taslīk, 51v.

¹¹⁶ From the texts of Ibn al-Malāhimī, there is no indication that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī had already employed this proof.

¹¹⁷ Fāʾiq, 10r; Muṭʿamad, 198.

an act without a motive.¹¹⁸ On this basis, Ibn al-Malaḥimī argued that God, since He creates nothing without a motive and since His motive must be based on knowledge of the reality of the thing He creates, must necessarily be knowing.¹¹⁹ Since al-Hillī shared the view of Ibn al-Malaḥimī that an agent does not act but for a motive, he could similarly employ the latter's proof for God's knowledge.

Al-Rāzī also referred to two proofs in order to show that God is knowing. The similarity of his proofs to those employed by Ibn al-Malaḥimī suggests that al-Rāzī was influenced by the latter's reasoning. He states:

The creator of the world is knowing because His acts are well-wrought and perfect as is indicated by observation and because the doer of a well-wrought, perfect act must be knowing. This is known by immediate insight. Moreover, God acts by choice and a choosing agent is one who intends the production of a certain kind. The intention to create a certain kind is subject to the condition that [the agent] conceives that essence. Thus it is established that God conceives some essences and the essences by themselves undoubtedly require the stability of some qualities and the non-existence of others. And the conception of what requires necessitates the conception of what is required. Thus, from God's knowledge of these essences follows His knowledge of their concomitants and effects.¹²⁰

118 See supra, p.129-30.

119 *Fā'id*, 18r.

120 *Ma'ālīm*, 50-1; see also *Arba'īn*, 133-4, *Ma'ālīm*, 3.107ff; see also *ibid.*, 117ff where he expresses his preference for the second proof.

b. God's Knowledge of the Non-Existent

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī were confronted with the position of the philosophers who held that God knows the universals (kulliyat) but not particulars (juz'iyat). The argument underlying the philosophical position was that particulars are subject to constant change and if God knew them He, too, would be subject to constant change. This, however, was unacceptable.¹²¹ Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī, who upheld the theological view of divine omniscience which includes universals and particulars, disagreed. Thus they were required to counter this argument.

Of special relevance to al-Rāzī and al-Ḥillī was the philosophical objection that God cannot be aware of the change when something either gains existence or ceases to exist. If He knew that something comes into existence or ceases to exist at this moment, this knowledge would require a change in His essence as well. God's knowledge of the temporals must be timeless and cannot be subject to change. Al-Ḥillī reports the view of the philosophers referring to the example of God's knowledge of the occurrence of a lunar eclipse:¹²²

This is the objection of the philosophers. They claim [reading unclear] that God does not know particulars. By particulars they mean that He does not know whether something subject to [His] knowledge existed in the past, whether it will exist in the future or whether it exists now. He is in fact able to know something that is connected with its cause and with time but not whether it occurred in the past or whether it will occur in the future. He knows for instance that when the sun reaches a certain limit, the earth is in a middle position between the sun and the moon. Thus, the eclipse occurs. This knowledge is present to Him prior to the eclipse, after it and with it. But He

¹²¹The question of how Ibn Sīnā in particular understood God's universal knowledge in contrast to man's knowledge has been the subject of a study by M. Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of the Particulars," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 82 (1962):299-312.

¹²²For this example among the philosophers, see *ibid.*, 310-1.

does not know whether the eclipse occurred already, whether it will occur in the future or whether it occurs at this moment. This is the elaboration of their argument.¹²³

Al-Hillī rejected this argument. It is not the attribute of knowledge which changes but the connection (taʿalluq) between God's essence and the object of His knowledge.¹²⁴ Therefore, when a thing is non-existent, there exists a relation between it and God's essence in so far as it is non-existent. Once it gains existence, a new connection replaces the former one between God's essence and this object of His knowledge. In some of his works, al-Hillī substitutes the term idāfa for the term taʿalluq.¹²⁵

With this view, al-Hillī followed Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who rejected the philosophical objection in the same way. He states:

We have already clarified that knowledge has no meaning but that of a relation (idāfa) between the knower and the object of his knowledge. Accordingly, we say that if the object of knowledge changes that relation must inevitably change [too] because the reality and constancy of any relationship is connected with two related matters. If one of the two changed in the aspect in which it is related while the relationship did not change, it would suggest that the relationship is independent in itself [from the two related matters]. Thus, the relation would not be a relation, rather [knowledge would perhaps be] something else to which the relation is accidental. This is impossible. However, a change like this does not require a change [in His essence] [word missing] because what entails God's knowing that Zayd is in the house is either His essence or a determinant which subsists in His essence with the condition that Zayd is in the house. If Zayd leaves the house, the condition for this relationship does not endure. Thus it [i.e. the relationship] is interrupted and the condition for the stability of another relationship exists which is the knowledge that he has left the house. Thus, the first [relationship] is certainly negated and the second exists without any need for a change. This case is like that which our people agreed upon that God's power is connected with a thing when it comes into

¹²³ Maʿarrif, 116v, see also Asrār, 225r, Manāshih, 91r.

¹²⁴ Nihāyat al-marām, 80r.

¹²⁵ Asrār, 225r, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 198, Nihāyat al-marām, 80r; Taslīk, 56r.

being. When it has become permanent the connection (ta^Calluq) of the power is interrupted. When He annihilates it the connection of the power to it recurs. From this it does not follow that He needs something which changes....The same applies here.¹²⁶

With this answer, al-Rāzī followed the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī who offered a similar reply when they were confronted with the same objection.¹²⁷ They argued that God knows by His essence from eternity that He is one and that He will create the creation. However, the connection (ta^Calluq) of God's knowledge with the existence of a thing, which is also necessitated by His essence, occurs only when the thing exists.¹²⁸

Thus, God knows a thing before its existence in its reality and how it will be when it occurs but He does not know it as existent.¹²⁹ Once the condition of the existence of the thing is fulfilled, the connection of God's knowledge with the existence of a thing is initiated (ta^Jaddada

126 Ishāra, 15v; see also Ma^Calim, 51-2; Matālib, 3:155ff, 157, Mulakhkhaḡ, 343vff.

127 See Ibn al-Maḡhīmi, Fā'iḡ, 46vff. Taḡī al-Dīn, 253ff.

128 Ibn al-Maḡhīmi, Fā'iḡ, 46r-47r.

129 Ibid., 47v.

al ta'alaqqi.¹³⁰ According to Ibn al-Maḥḥamī and Taqī al-Dīn,

¹³⁰ *Ḥaṣṣat*, 47v.

In contrast to Ibn al-Maḥḥamī's efforts to confine the charge to the connection between God's knowledge and the object, al-Hillī reports in his *Ḥaṣṣat* that Abū Ḥusayn and his followers argued that God's knowledge is itself subject to change, namely, change with the change of certain temporal objects of knowledge. This argumentation was not accepted by Ibn al-Maḥḥamī and al-Hillī, as evidenced in the latter's position since it does not refer to the connection between God's knowledge and its object.

Al-Hillī states (Ḥaṣṣat, 91): "It was said against them [i.e. the school of Abū Ḥusayn] 'Knowledge is an attribute of essence, so that change would be impossible for it'. They answered 'Change is an attribute of essence is not permissible if it is absolute; however, if it is subject to a condition, [change] is permissible. The condition of this is that God is from eternity capable of the creation of the world and this is an essential attribute. It is not absolute, however, but subject to the condition of the non-existence of the world. When it [i.e. the world] exists, the endurance of the capability is impossible. Otherwise, the production of the existent would be necessary, we say the same about perception. For God is from eternity perceiving, but on the condition of the existence of the perceivable object in contrast to God's essence which is necessitating in an absolute way. Likewise God's being knowing a thing is subject to the condition that the thing is an object of knowledge in this manner. When that which he knew would exist comes into being, the possibility of being subject to knowledge that it will exist may remain and this leads necessarily to ignorance. Or it does not remain, but rather it ceases being subject to knowledge that it will exist after [having come into] existence and he knows that it exists. Thus, you have acknowledged a change of the condition, namely the change of the object of knowledge. From this follows necessarily a change of the subject of the condition [i.e. the attribute]'. "

This account apparently derives from the teaching of later representatives of the school of Abū Ḥusayn, most likely from the Kitāb al-Kamāl of Taqī al-Dīn. After the latter mentions the different the logical opinions about how God knows the non-existent (ibid., 252ff), he points out that the view of Abū 'Alī, Abū 'Aṣim al-Kūfī and Abū Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī must necessarily lead to the possibility of change in God (ibid., 253). Against the position of Abū Maḥmūd, Taqī al-Dīn puts forth his own argumentation that God's knowledge is in fact subject to change (ibid., 259-60). He does not resort to the notion of connection, but maintains that God's knowledge itself changes. In affirming that this is permissible, he puts forth the same reasoning as it is reported by al-Hillī. Some attributes, like God's being powerful and perceiving, are subject to conditions in order to become actual. The same applies to knowledge, if something occurs in a specific manner, the condition is fulfilled for

the same answer had been offered by Abū 'Alī and Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka'bī to a similar objection.¹³¹

God to know its existence in this specific manner. If the existence or some other aspects of it change, God's knowledge changes accordingly (ibid., 259-60). Taqī al-Dīn does not ascribe this argumentation to any earlier theologian and his presentation gives the impression that it was he who introduced it.

¹³¹ Ibn al-Malāhimī reports (Fā'iḡ, 46v): "Our master Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī reported in the [Kitāb] al-taṣaffuh about the master Abū 'Alī and Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka'bī that they held...that when a thing comes into existence after [its] non-existence its connection (ta'alluḡ) with God's knowledge and His awareness (tabayyun) that it gained existence is renewed (tajaddada). The connection of the knowledge with that the thing will exist differs from [its] connection with that it has come into existence." See also Taqī al-Dīn, 253.

The position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers provoked accusations by later authors that they had returned to the views of Hishām b. Hakam and Jahm b. Safwān (for their views, see later); see al-Shahrastānī, *Milāl*, 1:85; idem, *Nihāya*, 221; Kamāl al-Dīn Ahmad b. Hasan al-Bayḍī, *Ishārāt al-marām min 'ibārāt al-imam* (edited by Yūsuf 'Abd al-Razzaq, Cairo, 1368/1949), 127-8; al-Muḥallī, 76r. However, Ibn al-Malāhimī drew a clear line between the position of Hishām b. Hakam and his own. He pointed out that the latter, in contrast to his own thesis, did not allow that God knew that the things will exist (Fā'iḡ, 47v).

According to Taqī al-Dīn,¹³² and al-Ḥillī,¹³³ Ibn al-Malāḥimī differed from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in one aspect of their theory. While the latter maintained that the newly arising connection of God's knowledge is added to its former connection with the object, Ibn al-Malāḥimī held that it replaces it so that the former knowledge vanishes. Al-Ḥillī supported the position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.¹³⁴

The position of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Ḥillī and al-Razī was not shared by most of the earlier Muṭazilites. According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, the Bahshamiyya held that God's knowledge of a thing is always connected with its existence regardless of whether it will exist in the future, exists now, or existed in the past. There is only a difference of expression (ʿibarat) in relation to the three cases. Thus, if a thing will exist in the future, God knows its existence and that it will be in the future. In the case of a past thing, God will likewise know its existence and that it existed in the past. Ibn al-Malāḥimī reports Abū Rāshim's position:

His knowledge does not change because of this [i.e. the turning of a thing from non-existence into existence] and He does not depart from the attribute of essence [i.e. His being knowing] because the knowledge that the thing will exist and the knowledge that it has come into existence is one knowledge. Only the expressions change in accordance with the change of the thing known. If its existence is in the future, the knowledge is described as knowledge that it will exist. If it exists the knowledge is described as knowledge of

¹³²Taqī al-Dīn, 261; also *ibid.*, 127.

¹³³Manāḥij, 91r; Nabāyat al-merām, 79v-80r.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*

its existence. If it ceases to exist it is described as knowledge [reading ʿilm for ʿālim] that it did exist.¹³⁵

Abū Hāshim's main concern therefore was to rule out any change in God's essential attribute of being knowing. If God knows a thing before its existence and it enters existence, God's knowledge apparently must either be adjusted to this new situation, thus requiring a modification of His knowledge, or it is not adjusted and turns into ignorance.¹³⁶ By tying God's knowledge closely to the existence of the thing, Abū Hāshim sought to avoid these unacceptable alternatives.¹³⁷

¹³⁵Fā'iq, 46v. For Abū Hāshim's view, see also al-Ḥillī, *Nihāyat al-ma'arāf*, 79v. Al-Ḥillī's account appears to be directly based on the Fā'iq.

¹³⁶Ṭaqī al-Dīn, 252, Ibn al-Malahimī, Fā'iq, 46r-v.

¹³⁷Ibn Mattawayh states (*Ma'jmu'at*, 1:118): "The state of the object of knowledge does not differ in its being the object of knowledge in the [state of] existence and non-existence. Thus, nothing is initiated which could be made a condition."

It is interesting to note that the issue of how God knows things in their state of non-existence and existence was already discussed among earlier theologians. The problem, however, was different.

Most of the early theologians identified "thing" (*shay'*) and "existent" (*mawjud*). This raised for those who held that the object of all knowledge was things, the problem whether and how God knows the non-existent which is not a thing. Some early answers were radical.

Al-Ash'arī reports (*Maqālāt*, 489) the position of a group whom he regularly calls the "eternalists" (*azaliyya*). They held that since God eternally knows all things, they must necessarily exist eternally. Van Ess suggests that the *azaliyya* were an anonymous group holding non-Islamic views comparable to the *dahriyya* (*Erkenntnislehre*, 193). The *Ikhwān al-Safā'*, in fact, called the *dahriyya* by the name *azaliyya*, presenting them as those who believe in the eternity of the cosmos (See I. Goldziher and A.M. Goichon, "Dahriyya," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2:95.)

Apparently in direct response to this position (al-Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, 489), Hishām b. ʿAmr al-Fuwatī (d. before 218/833) drew the opposite conclusion. Since things cannot be eternal it is not possible to say that God knew them from eternity. To maintain that God knows things eternally would be to assert their eternity. God can be said to be eternally knowing, according to al-Fuwatī, only with respect to His knowledge that He is one (*ibid.*, 158). A similar conclusion was drawn by Jāhīm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/745) who also identified "thing" with "existent" (*ibid.*, 494-5; W. Madelung, "The Shiite and Kharijite Contribution to the

5. God as Hearing and Seeing

Al-Ḥillī accepted on scriptural grounds that God is hearing and seeing. Moreover, he affirmed that nothing from the point of view of reason stands against this. He states

Pre-Ash'arite Kalām," in Islamic Philosophical Theology (edited by P. Morewedge. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), 125). Hishām b. Hakam (d. 179/796), also maintained that God knows only existent things. If He knew things eternally this would necessitate the eternity of things (al-Ash'arī, Maqālāt, 493-4, Madelung, "Contribution," 123).

The possibility of God's knowledge of things prior to their existence was asserted as soon as the theologians differentiated the term "thing". Al-Shahhām appears to have been the first who offered such a distinction. Prior to their existence, things may be known by God although they become real things only when they occur. (See van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 192-3) Abū 'Alī envisaged a similar differentiation when he taught that things are not things prior to their existence since existence (kawn) means being found (wujūd) (al-Ash'arī, Maqālāt, 162). However, a thing may be called a thing and may be known prior to its existence insofar as it is possible to make a statement about it (ibid., 161; see also ibid. for farther meanings in which a thing can be said to be a thing prior to its existence).

Owing to their notion of states, the Suhshamiyya were not confronted with the issue whether a thing may be known prior to its existence. The attribute of essence through which it is what it is is always attached to it, regardless of whether the thing exists or not.

The school of Abū l-Hasayn al-Baḡrī repudiated the notion of states and offered a solution similar to that of Abū 'Alī. They affirmed two meanings for the term "thing" (lbn al-Malāḡimī, Fa'iq, 49r). In the first sense, "thing" means an existent object, i.e. an essence (ḥayāt). In the second sense, something non-existent may be called "thing" insofar as it is possible to make a statement about it.

Al-Ḥillī employed the philosophical notion of existence in the mind in contrast to existence in the external world; he held that it is possible to know the non-existent by ratiocination (Manāḡil, 79v-80r).

Thus, the problem that gave originally rise to the question of how God knows the non-existent, i.e. that a thing cannot be asserted to be a thing prior to its existence, was no longer a problem. The main concern of the later theologians was rather to assert God's omniscience without, however, allowing any change to occur in His essence. (For a systematic outline of the dispute among the early theologians, see van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 192ff).

There is no impediment from the point of view of reason from describing God as perceiving. Moreover, the Qur'an [describes Him so] [word missing]. If [reading idha for idhan] [the Qur'an] describes Him [reading yusufuhu for yusufu] as such, it is necessary to adhere to this view, unless a rational indication made it impossible to apply [reading itlaquhu for itla] [this attribute] to Him, when it would be necessary to interpret [the scriptural evidence metaphorically].¹³⁸

This passage reflects al-Hillī's general hesitation to explain what he meant by God's being perceiving. Among the earlier Mu'tazilites, the following two views were most favoured which he summarizes:

Abū Hāshim and his followers maintained that the meaning of God's being perceiving is that it is not impossible for Him to perceive the perceivable whenever it exists. Likewise, God is eternally described as being capable of hearing (sami^C) and capable of seeing (basir). He made perception a matter additional to knowledge.

The Baghdadis explained it as meaning that God is knowing what the living among us hear and see. They denied anything in addition to this.¹³⁹

The Bahshamiyya maintained that God's capability of hearing and seeing is entailed by His being alive. Whenever a perceivable object exists the condition for perception is fulfilled.¹⁴⁰ Thus, God is eternally described as capable of hearing and seeing (sami^C/ basir). Yet only when the condition for the actual perception is fulfilled, may He be called actually hearing and seeing (sami^C, mubasir). This distinction between the transitive and the intransitive meaning of hearing and seeing originated with Abū 'Alī.¹⁴¹

The Baghdadis, in contrast, reduced God's perception to His knowledge. To say that God is hearing (sami^C) and seeing (basir) can only mean that He knows what man perceives through his senses.¹⁴²

138 Manāḥij, 92r.

139 Ibid.

140 Al-Nisābūrī, Fi l-tawḥīd, 562ff, 564; Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 5:242.

141 Al-Ash'arī, Maqālāt, 176.

142 Ibid., 168, 175; al-Baḡhdādī, Farq, 166, 181; idem, Usūl al-dīn, 96, Manakdīm, 168; see also McDermott, 145.

The school of Abū l-Husayn al-Baḡrī was divided on this issue. Abū l-Husayn himself is usually reported to have supported the school of Baghdad.¹⁴³ The reliability of these reports is not certain. He had put forward an argument supporting the view of the Baghdadis which appeared to invalidate the position of the Baḡrans.¹⁴⁴ He refrained, however, from explicitly stating his support for the view of the Baghdadis.¹⁴⁵

Although Ibn al-Malāḥimī accepted Abū l-Husayn's objection to the Baḡran view, he ultimately supported the Baḡran position.¹⁴⁶

In most of his works, al-Ḥillī surveyed the arguments of both positions refuting them all.¹⁴⁷ He refrained from stating his own preference while asserting that the only safe indication for God's being perceiving is scriptural evidence.¹⁴⁸ Only in his *Maḥārij*, he states that the reduction of God's perception to His knowledge is the most acceptable explanation.¹⁴⁹

Al-Ḥillī followed al-Razī in his cautious approach in this question. The latter maintained that God must be said to be hearing and seeing because these are attributes of perfection (*ṣifāt al-kamāl*) while their opposites would be attributes of deficiency (*ṣifāt al-nuqṣan*). He further referred to scriptural evidence. Yet he acknowledged that

143 E.g. al-Rūzī, *Muḥassal*, 248; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 90, al-Ḥillī, *Nahj al-mustarshidin*, 205; idem, *Tasliḥ*, 52v, al-Miqdād, 206. Al-Muḥallī (66v), in contrast, reports that Abū l-Husayn, like Ibn al-Malāḥimī, supported the position of the Baḡshamiyya.

144 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iḡ*, 19r, idem, *Muḥtamad*, 215.

145 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iḡ*, 19r. See also al-Razī, *Iṭṭiqādāt*, 42, where he states that Abū l-Husayn was undecided on this issue.

146 *Fā'iḡ*, 19r-v, *Muḥtamad*, 212ff, esp. 217ff. For the views of Abū l-Husayn and Ibn al-Malāḥimī, see also Taqī al-Dīn, 196-7; W. Madelung, "The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī," in *Actas del XII Congreso de la U.E.A.I.* (Madrid, 1986), 490-1.

147 *Manāḥij*, 92r; *Nahj al-mustarshidin*, 205-6; *Tasliḥ*, 53r.

148 *Ibid.*, 53r.

149 *Maḥārij*, 118r.

this is valid only as long as there is no definite proof that God cannot literally be said to be hearing and seeing. He states:

Concerning the clarification that God is described by hearing and seeing. The proof for this is that hearing and seeing belong to the attributes of perfection while their opposites belong to the attributes of deficiency. Moreover, the Qur'an affirms them for God... Since there are numerous passages reporting [these attributes for God], they must be asserted for God, unless the opponents put forth a proof that the reality of these two states is conditional on a condition whose realization is impossible in regard to God. In that case it would be necessary to interpret [these verses metaphorically].¹⁵⁰

Like al-Ḥillī, al-Razī went on to refute the arguments of both those who affirm hearing and seeing as separate attributes to God¹⁵¹ and those who deny this.¹⁵²

It is most likely that al-Ḥillī's argument that God is hearing and seeing on scriptural grounds, and that nothing from the point of view of reason stands against this is directly based on al-Rāzī's Arbaʿīn or another work by him.

¹⁵⁰ Arbaʿīn, 170.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 170ff.

¹⁵² Ibid., 172ff.

6. God as Willing

Al-Hillī and al-Rāzī disagreed about the nature of God's will.

In accordance with his determinism, al-Rāzī held that God's will is an essential attribute. God is qualified by an eternal will (irāda qadīma).¹⁵³ Through His eternal will, God has predestined everything that happens. Therefore, nothing can occur that He did not eternally wish to happen.¹⁵⁴

Al-Hillī, following the Muʿtazilite tradition,¹⁵⁵ denied that God has determined things eternally and that He wills through an eternal will. However, although the Muʿtazilites were united in their opposition to determinism, they disagreed among themselves about the nature of God's being willing. Al-Hillī identified God's will with His motive (idāʿi) for an act. Whenever God knows that an act would benefit His creation and is free from any evil aspects, this knowledge is His motive to perform this act. Will has no meaning beyond this motive in regard to God.¹⁵⁶

Here, al-Hillī disagreed with those Muʿtazilites who considered God's will as a separate attribute of act which is additional to His knowledge of the beneficial nature of the act. He summarizes the various views on the nature of God's being willing:

Although the Muslims agree that God must be described as willing, they disagree about [the nature of God's] will. A group of theologians maintained that will is an expression for the motive [for the act] which consists in the knowledge of the benefit of an act; and that disapproval is an expression for the deterrent (sārīf) [from the act] which consists in the

¹⁵³ Arbaʿīn, 153-4; Maʿālim, 58-9.

¹⁵⁴ Arbaʿīn, 244ff; Maʿālim, 89-90.

¹⁵⁵ An exception was Bishr b. Muʿtamir who maintained that God's willing is an attribute of essence as well as act. See al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 190, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/2:3.

¹⁵⁶ Manāhil, 91v; Aṣrār, 223v; Tasliḥ, 31v.

knowledge of the harmfulness of the act. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī held that will and disapproval consist of knowledge [of the benefit and harm of the act] in regard to God, but they are additional in regard to us [men]. The majority of the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites affirmed that [will] is additional [to knowledge] in regard to us and to God.... Al-Kaʿbī maintained that God's will for His own acts means that He knows them. [His will] in regard to our acts [reading afʿā for afʿāliḥā] means that He commands them.¹⁵⁷

By the majority of Muʿtazilite theologians who maintained that God's will is additional to His motive, al-Ḥillī meant the school of Basra prior to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. He presents their position and refutes it:

The third investigation about God's being willing by virtue of His essence (li dhātihī). The two Jubbā'īs held that God is knowing through a temporal will (irāda ḥaditha) which does not inhere in a substrate (la fī mahall).... [This is false] because the subsistence of a will by itself (qiyām al irāda bi dhātihā) is not reasonable, and because its occurrence would require another will. This would lead to an endless regress.¹⁵⁸

The position of the Basran Muʿtazilites originated with Abū l-Hudhayl.¹⁵⁹ He denied that God's will to create a thing can be identified with His creation of it.¹⁶⁰ Rather, God's will of a thing together with the creative imperative "be" (kun) addressed to it constitute His creation.¹⁶¹ God's will of the acts of others cannot be identified with His command of them.¹⁶² This affirmation of a temporal divine attribute of will raised the question of its origin and locus.

¹⁵⁷Maʿarīj, 117r; see also Taṣlīk, 52r-v.

¹⁵⁸Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 218.

¹⁵⁹For Abū l-Hudhayl's view on God's will, see generally Madelung, Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, 165; Frank, "Attributes," 494ff. It is noteworthy that later writers usually mention Abū l-Hudhayl among those theologians who denied that God's will has a specific reality of its own; see e.g. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, 240; idem, Fāʾiq, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 202, al-Jurjānī, 57. Ibn al-Malāḥimī seems to be the first source which attributes this view to Abū l-Hudhayl.

¹⁶⁰Al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 189, 364.

¹⁶¹Ibid., 190, 363, 510; also ibid., 363, 366 where creation (khalq) is defined as qaw and irāda.

¹⁶²Ibid., 510.

Abū l-Hudhayl maintained that God is willing through a will which is created in a metaphoric sense (fī l-majaz).¹⁶³ By this he presumably meant that if it were created, its creation would require another will. This would lead to an endless regress. He further stipulated that this will is in no place (lā fī makān).¹⁶⁴ With this, he attempted to avoid a conflict between his notion of God's temporal will and the common doctrine that nothing temporal may inhere in God. Abū l-Hudhayl's view was shared by Abū ^CAlī.¹⁶⁵

Abū Rāshid followed Abū l-Hudhayl and Abū ^CAlī in holding that God wills in a manner comparable to man.¹⁶⁶ Thus, His attribute of willing is a separate attribute of act.¹⁶⁷ Since nothing may inhere in God he, like his predecessors, stipulated that His will subsists in no substrate (lā fī mahall).¹⁶⁸

The assertion of accidents which do not inhere in a substrate was one of the peculiarities of the theology of the Basrans prior to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī. The latter denied the possibility of this.¹⁶⁹ Al-Ḥillī followed him in this regard.¹⁷⁰

In another respect, too, al-Ḥillī followed the doctrine of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī concerning God's will. They identified God's will and disapproval with His motives and deterrents. His knowledge that an act is beneficial constitutes His motive to perform it and His knowledge that an act is harmful constitutes His deterrent from performing it.¹⁷¹

¹⁶³Ibid., 366, 189.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 190, 363; al-Baḡhdādī, Faḡḡ, 127, al-Shahrastānī, Mīḡāl, 1.51, 53; see also ^CAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/2:4 where Ibn ^CAyyāsh is quoted asserting that Ja^Cfar b. Ḥarb introduced this formula.

¹⁶⁵Al-Ash^Carī, Maqūlāt, 510.

¹⁶⁶Mānakdīn, 434.

¹⁶⁷^CAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/2 140ff.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., 6/2:149ff.

¹⁶⁹Ibn al-Malāḡhīmī, Mu^Cṭamad, 133-4.

¹⁷⁰Manāḡih, 88v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 91.

¹⁷¹Ibn al-Malāḡhīmī, Mu^Cṭamad, 240; Taḡī al-Dīn, 203, al-Muḡallī, 150v; Mītham al-Baḡrānī, 88.

In his presentation of the view of Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka^cbī and his school, al-Ḥillī correctly stated that they held that God's will in regard to man's acts consists in His command. Yet when he presented their view on God's will of His acts as virtually identical with the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, both reducing it to His knowledge of His acts, al-Ḥillī was mistaken. The Baghdadis rather reduced His will for His own acts to His creation of them.¹⁷² With this wrong presentation, al-Ḥillī followed the usage of a number of earlier writers who maintained that Abū l-Ḥusayn followed al-Ka^cbī in his notion of the nature of God's will.¹⁷³

The basis for the Baghdadī position was laid by al-Nazzām.¹⁷⁴ In his doctrine, God's attribute of will virtually disappears as he identified it with three different meanings.¹⁷⁵ With regard to His own acts, God's will is identical with their creation.¹⁷⁶ With regard to the acts of His servants, His will is identical with His command (amr).¹⁷⁷ God may also be said to will an event in the future such as

¹⁷² Mānakdīm, 434; al-Ash^carī, Maqālāt, 191, 509, al-Baghdādī, Farg, 181-2; al-Shahrastānī, Milāl, 1:55, 78.

¹⁷³ Taqī al-Dīn, 202; al-Jurjānī, 57; al-Rāzī, Arba^cīn, 147; idem, Matālib, 3:179. In his article "L'attribut divin d'irāda (volonté) d'après une source inexploitée," *Studia Islamica* 31 (1970):257-268, G.Vajda offered a translation of a passage on God's will from an anonymous Ash^carite fragment, preserved as MS 1259 in the Bibliothèque Nationale (see Vajda and Sauvan, 3:131). This fragment is undoubtedly a portion of al-Rāzī's Matālib al-^calīyya; see Matālib, 3:173-182, for the text which corresponds to Vajda's translation.

¹⁷⁴ Al-Shahrastānī, Milāl, 1:55. For his view on God's will, see generally al-Ash^carī, Maqālāt, 190-1, 365, 509-10, Mānakdīm, 434; ^cAbd a. Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/2, 34; also Madelung, Al-Qasim ibn Ibrāhīm, 165-6; J.van Ess, "Gottliche Allmacht im Zerrbild menschlicher Sprache," Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph 49 (1975-6):670-1.

¹⁷⁵ It is noteworthy that al-Nazzām usually avoids the term irāda employing the term a. wasf bi-annahu murīd instead; see e.g. al-Ash^carī, Maqālāt, 190-1, 509-10.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 190-1, 365, 509-10.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

the day of resurrection. In this case, al-Nazzām identified His will with His deciding (ḥākim) the event and announcing it.¹⁷⁸

Al-Ḥillī mentioned a disagreement among the Muʿtazilite theologians about man's will.¹⁷⁹ Is it identical with his motives for the act or does it have a meaning beyond these?

This question did not pose itself for the Bahshamiyya who upheld a separate attribute of will in man in the context of their theory of states. The followers of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, however, disagreed among themselves about this point. Abū l-Ḥusayn allowed the existence of a will in addition to the motive for the act in man.¹⁸⁰ Once man has the motive for a certain act, he develops a wish (ṭalab/muṭālabā) for it. This wish, which is possible only for a corporeal being with appetites but not for God, is called by Abū l-Ḥusayn "will".¹⁸¹ Ibn al-Malāḥimī disagreed with him in rejecting the reality of will even in man. In his opinion, will and disinclination can be reduced with regard to both man and God to the motives for, and deterrents from, the act.¹⁸²

Al-Ḥillī followed the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī. Once man has the motive for an act, he develops an inclination (mayl) toward the act which differs from his motive.¹⁸³ Al-Razī developed a concept of man's will for his acts which bears great resemblance to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī's and al-Ḥillī's position.¹⁸⁴

178. Ibid.

179. Muʿtazilī, 117r (quoted supra, p. 202-31).

180. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtazilī, 240; idem, Fāʾiq, 22r;

Ṭaḡī al-Dīn, 203; al-Muḥallī, 150v.

181. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtazilī, 240-1, 249.

182. Ibid., 249; idem, Fāʾiq, 22r; see also al-Muḥallī, 150v.

183. See supra, p. 127-8.

184. See supra, p. 133.

CHAPTER VI
PASSING AWAY (FANĀ') AND RESTORATION (I^CĀDA)

1. God's Obligation to Restore Man to Life

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī agreed that God will restore men after having caused their passing away. However, they disagreed whether God is obliged to do so or not.

In view of his notion of divine justice, al-Ḥillī supported the position that God is obliged to restore men. He comments on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's argumentation with which he fully agreed:

The author [Naṣīr al-Dīn] argued for the absolutely obligatory nature of the restoration from two aspects. First, God promised reward and threatened punishment, while the death of the morally obliged is witnessed. Thus, their return is necessary in order for His promise and threat to be fulfilled. Secondly, God has morally obliged [men] and inflicted pain and this requires reward (fawāb) and compensation (ciwad). Otherwise, God would be oppressive, but God is exalted far above this. We have already clarified His wisdom, and there is no doubt that reward and compensation will reach the morally obliged in the hereafter because of their negation in this world.¹

He stipulated further that the restoration of the following groups is incumbent upon God:

The restoration of the morally obliged who deserve compensation (ciwad) either from God or from somebody else, or from whom another being deserves compensation, is known by reason to be obligatory. As for the first category, this is because of the negation of injustice on His part. As for the second, this is because God is obliged to establish justice (intisāf). As for the third, the same [principle] applies. The restoration of the

¹ Kashf al-murād, 320; see also Manāḥij, 103r; Nahj al-mustarahidīn, 407. For the identical Mu^Ctazilite arguments that God is obliged to restore men to life, see Taqī al-Dīn, 322; Abū Muḥammad b. Mattawayh, al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-ṭawāhir wa-l a^Cṭrād (edited by Sāmī Naṣr Lutf and Fayḡal Badīr ^{Aw. Silsilat nafā'is al-fikr al-islāmī}, no.1. Cairo: Dār al-thaqāfa, 1975), 244-5; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:20ff.

infidels and of the children of the believers is obligatory [only] because of scriptural evidence since there is no disagreement among the Muslims [about this] while no rational proof points to their restoration. The restoration of someone who deserves reward is rationally obligatory because of the necessity that he receive what he deserves. Moreover, scriptural evidence also points to this. The restoration of [living beings] other than these is not obligatory.²

With this classification, al-Mīlī was in agreement with his Mu^ctazilite predecessors.³

Al-Rāzī, as an Ash^carite, denied in principle that God is subject to any obligation. However, when he argued that restoration will actually take place, he not only resorted to the traditional scriptural evidence⁴ and to consensus,⁵ but he also added two rational proofs based on principles which do not easily agree with his traditional Ash^carite position. In his first proof, he ascribed to man's life in this world the purpose of gaining reward in the hereafter. If this were not the case, life in this world would be futile (ʿabath) and foolish (saʿafah). He states:

We see in this world people who obey, people who disobey, people who do good, and people who do evil. We moreover see that the obedient dies without any reward reaching him in this world, while the disobedient dies without any punishment. If there were no congregation (ḥashr) and restoration (nashr), when the good person receives his reward and the evildoer his punishment, this worldly life would be futile, nay folly.⁶

This argument implies that God created the world for man's benefit and that He is obliged to bring about congregation and restoration. Both principles are in conflict

² Manāḥij, 103v; see also Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 407; Tasliḥ, 77v-78r.

³ E.g. Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fāʾiq, 222r-v, Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 2:310-1; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11:464ff.

⁴ Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:134; vol.9, pt.17:29, 32, vol.13, pt.26:113, vol.15, pt.29:22, Ishāra, 63v-64r. For earlier Ash^carite references to scriptural evidence, see Ibn Fūrak, 145; al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 237.

⁵ Ishāra, 63v-64r; see also al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 232, who equally referred to consensus.

⁶ ʿArbaʿīn, 293-4.

with with al-Rāzī's view of God's relation towards His creation. It also implies that the moral quality of man's acts is the cause for his fate in the hereafter. As will be seen in the discussion on reward and punishment, this principle also does not agree with al-Rāzī's Ash^Carite position.

In his second argument, he argued further on the basis of non-Ash^Carite principles. He stated that God created man for the purpose of his comfort (rāḥa) and pleasure (ladhdha). This purpose cannot be reached in this world since there exists no real pleasure. Pleasure in this world is only the repulsion of harm (daf^C al-darar). Therefore, he concluded, God will cause man's restoration in the hereafter so that he may experience real pleasure. If this were not the case, it would contradict God's description as beneficent (muh^hsin), as compassionate (rahim) and as self-sufficient (ghani). He states:

God created creation either for comfort or hardship (ta^Cab) and pain or neither for comfort nor for hardship. It is not permissible that He created them for hardship and pain since this is not appropriate for the Beneficent, the Compassionate, the Self-sufficient who does not need the creation. Likewise it is not permissible to say that He created them neither for [their] comfort nor for hardship and pain because this was the case when they were non-existent. This indicates that He created them only for their comfort. Then we say that this comfort occurs either in this world, because what man assumes [to be] pleasure in this world is not pleasure but rather the repulsion of harm. Eating, for instance, is not really a pleasure but rather the repulsion of the pain of hunger....Since it has been established that the living being has been created for the purpose of pleasure and comfort and that this does not occur in this world, it must inevitably be affirmed that there exists another world after this in which this purpose will be accomplished. This is the hereafter.

7 Ibid., 294-5.

Like in the first proof, al Rāzī's assertion that God created men for their comfort and pleasure and that He is obliged to ensure that they will receive this, contradicts his Ash'arite notion that God does not act for a purpose but by His arbitrary will.

2.The Nature of Passing Away and Restoration

Discussing the nature of passing away, al-Hillī presents two contrasting views and indicates his own choice:

Abū Hāshim and his followers affirmed that the passing away is an entitative determinant (ma^cna). The remaining [theologians] denied this; and this is the truth. They [i.e. the Bahshamiyya] argued that the atoms endure while non-existence is possible for them. This is not possible except with the affirmation of the [accident of] passing away (fanā').As for [the stipulation that] this requires the affirmation of [an accident of] passing away, [this is so] because the annihilation (i^cdām) occurs either because of the essence [of the thing which passes away]. This is impossible. Or it is due to an agent. This is [likewise] impossible because the effectiveness (ta'thīr) [of an agent] is for production (ijād) not for annihilation (i^cdām), since effectiveness means the production of an effect (ijād al-athar). Or it results from the occurrence of the opposite which is the [accident of] passing away....As for the ancients (awā'il), since they maintained that production and annihilation may equally be dependent on the effector, they are not bound by this impossibility [i.e. of non-existence being caused directly by an agent]....The truth is the position of the ancients.⁸

As indicated in this passage, the position of the Bahshamiyya was an attempt to assert the possibility of passing away without infringing two other vital notions of the school.

⁸Manāhij, 88v.

One of these was that all atoms (jawāhir)⁹ and most accidents (ʿarāḍ)¹⁰ endure by themselves. Here they disagreed with the Baghdadis who maintained that accidents last only for one instance so that they always need to be recreated.¹¹ Passing away simply consists, according to this latter view, in the failure of God to recreate the accidents.¹² The Bahshamiyya had to find a different solution. The second notion which they had to take into consideration was that an agent may effect only production (ijād) but not annihilation (ʿidām). This also applies to God. Thus, He can undo something only through the creation of its opposite.¹³ The solution of the Bahshamiyya, therefore, was that God causes the passing away of the atom through the creation of a single accident of passing away (fanaʾ). This accident is the opposite of all atoms and, thus, is capable of annihilating

⁹Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 212; idem, Majmūʿ, 2:288ff; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11:441ff.

¹⁰The Basran Muʿtazilites considered the following types of accidents as stable: colours (alwan), tastes (ṭuʿūm), smells (rawāʾih), hotness (harara), coldness (burūda), wetness (rutūba), dryness (yubūsa), life (ḥayāt), and composition (taʿlīf), see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 41. The following accidents were not considered as enduring: pains (ʿālam), joys (ladhdhāt) (ibid., 326-7), voices (awwāt) (ibid., 335), and pressure (ʿitimād) (ibid., 554-6).

¹¹Al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 358, 367; Ibn al-Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 2:290; Taqī al-Dīn, 289, al-Baghdadī, Uṣul al-dīn, 231, see also Pines, 24.

¹²Taqī al-Dīn, 289. Underlying this notion was the Baghdadi view that an atom must necessarily have an accident of every genus of accidents that it is capable of having (Frank, Beings, 94). When God therefore fails to recreate an accident, the atom necessarily passes away.

¹³Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 212, 215-6; idem, Majmūʿ, 2:293ff, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11:442-3.

any atom.¹⁴ It must itself be existent (maʿjūd),¹⁵ but it cannot inhere in a substrate (lā fī mahall).¹⁶ Furthermore it does not endure.¹⁷

This theory provoked much criticism among opponents and later Muʿtazilites. The Ashʿarites correctly objected that once God creates the accident of passing away all atoms are annihilated. He is therefore unable to cause the annihilation of only some of the atoms.¹⁸ The followers of the school of

¹⁴Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 231ff, idem, Majmūʿ, 2:297-8, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11 444; also al-Baghdādī, Farq, 197; idem, Usūl al-dīn, 231; al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 86-7. Al-Hillī reports (Manahij), 88v) that Shaykh al-Tūsī was undecided about this point. From al-Tūsī's available works, this can not be verified, see e.g. his "Muqaddima," 187-8.

¹⁵Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 219.

¹⁶Ibid., 218ff. This condition was introduced by Abū l-Hudhayl who described passing away (fanāʾ) as God's will of it together with His uttering of the command "pass away". Endurance and passing away, he held, do not subsist in a place (lā fī makān). For his position, see al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 366-7; Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 217-8, 243; Taqī al-Dīn, 290.

¹⁷Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 224-5. Most of the points of this concept had been introduced already by Abū ʿAlī. However, Abū Hāshim disagreed with his father on a number of points. In his earlier works, Abū ʿAlī is reported to have maintained that there are different types of passing away each of which causes the annihilation of only the corresponding type of atoms. In a later version of his Naqd al-tāʾ, he is reported to have revised his position, stating that only one passing away is required for all atoms (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 231; also Gimaret, "Matériaux," 292). Abū ʿAlī further maintained that it is reason which indicates that the atoms will in fact pass away. Abū Hāshim and his followers disagreed. If it were not for scriptural evidence, there would be no indication that the passing away will actually occur (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 209; Taqī al-Dīn, 289). Abū ʿAlī further rejected on principle that anything which does not subsist in a substrate may be defined as an accident. Thus he refrained from classifying passing away as an accident. Abū Hāshim and his school admitted a category of accidents which do not inhere in a substrate (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 218). For the different categories of accidents in relation to the substrate according to the Bahshamiyya, see *ibid.*, 36.

¹⁸Abū l-Qāsim al-Ansārī, Sharh al-irshād (MS Princeton University Library, ELS 634), 131r; idem, al-Ghunya fī usūl al-dīn (MS III Ahmet 1916), 94r, al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 140; al-Kāmil fī iḥtisār al-shamīl (by an unknown author, MS III Ahmet 1322), 73v-74r. Before having revised his position that there are different types of passing away each of which causes the annihilation of only the corresponding type of

Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī and the Ashʿarites also objected to the idea that the accident of passing away does not inhere in a substrate. It is one of the peculiarities of the Bahshamiyya that they allowed that certain accidents do not inhere in a substrate.¹⁹

The second position mentioned by al-Ḥillī, which he approved, is founded on the philosophers' view that a contingent matter requires an effector because of its contingency and not merely for its occurrence.²⁰ It is defined as contingent by virtue of itself (*murkin li-dhātihī*) regardless of whether it exists or not. Thus, having gained existence it is still essentially contingent by itself. No essentially contingent existent may endure by itself. Rather it depends on its effector even when it exists.²¹ In relation to the capability of its effector, the choosing agent, existence and non-existence of the effect are equally possible. He may therefore choose either to undo the effect or to cause its endurance.²² Since God is in al-Ḥillī's view a choosing agent, He may undo the world through a direct act if He wishes to do so.²³

atoms (see supra, p.213 n.17), Abū 'Alī held that God can choose to annihilate only some atoms, see Gimaret, "Matériaux," 292; Ibn al-Matlawayh, *Tadhkira*, 231.

¹⁹ See e.g. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Mu'tamad*, 133 4, al-Ḥillī, *Manāḥij*, 88v, idem, *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*, 91, al-Baḡhdādī, *Farq*, 197.

²⁰ E.g. Ibn Sīnā, *Najāt*, 249-50.

²¹ *Asār*, 205r, 212v; *Manāḥij*, 79r, 88v; *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*, 164; *Nihāyat al-marāʾ*, 48v. See also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iqa*, 218r, 225r-226v, where the author attacked this view while defending the traditional Mu'tazilite position that existing things exist by virtue of themselves and do not require an effector.

²² *Manāḥij*, 84v.

²³ *Ibid.*, 88v; *Ma'ārīj*, 129r; *Tasliḥ*, 76r.

This possibility was rejected by most of his Mu^tazilite predecessors, who maintained that an effector is required only in order to produce things.²⁴ Once it exists, it endures by itself.²⁵

Having adopted the philosophers' concept of endurance and annihilation, al-Ḥillī disagreed, however, with their doctrine of the eternity of the world. In their view, since God is a necessitating agent, it is impermissible that He may undo any of His effects. If He were to annihilate His creation, the motive to annihilate would be substituted for the motive to create. Yet God is eternal and acts only in accordance with His perfect essence which is not subject to any change. It is, thus, impossible that He may undo at some time what He effected at another time. Therefore, the world, like God, must be eternal.²⁶ Al-Ḥillī envisaged God as a choosing agent who acts on the basis of His motives arising from His knowledge of the beneficial results of His acts for His creation. He therefore allowed that God may annihilate His creation if He has the motive for doing so.²⁷

However, when discussing the nature of restoration, he denied that the non-existent may be restored. He states:

²⁴An exception was Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāt who maintained that the passing away of the world occurs through its direct nullification (i^cdām) by God (see Ibn Mattawayh, *Tadhkirā*, 212; Ibn al-Malāhimī, *Fā'iḳ*, 217v; Taqī al-Dīn, 290; al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.15, pt.30:53). According to Ibn Mattawayh (*Tadhkirā*, 212), the same position was held by Abū l-Ḥafṣ al-Khallāl al-Baḡrī (d. 377/987). Ibn al-Malāhimī in principle approved al-Khayyāt's explanation but eventually rejected it since no scriptural or rational proof indicates that God would do so, see *Fā'iḳ*, 218v, 219v; see also Taqī al-Dīn, 290.

²⁵Ibn al-Malāhimī, *Fā'iḳ*, 218r, 226r.

²⁶Al Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, 84ff; Ibn al Malāhimī, *Fā'iḳ*, 225rff.

²⁷Manahij, 103r; Ma^cārīj, 129r; *Tasliḳ*, 76r v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 396.

The second investigation about the restoration of the non-existent (*al-ʿādat al-maʿdūm*). People disagreed about this. The critical investigators (*muḥaqqiqūn*) denied [its possibility] while others affirmed it. The former argued that of whatever passes into non-existence, no identity (*huwīyya*) remains. Thus, it is not possible to affirm its contingency. Moreover, if it were to be restored it would have to be restored together with its time [i.e. of the initial creation]. It therefore would be at the same time initiated and restored. [Moreover, if it were to exist after its restoration] it could not be distinguished from its like if it existed....We investigated the arguments of both groups in the *K.ʿab al-muḥāyir*. The reliable view is that the first position must be considered as necessary.²⁸

He shared these arguments with the philosophers and with Ibn al-Malāḥimī, who also denied that the non-existent may be restored.²⁹

Ibn al-Malāḥimī rejected the possibility of the restoration of the non-existent³⁰ because, following Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, he repudiated the position of the Bahshamiyya that a non-existent is a thing prior to its existence. The latter maintained that an essence (*ḍhat*) together with the attribute of essence attached to it has a reality prior to existence. Thus, an essence which passed into non-existence is still real (*ṭabīʿī*).³¹ Ibn al-Malāḥimī, in contrast, held that if God let any bodies pass into non-existence their individual essences would likewise cease to be. In this case, it would be impossible for the individual bodies to be restored.³² Any bodies which He would create at the restoration could merely be similar to the individual bodies of this world.³³ This, however, is inconceivable since the restored person who receives reward, compensation or punishment in the hereafter must be identical.

²⁸Ibid., 193, see also *Idāh al-maqāṣid*, 23ff, Amṣar, 173v-174r, *Maṇāḥiṭ*, 103r-v.

²⁹For the arguments of the philosophers, see al-Jurjānī, 246ff.

³⁰*Fāʾiq*, 217rff, 224rff. Al-Ḥillī ascribed this view already to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (*Maʿārij*, 129r). Ibn al-Malāḥimī does not report Abū l-Ḥusayn's position on this issue.

³¹Frank, "Non-Existent," 204-8.

³²*Fāʾiq*, 224r; also Taḡī al-Dīn, 324-5.

³³*Fāʾiq*, 224r; also al-Ḥillī, *Maʿārij*, 129r.

with the person in this world who deserves them. Otherwise, restoration, punishment, compensation and reward would be unjust on the part of God.³⁴

For the Bahshamiyya, this problem did not arise. When they asserted that by the accident of passing away the existence of the bodies will be nullified, it was still possible for God to restore the former individual bodies, since their essence together with the attribute of essence would not vanish with the passing away of their existence.³⁵ Thus, they defined the restoration of the bodies as a second initial creation by God, comparable to His first one.³⁶

Ibn al-Malāḥimī's solution was that bodies do not really pass into non-existence. Rather, they die and their parts (ajzā') become dispersed (tafarruq).³⁷ At the time of the

34. Fā'iḡ, 224r-225v.

35. Taqī al-Dīn presents the Basran position as follows (329-30): "Then they maintain that these atoms pass away into non-existence. Non-existence means for them only that [the atoms] are no longer characterized by the attribute of existence while the reality of [their] essence (ḥaqīqat al-dhat) remains since it [i.e. the atom] is described by its essential attribute. Then it is restored to existence. This restored existence is different from the existence it had before. Then it receives the recompense it deserves." See also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iḡ, 224v, al-Jurjānī, 244.

36. 'Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11.456ff; Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 237. The Basrans maintained that a thing must fulfil certain conditions for its restoration to be possible. Ibn Mattawayh enumerates these conditions (Majmu', 2.305). "That for which it is proper to be restored must be [long to the category of the] enduring (ḥaqīq), it must be [the product of] an act of God to the exclusion of anybody else, and it must have been [produced by] an initial act (mubtada'). If these three conditions are fulfilled, the restoration of the entity is possible, regardless of whether it belongs to the type (ḡun) [of act] of which men are capable or it does not belong to that type but the Eternal one has specific power over it." In contrast, Abū 'Alī had held that God may not restore anything which belongs to the category of what is subject to man's capacity (Ibn Mattawayh, Majmu', 2:305, idem, Tadhkira, 238, 243-4; Taqī al-Dīn, 322).

37. Fā'iḡ, 217v, 220v, 221r, 224r; see also Taqī al-Dīn, 325, 333; al-Jurjānī, 244.

restoration, God reunites these parts so that the individual bodies which existed before will again exist.³⁸ This view, Ibn al-Malāḥimī states, was backed by al-Jāhiz.³⁹

Confronted with objections of the philosophers that the physical parts of a living being are subject to constant change and therefore cannot constitute its individual personality, Ibn al-Malāḥimī defined his notion of a living being. It consists of basic parts which remain without modification during the whole life. These constitute the individual. Changes occur only in the additional parts which do not constitute the individual. The restoration applies therefore only to the basic parts.⁴⁰

Al-Ḥillī closely followed Ibn al-Malāḥimī in his view of passing away and restoration. He agreed with him that a living being consists of basic parts (*ajzā' aṣliyya*) which are not subject to change and additional parts which are. When it dies its parts are dispersed. At the time of its restoration, God reassembles only the basic parts of the living being. Having adopted Ibn al-Malāḥimī's concept of man, al-Ḥillī argued against the view of the philosophers and some theologians that man consists of a body and a rational soul (*nafs naṭīqa*).⁴¹ This does not prevent him from dealing theoretically with restoration on the assumption that man consists of a soul and a body. In this case, the body would indeed pass into non existence. After the restoration, the soul which did not pass into non-existence would be united with a different body. He states:

The author [i.e. al-Ḥillī] adheres to this position [i.e. of Ibn al-Malāḥimī]. And since the prophets consistently agreed upon restoration (*al-ʿadā*), which in literal meaning is applied to the production of something which was deprived of the attribute of existence and metaphorically is applied to something else, it is necessary to turn this word

³⁸ *Fā'iqa*, 221r, 224r.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 217r, for al-Jāhiz' position, see also Abu Muhammad ʿAlī b. Ahmad b. Hazm, *al-Fiṣal fī l-milal wa l-ahwā' wa l-nihāl* (Beirut, 1405/1985), 562.

⁴⁰ *Fā'iqa*, 223r-224r.

⁴¹ *Asar*, 154r, Maʿārīj, 128r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 387, Taslīk, 45v.

to its metaphoric meaning. This means either the reassembling of the parts [of the body] after their dispersal if we adhere to the view that man consists of the basic parts in this body. Or it means the restoration of the soul to a different body after the passing away of the first body, on the assumption that we adhere to [the view] that man consists of a body and] the rational soul.⁴²

Like al-Hillī, al-Rāzī allowed that God may annihilate the world through a direct act.⁴³ He argued accordingly that a contingent requires an effector either to exist or not to exist; by virtue of itself, existence and non-existence of a contingent are equally possible. The effectiveness of an agent which is related to its contingency may thus either create or undo something.⁴⁴ Here, he was at variance with the position of the earlier Ash'arites who denied that an agent may undo something.⁴⁵ Like al-Hillī, he also disagreed with

⁴² Ma'ārīj, 129r.

⁴³ Arba'īn, 279; Ma'ālīm, 116-7.

⁴⁴ Ishārā, 38r; Arba'īn, 79. On the basis of the principle that a contingent always requires an effector for its existence or non-existence, al-Rāzī differed with his predecessors on the question of endurance. This also applies to his view on the endurance of accidents. While the Ash'arites traditionally maintained that accidents cannot endure by themselves (Ibn Fūrak, 230, 237, 337; al-Juwaynī, *Irshād*, 139), al-Rāzī affirmed this possibility. Accidents are contingent (*muḥim* al-wujūd). If they gain existence, they endure as long as their effector endures. Were they to vanish at every moment, this would mean that they turned from contingency to essential impossibility by virtue of themselves (*al-ḥimā' al-dhātī*). This is impossible according to the rules of contingency; see Ma'ālīm, 14.

⁴⁵ Al-Ansārī, *Sharḥ*, 130vf, idem, *Ghunya*, 92v; al-Kamil fī iḥtimār al-shāmī, 74r-v. However, being forced by the arguments of his opponents, al-Bāqillānī is reported to have allowed that God may annihilate the bodies through a direct act; see al-Kamil fī iḥtimār al-shāmī, 74r; al-Ansārī, *Ghunya*, 73v; idem, *Sharḥ*, 103r; al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol. 15, pt. 1053, for his other explanations of passing away, see later. Al-Ghazālī in his *Tahāfut* (901) maintains that God as a capable agent may either produce or undo something in accordance with His will. On this basis he sought to defend the possibility of the annihilation of the world created by God against the philosophers.

A.-Ash'arī's notion of passing away was founded on the assumption that nothing may last for more than one instance. Thus, all atoms and bodies require for their endurance an accident of endurance (*baqā'*) inhering in them. This accident similarly lasts only for one instance and, thus, is

the philosophers who denied that God may undo His creation. It is very likely that al-Hillī was directly influenced by

constantly recreated by God. (Ibn Furak, 218) God endures similarly through an attribute of endurance which lasts. (ibid., 237). Passing away is caused by the failure of God to recreate the accident of endurance. (ibid., 230, 338; al-Baghdadī, *ʿaql al-dīn*, 230, al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, 88).

Although al-Bāqillānī initially agreed with al-Ansārī's notion of endurance (see Kholeif, *A Study of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His Controversies in Transcendental Theosophy*, Série I, *Pensée arabe et musulmane*, vol 31, Beirut: Dar al-machreq, 1984, 135 n.6), he is reported to have rejected it later (see al-Kanīl fī ikhtigār al-shāmil, 74v, al-Ansārī, Ghunya, 92r). His doubts arose in regard to God's eternal attributes. Do they require an accident of endurance? If they require an accident of endurance this would contradict the view that no accident may inhere in God and His attributes (for the impossibility of this according to the Ashʿarites, see e.g. al-Juwaynī, *Irshād*, 441). Al-Ashʿarī is reported to have held that His attributes endure because of His endurance. (Ibn Furak, 43, 237, 326-7, 337) In al-Bāqillānī's view, this would lead to the conclusion that on principle anything may endure by itself. (Al-Ansārī, Ghunya, 92r, al-Kanīl fī ikhtigār al-shāmil, 74v. Holding on to the Ashʿarite principle that accidents do not endure, he apparently argued that atoms do not require an accident of endurance but exist as long as at least one representative of each genus of accidents inheres in it (al-Ansārī, Ghunya, 93v). Thus, he explained passing away as the withholding of any genus of accidents. (ibid.) In his argumentation he usually chose to say that an atom passes away when the genus *kawn* is removed in order to make his position valid for the Bahshamiyya (al-Ansārī, *Sharh*, 130r v, idem, Ghunya, 93v, Taqī al-Dīn, 289, see also Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, 88-9 where he reports this view as a position held by a 'a group of Ashʿarites'). The latter maintained that an atom may exist without any accident attached to it, except for a *kawn* (see Frank, *Beings*, 94, also al-Hillī, *Manhaj*, 82r, see also Kholeif, *Rāzī*, 105 n.5ff where he expresses his doubts about the authenticity of the attribution of this modified view to al-Bāqillānī by later authors. Especially on the basis of the evidence from al-Ansārī's *Sharh* and his Ghunya, there does not remain serious justification for doubt). There are other reports that al-Bāqillānī came to the conclusion that there is no reason why accidents should not endure by themselves. On that basis he put forth a second explanation of passing away defining it as the direct annihilation of bodies by God.

Although rejecting this last possibility, al-Juwaynī shared al-Bāqillānī's modified view on endurance of atoms (*Irshād*, 140-1). Accordingly, he explained passing away as the withholding of any genus of accidents from the atom. In contrast to al-Bāqillānī, he did not mention the *akwān* specifically. Al-Juwaynī's view may well be an elaboration of al-Bāqillānī's position.

al-Rāzī in regard to these points.

Yet, al-Ḥillī clearly disagreed with al-Rāzī, when the latter affirmed that the non-existent may be restored by God. According to al-Rāzī, God is able to recreate individuals even though their specific essence (dhāt mahsūsa) was annihilated when they passed into non-existence. On this point, he was in agreement with his Ash'arite predecessors. They defined restoration as a totally new creation of beings which is comparable to their first creation. It is within God's omnipotence to create the individual beings a second time although their essence vanished during their non-existence.⁴⁶

Al-Rāzī presents the view of his predecessors and states his own argument for it:

Our companions maintain that, when a thing passes into non-existence, its essence is void and it becomes pure negation and sheer non-existence. In the state of non-existence, no identity or specification remains of it. Despite this view they argued that it is not impossible in God's power to restore it identically. No group among the rational people affirm this view except our companions. The proof for its soundness is that when a thing becomes non-existent, it remains something feasible to exist (jā'iz al-wujūd), and God has power over all contingencies. From this follows by necessity that God has power to restore it identically after its non-existence.⁴⁷

Evidently under the influence of Ibn al-Malāḥimī, al-Rāzī at the same time affirmed that God is able to reunite the parts of the bodies after their dispersal.⁴⁸ In some of his works it is not clear which of the two views of the restoration he preferred. In his *Ishāra*,⁴⁹ however, he expressed his preference for the position that God disperses the bodies rather than annihilates the world. Confronted with

⁴⁶ Al-Ansārī, *Ghunya*, 213v-214r; Ibn Fūrak, 55, 111, 240, 242-3, al-Baghdādī, *Usūl al-dīn*, 233-4; al-Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal*, 338; *Idem*, *Tafsīr*, vol.9, pt.17-32; al-Jurjānī, 244.

⁴⁷ *Arba'in*, 275; see also *Ishāra*, 63r, Ma'ālīm, 116, *Muḥaṣṣal*, 338; *Tafsīr*, vol.1, pt.2:136, vol.13, pt.26-109.

⁴⁸ *Arba'in*, 288; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 339; *Tafsīr*, vol.1, pt.2:134-5; vol.9, pt.17-29.

⁴⁹ *Ishāra*, 63v.

arguments of the philosophers that the parts of a living body are subject to infinite change and therefore cannot constitute its individual personality, he replied with the same answer as Ibn al-Maḥḥimī. A living being consists of basic parts (ajza' aḥḥyā) which are not subject to change and of additional parts (ajza' za'ida/ ajza' fādila) which may change. For the restoration, it is sufficient that God will reunite the basic parts of a being.⁵⁰ Although mentioning some other possible answers to the philosophers' objection, he made clear that he preferred this one.⁵¹ It seems that he favoured Ibn al-Maḥḥimī's view that the human bodies are merely dispersed at death and will be reassembled at the restoration although, unlike him and al-Ḥillī, he did not exclude the possibility of their passing into non-existence prior to the restoration.

It is important to note here that al-Rāzī differed from al-Ḥillī in his concept of man. Man consists in his view of a body and a rational soul.⁵² While the body passes into non-existence the soul remains.⁵³ Al-Rāzī did not mention the soul in his discussions of restoration.⁵⁴ However, since he generally held that the soul does not pass away, his indecision about the nature of the passing away and restoration of the body is of minor significance.

⁵⁰Arbaḥīn, 291; Inḥāra, 63v; Tafaṭīr, vol 13, pt.26 109-10.

⁵¹Arbaḥīn, 291, Maḥḥimī, 118.

⁵²Maḥḥimī, 106-8; Mulakhkhaṣ, 311r.

⁵³Maḥḥimī, 112-3.

⁵⁴See also al-Jarjānī, 251 where he omits to list al-Rāzī among those theologians who asserted the restoration of the body and the soul.

CHAPTER VII
PROMISE AND THREAT (AL-WA^CD WA-L-WA^CʾID)

1. Reward and Punishment

The views upheld by al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī in regard to the relation between man's acts and his reward or punishment in the hereafter are closely linked to their opposing positions in the question of God's justice.

Al-Ḥillī maintained that man deserves reward and punishment by his acts of obedience and disobedience respectively. God is obliged to render to him all the reward and punishment he deserves for his actions unless He pardons him or the Prophet intercedes on his behalf. In this case he will not be punished.¹ This close link between acts of obedience and reward and between acts of disobedience and punishment is founded on the concept of man's moral obligation (taklīf) which al-Ḥillī shared with the Muʿtazilites. God puts man under such moral obligation that he is able to obey and to abstain from disobedience despite the hardship imposed by this obligation. The purpose of this imposition of moral obligation is to enable man to reach a higher degree of reward than he might otherwise achieve.² On this basis al-Ḥillī argued for the indispensable link between the acts of obedience which man fulfils under moral obligation and the reward he deserves for this:

The proof that reward is deserved for an act of obedience is that it is a hardship which God has imposed upon the morally-obliged. If this were not for a purpose it would be oppressive and futile, and this is an evil which does not issue from the Wise. If it is for a purpose it is either for causing harm which would be oppression, or for a benefit [reading li-naḥ^C for al-naḥ^C]. This benefit may either be granted initially or not. The first alternative is wrong, for otherwise the

¹Manāhij, 104r, Maʿārīj, 129v-130r.

²Kashf al-murād, 249.

[imposition of] moral obligation would be futile. The second alternative is what we sought to prove. That benefit is what is deserved by virtue of obedience accompanying [reading al-muqārīn for al-muqārīn] magnification (ta^czim) and glorification. It would be evil to render this benefit initially [i.e. without imposing moral obligation] since magnification of someone who does not deserve it is evil.

On account of their different understanding of God's justice, the Ash^carites basically disagreed with the view shared by the Imamites and the Mu^ttazilites in this question. God, according to the Ash^carites, is rationally not obliged to render reward or punishment. They rejected the formulation that man deserves (yastahiqq) reward or punishment for his actions which God is obliged to render to him.⁴ They preferred to say that it is generosity (fadl tafaddul) on the part of God to reward man for his acts of obedience and His just right (ʿAdl/ḥaqq) to punish him for his acts of disobedience.⁵ On the basis of scriptural evidence, however, they affirmed that God has promised always to reward acts of obedience.⁶ Since it is inconceivable that God would lie, this promise is a safe indication that God will not act otherwise.⁷ With this they admit that God's arbitrariness cannot be absolute.

On the surface, the Ash^carite view appears to agree with the Mu^ttazilite assertion of a necessary link between man's actions and divine reward and punishment. However, a second

³Kashf al-murād, 323, see also Nahj al-mustarah.dīp, 411; Manahij, 204r; Ma^caraj, 130r.

⁴Al-Ghazālī, Iqtisād, 84, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.6, pt.12 180; vol.7, pt.13 19-20, also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 213.

⁵See al-Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 74-5, idem, Taḥdīd, 351, al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 381, 392, al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 214v, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:143; vol.5, pt.10:180-1; vol.7, pt.14:10; vol.9, pt.17:33; vol.15, pt.29:337, also L.Gardet, Dieu et la destinée de l'homme (Etudes musulmanes, vol.9, Paris Vrin, 1967), 293.

⁶Al-Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 75; al-Mutawallī, 58, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.6:41; vol.4, pt.7:51; vol.11, pt.22-229; also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.

⁷Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 75; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:19 20; vol.7, pt.13:169.

principle connected with theodicy was involved in the question of reward and punishment which set Ash^Carite and Mu^Ctazilite thought on it fundamentally apart. The Mu^Ctazilite theory of moral obligation and of degrees of punishment and reward which man can achieve by acting under it was founded on the assumption that man is the author of his own acts. God does not predetermine whether a person will be a believer or an infidel, an obedient or a disobedient servant. Thus, man's own action is the only basis for the reward and punishment he will ultimately receive.⁸ The Ash^Carites, in contrast, maintained that man is not truly the author of his acts but that his acts are rather created by God.⁹ Moreover, God preordains a person's fate in the hereafter.¹⁰ There is, therefore, no necessary link between man's acts and his final destiny as the Mu^Ctazilites understand it.¹¹ At best, some Ash^Carites allow the formulation that man's acts serve as an indication of the destiny which God has ordained for him.¹² This indication, however, is not always reliable since God may wish to pardon all the sins of a sinner.¹³ It is similarly possible that the belief which a person displays during his lifetime

⁸ Al-Miqdād, 413, al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.6, pt.11:10, 16, idem, *Arba^Cīn*, 388. According to the Mu^Ctazilites, man is only entitled to reward and punishment when three conditions are fulfilled: that he has the capability for his act (*mutamakkkin min fi^Clihi*), that he is free to choose the act (*mukhalla baynahu wa-baynahu*), and that he does not act under compulsion (*ij^Cā*), see 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 14:308 and passim.

⁹ Al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.7, pt.14:13; see also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 210ff for references.

¹⁰ This Ash^Carite principle finds its expression in their concept of *muwāfāt*, which according to them meant that God eternally loves or hates a person. If He loves him, he will die as a believer and has always during his lifetime been a believer even if this was not obvious to men (Ibn Fūrak, 161-2; al-Ansarī, *Ghunya*, 228v-229v). On the different interpretations of *muwāfāt*, see E.Kohlberg, "Muwāfāt Doctrines in Muslim Theology," *Studia Islamica* 57 (1983), 47-66; for the Ash^Carite interpretation, *ibid.*, 50ff.

¹¹ Ibn Fūrak, 163; see also Gardet, *Pieu*, 300.

¹² See al-Bāqillānī, *Tamhīd*, 351; idem, *Inṣāf*, 75, also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.

¹³ Ibn Fūrak, 163; Bāqillānī, *Tamhīd*, 351, al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.4, pt.7:143.

may not be genuine and therefore be a false indication if he eventually dies as an unbeliever.¹⁴ Thus, neither indications for punishment nor for reward in the hereafter are in fact reliable signs for the ultimate fate of a person.

Al-Rāzī followed closely the traditional teaching of his school. Anyone obedient will eventually be rewarded by God. This is known not because man's actions are the reason for this reward, since nothing is incumbent upon God¹⁵ but rather because He has notified mankind that He will reward obedience.¹⁶ Therefore, God's reward for man is nothing but generosity (*tafaddul*) on His part.¹⁷ Since al-Rāzī clung firmly to the Ash'arite position that man is not the author of his acts and that it is God who creates his belief or disbelief,¹⁸ he also denied a necessary link between man's actions and his fate in the hereafter. On this basis, he argued that God is not obliged to render to man any reward for his actions. He states:

This is so because man's act depends upon will and this will is created by God. If God creates that will, he [i.e. man] obeys and if He creates the other kind of will, he disobeys. Thus, man's obedience is from God and his disobedience is also from God. However, an act of God does not oblige Him to [do] anything at all. Thus, neither does obedience make a reward obligatory, nor disobedience punishment. Everything rather comes from God by virtue of His divinity, His conquering force, and His power. Thus what we have asserted is sound; that if He wanted to punish all those who are near to him, this would be good on His part. And if He wanted to have mercy on all pharaohs this would [likewise] be good on His part.¹⁹

¹⁴ Ibn Furak, 161 2; al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.1, pt.2:140.

¹⁵ *Arba'ūn*, 388; *Tafsīr*, vol.1, pt.2:140, vol.7, pt.14 129, vol.15, pt.29:263; *Ma'ālīm*, 121-2.

¹⁶ "Ma'ālīl," 378-9; *Tafsīr*, vol.1, pt.2:137, vol.7, pt.13 170, vol.7, pt.14:87; vol.15, pt.29:12.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, vol.7, pt.14:87; vol.13, pt.25 11, 33, 66; vol.15, pt.29:157; vol.15, pt.30:263.

¹⁸ For al-Rāzī's position that belief and infidelity are created by God, see his *Matalib*, 9:101-110, 379-389; "Ma'ālīl," 375; *Tafsīr*, vol.5, pt.10 131, 165; vol.7, pt.13 145ff, 154 5, 158-9, 180, 191-2, 241-2, vol.7, pt.14 160; vol.15, pt.30:263.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, vol.4, pt.8:241, see also *ibid.*, vol.5, pt.10:78, 180, vol.8, pt.15:21-2, 63-4.

2. The Question of the Muslim Grave Sinner

While al-Hillī agreed with the Muṭʿazilite position that reward and punishment are deserved by man because of his actions and owed by God by virtue of His justice, he disagreed with them, following the Imamite tradition, on the final destiny of some offenders. This led him to partial agreement with al-Rāzī.

While all parties agreed upon the eternal punishment of the infidel (kāfir),²⁰ there was disagreement about the final state of the grave sinner (fāsiq) who affirmed his faith of Islam.

The Muṭʿazilites held that a person's fate in the hereafter is founded on mutual cancellation (tahābut) of his acts of obedience and disobedience. If a person commits more acts of disobedience than of obedience the reward deserved for the latter is outweighed and, therefore, cancelled by the punishment deserved for his acts of disobedience. In this case he deserves eternal punishment. If his acts of obedience

²⁰Al-Hillī, Manāhij, 104v; idem, Maṣāriḥ, 129v; idem, Nahj al-muṣtarshidīn, 423; idem, Kashf al-murād, 328; al-Rāzī, Maṣāliḥ, 123-4; idem, Tafsīr, vol.2, pt.3:153; vol.5, pt.10:75; idem, Muhassal, 346. For the general Shi'ite position, see ^CAlam al-Hudā l-Murtadā, "al-Usūl al-ʿiṭiqādiyya," in Nafā'is al-makhtūṭāt (edited by ʿAlī Yāsīn, Baghdad: al-Maṣārif, 1954), 82, Shaykh al-Tusī, Iqtisād, 126; idem, Tamhīd, 273; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 160; also McDermott, 251ff. For the general Muṭʿazilite position, see Ibn al-Malahimī, Fāʾiq, 232v; ʿAbd al-Jabbar, Faḍl, 209. For the general Ashʿarite position, see al-Baghdādī, Farg, 348, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.7, pt.14:80; Ibn Ḥazm, 4:80. See also generally al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 474.

outweigh his acts of disobedience the punishment deserved for the latter will be cancelled²¹ and so he deserves eternal reward.

These rules apply only when the acts of disobedience belong to the category of minor sins (ḡaḡhā'ir) and thus are of equal weight as acts of obedience. If a person commits a major sin (kabira) this cancels the reward deserved for all of a person's acts of obedience²² and it is impossible for a major sin to be outweighed by any number of acts of obedience. One who commits a major sin can escape his deserved punishment only by repentance (tawba)²³ and unless he repents he will inevitably be punished eternally.²⁴ The Mu'tazilites thus draw a sharp line of distinction between minor and major sins.²⁵

²¹ Mānakdīm, 524ff, Ibn al-Malāḡhīmī, Fā'iḡ, 204r-v, 206rff, also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:53 4; vol.4, pt.8 213 4, vol.8, pt.16:91. Abū 'Alī and Abū Hāshim disagreed about how this cancellation works. The former maintained that the smaller amount of reward or punishment will simply be cancelled by the larger amount, while Abū Hāshim adhered to the principle of muwāzana which means that the smaller amount will be deducted from the larger; see Mānakdīm, 527ff, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.6:40; vol.4, pt.8:209; Abū Hāshim's position was usually preferred by later Mu'tazilites. See e.g. Ibn al-Malāḡhīmī, Fā'iḡ, 208r-v.

²² Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:50.

²³ See later.

²⁴ Abd al-Jabbār, Faḡl, 211, 350, also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:114, 197, 237-8; vol.5, pt.9:119; vol.5, pt.10:75, 244; vol.6, pt.11:223; vol.7, pt.14:87; vol.8, pt.15:142; vol.15, pt.29:293; vol.15, pt.30:165.

²⁵ Ibn al-Malāḡhīmī, Fā'iḡ, 206r, also McDermott, 256ff. It should be noted that despite this sharp distinction between major and minor sins, man, according to the Mu'tazilites, is unable to know if a specific act of disobedience is a major or a minor sin; see Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14 193; Mānakdīm, 635, 801, also McDermott, 257 n.2. This view was at variance with the generally accepted view on major and minor sins in Islam. Although there was no definite list of major sins, the Qur'an clearly defines minor and major sins and offers numerous examples for each class (see A.J. Wensinck and L. Gardet, "Khatī'a," Encyclopedia of Islam, 4 1107). In the hadīth literature, further lists of major sins may be found. Moreover, Abū 'Alī composed a book entitled al-ikfār wa l-tafnīḡ (see Gimaret, "Matériaux," 282 no.6) which apparently dealt with the question of when a person is to be classified as an infidel or as a grave sinner. A book with the same title was included in Abd al-Jabbār's Mughnī (this part is not included in the edited text, see Gimaret,

The Mu'tazilite principle of mutual cancellation was based on the definition of faith (īmān) which included the performance of all religious duties (farā'id).²⁶ On this basis they maintained that performance of the religious duties, i.e. faith, deserves eternal reward while failure to perform them, i.e. deficiency in faith, deserves eternal punishment even if the grave sinner confesses his belief in the basic principles of Islam.²⁷ Since they denied the possibility of temporary punishment they resorted to the principle of mutual cancellation (tahābut).²⁸

Yet although they held that the grave sinner ceases to be a believer and deserves eternal punishment, he does not belong to the same category as the unbeliever. Rather, he is in a position between faith and infidelity (manzila bayn al-manzilatayn).²⁹ By this they sought to avoid the position

 "Matériaux," 282). The authors must have had a clear idea of what constitutes a grave sin. (A work entitled Kitāb al-baḥṭh ʿala adillat al-takfīr wa-l tafsīq by the Zaydite Abū l Qasim al-Bustī (a student of ʿAbd al-Jabbār) which is extant would presumably offer further information on this question. I did not have a chance to consult this work. For the author, see W.Madelung, "Bostī, Abū 'l-Qāsem," Encyclopaedia Iranica 4:388-9. Thus, ʿAbd al Jabbār's claim that man is basically unable to know whether a certain sin is minor or major is strange. It may be that he put forward this claim in order to defend the doctrine of mutual cancellation. Thus he argued that if man knew a certain sin to be minor, he would recognize that because of mutual cancellation he would not be punished for committing this sin. This might encourage him to commit this sin. See Mānakdīm, 635.

²⁶Mānakdīm, 707-8, 802; Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iḡ, 246r-v; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.29:336; Gardet, Dieu, 357-8. This was the position of Abū ʿAlī and Abū Hāshim. Abū l-Hudhayl and ʿAbd al-Jabbār maintained that supererogatory works (nawāfil) are also included in faith. However, since they did not hold the person who fails to perform these to be deficient in his faith, the significance of this disagreement appears to be minor; see McDermott, 234.

²⁷Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iḡ, 207r, 244rff, al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 474, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:148-9, 236, vol.5, pt.10:75.

²⁸Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iḡ, 206r-v.

²⁹Mānakdīm, 697; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Faḍl, 350.

of the Khārijites who considered the Muslim grave sinner an infidel (kāfir) as well as the position of the Murji'ites who affirmed that the Muslim grave sinner is a believer (ma'min).³⁰ With regard to punishment, the Mu'tazila held that for the sinner (fāsiq) it would be eternal but lighter than for the infidel.³¹

The Mu'tazilite position was contested by both al-Hillī³² and al-Rāzī.³³

The Shi'ite tradition did not include the performance of religious duties in its definition of faith. Rather, it defined it as conviction (taḥḍīq) of the heart consisting in the knowledge (ma'rifa) of the basic principles of religion. In order to be valid, this conviction must rest upon rational proofs leading the believer to knowledge of the basic principles.³⁴ Al-Hillī fully adhered to this concept of faith.³⁵ With this definition of faith, which stresses the element of knowledge (ma'rifa) to the exclusion of the performance of religious duties, the Shi'ites were close to the position which was commonly associated with the Murji'a.³⁶

Al-Hillī further stipulated that faith is sufficient to merit reward only on condition that the knowledge of God is complete. This condition is fulfilled when the believer knows all other basic principles of religion as well. He states:

³⁰ Mānakdīm, 701. 'Abd al-Jabbar, Faḍl, 159ff; al-Ka'bi, 115. For the positions of the Kharijites and the Murji'ites, see A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed. Its Genesis and Historical Development (London: Frank Cass & Co., 38ff, also McDermott, 233). For the origin of the Mu'tazilite concept of manzila bayn al-manzilatayn, see Madelung, Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, 10ff.

³¹ Al-Bazdawī, 131.

³² Ajwiba, 72-3.

³³ Tafwīḥ, vol. 4, pt. 7:54ff.

³⁴ See Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 140, *idem*, Tamhīd, 293, Mitham al-Bahrānī, 170; Khulāṣat al-nazar, 57v.

³⁵ Manāhij, 104r; Anwār 180, Ajwiba, 54.

³⁶ See al-Ash'arī, Maqalat, 132-141; generally for the position of the Murji'ites on faith, see McDermott, 234-5, Wensinck, 132ff.

It is permissible that reward is dependent upon a condition. If this were not the case, a person who knows God (al-^Cārif bi-llāh ^ḥḥ^Cālā) and ignores the Prophet would deserve reward since knowledge of God is an act of obedience independent in itself.³⁷

He stipulated further that the reward for an act of obedience depends upon the condition (shart) of muwāfāt, that is that the person will die as a believer.³⁸ In his Ma^Carīj,³⁹ he further clarifies what he means by this. Muwāfāt is the indication (ḥālāma) for the continuity of faith (istimrār ḥālā l-īmān) during a person's lifetime. A believer who becomes an infidel, therefore, does not deserve any reward for his former belief. Thus, he stresses, it is not the muwāfāt that is the reason (sabab) for man's meriting of reward, but his continuity in faith.

Among his predecessors, al-Murtaḍā, following his teacher Shaykh al-Mufīd,⁴⁰ had adhered to a concept of muwāfāt which he defined as the impossibility for infidelity to follow upon belief.⁴¹ Al-Ḥillī's concept of muwāfāt clearly differs. This is evident from his statement that al-Murtaḍā did not consider muwāfāt a condition for man to deserve praise for his faith⁴² although he was aware of al-Murtaḍā's view that belief cannot be followed by unbelief.⁴³ He fails, however, to mention that al-Murtaḍā called this principle muwāfāt.

In most of his works, al-Ḥillī does not indicate whether he considered it possible for a believer to become an infidel and he refrains from elucidating his own position in

37 Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 418; see also Kaḥf al-murād, 326; Manāḥij, 104r. See also Kohlberg, 64-5.

38 Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 419, Kaḥf al-murād, 346-7, Tasliḥ, 79r.

39 Ma^Carīj, 130r.

40 For al-Mufīd's position on this question, see McDermott, 240-2; Kohlberg, 53ff.

41 See Kohlberg, 55 n.1 for references; see also al-Ḥillī, Ajwiba, 21-2. Al-Murtaḍā's position was adopted also by his pupil Shaykh al-Tūsī; see Kohlberg, 55 n.2 for references.

42 Ajwiba, 21-2; see also al-Majlisī, Bihār, 69:214-5ff.

43 Ajwiba, 22

the Ajwibat al-masa'il al-muhanna'iyya⁴⁴ where he reports al-Murtada's view. In his Ma'arifi,⁴⁵ however, he implies that this is possible. Moreover, the fact that he maintained that muwafat, the state of being a believer at the point of death, is a condition for the reward of prior acts of obedience, suggests that he considered it possible for man to change from belief to unbelief.

In his Ajwibat al-masa'il al-muhanna'iyya⁴⁶ al-Hilli states that an unspecified group of Imamite scholars considered it possible for unbelief to follow belief. They also upheld the principle of the cancellation of deserved reward by deserved punishment (ihbat) and of muwafat, presumably considering it a condition for the reward.⁴⁷ It is possible that he associated himself with the view of these scholars rather than the position of al-Murtada in the question of whether unbelief may follow belief.

⁴⁴Ibid., 21-2; here, he merely refers to a more extensive discussion in his Nihayat al-marām. The manuscript of the Nihaya does not include this section.

⁴⁵Ma'arifi, 130r.

⁴⁶Ajwiba, 22.

⁴⁷The only Imamite group which is known to have held such views were the Banū Nawbakht. They upheld the Mu'tazilite thesis of mutual cancellation of acts of obedience and disobedience, and of reward and punishment. They further asserted that a believer may become an infidel, see McDermott, 24. It is not known whether they considered muwafat a condition for man's meriting reward. Since they allowed, however, that a believer may become infidel, they may well have considered it to be a condition. In his Masa'il al-Tarābulasiyyāt, al-Murtada refers to Imamites who consider it possible to follow unbelief as "those who do not believe in muwafat." I am indebted to Prof. Kohlberg for this reference.

Al-Rāzī did not include the performance of religious duties in his definition of belief.⁴⁸ Like al-Billī, he maintained that it is impossible for a true believer to believe in God but not in the Prophet. If this occurred, it would only show that the person's belief in God is also not true.⁴⁹

Al-Rāzī does not discuss his view of *muwāfāt* in his theological works. In various passages of his Qur'ān commentary, however, he sometimes accepts and sometimes rejects the stricter Ash'arite position that belief displayed during a person's lifetime is not genuine if he does not die as a believer.

In the following passage, al-Rāzī deals with the problem that somebody who at first believed and subsequently became an infidel would theoretically deserve eternal reward and eternal punishment. After refuting at length the principle of mutual cancellation (*ṭahābut*),⁵⁰ al-Rāzī concludes:

If this is established, two positions may be singled out as answers. First, the position of those who take [the principle of] *muwafat* into consideration. This means that the condition for the occurrence of faith is that he [i.e. the person] will not die as an unbeliever. If he died as an unbeliever, we would know that his previous conduct was unbelief. This position is obviously false. Second, man does not deserve reward for his obedience and punishment for his disobedience on the basis of rational necessity. This is the view of the people of tradition and [it is] our choice.⁵¹

⁴⁸Ma'ālīm, 127-8; Muḥassal, 347.

The tradition of the Ash'arite school was divided about the definition of faith. Al-Ash'arī himself in his *Lum'a* defined faith as conviction (*taṣḍīq*) without mentioning the performance of religious duties. In his *Ibāna* and the *Maḡālāt*, in contrast, he defined faith as consisting of speech and works. L.Gardet argues that al-Ash'arī's position gave rise to the later Ash'arite doctrine, that the act of conviction constitutes the "formal constituent" of faith, while the fulfilment of religious duties intervenes to perfect it, see L.Gardet "Iman," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3:1170-1; *idem*, *Dieu*, 371; see also McDermott, 235-6.

⁴⁹*Tafsīr*, vol.4, pt.8:197; vol.7, pt.13:77.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, vol.1, pt.2:139-40.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, vol.1, pt.2:140.

Here he denies the relevance of the discussion concerning the muwāfāt maintaining that man's obedience and disobedience are not the reason for God's reward and punishment. Elsewhere, however, he affirmed that the faith of a person which he displayed during his lifetime is genuine only when the condition of muwāfāt is fulfilled, that is, when he dies as a believer.⁵² Here, he was in agreement with the stricter Ash'arite position.

The definition of faith as belief to the exclusion of acts upheld by both theologians meant that faith cannot be impaired by any act of disobedience. The reward for the faith of a person, in their view, cannot be outweighed by any sin. Thus, although a believer must expect punishment for his sins, either, as al-Hillī would say, because he deserves it, or, as al-Rāzī would say, because he was told so by God, the punishment cannot be eternal. Both theologians, therefore, distinguished sharply between the destiny of a believing sinner and of an infidel. While the former, unless he repents or is pardoned, will be temporarily punished for his sins and then be eternally rewarded for his belief, the infidel will be eternally punished in hell.⁵³

⁵²He states (Ibid., vol.3, pt.6:38-9): "Thus it is established ...that if [someone] was a believer and then disbelieved, this former faith, even if we thought that it was faith, was no faith in the eyes of God. Therefore, it is clear that muwāfāt is a condition for faith to be [genuine] faith and for the unbelief to be [genuine] unbelief." Further evidence that al-Rāzī basically backed the stricter Ash'arite position is found in his Tafsīr (vol.8, pt.15 125 127) where he rejects the view that the istithnā' formula (if God wills) is unnecessary when someone says "I am a believer," since his belief at this moment is genuine (ibid., 127). Al-Rāzī insists on the requirement of adding the istithnā' (ibid., 127) arguing that man cannot be sure that his present state of belief will last (ibid., 126). Generally for the significance of istithnā', see Kohlberg, 51-2.

⁵³For references to the views of al-Hillī and al-Rāzī, see later. This view was shared by the earlier Imamite and Ash'arite theologians. For the Imamite position, see Ruhūṣṣā' al-nazar, 52v, 58r. Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 117 (Shaykh al-Tūsī is reported to have at first upheld the Mu'tazilite position of the eternal punishment of the grave sinner before adopting the common Imamite position; see M.Nallino, "Abū Ga'far al-Tūsī e un nuovo manoscritto del suo 'Kitāb

Al Ḥillī argues on the basis of reason against the eternal punishment of a believing sinner making the following points:

First, the doctrine of the eternal punishment of a sinner (fāsiq) implies injustice. Thus, it does not issue from God. The explanation of the minor premise is that the doctrine of cancellation is false, as we have shown. Thus, the sinner deserves reward for his obedience and for his belief and this must inevitably reach him. According to consensus, this cannot take place before the punishment. Thus it must happen after it, and this is what we sought to prove. Secondly, the doctrine of eternal punishment of the sinner leads to absurdity in so far as it would be equal to the state of the infidel despite the difference in the gravity of their sins and despite the fact that faith may be connected with sinfulness (fāsiq) and is incompatible with infidelity. Thirdly, it would be evil on the part of the Mighty (al-ʿazīm) that, if someone worshipped Him for a hundred years and then sinned once, He should cancel all those acts of obedience because of this. Fourthly, the sin of a sinner (fāsiq) is finite and so he does not deserve infinite punishment by it. This is not contradicted by [the case of] infidelity which is the gravest of sins, equalling infinite sinning.⁵⁴

Al-Rāzī argues for the same position:

Our doctrine is that even though God punishes the sinners from among the Muslims (ahl al-salāt) He will not leave them eternally in hell-fire but will take them out to paradise....What we rely upon in this question is that this sinner will either not deserve punishment, or he will deserve it while he is [also] entitled to reward. If the matter is like this the punishment must necessarily not be permanent.⁵⁵

al-istibṣār', "Rivista degli studi orientali 22 (1947):13, cf. Madelung, "Imamism," 28 n.1; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 160; also Madelung, "Imamism," 16, 20, 24, 27, esp.28; McDermott, 387-9. For the Ashʿarite position, see al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 386; Bāqillanī, Tamhid, 349-50; idem, Inṣāf, 83, al-Baqhdādī, Faṣḥ, 348, al-Bazdawī, 131ff, Ibn Fūrak, 164, al-Mutawallī, 58, al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 474, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:144, 237-8; vol.4, pt.8:211; vol.5, pt.9:99; vol.5, pt.10:106-7; vol.6, pt.11:228; vol.6, pt.12:74; vol.8, pt.16:9-10.

⁵⁴ Manāhij, 104v, see also Maʿārī, 129v; Taghlik, 80v-81r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 423; Kashf al-murād, 328-9. ⁵⁵ Arbaʿin, 413; also Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:197-8; vol.6, pt.11:56; vol.9, pt.18:64; vol.2, pt.3:155; "Masāʿil," 381-2; Maʿālīm, 124ff; Muḥaṣṣal, 343ff.

In accordance with their repudiation of the Mu'tazilite principle of mutual cancellation (taḥabūt), Ash'arites and Imamites denied the sharp distinction drawn by the Mu'tazilites between major and minor sins. They viewed all sins as major in so far as they constitute disobedience to God. There are degrees of gravity of sins in relation to each other but this does not affect their general status as major sins.⁵⁶ Aḥ-Ḥilli⁵⁷ and al-Rāzī⁵⁸ approved this position.

On the basis of the difference between the fate of the Muslim sinner envisaged by the Mu'tazilites on the one hand and by al-Ḥilli and Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī on the other, further disagreement arose about other ways in which the sinner's punishment might be cancelled.

⁵⁶ Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Tamhīd, 291, al Mutawallī, 59, al-J. waynī, Irshād, 391. See also McDermott, 258, A.J. Wensinck and L. Gardet, "Khatī'a," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:1107.
⁵⁷ Rashf al-murād, 328, Manāḥij, 104r; Ma'arīj, 129v.
⁵⁸ Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.29:9.

3.Divine Forgiveness (ʿafw)

One of these ways is God's forgiveness (ʿafw) for a sinner who died without repenting. The Muʿtazilites denied the possibility of God forgiving an unrepentant sinner, arguing that since God has notified mankind that He will punish the sinner it would be inadmissible for Him not to carry out this threat.⁵⁹ Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī, each of them following his own school tradition, rejected the Muʿtazilite position.

Al-Ḥillī maintained that to pardon a sinner is certainly good on the part of God and nothing from the point of view of reason speaks against it. Furthermore, he referred to scriptural evidence as a proof that God actually forgives some sinners.⁶⁰ Al Rāzī also admitted God's forgiveness for a sinner but he relied exclusively on consensus and scriptural evidence to support his position.⁶¹

⁵⁹Manakdīm, 644. See also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:10; vol.5, pt.10:7.

⁶⁰Maʿārij, 129v; Manāhij, 104v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 427; Taʿlīk, 80r. Generally for the Imamite position, see Khulāṣat al-naẓar, 53r, al-Murtaḍā, "Uṣul," 81, Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 126.

⁶¹Arbaʿīn, 406; Tafsīr, vol.6, pt.12:58; vol.10, pt.19:95. Generally for the Ashʿarite position on ʿafw, see al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9-40, 67, 99, 151-2, vol.6, pt.11:95; also Gardet, Dieu, 305; Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.

4. Intercession (shafa'at)

Closely related to the question of God's pardon is that of the Prophet's intercession (shafa'at) on behalf of Muslims. The Mu'tazilites affirmed that intercession is permissible only on behalf of those who deserve reward in the hereafter so that the benefits to which they are entitled shall be increased.⁶²

Al-Hilli⁶³ and the Imamite tradition⁶⁴ denied this. They held that intercession was reasonable only on behalf of Muslim grave sinners so that their deserved punishment would be cancelled. In their view, it was inadmissible that the prophet would intercede for the purpose of increasing the benefits of those who already deserve reward.⁶⁵

In contrast to his Shi'ite predecessors,⁶⁶ al-Hilli did not expressly ascribe an intercessory function to the Imams but only to the prophets. It is, however, unlikely that he would have denied this cardinal Shi'ite belief.

The cancellation of punishment was also the principal purpose of intercession according to Ash'arite doctrine.⁶⁷ In opposition to the Imamites, however, some Ash'arites maintained that the Prophet might intercede either for the cancellation of punishment of sinners or for the purpose of

⁶² Ibn al-Malahimī, *Fā'iḡ*, 230v; 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Faḡl*, 207, al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.2, pt.3 59, vol.4, pt.7 76, vol.5, pt.9:148-9; vol.1, pt.22:160, 225.

⁶³ Ma'arīf, 129v; Manāḡil, 105r, *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*, 427.

⁶⁴ Al-Murtadā, "Unul," 81, Shaykh al-Tūsī, *Iqtisād*, 126, *Khulāṣat al-nazar*, 54rff., also Madelung, "Imamism," 16, 20, 27.

⁶⁵ *Khulāṣat al-nazar*, 54r.

⁶⁶ For the general position of the Imamites, see Madelung, "Imamism," 28.

⁶⁷ A.-Mutawallī, 59, al-Baghdādī, *Farḡ*, 348, Baḡl. lā'ī, *Imnāf*, 82, 231, idem, *Tamhīd*, 374 5, 365ff; al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.2, pt.3:59ff; vol.4, pt.7:137; vol.5, pt.9:152; vol.6, pt.12:145, al-Juwaynī, *Iṣṡād*, 394-5, al-Ash'arī, *Maḡālāt*, 474.

increasing the benefits of those deserving reward.⁶⁸ Al-Rāzī admitted both purposes in some of his works⁶⁹ but rejected the second one in others.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ See Mitham al-Bahrānī, 166-7 who presents this as the usual Ash'arite doctrine. See also Ibn Fūrak, 167; he maintains that the prophet intercedes even for the repentant sinner so that his repentance will be accepted.

⁶⁹ E.g. *Arba'īn*, 419.

⁷⁰ E.g. *Tafsīr*, vol.2, pt.3:65, vol.4, pt.7:76, vol.5, pt.9:148-9; *Ma'ālīm*, 126-7; "Masā'il," 382-3.

5. Repentance (Tawba)

The third way to escape deserved punishment is repentance (tawba). All schools agreed that repentance was the only way for an infidel to avoid eternal punishment in hell-fire.⁷¹ They differed, however, as to the degree of necessity for a Muslim grave sinner (fāsiq) to repent.

The Mu'tazilites held that repentance is necessary for the grave sinner to free himself from eternal punishment and to gain salvation. If he fails to do so he will certainly be punished. The Imamites and Ash'arites did not consider repentance as indispensable for the final salvation of a believer. If the sinner fails to repent, God may either punish him temporarily or He may pardon him. On account of his faith, however, the grave sinner will eventually be rewarded eternally.⁷²

In regard to the elements of valid repentance, all schools agreed that it must consist of regret (nadām) for the sin committed and of the resolve ('azm) to abstain from it in the future.⁷³

Adhering to the traditional positions of their schools, al-Hillī and al-Rāzī disagreed with the Mu'tazilites on a number of details.

With regard to the effectiveness of repentance, the Mu'tazilite school of Basra affirmed that if man repents the punishment for his sin lapses automatically. They argued that

71 Al-Rāzī, Tafsiṭ, vol.3, pt.5 142; vol.4, pt.7:137; Gardet, Dieu, 311.

72 See al-Murtadā, "Usūl," 81-2; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 163.

73 Mitham al-Bahrānī, 168, al-Hillī, Nahj al-Mujtāhidin, 430, Mānakdim, 791; al-Rāzī, Tafsiṭ, vol.4, pt.8 219, vol.5, pt.10 3, vol.8, pt.16:180-1. Ibn al-Malāhimī, on the other hand, maintained that repentance consists only of regret while the resolve for the future is neither a part nor a condition for its validity. If someone has the motives for regret these motives will induce him to abstain from the sin in the future. Thus, a separate resolve for the future is superfluous. (See Fā'iḡ, 209rff).

if a sinner regrets his sin in a valid manner and is determined not to repeat it, it would be evil that he should still deserve punishment for it. Thus, God is obliged to cancel punishment for a sin for which the sinner is penitent.⁷⁴ They further argued that if the remission of sins upon repentance were not incumbent upon God, it would be evil on His part to put a grave sinner (fāsiq) under moral obligation since he has no means left to him to gain reward.⁷⁵

The school of Baghdad agreed that the deserved punishment will lapse if the sinner repents. This, however, does not occur because of the act of repentance itself but it is rather due to God's generosity (tafaddul) by which He accepts the repentance and cancels the just punishment.⁷⁶

Like the school of Baghdad, the Imamites rejected the Basran doctrine that God is obliged to remit sins on repentance and held that God does so only out of generosity (tafaddul).⁷⁷ Al-Hillī backed their doctrine:

Does the cancellation of punishment upon repentance follow necessarily or is it due to generosity? The Mu'tazilites hold the first position, while the Murji'ites and a group of people (jamā'a) maintain the second opinion. And this [i.e. the second opinion] is the more likely (al-aqrab). Our proof is that if the cancellation were necessary this would be due either to the obligation to accept it [i.e. the repentance] or to the increase of reward through it. Both sections are false. As for the first section, it would necessarily follow that if someone did the greatest harm to another person and then apologized to him, the injured party would be obliged to accept his apologies. The conclusion is false by consensus and so is the premise. As for the second section, [this is false] because of what has previously been said about the falseness of [the principle of] mutual cancellation (taḥābut).⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:337ff, Mānakdīm, 790-1, Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iḳ, 214v.

⁷⁵ Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:339ff; Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iḳ, 213v-214r; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.10:2; vol.8, pt.15:190.

⁷⁶ Mānakdīm, 790.

⁷⁷ Khulāṣat al-nazar, 53v; Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 124-5; idem, Tahid, 271; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 168.

⁷⁸ Nahj al-mustashhidin, 431; see also Ma'ārīj, 130r; Tasliḳ, 80r. In the manuscript of his Manāḥij (105r),

The latter argument of al-Ḥillī is out of place since the Muṭtazilites did not hold that the principle of mutual cancellation is involved in the remission of sins upon repentance.⁷⁹ His first argument, however, directly counters the common Muṭtazilite explanation of why God is obliged to accept man's repentance. The Basrans in fact asserted that an apology (istidhār) made in a proper way must inevitably result in a state where it would be evil to continue to blame the offender.⁸⁰

Both arguments of al-Ḥillī have been traditionally employed by Imamite⁸¹ and Ashʿarite scholars⁸² to refute the Muṭtazilite position. Some writers even claimed, either by mistake or in order to buttress their argument, that the Muṭtazilites based their position on the principle of mutual cancellation (tahābut).⁸³

Al-Rāzī,⁸⁴ following the Ashʿarite tradition, affirmed that God is not obliged to cancel the just punishment of a repentant sinner and He will do so only because of His promise.⁸⁵ The argument of the Ashʿarites was based on their dogma that nothing is incumbent upon God since He as the ruler of the universe is not subject to any obligation. Moreover, like the Imamites they rejected the principal Muṭtazilite argument that a proper apology (istidhār) must be accepted.⁸⁶

al-Ḥillī appears to back the Muṭtazilite rather than the Marjʿite position. Since this is highly unlikely, it may be presumed that the text is corrupt.

⁷⁹ Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fāʾiq, 214v.

⁸⁰ ʿAld al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14 112ff, 319, 337.

⁸¹ Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 125; idem, Tamhīd, 272; Khulāṣat al-nazar, 53v.

⁸² Al-Mutawallī, 60-1.

⁸³ For a Shiʿite example, see Khulāṣat al-nazar, 53v.

⁸⁴ Tafsīr, v.1.2, pt.3 23, vol.5, pt.10 2-3; vol.16, pt.31:175; Maʿālīm, 131.

⁸⁵ For the general Ashʿarite position, see al-Mutawallī, 60-1, Ibn Fūrak, 166; al-Bardawī, 227; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 403-4, al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.5:143, 198; vol.5, pt.10 3; vol.8, pt.15:15, 190, 225; Ibn Ḥazm, 4:107; also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.

⁸⁶ Al-Mutawallī, 61, al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 403.

Al Rāzī put forward a further argument basing it on the Ash'arite doctrine that all acts of man are created by God. This being so, it would be meaningless to say that repentance, which is an act of God, obliges Him to perform another act, that is to accept it. He states:

Man's capability in relation to repentance and failure to repent is either equal or it is not. If it is equal, repentance will not preponderate over failure to repent without a preponderator (murajjih). If this preponderator occurred without a producer it would lead to the denial of the Creator. If it were produced by man, the [former] division would recur. If it is produced by God, man proceeds to repentance by God's help and strengthening. Thus, this repentance is an act of kindness from God to man. An act of kindness of the Lord to His subject does not make it incumbent upon Him [i.e. the Lord] to perform a further act of kindness to him. Thus, the occurrence of repentance in man does not make it obligatory for God to accept it. If man's capability were not suited for failure [to repent] and for the act [of it], it would even more necessarily lead to compulsion (jabr). In this case the assertion that it is obligatory [for God] to accept [repentance] is even more obviously false and wrong.⁸⁷

The opinion that repentance is created by God is in conflict with the view of al-Hillī for whom, as a Mu'tazilite, repentance is an act of man only.⁸⁸

There was minor disagreement among the theologians whether, and on what grounds, repentance is incumbent upon man for all his sins. Abū 'Alī is reported to have held that a sinner is always, by virtue of reason and scriptural evidence, obliged to repent for major and minor sins.⁸⁹ Abū Hāshim, on the other hand, considered repentance as obligatory only for the grave sinner (ṣāhib al-kabīra). In respect to minor sins, he denied that repentance is

⁸⁷ Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.10:3; see also *ibid.*, vol.2, pt.3:22; vol.4, pt.8:239, vol.8, pt.16:180 l; Ma'ālīm, 130. For the general Ash'arite position that repentance is created by God, see al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.5, pt.10:69; vol.4, pt.8:239.

⁸⁸ For the general Mu'tazilite position, see *ibid.*, vol.5, pt.10:69.

⁸⁹ Mānakdīm, 789; 'Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:393; Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iḡ, 213r.

rationally obligatory⁹⁰ and held that scriptural authority also does not definitely indicate this obligation.⁹¹ He compared repentance for a minor sin with a supererogatory act (*ināfila*) which is not obligatory in itself. It is, however, good to perform it since it helps man to perform his duties or, in this case, to repent for his major sins. ⁹²Abd al-Jabbār argued that since man is unable to distinguish between major and minor sins, he is in fact obliged to repent for all of his sins.⁹² Ibn al-Malāḥimī adhered to the position of Abū ⁹³Alī affirming that repentance is equally obligatory for every sin. He argued that repentance is due because of the evil of a certain sin. The characteristic of evil, however, applies to every act of disobedience, regardless of whether it constitutes a minor or a major sin.⁹³

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī maintained that man's obligation to repent for his sins equally applies to every sin.⁹⁴ They differed, however, as to why man is obliged to repent.

Al-Ḥillī argued for man's obligation to repent principally with rational arguments which were also employed by the Muṭazilites.⁹⁵ In his commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-ʿAqā'id* he elaborates the arguments of the latter

The author [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī] argued for the obligation to repent with two points. First, it [i.e. repentance] repels harm, namely the punishment or the fear [of it], and the repulsion of harm is obligatory. Secondly, we definitely know the obligation to repent of doing evil or of the failure to do what is obligatory. When you recognize this, we say that it [i.e. repentance] is obligatory with regard to every offence since it is obligatory for an act of disobedience because of

⁹⁰Mānakdīm, 789; ⁹¹Abd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 14:394, Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iqa*, 212v-213r, also al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol 2, pt.3:22-3.

⁹²Abd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 14:394. See, in contrast, Mānakdīm, 789, where Abū Nāshim is reported to have held that repentance for minor sins is obligatory because of scriptural evidence.

⁹³Abd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 14:393.

⁹⁴Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iqa*, 213r.

⁹⁵Al-Ḥillī, *Manāḥij*, 105r; al-Rāzī, *Ma'ālim*, 131.

⁹⁶E.g. Mānakdīm, 789.

its being an act of disobedience, and with regard to failure to do something obligatory because of its being such. This applies in general to every offence and [to every] failure to do that which is obligatory.⁹⁶

Al-Rāzī referred only to scriptural evidence.⁹⁷ In this he was in agreement with the Ash'arite tradition.⁹⁸

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī agreed in rejecting the position of Abū Hāshim that it is impossible to repent of some sins while still carrying on with others when the penitent is aware of the evil nature of the acts with which he is persisting. Abū Hāshim is reported to have argued⁹⁹ that man repents because of the evil nature of the major sin in question. Since the characteristic of evil is shared by all major sins it would be inadmissible that one repents only of some major sins because of their evil while carrying on with others which are of the same gravity. With this position, which was also adopted by 'Abd al Jabbār,¹⁰⁰ Abū Hāshim disagreed with Abu 'Alī who admitted the possibility of repenting of some sins while carrying on with others.¹⁰¹ The only condition Abū 'Alī made was that the sin repented and that which was continued must not be of the same kind (ḡinn). It would, therefore, be impossible to repent of drinking wine from one pot while continuing to drink it from another, whereas it would be possible to repent of drinking wine while at the same time carrying on with adultery.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ Kashf al-murād, 331, see also Nahj al-mustarahidīn, 430-1. In his Manāḥil (105r), al-Ḥillī, too, refers to scriptural evidence.

⁹⁷ Ma'ālīm, 131 (referring to Qur'an LXVI:8).

⁹⁸ E.g. al-Mutawallī, 60 (referring to Qur'an XXIV:31); he also refers to consensus (ijmā'); al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 404; he refers only to consensus.

⁹⁹ Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 210v; Mānakdīm, 794-5, also Ibn Ḥazm, 5:69.

¹⁰⁰ Mānakdīm, 794.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 794-5; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 210v.

¹⁰² Mānakdīm, 794 5; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 210v.

Al-Ḥillī agreed with Abū Hāshim that penitence is only valid when it is done because of the evil nature (qubḥ) of the offence but he distinguished between general evil shared by all sins and specific evil which applies only to some. On this basis, he rejected Abū Hāshim's conclusion. He summarizes the dispute:

Is it possible to repent only of some evil?

Abū ^CAlī allowed this and claimed consensus for his position. Abū Hāshim denied it... Abū Hāshim's argument is that evil is avoided [reading yatraku for turika] only because of its evil nature. The avoidance of everything which shares its cause is then obligatory. Just as [when] ^Cor one says "I do not eat this pomegranate because of its sourness," it follows necessarily that he does not eat any sour pomegranates. Abū ^CAlī argued that it is possible by consensus to do [reading ityān for ithbāt] some obligatory thing to the exclusion of another, because [if] a person fasts but does not pray his fasting is valid. The clarification of the condition is that just as it is necessary to repent of anything evil because of its evil nature it is likewise necessary to do what is obligatory because of its obligatory nature. If, from the fact that evil matters share their cause it follows that repentance of some only is impossible, then since obligatory matters also share their cause it must follow that [to perform only] some of them is invalid. Abū Hāshim replied that there is a difference in the view of rational men between doing and failure to do something. The one who fails [to eat] the pomegranate because of its sourness avoids [reading] a.s. [pomegranates], while the one who eats it because of its sourness will not eat [reading akīlao for āk] all of them. This example is clear, because what prevents the eating in the case of failure to eat is the sourness and because of that it applies to all cases, while in the case of acting [i.e. eating] it is not the sourness alone which entails the act but [that sourness] together with [other] evils. This, it does not apply to all cases.

Now that Abū Hāshim's argument is cogent (lāzim) and that one cannot escape it except by maintaining that repentance is obligatory for anything evil because of its evil nature [in general] and because of the [particular] aspect of its evil. There is no doubt that evils are not alike in the [specific] aspects of their nature even if they are alike in their [general] evil character.¹⁰¹

101 ³Manāḥij, 105r.

Al-Ḥillī's discussion appears to be based directly on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's argument in the Fā'iq.¹⁰⁴ The latter affirmed in principle the correctness of Abū Hāshim's position when arguing that the repentant sinner must abstain from all sins for which the motive for abstention is the same as for the sin actually repented. However, he goes on to explain that this applies only if there is no difference in any aspect of these sins. Moreover, even if the motives for abstention from some sins are the same there may in some cases be additional deterrents (sawārif) which are missing in others. On this basis, Ibn al-Malāḥimī concluded that repentance for only some sins is permissible while at the same time upholding the principle that repentance is obligatory in general because of the evil nature of every sin. Against Abū Hāshim's position as reported by al-Ḥillī, Ibn al-Malāḥimī also maintained that abstention and action are in fact comparable with respect to their lack of general application. The motives for evil do not apply equally to all sins but depend mainly on man's individual longing (shahwa) and pleasure (ladhdha) and the same is true of the deterrents which drive him to repent of certain sins more strongly than of others.¹⁰⁵

Al-Razī also rejected Abū Hāshim's position¹⁰⁶ in agreement with Ash'arite tradition.¹⁰⁷ The argument he employed to refute Abū Hāshim's view seems likewise to be based directly on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's Fā'iq.¹⁰⁸ He states.

Most [theologians] maintain that repentance of some sins while persisting with others is valid. Abū Hāshim held that it is not valid. The proof of the former is that a Jew if he extorts a habba [i.e. 1/60 of a dīnār] and then repents of Judaism while persisting with the extortion of the habba, then people unanimously agree that this repentance is valid. The proof of Abū Hāshim is that if he repents for that evil [act] for its pure evil it is necessary that he repents for all evils. If he repents for it for a purpose other than its pure evil, his repentance is not valid. The answer [to this] is: Why is it not possible that he repents

104 Fā'iq, 211r-v.

105 Ibid., 211v.

106 Ma'ālīm, 131-2.

107 Al-Mutawallī, 61, al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 405ff.

108 Fā'iq, 211v.

for that evil because it is that [particular] evil, just as a man may have appetite for a [specific] food not because of the general [characteristic] of its being food but because it is that [specific] food?¹⁰⁹

Al-Ḥillī was asked by his disciple Muḥanna' b. S. nān¹¹⁰ whether the recurrence of a sin after repentance nullifies the validity of this repentance. Al-Ḥillī denied this in principle arguing that a valid repentance cannot be nullified under any circumstances. He states:¹¹¹

Repentance cancels all acts of disobedience which have preceded it. If he [i.e. the repentant sinner] returns to the act of disobedience that repentance is not annulled, nor do these previous acts return after they were cancelled by repentance.

It is likely that al-Ḥillī would apply this view to the related question whether repentance has to be renewed whenever the penitent remembers the sin of which he had repented. Al-Ḥillī's following discussion of the different positions seems again to be directly based on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's account in the Fā'iḳ:¹¹²

People disagreed over the act of disobedience: if a person repents of it and remembers it later, is [renewed] repentance for it obligatory [reading tajīb for ṣahḥa]? Abu Ḥāshim said that it is not obligatory while the others made this obligatory. Abū Ḥāshim argued that the person had performed what is obligatory. Thus, any restriction on it is void. The others argued that if the person remembers it, and if he then finds in himself the continuation of it, [he is then required to repent]. And this is possible only by a renewal [reading ḥi-tajdid for ṭa-dī] of his repentance. Thus, its renewal is obligatory. If he does not find [reading ṭajīb for ṣahḥa] in himself this continuation, it [still] is obligatory to renew the repentance because the repentant sinner does not know whether the punishment has been nullified by it. There is some weakness in this.¹¹³

109 Maḥālim, 131-2.

110 Al-Ḥillī, Ajwiba, 29.

111 Ibid.

112 Fā'iḳ, 213v.

113 Manāhil, 105r.

It is not entirely clear from the text whether al-Ḥillī considered the whole position of the opponents of Abū Ḥāshim weak or if this applies only to the second argument put forward by this group.¹¹⁴ Al-Ḥillī's answer in the Alwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya, which shows that he maintains the absolute effectiveness of repentance, suggests that he agreed with Abū Ḥāshim.

The argument of continuation, which backs the position that the renewal of repentance is obligatory, had been put forward by Ibn al-Malāḥimī.¹¹⁵ With this, he seems to have agreed with Abū 'Alī who likewise maintained that the renewal of the repentance is obligatory.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴See also Kashf al-murād, 335 6, where al-Ḥillī merely reports the different positions without expressing any opinion of his own.

¹¹⁵Fā'iḳ, 213r.

¹¹⁶Al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, 335.

CONCLUSION

The impact of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī upon al-Ḥillī's theological views was formative and in all issues where they disagreed with the Bahshamiyya, al-Ḥillī followed them closely.

In the realm of justice, he adopted their view that a capable agent cannot commit an act without a motive and he therefore repudiated the Bahshamiyya tenet which held that simple actions can be performed by a capable agent without a motive. Having applied this mechanism of the occurrence of an act also to God, he further followed Ibn al-Malāḥimī's view that God is obliged to act for man's best interest in every respect, whenever He has the motive to do so. In respect to some minor points of disagreement regarding the issue of compensation, al-Ḥillī preferred the views of Ibn al-Malāḥimī to those of the Bahshamiyya.

In the question of divine attributes, he closely followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in rejecting the notion of states (ahwāl) as developed by the Bahshamiyya, upholding only the notion of the characteristics (ahkām) of the divine attributes. With regard to God's will, al-Ḥillī again followed Abū l-Ḥusayn who repudiated the view of the Bahshamiyya that God wills through a temporal will which inheres in no substrate insisting instead that God's will must be identified with His motives to act. Regarding the question whether God's knowledge is subject to change following the change in temporal things, al-Ḥillī adhered to the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn and his school that this change is restricted to the connection (ta'alluq) between His essence and the object of His knowledge. He also followed their view that God is powerful over all possible acts, including the specific actions of man.

He also followed Abū l-Ḥusayn in rejecting the position of the Bahshamiyya which asserted the reality of essences and attributes of essence in the state of non-existence. In his view, the non-existent (ma^Cdūm) cannot be asserted to be a thing (shay'). On this basis, al-Ḥillī also adopted Ibn al-Malāḥimī's view on passing away (fanā') and restoration (ī^Cāda). Since things have no reality in the state of non-existence, God does not annihilate the body, except in a metaphoric sense when He disperses its parts. This dispersal occurs through a direct act on the part of God and restoration subsequently consists in the reassembling of these parts by God.

As for the issue of promise and threat, al-Ḥillī held on to the specific Imamite position which traditionally differed from the Mu^Ctazilite view. On account of the Imamite concept of belief, he rejected the Mu^Ctazilite notion of the intermediate position and eternal punishment of the grave sinner. He adhered to the Imamite doctrine of intercession (shafā^Ca) and the possibility of divine forgiveness (ʿafw) for a grave sinner. Yet in regard to the doctrine of repentance, of which at least some elements were shared by Mu^Ctazilites and Imamites, al-Ḥillī preferred the opinion of Ibn al-Malāḥimī to those of Abū Hāshim whenever his Imamite perspective was not in basic conflict with the Mu^Ctazilite view.

Al-Ḥillī also followed Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers whenever they disagreed with the Bahshamiyya in regard to natural philosophy. He agreed with the former in his rejection of the notion of entitative determinants¹ entailing states. While the Bahshamiyya, for instance, defined kawn as the entitative determinant which causes an atom to be in a certain position,¹ al-Ḥillī explained kawn simply as the occurrence of the atom in a position.² This difference of definition extended also to the four kinds of kawn, movement

¹Frank, Beings, 98.

²Manāḥij, 82v, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 69. For the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī, see Ibn al-Malahimī, Mu^Ctamad, 86ff.

(ḥaraka), rest (sukun), contiguity (ijtimaʿ) and separation (iftirāq).³ He further denied the possibility that an accident may subsist outside a substrate (la fī mahall).⁴ and the possibility that one accident may subsist in two substrates.⁵ Among the former category of accidents, the Bahshamiyya counted God's will, His disapproval and annihilation. In the latter category, they classified the accident of composition (taʿlīf) which inheres in two adjacent atoms. By this inherence it causes them to be conjoined as a single thing.⁶

Apart from this formative impact of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī, the theology of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī had a significant influence on al-Ḥillī's theology. Such influence can be detected most often in technical details in the various fields where al-Rāzī developed original views, such as his proofs of the impeccability of the prophets, or his proofs for the veracity of the claimant of the prophetic office and other details. Al-Rāzī's views, however, were especially influential in shaping al-Ḥillī's thinking wherever parallels between al-Rāzī's positions and the positions of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī existed.

It has been seen that al-Rāzī's theology developed under the major influence of the doctrine of Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers. Owing to the influence of philosophy on his thought, al-Rāzī further developed these views through freely mixing theological concepts with philosophical notions and terminology. This fusion was facilitated by the fact that quite a few of Abū l-Ḥusayn's views had affinities with philosophical views. Al-Rāzī's amalgamation of philosophical and theological concepts had a distinct impact on al-Ḥillī's thought. Some examples follow.

³ Manāḥij, 83r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 69-70. For the view of the Bahshamiyya, see Frank, Beings, 98-9.

⁴ Manāḥij, 88v, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 91. For the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, see Ibn al-Maḥāzī, Muʿtamad, 133 4.

⁵ Manāḥij, 88v, Nihāyat al-marām, 100r. For the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, see Ibn al-Maḥāzī, Muʿtamad, 133 4.

⁶ Frank, Beings, 104.

Al-Rāzī agreed with Abū l-Ḥusayn that will is additional to the motive for an action in the visible world. He did not, however, use Abū l-Ḥusayn's terminology but rather drew upon that of the philosophers in stating that man's motive generates a longing (*shawq/mayī*) which is his will (*irāda*). Al-Ḥillī adopted this modified terminology.

When dealing with the connection (*ta'alluq*) between God's essence and the objects of His attributes, al-Rāzī substituted the philosophical terms of relation (*idāfa/ nisba*) for the theological term connection, without, however, modifying the meaning of the latter term as used by the theologians. Al-Rāzī's terminology is evident in al-Ḥillī's writings.

Al-Rāzī, moreover, also adopted a number of philosophical notions which had no direct parallel in the thought of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baḡrī. Here, he was also followed by al-Ḥillī. Al-Rāzī adopted, for instance, the philosophical notion of contingency. This led to a modified terminology in a wide range of issues which equally had direct parallels in al-Ḥillī's writings. On this basis, al-Rāzī, followed by al-Ḥillī, allowed that God may equally undo or create. This view, which led to direct disagreement with those earlier theologians who denied that God may undo something through a direct act, was also shared by al-Ḥillī. Regarding the passing away of the body, al-Rāzī and al-Ḥillī therefore maintained that God may simply undo it. This possibility had been rejected by earlier theologians who were forced to find a different explanation of the way in which God causes the body to pass away.

Yet, despite the impact of al-Rāzī's concepts and terminology on al-Ḥillī's theology in a large number of details, the latter strictly repudiated al-Rāzī's Ash'arite views whenever they were in conflict with his Mu'tazilite principles.

In sum, except for the issue of God's promise and threat to mankind where al-Ḥillī followed the Shi'ite tradition which differed here from the doctrine of the Mu'tazilites, his theology can be said to be primarily based on the

doctrine of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and to be secondarily influenced by the formulations of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī whenever these did not disagree with his basic theological views.

An exception was his treatment of essence (*maḥiyya*) and existence (*wujūd*) where al-Ḥillī, independently from these two major influences on his thought, closely followed the Avicennan tradition.

These conclusions apply to al-Ḥillī's doctrine as set forth in his theological works. Since he was, however, equally well-trained in philosophy and wrote a number of philosophical works, it must be asked to what extent his theological works are representative of his personal convictions, and whether he held different views in his philosophical works. This question is of special interest since al-Ḥillī's teacher, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, was a philosopher rather than a theologian although he did write a few theological treatises in which he was, like al-Ḥillī, influenced by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's and al-Farī's views. From Naṣīr al-Dīn's autobiographical report,⁷ it is known that he began with the study of traditional religious sciences and theology but soon became dissatisfied with the views and methods of the *kalam* theologians who, in his view, did not sincerely seek the truth. He then turned to the teaching of the philosophers and found that they sought the truth on the basis of reason alone without blindly following any authority. His deep commitment to the views of the philosophers is evident especially in his refutation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's critical commentaries on the works of Ibn Sīnā.⁸ Although Naṣīr al-Dīn joined for some time the

⁷ *Majmūʿa-yi rasā'il al-Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn* (edited by Mudarris Ridawī. Tehran, 1335sh), 36ff.

⁸ These are especially his commentary on al-Rāzī's *Sharḥ al-ishārāt*, and his *Talkhīs al-muḥaṣṣal*.

Ismā'īlīs he ultimately proved to be a true philosopher.⁹ His few concise theological treatises, therefore, cannot be considered as representative of his thought.

There are a number of safe indications that al-Ḥillī, in contrast to Naṣīr al-Dīn, was primarily a theologian who repudiated philosophical doctrine in both his theological and philosophical works whenever it disagreed with his theological views.

From his few extant works on philosophy, only two are relevant for an evaluation of the present question, the Asrār al-khafiyya, presumably written before 680/1281, and his commentary on al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī's Hikmat al-'ayn, the Idāh al-maqāsid fī sharḥ hikmat al-'ayn. In the third part of the Asrār which treats with theology, al-Ḥillī is severely critical of philosophical notions whenever they disagree with his theological views. This impression is supported by occasional remarks in the Idāh where he states his criticism of al-Kātibī's view and usually refers the reader to more extensive discussions in his Asrār. In these two works he radically rejected the philosophical notion of emanation.¹⁰ God is not a necessitating cause (mūlīh) from whom an effect inevitably emanates because of His self-reflection; rather, He is a choosing agent who acts whenever He has the motive to do so.¹¹ Thus al-Ḥillī repudiated the philosophical view that God does not act for a purpose other than His self-reflection.¹² He also held the philosophical view that God's knowledge does not include particulars to be false.¹³ He attacked the philosophical view that since God and His

⁹ Evidence for this can be found in his Maṣāriḥ al-misāriḥ which is a refutation of the Kitāb al-musārā'a by al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) in which he defends Ibn Sīnā's positions against the objections of al-Shahrastānī who argued from an Ismā'īlī point of view. For this work, which he evidently wrote after he left the Ismā'īlīs, see Madelung, "Streitschrift," 250-259, esp. 258-9.

¹⁰ Asrār, 216r, 219r; Idāh al-maqāsid, 113-4, 224.

¹¹ Asrār, 210r, Idāh al-maqāsid, 83, 234, also Ajwiba, 152.

¹² Asrār, 215v; Ajwiba, 152.

¹³ Asrār, 225r-v.

knowledge of the best order of things, which necessitates their emanation from Him, are eternal, and since change is inadmissible in Him, the world is a necessary concomitant of God and as such co-eternal with Him.¹⁴ He equally rejected the philosophers' view that the world cannot pass away into non-existence since God, who is the primary cause of the world, does not vanish.¹⁵ Having rejected the notion of emanation, al-Hillī maintained that God is capable of creating an infinite number of things. He does so through a direct act of creation.¹⁶ He further rejected the philosophical notion of divine attributes and defended the theological view that God's attributes have a reality in themselves. They are existential yet they have no separate existence except in the mind.¹⁷

A further indication that al-Hillī considered himself primarily as theologian may be the fact that most of his remaining philosophical writings are lost. It is likely that he wrote them as teaching books for his students. They were therefore of little originality and not considered worth copying by later students and scholars.

In his Ajwibat al-maṣa'īl al-muḥanna'iyya, which contain his answers to questions by his student Muḥanna' b. Sinan covering a wide range of topics, al-Hillī clearly stated that he considered the upholders of the eternity of the world as infidels (kāfirūn).¹⁸ Since this collection of answers was written at a late stage of al-Hillī's life (between 719/1319-20 and 720/1320) and was not meant to be a specifically theological book, this further suggests that even during later life he firmly held on to his basic theological position.

This overall impression is corroborated by a comparison of al-Hillī's theological works with the theological treatises by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. It appears that

¹⁴ Asrār, 212v, Idāh al-maqāṣid, 231-3.

¹⁵ Ibid., 83.

¹⁶ Ibid., 113-4; 222; Asrār, 216r.

¹⁷ Ibid., 210r.

¹⁸ Ajwiba, 88-9.

al-Ḥillī displayed in his kalām works a quite conservative attitude even in regard to questions which did not directly touch theological issues and in which Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī fully adopted the philosophical position. Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, left them either undecided, or tended to follow the traditional positions of the theologians.

Naṣīr al-Dīn adhered in his theological writings to the philosophical notion of man consisting of a soul (*nafs*) which is attached to a body (*badan*).¹⁹ Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, seems to have been undecided between the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who defined man as consisting of basic parts (*ajzā' aṣliyya*) and the position originating with the philosophers. Although in most of his theological and philosophical works he put forward arguments against the concept of the existence of a soul in addition to these basic parts,²⁰ he usually hesitated to reject it outright. In his *Maḥārīj*, he concludes his discussion by stating that both positions, that of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and that of the philosophers, are strong.²¹ He expresses similar views in his *Asrār*.²² In his *Tasīk*, he states that although the proofs for the existence of the soul must be rejected, equally there are no proofs for the impossibility of its existence. Therefore it must be considered as possible.²³ An indication that he tended rather to the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī is found in his discussion on passing away and restoration. Holding on to the view that man consists of basic parts without a soul attached, he maintains that God does not annihilate the body but only disperses its parts. Only in his *Maḥārīj*, he explains passing away and restoration on the assumption that man consists of body and soul. In this case, the body only would pass away into non-existence. When God wished to restore man, another body

¹⁹ *Tajrīd*, 138ff; *Fuṣūl*, 21-2; see also al-Miqdād, 389.

²⁰ *Asrār*, 154rff; *Maḥārīj*, 128r; *Nahj al-mustarhidīn*, 387; *Tasīk*, 45v.

²¹ *Maḥārīj*, 128r. In his *Manāḥij* (89r-v), he offers objections to both without indicating his preference, he concludes, however, saying that both views are very close to the truth.

²² *Asrār*, 153r-v.

²³ *Tasīk*, 46r-v.

would be attached to the soul which did not pass away. Al-Hillī offered this explanation, however, on the theoretical assumption that man consists of body and soul without expressing his approval of this view. In some of his refutations of the philosophers' objections to the theological dogma of the annihilation of the world and restoration of the human body, he expressly denied that man consists of a soul and a body.²⁴

In regard to atomism al-Hillī preferred in most of his theological works the theological concepts of jawhar and ʿarāḍ, defining the former as an atom occupying space (mutahayyiz) and the latter as an accident inhering in a body occupying space (ḥāl fī l-mutahayyiz).²⁵ He also favoured the theological definition of a body (jism) as a compound of atoms.²⁶ He does, however, not take sides in the discussion of the theologians as to how many atoms constitute a body.²⁷ In his philosophical works he rather adopted the philosophical concepts of jawhar and ʿarāḍ, defining jawhar as substance, i.e. that which does not exist in a subject (mawjūd la fī mawḍūʿ), and ʿarāḍ as that which exists in a subject (mawjūd fī mawḍūʿ).²⁸ He, therefore, differed from Naṣīr

²⁴ Ibid., 77v.

²⁵ Maʿārīj, 110r; Manāḥij, 80v; Naḥj al-mustarshidīn, 25. In his Taslīk (9v-10v), he only reports the positions of the theologians and the philosophers without indicating his own position.

²⁶ Maʿārīj, 120r; Manāḥij, 81r; Naḥj al-mustarshidīn, 29, Taslīk, 12r.

²⁷ Manāḥij, 80v; Naḥj al-mustarshidīn, 29.

²⁸ Anṣār, 175v; Kashf al-khafa', 16r, 58r. The philosophical views on accidents had nevertheless some influence on al-Hillī; this can be found in both his theological and philosophical works. Examples of this influence are his view that an accident may subsist in an accident (ʿiyyān al-ʿarāḍ fī l-ʿarāḍ) which was unanimously rejected by the theologians with the exception of the early Muʿtazilite Muʿammār b. ʿAbd al Sulamī (d. 215/830), but which was generally accepted among the philosophers. (Manāḥij, 88v, Naḥj al-mustarshidīn, 130, Maʿārīj, 115v, for the view of the Bahshamiyya, Ibn al-Mattawayh, Tadhkirah, 274-5, for the position of the philosophers, Ibn Sīnā, Dhayr al-ḥayāt, 158). Having accepted this principle, al-Hillī was able to define a letter (ḥarf) like the philosophers as an accident which subsists in the accident of voice (ṣawṭ). (Manāḥij, 84r, Naḥj al-mustarshidīn, 85) while the earlier theologians defined a

al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who adopted the philosophical concepts of jawhar and ʿarāḍ both in his philosophical and theological writings.²⁹

The different approaches of al-Ḥillī and Naṣīr al-Dīn are also apparent in regard to the question of whether God may be said to experience pure intellectual pleasure. The theologians traditionally denied that God could be described as experiencing either pain (alam) or pleasure (ladhdha), arguing that this is possible only for corporeal beings. The philosophers, in contrast, asserted that God does experience a kind of pure intellectual pleasure. They argued that, since He perceives through self-reflection the most perfect being, that is His own essence, He experiences delight.³⁰ While Naṣīr al-Dīn admitted this possibility in his Tajrid, al-Ḥillī expressed doubts. The application of the expression "enjoying" (multaḍḥḍḥ) to God would only be justifiable if there were permission by revelation (idhn sharʿī).³¹

It seems, therefore, safe to conclude that whereas Naṣīr al-Dīn's importance was as a philosopher, al-Ḥillī was primarily a theologian who was only marginally influenced by philosophical concepts and terminology. As such, he displayed considerable conservatism in issues where he could have adopted the philosophical position without contradicting any of his theological views. Naṣīr al-Dīn

letter usually as a kind (jins) or part (juzʿ) of voice. (Ibn al-Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 362ff) In regard to the accident of colour (lawn), al-Ḥillī did not follow the Bahshamiyya that there are five simple pure kinds of colours, namely black, white, red, green and yellow. Rather he followed in his Nahj al-mustarshidīn (74-5) the position of the majority of the philosophers that the only real, pure colours are white and black while all other colours occur because of different mixtures of these two colours. In his Manāḥij (83v), he refrains from taking a position about this question. When he discussed the accident of pressure (ḥṭimād), he usually pointed out that it corresponded to the accident of inclination (mayl) in the usage of the philosophers. (Tasliḥ, 17r; Manāḥij, 84r).

²⁹ Tajrid, 100.

³⁰ Ibn Sīnā, Najāt, 281-2.

³¹ Kashf al-murād, 229, see also Asrār, 21iv, Manāḥij, 94v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 233.

al-Tūsī was therefore of greater importance than al-Hillī for the subsequent fusion of theology and philosophy in Imamite thought, which was moreover mixed with elements of the philosophy of illumination of al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190) and the Sufi thought developed by Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). The first major representative of this tendency was Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʾī (d. after 904/1499).³² At a later stage, a far-reaching substitution of philosophy for Islamic theology was achieved by ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Lāhijī (d. 1092/1661).³³ This current of thought, however, had only a limited impact upon the Shīʿism.³⁴ In the long run, traditional theology as represented by al-Hillī was more important.

³² See W. Madelung, "Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʾī's Synthesis of Kalām, Philosophy and Sufism," in *La signification du Bas Moyen Âge dans l'histoire et la culture du monde musulman. Actes du 8ème Congrès de l'Union européenne des arabisants et islamisants* (Aix-en-Provence, 1978), 147 ff. Also idem, "Sīqa," 367.

³³ Ibid., 367.

³⁴ Ibid., 367.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

RESEARCH REPORT

THE CHEMISTRY OF THE CARBON DIOXIDE SYSTEM

The following report was prepared by the members of the Division of the Physical Sciences, Department of Chemistry, University of Chicago, during the period from January 1, 1960, to December 31, 1960.

The report is divided into two parts. The first part, entitled "The Chemistry of the Carbon Dioxide System," is a review of the literature and a summary of the results of the research. The second part, entitled "The Chemistry of the Carbon Dioxide System," is a detailed account of the research.

The research was supported by the National Science Foundation, the Office of Naval Research, and the University of Chicago.

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